The United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) 1948-1965, with postscript on the impact on UNMOGIP of the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 by Dawson, Pauline
This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights and 
duplication or sale of all or part is not permitted, except that material may be 
duplicated by you for research, private study, criticism/review or educational 
purposes. Electronic or print copies are for your own personal, non-
commercial use and shall not be passed to any other individual. No quotation 
may be published without proper acknowledgement. For any other use, or to 
quote extensively from the work, permission must be obtained from the 
copyright holder/s. 
THE UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP 
IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN (UNMOGIP) 1948-1965, 
with a Postscript on the Impact on UNMOGIP 
of the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 
Pauline Dawson 
Thesis Submitted for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
1987 
i 
ABSTRACT 
In January 1949 the first UN Military Observers arrived in 
Kashmir to supervise a ceasefire between India and Pakistan, 
following hostilities arising from'Kashmir's disputed status 
after Independence. In-accepting the'resolutions of a UN 
Commission which had been despatched to the area, and by 
ratifying the Karachi Agreement of July 1949, India and 
Pakistan committed themselves to accepting the presence of 
Observers until the Dispute was resolved. 
This thesis gives an overall view of UNMOGIP. it 
describes the background to the Dispute and the emergence, 
organisation and modus operandi of the Mission. It attempts 
to analyse UNMOGIP's contribution to the maintenance of peace 
by highlighting the Mission's efforts at stabilizing the 
situation. Considerable mention is made of civilians who were 
the major cause of incidents. 
The thesis supports the view that for fifteen years 
UNMOGIP successfully assisted the parties in their desire for 
peace, but when this desire faltered a small group of Observers 
was unable to save the situation. Thus after five years of 
deteriorating relations between civilians and police along the 
Ceasefire Line, war again erupted for seventeen days in 
September 1965. The Observers had virtually to suspend 
operations until a further Ceasefire was called. Even then it 
was not until the Indian and Pakistan leaders reached a 
Political agreement in Tashkent in January 1966 that the 
Ceasefire truly held, and the withdrawal of forces was able to"' 
take place under the supervision of the Observers. 
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In 1972, after another war, the two parties agreed to 
solve their problems bi-laterally, and India maintained that 
UNMOGIP had no further function to perform. Unable to obtain 
Pakistan's or the UN's consent to the Mission's withdrawal, she 
withdrew her own co-operation. UNMOGIP has not since been 
able to operate on the Indian side although it remains in 
position. 
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PREFACE AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 
The initial-intention of this thesis was to make a study 
of India as both a major participant in United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations, and as host to two such operations - 
in particular the United Nations Military Observer Group in 
India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), since the United Nations 
India-Pakistan Observer Mission had already been covered in 
another thesis*. It seemed unlikely that there would be 
sufficient material available to sustain a complete thesis on 
UNMOGIP as very little indeed has been published about this 
Mission. The regular reportsýfrom the Chief Military Observer 
to the Secretary-General have always-been. on a strictly 
confidential basis. Indeed, although'a summary has been made 
at moments of-extreme crisis, it appears that the reports have 
only very rarely, - if atýall - been even so much'as privately 
circulated to Members-of, the Security Council-, -which holds 
ultimate responsibility for the Mission. - -I 
However, during the early days of-my-research, I was 
fortunate to have-, put, at my disposal all the correspondence in 
the United Nations Archives between the Chief Military Observer 
of UNMOGIP-and those responsible: for the Mission on a 
day-to-day basis in the UN Secretariat in New York, including 
these confidential reports. As a special privilege Iýwas also 
allowed to search a limited number of UNMOGIP's own files 
dating back to its inception, sixteen crates of which had only 
recently arrived from the Mission area, and had not yet been 
catalogued for the Archives. ' Since there was such a wealth of 
-I 
*Chauhdry, S. H. - United Nations India-Paki5tan 
Observation Mission, 1965-66 - Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, 
1979, Keele University. 
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material on the subject, material which had never before been 
seen by anyone not closely connected with the Mission, I 
decided to devote the whole of my thesis to UNMOGIP. 
What I have done is to try to place this operation within 
the wider context of United Nations peacekeeping, assessing the 
extent to which it reflects the general principles and purposes 
of that activity. It is generally assumed that peacekeeping 
rests on the impartiality of the peacekeepers and the consent 
and cooperation of the states which are-involved as parties, 
hosts and contributors. --It is also assumed that peacekeeping 
operations cannot make, a primary contribution to the 
maintenance of international'peace, -but may be able to play a 
valuable stabilizing role of a secondary kind - helping the 
parties in their desire-to maintain quiet. -Inýsurveying-the 
origin and work of UNMOGIP from-1949 to 1965 (with a postscript 
on its role during and after the 1971 war) I will be keeping 
these principles and purposes-very much in mind, My'aim is to 
see whether-UNMOGIP did indeed act in accordance with the 
principles which came to be seen as-integral to-peacekeeping 
and, if so, to-what extent; and'how'this helped it, to make a 
contribution towards preventing the situation in the disputed 
state of Jammu and Kashmir giving rise to war between India and 
Pakistan. 
As a background to the, thesis,, Part I- The Origin'of 
UNMOGIP - reviews the-development of United Nations 
Peacekeeping, the causes of the Kashmir Dispute between India 
and Pakistan, and the early involvement of the United Nations, 
leading to the emergence of UNMOGIP., ', Part II, an analysis of 
UNMOGIP's organisation and operation, -is derived from reports 
received from the Mission by the UN Secretariat in New York, -- 
particularly those of its Chief Military Observer, . 
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Major-General (latterly Lieutenant-General) R. H. Nimmo. 
General Nimmo held the office for just over fifteen years, from 
the end of 1950 until his death in January 1966, that is for 
the major part of the time covered by this thesis. The fact 
that, apart from a postscript on the impact of the 1971 war, 
the thesis ends at the time of the death of General Nimmo is, 
however, coincidental. His death occurred Just as the leaders 
of India and Pakistan were about to meet in Tashkent, an event 
which was a major watershed in the unfortunate history of the 
two parties' relations, and thus a fitting moment to end. 
Furthermore, only a small amount of material dating from after 
that period had reached the Archives at the time of my 
research. 
Part III on Attitudes to UNMOGIP is also taken mainly from 
reports from the Mission, but is interspersed with material 
from a variety of sources in order to place the events within 
the context of Indo-Pakistan relations in general. Part IV on 
the hostilities of 1965 and 1971 likewise draws on a variety of 
-sources, including General Nimmo's reports on the events 
immediately preceding the war of 1965, which were to some 
extent eventually made public. But it particularly draws on 
the extensive number of cables which passed between the Mission 
and New York from early 1965 until February 1966, when the 
situation stabilized with the withdrawal of forces to their 
peacetime positions, and again during and after the war of 
1971. 
The urgencyýengendered by times of, -war necessitated most 
of the communications between the Mission and Headquarters 
being by cable, whereas in quieter times a somewhat slower 
method sufficed. The correspondence dating from 1966 onwards 
was for the most part not available in the Archives, but 
xviii 
fortuitously the cables were. Thus, although it is not 
possible to detail the period between 1966 and 1971*, the war 
of 1971 and its consequences can be fairly well documented. 
It seems appropriate, therefore, to add this as a postscript 
since the outcome of the war had a dramatic impact on the 
operation of UNMOGIP, a fact which I was able to confirm when I 
visited the Mission in 1982. 
*It might reasonably be concluded, that UNMOGIP's , operations between 1966 and 1971 continued much as in the 
period from 1950 until the outbreak of war in 1965. 
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PART I- THE ORIGIN OF UNMOGIP 
CHAPTER ONE ý- UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 
EMERGENCE 
Collective Seýurity 
The United Nations, Organisation (UN), -was-conceived in 
London in 1941 as the successor to the League of Nations, which 
had failed in its primary, purpose of, preventing a second World 
War. On 1st January, 1942 in Washington the twenty-six states 
at war with Germany and-Japan expressed their faith, ýin the 
form of the United Nations Declaration, that in the long-term, 
and with the Great, Powers taking'the'lead, the common interest 
of states would enable the anarchy of international, relations 
to be controlled. ' The Charter of the United Nations, which 
was signed in 1945, laid down a code of behaviour by-which 
nations would work together to pliminate aggression and promote 
economic and social security. Its central aim, -for which one 
organ of the Organisation - the Security Council - was given 
primary responsibility, was-signified in. Article'l. ''This was 
"to maintain international, peace and-security, and to that end 
to take collective, measures, for the prevention, -and removal of 
threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of, 
aggression... "'. The right of self-defence in the'event of an 
armed attack was upheld, so"long as measures taken in'the, 
exercise of this right were-iMMediately reported to the, 
Security Council. I- 
The Council, -composed in--the first place of eleven states 
and subsequently fifteen, included five Permanent Members - 
China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the 
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United States of America. These were the five major powers in 
alliance at the time of its conception, and are still the only 
avowed nuclear powers, although after the Communist takeover in 
China that nation was actually represented by the Government on 
Taiwan until 1971. 
It was thus originally envisaged that the five Great 
Powers, in continuing harmony with each other and the rest of 
the world, would take enforcement action against any smaller 
state which committed an act of-aggression against any other. 
The unanimity of these Five was the-necessary condition for 
such Joint action. ýý 
However, the international scene after the Second World 
War was different from that which had been envisaged.. There 
were two major developments. Firstly,, -there-was an-open split 
between the Allies, coupled with a nuclear stalemate-. The 
onset of the Cold War, and the-division of the, world into two 
Superpower blocs gave rise to little hope for the kind of 
collective security that had been contemplated, and made any 
form of effective Joint action difficult to achieve. 
Secondly, a period of rapid decolonisation, a movement to which 
the UN itself, gave much impetus, resulted in a proliferation of 
new states, mainly small and underdeveloped, and led,, to-' 
international instability and local clashes, which became the 
source of most post-World War II conflicts seen, as befitting 
United Nations intervention. of, the UN grew almost 
identically in line with the increasing number of sovereign 
states arising from this period of decolonisation, and with it 
the difficulties in reaching a consensus of views on any matter 
brought before the Organisation. 1. $t. _-. 1 I .' 
The-Charter accepts, that membership of-the United Nations 
is composed of nation states whose sovereignty is paramount so 
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far as their domestic affairs are concerned, and specifically 
maintains that, nothing contained in the Charter authorises the 
UN to intervene in matters which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any state, or to require any Member to 
submit such matters to settlement under the Charter. It takes 
little accounti-however, of the fact that in this day and age 
many, if not most, internal conflicts have an international 
dimension, - and that it may be difficult-to distinguish between 
internal and interstate conflicts because of the tendency of 
some statesto foment or support insurgencies in others. 
Since it was never anticipated'that-the UN would take 
measures against any-of the five Great-Powers, the--UN, Charter 
never fully,. encompassed theýprinciple of-dollective'securitv. 
It was, nevertheless, - designedrtoýimplement collective security 
in respect., of-situations where none of'the Great Powers was 
directly-involved, -but evenýthat required, a degree of 
confidence and trust-between them that-was soon-found-to be 
lacking. - 
Instead of presenting-a united, front against aggression 
the Permanent Members of the Security Council were inclined to 
become-politically involvedýin, conflicts, and on different 
sides. '' The threat. of small brUshfire, wars thus escalating - 
into. a nuclear conflagrationbecame a, maJorconcern of the 
international community. - The concept of collective security 
was reduced to, an attempt at political action to contain such 
conflicts-rather thanýmilitary force, -to curb aggression., 4ý 
The Charter's Provisions for the Maintenance of Peace 
Differences between the, 'Five rose to the', surface even as 
preliminary discussions were taking place, and the Soviet 
Union, with little dissent from the others, -, insisted on, the 
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power of veto being included in the Charter. Each of the, five 
Permanent Members is therefore able to veto any resolution of 
the Council. This was a measure of realism reflecting the 
impossibility of taking enforcement action against a Great 
Power without risk of major war, but, it had the effect of 
making it possible for the UN-to act against an aggressor only 
if none of these Five was opposed to its: doing so. It was 
also looked upon by the newly-emerging states as an 
institutionalised means, of perpetuating the hegemonic 
relationship of the Great Powers towards-these smaller nations., 
At first the use of the veto-threatened to stultify any 
attempted action by the Security Council, but the Permanent 
Members soon adopted a procedure, not enshrined in the, Charter 
and first used by the Soviet-Union, which'allowed-for the, 
possibility of a middle way between voting for a resolution and 
vetoing it: abstention from voting was deemed not to ,, 4 
constitute a veto, but enabled a, Permanent Member to express a 
degree of dissent without obstructingýthe will of the majority 
on an issue of insufficient importance to its own vital 
interests'to warrant a veto. 
Any state, member or not, can submit an issue-to, the 
United Nations. In. addition the General,, Assembly - the organ 
of the Organisation consisting of representatives of all Member 
States - and the Secretary-General - an international civil 
servant in charge of the UN Secretariat--are'empowered to 
bring-to the attention of-, the Security Council any matter which 
may threaten the maintenance of peace. - If a majority of 
members including the-five Permanent Members-agree, the 
Security Council can investigate such a situation., 
Members of the Organisation agree to accept and-carry out 
decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the 
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Charter. Chapter Six, regarding the Pacific Settlement of 
Disputes, obligates parties to a dispute "likely to endanger 
the maintenance of international peace and security" to "seek a 
solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, 
arbitration, Judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies 
or arrangements, or other means of their own choice"'. ý The 
Security Council does not, in this instance, have the power to 
impose a decision but canýrecommend'the manner in or the-terms 
on which the dispute might be settled. The states involved in 
the dispute have then to agree before any action can be taken. 
This reflects the insistence of states to, hold on to their 
legal freedom until the last possible-moment. 11 
Under Chapter Seven, ýhoweverv the Council is provided with 
enforcement powers, if itýdetermines that there exists'a threat 
to the peace, a, breachýof theýpeacbf or an act of,, aggression. 
In such an event it may order the parties to the conflict and 
all member states to accept "provisional-measures" such as a 
ceasefire or an order prohibiting intervention by outside 
powers. As an alternative to the use of armed force, which is 
to be used only if all other measures prove inadequate, the 
Council is also empowered to call upon members to apply other 
sanctions, such as the severance, of diplomatic relations or 
economic measures. 
The Charter makes provision for Members "to make available 
to the Security Councili and in accordance with a special 
agreement or agreements, armed, forces, -assistance, and 
facilities, including rights ofýpassage, necessary for the 
purpose of maintaining international peace and security", and 
provides for a Military Staff Committee composed of the Chiefs 
of Staff of the Permanent Members to make the necessary 
arrangements. In April 1947 this Committee produced a report 
6 
which agreed that the five Permanent Members should provide the 
bulk of the armed forces, but members of the Committee were 
unable to agree, inter alia, on the size and locations of the 
forces and the balance of contributions. The degree of- 
political mistrust which lay, -behind such disagreements on 
details led to the Committee's admission of defeat in July 
1948. The Military Staff Committee continued to meet, but the 
military arrangements foreseen, in Chapter Seven never became, a 
reality, leaving the United Nations without the, necessary means 
of enforcement to promote its central aim. --Instead the 
Secretary-General and the General Assembly came to play more 
important roles in the realm of the maintenance of peace than 
was originally anticipated under the Charter. 
In 1948 Secretary-General Trygve Lie proposed a United, 
Nations Guard Force for duty with UN-missions,, the conduct of 
plebiscites under the supervision of the UN, and the - 
administration of truce,, terms. This idea finally, emerged in 
watered-down form as a UN Field Service of, unarmed 
international civil servants to assist UN field, operations in 
such activities as administration and the maintenance of 
communications equipment and, vehicleS4. . 
The lack of trust does not extend only to the Great 
Powers. Whilst there is universal condemnation of aggression 
in the abstract, when it comes down to individual acts, one 
state's aggression is another's legitimate use of force to 
defend vital national interests. Every state recognises that 
it might itself feel obliged one day to use force to defend its 
national interests, even at the cost of being considered to be 
indulging in an act of aggression by the weight of UN, opinion. 
Thus every state has reservations about offering the UN a 
competent means of enforcement. 
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Evolution of Observer Groups 
In these early years, while the use of military personnel 
on a large scale and under the exact terms of the Charter was 
being discussed with diminishing prospect of agreement, methods 
of using them productively on a far smaller scale evolved 
almost by accident. In Greece in 1947 the military attaches 
of the members of the United Nations Special Committee on the 
Balkans proved themselves invaluable as an observer group in 
checking on infiltration into Greece from her northern 
neighbours'. As a result, UN missions sent to the Middle East 
and Kashmir in 1948 were formally offered the aid of Military 
I 
Observers. 
The first truce agreements in the Palestine war in July 
1948 were supervised by Military Observers working under the' 
United Nations Mediator and a Chief of Staff. This team 
developed into the United Nations Truce Supervision 
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Organization (UNTSO) after the armistice agreements between 
Israel and her Arab neighbours were concluded in the period 
between February and July 1949. Similarly, and further to the 
suggestion in the Security Council resolution by which it was 
initiated in 19481, the United Nations Commission f or India 
and Pakistan requested a group of Observers to supervise the 
ceasefire which came into effect in Kashmir on 1st January, 
1949. This group subsequently became the United Nations 
Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). Thus 
Observer Groups came into being soon after the United Nations 
itself, and long before the term "peacekeeping" came into 
vogue, although they did ultimately come to be embraced by the 
term. 
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Korea and the birth of non-alignment 
The only true enforcement action taken in the name of the 
United Nations occurred when South Korea was invaded by North 
Korea in 1950, at a time when the Soviet Union could not veto 
the proposed action because she was boycotting the Security 
Council in protest against Communist China's exclusion from the 
Organisation. Since the armed contingents envisaged for the 
UN had not been prepared for, the Security Council was only 
able to recommend that members send forces to South Korea's 
assistance. Sixteen states did supply troops, and a further 
twenty-nine supplied some form of aid, but essentially the 
enforcement action was a United States operation under the 
formal umbrella of the United Nations. The fact that such a 
UN operation could not have taken place if the USSR had been 
present to register its veto in the Security Council led to the 
subsequent US-sponsored Uniting for Peace Resolution being 
passed by the General Assembly. The effect was to enable the 
General Assembly to take over some aspects of the Security 
Council's role in the maintenance of international peace and 
security when the latter's ability to move was blocked by a 
veto. Oddly enough, the United States and the Soviet Union 
were in limited agreement in the Security Council when the 
Uniting for Peace Resolution was first used to raisea United 
Nations force - at the time of the Suez crisis in 1956 - and it 
was the British and French vetoes which made the move to the 
General Assembly necessary. 
It had by then become apparent that while there were still 
Five Permanent Members of the Security Council, there were only 
two powers that really counted, and they were too much at odds 
with each other to be able Jointly to make use of the 
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enforcement measures originally intended by the framers of the 
Charter. Even when the United States condemned the invasion 
of Suez by Britain and France, she was not prepared to take up 
the Soviet offer of a combined Superpower force against her 
allies. Thus a new idea was born a United Nations 
Peacekeeping Force. 
The Hungarian invasion by the Soviet Union, coincident 
with the Suez Crisis,, provoked stronger verbal denunciation 
from the General Assembly, yet a UN force was sent to Suez, but 
not even considered for Hungary, because no country was 
prepared to risk an outright clash with the Soviet Union in an 
area that was of vital interest to her. Britain and France, 
however, were no longer strong enough to resist the weight of 
world opinion, backed by these SuperpowerS7. 
At the other end of the spectrum, when in 1961 India 
invaded the Portuguese colony of Goa on the Indian. 
Subcontinent, and Portugal brought the matter to the-attention 
of the Security Council, a Western-sponsored resolution was not 
only defeated by a Soviet veto, but was,, opposed by all three 
Afro-Asian members of the Council. The Uniting for Peace, - 
mechanism was not invoked because there seemed no prospect of 
obtaining a two-thirds majority in, the General Assembly for any 
similar resolution. And even the defeated, resolution had not 
called for a UN force, butýonly for a withdrawal of Indian 
forces and a solution by peaceful means. The-kind of, -. 
aggression committed was not considered by the weight of public 
opinion this time to be a5 sinful as Portugal's crime-of 
colonialisms. 
The reason for this was that smaller states, had introduced 
a third, so-called non-aligned, bloc into international 
relations, to act both as a voting balance between East and 
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West, and as a force for the promotion of decolonisation. The 
seeds were sown in the Korean War when the Asian states, led by 
India, and a number of NATO countries, sought to induce the 
United States and the Soviet Union to settle for the status quo 
ante bellum. The movement developed during the 1950s, mainly 
under the leadership of India's Prime Minister Nehru, as many 
of the newly emerging nations found themselves united in their 
reluctance to have any partýin-, Western military pacts directed, 
albeit defensively, against the Communist bloc. 
The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) 
The Suez Crisis was complicated by the heavy involvement 
of two Great Powers, France and Britain, and by the threat of 
involvement by a third, the Soviet Union'. It seemed that the 
only way to bring about a withdrawal without the disastrousý 
intervention of the latter - possibly thus-bringing that nation 
and the United States into direct armed conflict - was to 
create a face-saving device. Under the Uniting for Peace 
Resolution the General Assembly authorised the setting, up of a 
United Nations Emergency Force, the first force of its kind and 
the one for which the term peacekeeping first came to be used. 
UNEF acted both as an interposition force between the 
combatants and as a police force to maintain order-in, the, Canal 
Zone, so that the UK and France could claimthat there was no 
longer any need for their presence. -It, was not, a force 
designed actively to counter aggression but a security force 
designed to play for time,, and allow the armies of the parties 
concerned to disengage and return to their own soil! o. It 
was, in fact, a development of the idea of United Nations 
Military Observer Groups which had been, established earlier 
with a view to patrolling borders when infiltration and 
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subversion were suspected, or supervising a ceasefire or truce 
after hostilities had ceased. However, unlike the Military 
Observers, the members of UNEF (and subsequent UN peacekeeping 
forces) have been equipped with light arms for defensive 
purposes. iý 
Definition of Peacekeeping 
Thus the term peacekeeping is not mentioned in the United 
Nations Charter. It came into use, in the'late 1950S to' 
describe, at that time mainly retrospectively, the various ad 
hoc operations thatýthe United Nations Organisation was able to 
mount for the purpose of aiding states in dispute to'implement 
a political resolve to stabilize or restore the, peace., 
Commentators, disagree on its exact definition, with some 
reserving the term purely for military, forces, sometimes - but 
not normally - including the Korean enforcement action"-,, and 
'others taking in the whole spectrum of, UN field'activities, 
concerned with the'settlement of dispute S12, such as single 
mediators and investigation commissions, 'and-even technical 
assistance aimed at increasing political stability,. * These 
latter might more conveniently be separately defined under the 
broader terms of "preventive diplomacy" or "a UN presence"_13, 
which encompass the various aspects of the UN's endeavours 
towards the maintenance of peace, With the-term "peacekeeping" 
being reserved for non-enforcement missions composed of 
military personnel. 'The-purpose of peacekeeping, then, is to 
establish-a political presence which, carries out'certain- ý 
military or policing duties with-a view to, assisting-in the 
management of a conflict-and setting the-stage for peaceful' 
settlement. Peacekeeping operations have varied widely in 
function and size, with missions ranging from observer grou-Ds 
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of less than twenty officers to a force of 20,000 troops. But 
all are composed of military personnel in an unaccustomed role 
- that of keeping the peace without resort to arms,, but with 
political, awareness, tact, diplomacy and utter impartiality. 
The inculcation of these qualities has not normally been part 
of a soldier's training, so that United Nations peacekeeping 
operations embody concepts which. -are almost completely alien to 
the professional soldier. - As General Rikhye, a former 
Military Advi. sor to the Secretary-General and, -Commander of, 
UNEF, said: "There is no enemy... to be defeated.., and. the 
idea of neutralizing has a different tone; -it is not enough to 
neutralize one opponent - it is necessary to neutralize all 
belligerents without using force, solely by being present"24., 
The reserve soldiers from some of the small countries 
which contribute, such as those of Scandinavia, have sometimes 
been looked down upon by-their*more professional, counterparts, 
but the Psychological demands of peacekeeping are a great deal 
more complex than those faced in classical militaryýoperations. 
Brigadier Harbottle makes the following points: "Peacekeeping 
is a form of soldiering that, does not depend on the, rifle for 
its answers but on quiet reasoning, -infinite patience, an 
impartial attitude and approach' , 'and above all an understanding 
of human relationships. A soldier who has been trained to 
meet force with force does not-find it easy at first to adapt 
himself to the new requirements., For this reason the amateur 
of the small country has a lot'to offer. . He is the school 
teacher, the-farmer, factory hand, -shop keeper who volunteers 
from his national-conscript service to serve, in UN peacekeeping 
missions. He may not have the-same degree oftechnical and 
professional standards, but-he does have an immediate affinity 
with the community or communities that he has, come to 
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serve"15. 
Comparison with other forms of Preventive Diplomacy 
The role of personal diplomacy has normally been 
complementary to but distinct from the establishment and 
deployment of peacekeeping missions, since it has seemed 
desirable to have the two running in parallel. The former, 
consisting of mediators, arbitrators and investigation or 
conciliation commissions, is provided for under Chapter Six of 
the UN Charter, and has the task of attempting to find a 
solution to the dispute. 'The latter, which was a development 
of the spirit of the Charter, rather than being provided for in 
it, has the task of facilitating such endeavours by preventing 
ongoing hostilities. A certain amount of day-to-day mediation 
and conciliation is by no means unheard of as part of'a 
peacekeeping mission's informal'duties, but peacekeeping is' 
primarily an auxiliary to diplomatic measures. 
In many conflicts there is no definable aggressor, but a 
complex set of circumstances in which both sides may lay claim 
to injustices, which may be no fault of their own or the other 
side, but rather of historical experience. The conciliators 
engaged in-personal diplomacy attempt, by means of negotiation 
or arbitration, to bring the parties to a situation of mutual 
understanding and compromise, whilst the peacekeepers attempt 
to assist the parties in their avowed wish to restrain 
hostilities in the interim. The majority of peacekeeping 
operations have'been, and still are, in the Middle East, an 
area whose problems precede colonisation, but were most 
recently fired by Britain's departure from Palestine in 1948, 
and Israel's subsequent seizure of the land. 
6 The Kashmir Dispute, where UNMOGIP is engaged, likewise 
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arose immediately from the departure of Britain from the Indian 
Subcontinent in 1947, but with the root of the problem 
stretching back into the history of the area. It was the much 
earlier Muslim encroachment on Hindu soil which led to the 
partition of the Subcontinent in 1947, and thus the dispute 
between India and Pakistan over who should have control of 
Kashmir; with its Hindu ruler, mainly Muslim population, and 
divided loyalties*. Viewed in comparison with many states 
which later achieved independence as the process of 
decolonisation gained momentum, Kashmir had strong grounds for 
claiming its own independence, in which event other differences 
between India and Pakistan might not have led to war. At the 
time it was felt that Kashmir, economically unviable and with 
five larger powers, including two Great Powers, in the 
immediate vicinity, was too vulnerable to outside interference 
to sustain independence. In fact, many post colonial states 
are neither economically nor militarily viable and are very 
vulnerable to interference even from small outside powers; and 
many are divided internally - for example, Cyprus, where the UN 
has played a significant role since 1964. In Cyprus the UN 
was originally explicitly involved with domestic matters, but 
the implicit fear was the intervention of Greece and Turkey. 
Furthermore, since both were in NATO, this could have led to an 
undesirable degree of involvement by the major NATO powers, and 
the Soviet Union was also showing interest. The first fear 
was Justified when Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 despite the UN 
presence. 
*See following Chapter. 
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Legal Basis 
The authority for the command and control of each 
peacekeeping operation derives from the mandate contained in 
the Security Council or General Assembly resolution authorising 
the operation and is normally delegated to the 
Secretary-General, who is responsible for implementing the 
resolution and is the executive authority in charge of the 
operation*. A body of precedent has been established, with 
occasional challenge, by the peacekeeping resolutions he has 
been directed to implement, and by his own interpretations 
where specific guidance was lacking. 
The Secretary-General appoints as head of the mission a 
senior officer, variously known as Commander, Chief Military 
Observer, Chief Officer or Chief of Staff. He is usually of 
the rank of Major-General or Lieutenant-General, and is 
appointed with the position of international civil servant, 
responsible to the organ of the UN which set up the operation, 
but on the staff of the UN, and reporting directly to the 
Secretary-General. The Secretary-General usually delegates 
the general politico-military direction of the peacekeeping 
operation to an Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs, 
and Most of the administrative and logistical support to the 
Field Operations Service, with some functions to the Offices of 
Personnel, Controller and Legal Affairs. 
The Secretary-General gives the chief of the mission a 
directive, based on the resolution authorising the peacekeeping 
operation, and this constitutes the terms of reference for the 
*The mandate of later operations played down the 
Secretary-General's role. 
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operation and provides the latter with his instructions for 
carrying out his tasks, so that he may issue his own 
operational instructions and standard operating procedures. 
When the General Assembly made Secretary-General 
Hammarskjold responsible for negotiating the necessary 
arrangements for the establishment of UNEF, the experience 
enabled him to develop much of the philosophy and rationale in 
Support of peacekeeping as a distinctive feature of UN 
practice. He interpreted a number of Articles in Chapter Six 
of the-Charter, dealing with the settlement of disputes, plus 
some of the general Spirit of Chapter Seven, the Preamble, and 
Article I as a sufficient mandate for peacekeeping operations, 
and defended the concept against those who questioned its 
legitimacy and the role of the Secretary-General in its 
operation. He adopted certain principles which, in October 
1958, in the conclusion to his report on UNEF", he set out in 
black and white as guidelines for the creation of future 
peacekeeping missions. They remained the basis of 
peacekeeping thereafter but were formulated to a large extent 
not only from experience gained from UNEF, but also from 
observer groups which had been established much earlier, but 
which came likewise to be known as peacekeeping operations. 
A major problem in peacekeeping has been the inadequate 
political control and guidance from the authorising organ of 
the UN, which then uses the Secretary-General as a scapegoat if 
anything goes wrong. On the other hand, this lack of guidance 
has given the Secretary-General a comparatively free and 
flexible hand in mounting peacekeeping operations. 
Hammarskjold maintained in 1958 that UN experience with various 
operations justified the assumption that in each new conflict 
situation in which the UN might be called upon tolintervene, 
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the nature of the actual organization required and its 
paramilitary aspects would be determined by the particular 
needs of the situation, and could not, therefore, be 
anticipated in advance. Thus, he felt, a considerable degree 
of. flexibility, was required17. 
CONCEPT 
Peacekeeping differs from collective security in four 
major respects. Firstly, a collective security force is 
partisan whilst a peacekeeping mission is impartial. 
Secondly, under the collective security provisions of Chapter 
Seven of the Charter, the Security Council is entitled to order 
a UN force to enter an area of conflict, whereas a peacekeeping 
mission can only enter the territory of a state after having 
received its consent. Thirdly a collective security force 
attempts to impose its will by force of arms, whilst a 
peacekeeping mission requires the cooperation of all parties in 
order to implement its tasks. And fourthly a collective 
security force is created in order to thwart aggression, whilst 
a peacekeeping mission is aimed at stabilizing a situation of 
conflict until a solution is reached by diplomatic methods. 
Impartiality 
In order to be acceptable to both sides and to have any 
hope of success, a peacekeeping mission has to establish its 
complete neutrality as regards the issues in dispute, or else 
one or both of the parties may resist cooperating out of fear 
that their security or interests will be compromised. Thus a 
peacekeeping mission insists that it should not itself be used 
to affect the political outcome of, a dispute. According to 
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Hammarskjold, UNEF "functioned under a clear-cut mandate which 
entirely detached it from involvement in any internal or local 
problems, and enabled it to maintain its neutrality in relation 
to international political issues"18. He stressed the fact 
that United Nations personnel could-ýnot be permitted to be a 
party to internal conflicts. r -This was not a new concepti but 
one under which Observer Groups%had been working for some 
years. Major-General Nimmo, who became Chief Military 
Observer of UNMOGIP in 1950',. received a letter from, 
Secretary-General Trygve Lie which confirmed his appointment 
and formulated his terms of reference. The letter explicitly 
stated: - "it is imperative, that every endeavour-be made to 
ensure that the Military-Observers remain fully impartial in 
their decisions and broad in their outlook"". 
This impartiality does not, however, preclude the 
possibility of apportioning blame--for specific incidents'to one 
side or the other, provided that the mission can be, seen to be 
equally prepared to blame either side according to the merits 
of the case. 'It does mean that classified documents have to 
be handled with extreme care, and thai Observers"should refrain 
from-saying anything on sensitive political, religious or 
racial questions, to the extent of being careful in-speaking to 
each other by telephone or radio, and even in writing personal 
letters*. 
Consent 
a 
Under Chapter Seven of the Charter the Security Council 
can take decisions binding on all Member States and it seems 
reasonable to suppose that in ar, situation of complete. breakdown 
*See Cadwalader Incident, page 260. 
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of law and order the Council might yet find itself in 
sufficient agreement to decide-to intervene without the consent 
of the state concerned. However, whilst the consent of the 
host government for collective security is not required by the 
UN Charter, with the onset of the Cold War, the strong 
nationalist feelings-of, the newly emerged states and the growth 
of non-alignment, political - and thus legal - realities 
dictated the, necessity, of consent. In recognition of this 
Hammarskjold advised: -"As-the arrangements... do not cover the 
type of force envisaged'under Chapter Seven of the Charter, it 
follows then from international-law-and the Charter that the 
United Nations cannot undertakeýto, implement them by stationing 
units on the, territory of, -a MemberState'without-the consent of 
the Government concerned 
! '20. 
a 
Such consent is necessary not least because states would- 
be reluctant, to contribute to a peacekeeping operation that was 
on the soil of an unwilling, host for fear-of setting a 
precedent that"might be used against themselves. -During the 
setting up of UNEF India specifically-let it-be known-that, she 
interpreted thetphrase "with the consent of-the nations 
concerned" to mean with the consent ofthe, contributing, as well 
as the host nations, and this interpretation was generally- 
accepted2L. This consent indicates a desire'by the parties in 
dispute to avoid conflict, and emphasises-thelfact that the UN 
is assisting in maintaining the peace,,. rather. than intervening 
in the hostilities. 
Cooperation 
A UN peacekeeping operationýis essentially a moral 
presence and not normally of sufficient strength to impose its 
will. Such an operation can only be authorised and mounted 
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with the cooperation, of the parties involved. An Agreement 
on the Statuslof the Force in Egypt, concluded on February 8th, 
1957, and one of the major legal documents on which UNEF was 
based covered all questions of definition, status, privileges, 
immunities and matters related to civil and criminal 
Jurisdiction. -It stated that Egypt would be guided in good 
faith by the General Assembly Resolution 100 when exercising 
its sovereign'powers in all matters concerning the functioning 
of the Force on its territory. - UNEF personnel, if involved in 
criminal actions, were to come under the Jurisdiction of the 
criminal courts of theirýhome countries, a principle that was 
followed in subsequent operations as it was considered- 
essential for, successful recruitment. Such issues have to be 
addressed by all peacekeeping missions and their hosts, , 
although not all are blessed-with such a comprehensive, document 
in this regard. II 
Since it cannot-use its own armed personnelto keepýopen 
the channels of communication, transportation and supply , 
necessary for successful completion of its task, cooperation 
between the host-nation and the mission is required for a 
peacekeeping mission to have within its, area of operations the 
absolute right, of freedom of movement, including overflights, 
and access to necessary facilities, whether to observe and 
report on border, conditions, or-to perform a policing 
functionn. In practice most peacekeeping operations have 
faced certain problems-in this connection. 
Another issue which has led to controversy* between the 
United Nations and host states. is the question of the national 
composition of missions., Hammarskjold insisted the United 
*See The Question of the US Observers, pages 277-285. 
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Nations should reserve for itself the final right to decide on 
composition, but admitted that the host country, in giving its 
consent, could not be indifferent to the composition of 
personnel stationed on its soil. In order to limit the scope 
of possible differences of opinion, Hammarskjold laid down two 
principles: not to include unitsýfrom any of the Permanent 
Members of the Security-Council*, and not to include units from 
any country which'because-of its geographical position or for 
other reasons, might be considered as possibly, having a special 
interest in the situation which has, called for the operation 23. 
Military personnel for UN peacekeeping forces have been 
raised by two methods: on ad'hoc basis, provided by Member 
States willing to contribute-them, when the-need for a-- 
peacekeeping operation arose, -and by Member States-earmarking-, 
them in advance**. There has been no recognition of any - 
obligation by a Member State to contribute, nor of the right of 
a Member State to contribute to, a-'particular operation, ýand 
states normally retain-the-right to withdraw units Committed to 
an operation. J 
So far as Observer Groups are concerned; in 1948-the 
General Assembly made provision forýa Panel of Observers. 
Each Member Statetwas invited to-'appoint from one to five 
*The UK has, as an exception to this rule, contributed the 
major contingent to the peacekeeping force in Cyprus, but 
with the complete agreement of both parties to the 
dispute, because having a base on the island she already 
had troops in position, and was able to supply all the 
necessary logistical 'support. - And much later, in 1978, 
France was included when the UN Interim Force in the 
Lebanon was created, but by this time the political 
climate surrounding UN peacekeeping had changed somewhat. 
**A small group of middle powers has provided the 
backbone of UN peacekeepingý, notably the Scandinavian, 
countries, Canada, India and Ireland. With their neutral 
political positions Finland, Sweden and India have been 
widely accepted, and found the role of peacekeeper 
congenial to their foreignpolicies. 
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persons to be available to serve as Observers, and several 
states made such provision24 , but in practice observer groups 
have tended to be organised on an ad hoc basis rather than by 
this means. When the Security Council has agreed to send a 
military observer group, "the Secretary-General requests certain 
countries, acceptable to the parties concerned, to make 
officers available for the purpose from their national armies. 
Middle ranking officers are usually-chosen as they have the 
necessary training to be able to report accurately on'the 
military situation, yet tend to: be young and fit enough to 
survive what are often rugged-conditions. , 
Mr. Thunborg Anders, then Under-Secretary of State, 
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, suggested in 1976 there 
were many good-reasons for responding to an invitation from the 
Secretary-General to participate in a peacekeeping operation: 
the preservation of peace is in'the interests of all nations; 
it supports the authority ofý-the UN andýits Secretary-General 
in a delicate situation where a "no" would detract from the 
status of-the UN as a preserver, of peace; - the country's, own 
military command is usually in-favour as it gives it an 
opportunity of doing something, concrete rather than peacetime 
training and manouevres, and it-raises the prestige-of the 
whole military'community - if the assignment is carried out 
well - thus promoting recruitment. But he suggested that the 
practical experience it afforded for national defence should 
not be overrated as international and national assignments 
generally differ far, too much. 
He also pointed out the disadvantages: a state's own 
military preparations may make it difficult to spare, more-than 
a limited force; the UN's'financial situation may make it ,, 
doubtful if and when costs incurred will be reimbursed; and, 
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more important, there is the possibility of the conflict in 
question developing in such a way that the task of the UN 
changes from that originally foreseen. If regular fighting 
breaks out causing loss of life, the support of home opinion 
for the operation may weaken. The situation may also become 
complicated from the political point of view. There may be a 
coup d'etat in the host country and the contingent sent from a 
participating country mayýsuddenly find itself supporting a new 
regime. Participation may also lead to irritation in 
relations with other states: Sweden's participation, in the 
Congo somewhat disturbed her relations with Belgiumzs. ' 
Stabilization 
The primary aim of UN peacekeeping is to create-an, , 
environment in which a peaceful solution to, a dispute-may be 
sought. To this end an attempt is made to insulate a conflict 
from external interference',, and, to prevent,, terminate or -, 
contain violence in the area. For the most part the kind,, of 
conflict which has lent itself to UN peacekeeping has been that 
arising from the, destabilizationý, caused by decolonisation-, both 
at the time or subsequently, -and particularly-where-there is 
the likelihood, -of; 'direct confrontation between the Great 
Powers. The deliberate introduction, of, a neutral third party 
enables the Great Powers - without whose agreement the- -- 
operation would be unlikely to be established - to distance 
themselves from the scene, ýand acts as a deterrent to other 
forms of external involvement. 
Whilst each-mission has-tasks peculiar to; itself, both 
formal and informal, the main tasks have usually been either 
the supervision of a ceasefirey or the monitoring-of a border 
or ceasefire line. The latter, may, take the form of control 
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and prevention of illegal crossings, which generally speaking 
only a peacekeeping force would be equipped to do, or the more 
passive role of observing and reporting on subversion and 
infiltration, which is that normally undertaken by an Observer 
group. 
Observers usually set up posts on each side of the 
ceasefire line or border, but in some mission areas the 
observation posts may be many miles apart in remote regions*of 
inhospitable terrain,, and manned by as few as two Observers. 
Their potential effectiveness is therefore limited, and the 
Observers' presence may have, more moral than practical value, 
but such value should not be underestimated., , Peacekeeping 
forces indeed are largely symbolic-since-they are not normally 
of sufficient size to participate in a major-confrontation,, and 
are in any event, restricted to, the defensive use of force only. 
Three continuing, and to some-extent inter-related,: 
objectives in the attempt to contain violence - normally within 
the context of the supervision of-a ceasefire - are anxiety 
reduction; incident prevention and crisis defusion2l. -- A 
peacekeeping operation's very presence, -as the result of an 
agreement by the belligerents to accept such a mission-on their 
soil, is a major factor in anxiety reduction, since it implies 
that neither side wishes to mount or resume hostilities. The 
fact that the opposing side-is being watched by an independent 
party makes, a further-contribution because it-, creates 
confidence inýthe belief-that-the opposing side is not 
strengthening its defences in preparation for a renewal of 
military activity, and lessens the likelihood of incidents 
occurring. 
In order to separate the belligerents and create a major 
means of incident prevention the, first stages of ceasefire 
25 
supervision are likely to be the establishment of ceasefire 
lines and demilitarized zones, followed by supervision of the 
withdrawal of forces to a specified distance on their own side 
of the line. Nevertheless incidents - such as firing, 
ceasefire line or border crossings, strengthening of defences, 
or other belligerent acts - do occur, and the fact of being 
able to report them to an independent party, in the knowledge 
that they will be impartially investigated and reported on to 
the Secretary-General, acts as a safety valve and reduces the 
risk of escalation. 
An impartial third party may also be able to suggest means 
of eliminating the risk of similar incidents recurring, or 
improve relations by offering its Good Offices to act as a 
channel of communication between the disputants to assist in 
such matters as arranging for the exchange of prisoners, often 
civilians who have crossed the into a forbidden area in all 
innocence, or the return of stray animals. 
Should the mission's presence or endeavours not prove 
sufficient to forestall an incident, or prevent its escalation, 
it may at least be able to defuse the ensuing crisis, by 
negotiating a ceasefire between local commanders if minor 
hostilities erupt as the result of a local incident. if 
unsuccessful it may make a speedy report to the 
Secretary-General before the situation becomes really serious. 
Similarly it may report a buildup of forces by one or both 
sides, which the offenders refuse to rectify. In ei ther event 
the Secretary-General is able to approach the respective 
delegations at the UN to put pressure on them and their 
governments, and if necessary report to the Security Council 
for its members to consider further action. By publicising 
and internationalising a crisis the UN exerts a special 
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pressure of its own in the form of the weight of world opinion, 
which states find surprisingly difficult - though by no means 
impossible - to ignore, and-also more acceptable than pressure 
from individual. states; 
ATTITUDES OF THE PARTIES 
A United Nations peacekeeping mission does not impose 
itself on the territory of its hosts without their consent. 
Accordingly it is reasonable to suppose that they are not 
unwilling to see it there, and are disposed to be cooperative. 
The chances of this being unreservedly so, however, are much 
higher if the objectives of the enterprise are quickly achieved 
and the mission speedily retires. 
The military authorities, especially, might be expected to 
regard the operation from a professional point of view, and for 
the most part be cooperative with their colleagues from other 
countries, at least unless or until the peace begins to break 
down again, when their first priorities will be for the defence 
of their country- The local people, on the other hand, might 
be expected to judge it exclusively on whether they are helped 
or hindered by it - whether they are relieved to be given some 
respite, either temporarily or permanently from the ravages of 
war, or whether they are being prevented from fighting for what 
V 
they consider a new and just order in their society. The 
political authorities might be more inclined to ebb and flow 
according to their perception of the progress of any parallel 
diplomatic discussions which are likely to be taking place 
under UN auspices, and use the mission as a tool on which to 
vent their occasional displeasure with the Organisation. 
If there is no settlement of the underlying dispute, and 
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the mission if forced to linger on indefinitely, there may be 
such a change in theýpolitical environment-that its welcome is 
no longer assured. Host states are only willing to accept an 
alien presence when they think it is to their advantage. They 
may be prepared to accept-it as a face-saving device to-end 
hostilities which do not, seem to be leading to a desirable 
conclusion, or for its assistance to-contain, hostilities which 
they no longer wish to pursue if there is a chance of a 
peaceful settlement. But if the situation becomes frozen to 
the point where it seems to have no purpose in an unchanging 
scene, the mission may become something of an unwarranted 
burden. Either, or both, of the parties may then contemplate 
reverting to the use of force in order to settle the matter 
once and for all. On the other hand, one of the parties may 
decide to settle for the status quo in which case the operation 
draws any undesirable amount of attention to a dispute which 
that party may now wish to claim no longer exists, whilst the 
other party is only too happy to have an independent body on 
hand to draw attention to what it perceives as a continuing 
dispute. 
The United Nations Military Observer Group in India and 
Pakistan has been supervising the ceasefire between these two 
nations in the disputed state of Kashmir since 1949. UNMOGIP 
is therefore a prime example of an observer group which has 
faced the problems of being deployed in an initially hopeful 
and ultimately frozen situation, which occurred despite 
numerous attempts, at the diplomatic level by the United Nations 
to bring the two sides to a settlement, and a considerable 
amount of bi-lateral effort by the parties themselves. After 
years of assisting the parties to maintain their uneasy peace, 
UNMOGIP saw that peace break down when one of the parties felt 
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compelled, perhaps by the more militant civilians of the 
divided state, to take matters into its own hands in an 
unsuccessful attempt to break the deadlock. At the same time 
the other party, becoming increasingly prepared to accept the 
status quo, became correspondingly less willing to accept a UN 
peacekeeping mission on what it now deemed to be irrefutably 
its own soil, until finally it withdrew its cooperation. The 
following is an analysis of UNMOGIP's attempts to stabilize the 
situation under these circumstances. 
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CHAPTER TWO - THE KASHMIR DISPUTE 
THE PARTITION OF INDIA 
The Kashmir Dispute arose from the partition of India at 
the time of Independence. The Indian Independence Act was 
passed in London on 18th July, 1947' and provided for British 
India to be partitioned into the independent Dominions of India 
and Pakistan as from 15th August that year. What should 
happen to the Princely States, those parts of the Indian 
Subcontinent which were not directly ruled by Britain but which 
had, to a lesser or greater extent, retained their own autonomy 
within the British Empire, was left unclear. They included 
nearly 100 million people, or approximately one quarter of the 
population of the. Subcontinent, and comprised 45% of its 
territory. The number of states involved is uncertain because 
of confusion over the status of some of the smaller ones, but 
the figure is probably well over 600, and some of these states 
were very small indeed. Theoretically, since the states had 
given up some important legal rights to Britain, those rights 
were now their own again. It soon became clear, however, that 
pragmatic considerations were to hold swayýýover legal niceties. 
The British Government abrogated the responsibility'Britain had 
taken upon itself towards the states under treaties and - 
agreements of many years' standing and simply maintained it 
would cease to exercise the powers of paramountcy from the date 
mentioned2. 
Many, perhaps the majority, ofýthe states were too small 
to be viable on their own; -and, vital services such as the 
railways and postal services were already run by the 
authorities of British India and would be inherited by India 
30 
and Pakistan. Furthermore, the Freedom Movement had 
deliberately been extended to the peoples of the states, so 
that a large section of their population expected to join the 
Indian Union. Lord Louis Mountbatten, the last British 
Viceroy of India, who was overseeing the transfer of power and 
who subsequently became the-first Governor-General of India, 
confirmed the legal independence, of the Princely Statesi but 
advised their rulers that practical considerations left them 
only with the choice, based on geographical considerations and, 
in the case of any doubt, the will of. their people, of 
accession either to India or to'Pakistan. -TheIndian National 
Congress formed a special States Department'in July 1947 which, 
with a skilful mixture of persuasion and coercion, convinced 
all but two of the states within India's geographic limits to 
accede to India3. The remaining two, Hyderabad'and Junagadh*, 
after a considerable amount of trouble, did ultimately become 
part of the Indian Union**. I 
*See Map 1. 
**Hyderabad was the most important princely state with a 
population of 17 million and territory of 83,000 square 
miles, situated in the heart of India. The Nizam was a 
Muslim but only 14% of his subjects were of his faith. 
However, in the hope of negotiating independence, he 
entered into a Standstill Agreement with India for one 
year. Before the year ended the terrorist activities of 
a para-military corps of Muslim extremists, which 
over5pilled into Indian territory and raised the spectre 
of further communal violence in retaliation, caused India 
to launch police action against the State. Hyderabad 
then acceded to India. 
Junagadh was a small coastal state contiguous to India 
with only an 18% Muslim population, but a Muslim Nawab who 
chose to accede to Pakistan. The State received tribute 
from two minor feudatories which acceded to India as a 
result of which they were invaded by troops from Junagadh. 
Three requests by Nehru to-Pakistanýfor the withdrawal of 
these troops were ignored and Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime 
Minister of Pakistan, personally insisted to Nehru,. in 
regard to Junagadh, that a ruler had the absolute right to 
accede without reference to the moral or ethnic aspects of 
the case, a remark which somewhat weakened his subsequent 
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The Instrument of Accession committed the states to accept 
the control of the Dominion to which they acceded in matters 
only of defence, external affairs and communications, without 
any financial liability and subject to final settlement. 
However, the takeover was far more complete than that, and in 
the "final settlement" all the states, except the State of 
Jammu and Kashmir, found themselves totally absorbed into 
either India or Pakistan. 
Although contiguous to both India and Pakistan, had the 
logic of partition been applied, rather than the decision being 
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left in the hands of its Hindu Maharaja, the greater 1ýart of 
the State of Jammu and Kashmir should have been awarded to 
Pakistan: there was an overwhelmingly Muslim majority 
contiguous to the Muslim majority region of the Punjab, which 
went to Pakistan; the State's communications with the outside 
world lay through Pakistan; and the waters of the Indus, 
Jhelum and Chenab Rivers, all of which flowed through Kashmir 
territory were vital to the agricultural life of Pakistan. 
The fact that partition did not automatically extend to the 
State's territories was essentially the result of a series of 
historical accidents, mainly in the nineteenth century, which 
converted a group of otherwise unrelated tracts of land into a 
Princely State. 
objection to the Maharaja of Kashmir's accession to, India. 
Eventually Indian troops also entered the two minor 
feudatories, and soon afterwards the Nawab of Junagadh. 
fled to Pakistan. The Indian Government then referred 
the issue to a popular plebiscite which resulted in an 
overwhelming vote in favour of accession to India 4. 
32 
THE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR* 
The State of Jammu and Kashmir was described before the UN 
Security Council in January 1948 as having been an independent 
state in treaty relations with the Crown of England and having 
no international existence', Estimates of the total area of 
the State of Jammu and Kashmir vary, not least because the 
location of its border with China is in dispute, but it was 
something over 80,000 square miles, or roughly the same as the 
British mainland. The State comprised several regions: most 
importantly Kashmir Province in the centre, including the Vale 
of Kashmir, and Srinagar, the State capital, and Jammu Province 
to the South. There were also the districts of Muzaffarabad 
(administered as part of Kashmir Province), and Mirpur 
(administered as part of Jammu Province), and the feudatory 
state of Punch to the West. The frontier districts of Ladakh 
and Baltistan lay to the east and north. To the north-west, 
separated from the rest by the River Indus and by high and 
difficult mountain ranges, were Gilgit and Gilgit Agency, 
including the two small states of Hunza and Nagar. Though 
formally acknowledging the suzerainty of the Maharaja of 
Kashmir, these areas had never come under his control, and were 
governed by a Political Agent of the Government of British 
India between 1889 and 1947. 
With most of the State without roads and quite 
inaccessible, so that whole communities lived in isolation, 
there was no cultural or linguistic unity in Jammu and Kashmir 
when British paramountcy lapsed in 1947: 34% of the population 
spoke Kashmiri, 15% Dogri and 30% Punjabi, and several more 
languages were spoken by small numbers of people. The present 
*See Map 2. 
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Constitution (promulgated in 1956) allows for six official 
languages, and there are at least six distinct peoples with 
differing CUStOM5. 
Jammu 
A narrow fringe of flat land along the southern border, 
mainly contiguous to the Pakistani Punjab but partly also to 
the Indian Punjab and Chamba, in what is now Himachal Pradesh, 
gives way first to stony and sandy hills rising to about 2,000 
feet and then to higher, temperate hills covered with forests, 
and finally to the Pir Panjal range, which divides the 
Provinces of Jammu and Kashmir and includes peaks of up to 
15,000 feet. 
Kashmir 
The Vale of Kashmir, from where the main wealth is 
derived, comprises only about 10% of the total area of the 
State but about half its population. It is very fertile and 
consists of the main valley drained by the Jhelum River, and 
two lateral valleys, standing at over 5,000 feet above sea 
level and surrounded by mountains of about 12,000 feet. The 
Valley is covered with snow in the winter months but is a 
popular hot weather holiday resort. 
The Frontier Districts 
Except for Gilgit, which is fertile and has a good 
climate, these are areas of mountain ranges varying from 17,000 
to 22pOOO feet, and of very high plains and valleys. To the 
east Ladakh, drained by the River Indus, has a scanty 
population and has very little cultivable land. Baltistan, to 
the north, has the highest peaks including K2, the second 
highest in the world. 
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Historyb 
Jammu was the capital of an ancient Dogra Rajput dynasty 
which became subject to the Sikh Government of the Punjab under 
Ranjit Singh at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The 
latter finally annexed Jammu and conferred it upon Gulab Singh, 
a member of its Dogra ruling family. ' 
In contrast, Kashmir has undergone many changes, being 
ruled by a Hindu dynasty until the beginning of the fourteenth 
century and then by a variety of Muslim regimes, both Sunni and 
Shia, although the actual administration continued in Hipdu 
hands for some considerable time. In 1588 it was conquered by 
the Indian Emperor Akbar whose Moghul dynasty lasted until 
1752. Kashmir then came under Afghan rule until 1819, when 
the Sikh leader Ranjit Singh seized power. During the 
centuries of Muslim power the Kashmiri Hindus were often so 
badly persecuted that most converted to Islam in a vain attempt 
to relieve their lot. With the return of Hindu power they 
suffered again, directly as a result of this conversion. They 
are rarely described in a complimentary fashion, and are at 
best seen as passive and artistic, and very different from the 
warrior races of West Kashmir and the Punjab. 
At the end of the first Sikh war in 1846 Gulab Singh, the 
Raja of Jammu, acted as mediator between the British and the 
Sikhs. The Sikh Maharaja, besides ceding a large tract of 
territory in the Punjab, had to pay an indemnity which he could 
not afford and instead gave up a large tract of hill 
territories, including Jammu and Kashmir. Lord Hardinge, the 
Governor-General, considered the occupation of the whole of 
these territories inadvisable for two reasons. Firstly, it 
would involve a very large extension of the British frontier 
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and a corresponding increase in the military establishments for 
guarding it. Secondly, the districts in question, with the 
exception of the comparatively. small Vale of Kashmir, were for 
the most part unproductive and unlikely to pay the cost of 
occupation and management. On the other hand they included 
the whole of the hereditary possession of Gulab Singh, who 
offered to pay the war indemnity if he was constituted the 
independent ruler of Jammu and, Kashmir. The-offer was 
accepted and the Treaty of Amritsar of 16th March, 1846 thus 
confirmed Gulab Singh in the territories which he already 
possessed, and transferred to him both Kashmir and Gilgit, 
though he never succeeded in gaining control over the latter 
remote area. He for his part acknowledged the supremacy, of., 
the British Government, and thereafter the relations with the 
British of the new State of Jammu and Kashmir were similar to- 
those of the other Indian States. The internal administration 
of the State remained under the control of successive Maharajas 
of the family of Gulab, Singh, apart from an interlude beginning 
in 1889 when, because-of the unsatisfactory rule of the 
Maharaja and increasing pressure from Russia, the - 
administration was'entrusted to a Council under the supervision 
of the British Resident. ýThe Council was abolished in 1905 
but the Maharaja was not restored to his full powers until 
1925. 
Sheik Mohammed Abdullah 
After centuries of merciless exploitation there had been 
little political consciousness among the Kashmiri peoples until 
Sheik Abdullah came on the scene in the late 1920s. In spite 
of being regularly in and out of prison he remained their 
dominant political leader until his death in'September 1982. 
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In 1931 he led a minor revolt and was imprisoned, briefly, for 
the first time. In October 1932 he founded the All-Jammu and 
Kashmir Muslim Conference which initiated a number of 
unsuccessful protests and revolts against the tyrannical regime 
of Maharaja Hari Singh. Later he came under the influence of 
Nehru, himself of Kashmiri Brahmin descent, though born in 
India*. Nehru admired Abdullah's-national and socialist 
outlook, whilst Abdullah in turn was attracted to the secular 
politics of the Indian National Congress. The two men became 
close friends. InýJune 1939, 'in order to-shed-its communal 
label, Abdullah persuaded the Conference to change. its name to 
the All-Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, so that it could 
become a focus for all the peoples of Kashmir and not Just the 
Muslims. A minority, led by Chaudhri Ghulam Abbas, continued 
as the Muslim Conference., ýInevitablyýthe, latter grew, closer 
to the Muslim. League-and later,. threw in its-, lot, with Pakistan, 
becoming the nucleus of the Azad Kashmir Government, whilst 
Abdullah's National Conference aligned itself with the Indian 
Congress. Abdullah fell out with Jinnah over-what-he - 
considered to be Jinnah's partisan approach-when asked to 
arbitrate between the National Conference and, -the Muslim 
Conference in 1944. -- -The National Conference had ', ý 
*Nehru, aware that many people believed his policies 
towards Kashmir were motivated'by his emotional attachment 
to it, said in the Indian Parliament on 7 August, 1952: 
"I am-called a Kashmiri in the sense that ten generations 
ago my people came down from Kashinir to India. That is 
not, the bond I have in mind when I think of Kashmir,, but 
other bonds which have tied us much closer". In fact, as 
Frank Moraes notes: "all Indians are emotionally drawn to 
Kashmir as a land which is seen as an almost perfect 
product of God's (or the gods') creation, a favourite 
holiday resort for rich Indians and a place that even the 
poorest dream of visiting, a dream which would be 
shattered if Kashmir was handed over to Pakistan". Lord 
Birdwood suggests that that is the result of a carefully 
conceived policy to accustom the public to regard Kashmir 
as inherently and without question IndianO. 
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strengthened its hold in the War years as it welcomed Muslims, 
Sikhs and Hindus, but its secular appeal was based more on a 
common hatred of, the'Maharajals autocratic government than on 
any sense of mutual brotherhood. In May 1946 Abdullah 
launched a "Quit Kashmir" campaign against the Maharaja and was 
sentenced to nine years'ý imprisonment. Nehru went to Kashmir 
to support Abdullah but was arrestedýand deported. This move, 
however, gave Nehru great popularityý`with the Kashmiri people 
which was later to stand him in, -good stead. Abdullah was also 
at this time President of theýStates-Peoples Congress, a 
democratic movement in the Princely,, states which supported-the 
All India Congress Party. ,II 
Population 
The 1941 Census of India showed the population of the 
Sýate of Jammu and Kashmir as 4,021,616 of which 77%, were 
Muslims, but there was-no further breakdown. From a-breakdown 
in the 1931 census it appeared that the. Muslim percentageýin 
Kashmir Province was at least 92.5'yo, and in the frontier---- 
districts at least 80%, though the eastern quarter of the 
sparsely populated Ladakhýheld a concentration of-about 40,000 
Buddhists. The overall figure for Jammu was 61% Muslims, but 
in Jammu, Kathua, Udhampur and Chenani, the Muslims, were in a 
minority at 39.8%, - 24.6%, 4.8%-and 14% respectively. A mass 
exodus of Muslims from Jammu, in the disturbances of October 
and November 1947 in particular, eventually left Jammu with a 
mainly Hindu majority. 
Communications and Trade 
At the time of Independence in 1947 the only railway in 
the State was a short line linking Jammu with Sialkot in West 
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Punjab. The two principal roads joining the Kashmir Valley 
with the Punjab both entered Pakistan, firstly from Srinagar 
over the 9,200 foot Banihal, Pass to Jammu andýon to Sialkot, 
and secondly from Srinagar'to, Baramula, Uri and Domel and then 
south through Pakistan, to-, Rawalpindi... The former was 
generally closed-by snow during the winter whilst the latter 
remained open all the year. Although Kashmir's overseas trade 
passed through Bombay as well as, and mainly, through Karachi, 
it had to pass either by the: various rivers or along-these'two 
main, roads, all of which after Partition entered-Pak15tan. In 
the same wayýthe State relied'on these roads for'-its imports, 
of which only 36% - in the form of grains, pulses, oils, -, salt 
and petrol - were estimated toýcome either from'Pakistan-or 
overseas, but-64% from India - in the form of cotton 
manufactures, sugar, tea, oilseeds, metal and metal 
manufactures and tobacco.. India, however, 'quickly completed a 
road betweenEast, Punjab andZammu, ýbut could not so easily 
overcome, the-problem of the. Banihal Pass being blocked for part 
of the winter,, though eventually a tunnel was built to overcome 
the problem. .. I 
I The road joining Gilgit to the'Kashmir Valley, had to cross 
passes at heights of 11,000 and 13,000 feet which were always- 
closed in winter, There was no direct route to Pakistan, and 
a regular air service had to be initiated when Gilgit opted to 
accede to that country. 
THE ACCESSION OF KASHMIR 
Indecision 
When it came to the question of accession, the principle 
of geographic contiguity, which was a major ruling element 
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elsewhere, could not be applied in the State of Jammu & Kashmir 
which was contiguous to both India and Pakistan. In addition, 
with its boundaries, for many miles not internationally 
defined, abutting also on China (Sinkiang and Tibet), 
Afghanistan and the Soviet Union* it was in a position of great 
strategic importance. The principle that the ruler should 
decide but should take into account the wishes of his people 
was confused by the fact that the ruler was a, Hindu who might 
well incline to the nominally secular but largely Hindu India, 
whilst the majority of his subjeats were Muslim and might be 
expected to prefer the avowedly Muslim state of Pakistan. The 
issue was further confused by-the fact the foremost Muslim 
leader in the State, Sheik Mohammed Abdullah, was in favour, of 
accession to India, but he was in prison at the time as-a, 
result of his opposition to, Maharaja, Hari Singh's tyranny., 
The MaharaJa could not decide which option to take and it seems 
likely that his inclinationýwas, to remain independent. 7, Had he 
been a popular ruler with an effective representative 
government a bid for independence-might well have been 
successful; as things were, however, Pakistan would be likely 
to plot to remove the unpopular Hindu ruler from continuing to 
rule his ill-treated-Muslim-subjects, ýandýthe Indian Government 
would be likely to seek his downfall, with the help of Sheik 
Abdullah, as an enemy of theirýown democracy"; ' It has been 
suggested that if the British had ensured that the major 
*A narrow strip of inhospitable and mountainous terrain, 
known as the Wakhan Strip, had been established under the 
Pamirs Settlement of 1895 to be controlled by the Afghans 
as part of their territory to serve as a buffer between 
the Russian and British Empires. Nevertheless Ka5hmir 
was said to be bordering on the'USSR by the Maharaja in 
his letter accompanying the Instrument of Accession, and 
tended to be so described during discussions about the 
Dispute9. Certain, but not all, maps also show this to 
be the case. I 
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Princely States acquired workable representative governments, 
the Kashmir problem might well have been avoided, since a 
popular Kashmir Government could have made decisions about its 
future which both India and Pakistan, would have respected, 
whilst an autocratic and unpopular Maharaja was in no position 
to make such decisions". In the-end Hari Singh seemed to be 
playing for time, perhaps to see what would happen in other 
states such as Hyderabad and Junagadh, but the communal- 
massacres and-migration of peoples', which took place in'the 
neighbouring state of Punjab in the, wake of independence can 
have done nothing. to encourage his accession to either state. 
In June 1947 Lord-Mountbatten went, to Kashmir to advise 
the Maharaja that he should ascertain the-will of his people 
and accede to whichever Dominion they chose. In a speech. 
twelve months later tothe East India Association, in London 
Mountbatten said: p-"Had he acceded to Pakistan before August 14 
the future Government ofIndia had allowed me to give-His 
Highness an assurance that no-objection whatever would be 
raised by them. Had His Highness acceded to India by August 
14, Pakistan did not then exist, and therefore could nothave 
interfered"12. The future Indian, Government was-, 'however, 
apparently not prepare&to consider the option of an,. 
independent Kashmir, possibly because this might setýa 
precedent for. other Indian princes, though the, Indian 
Representative, perhaps foolishly, claimed before the Security 
Council in January 1948 that this was an option open to the 
Maharaja*. 
The word "Pakistan",. ýmeaning "Land of the Pure", was 
derived in 1933 from the initial letters of the regions from 
ýr ý 
*Sir Zafrullah Khan said in reply that he, wished the same 
choice had been offered to other states also". 
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which a Muslim nation might be created*, the "K" thus standing 
for Kashmir. It is often argued that not only does this imply 
that the Muslim leaders had always calculated on Kashmir 
becoming part of Pakistan if their call for partition was 
successful, but also that the Indian Congress leaders must have 
accepted this liklihood as they had never questioned the 
possibility in the light of the free use of the word over the 
years. In fact this is-not so. The Muslim League's policy 
had always been one of non-intervention so far as the Princely 
States were concerned, to the extent of advocating independence 
for them. More conclusively, in reply to a query by Mahatma 
Gandhi on the Muslim League's decisive Lahore Resolution of 
1940, which called for areas with a Muslim majority to be 
formed into separate independent nations, Jinnah specifically 
stated on 17th September, 1944: "Yes, the word Pakistan is not 
mentioned in the resolution and it does not bear the original 
meaning. The word has now become synonymous with the Lahore 
resolution... (which) is only confined to British India "14. In 
other words, it did not include the Princely States. 
Mahatma Gandhi, being well aware of Kashmir's strategic- 
importance, advocated joint discussions between the-Maharaja, 
representatives of the Kashmiri people, and the Indian and 
Pakistan Governments in August 1947, in order to avert trouble 
over Kashmir's future. As early as July 7th he had said that 
the Indian and Pakistan armies were being created not-to fight 
a common danger, but to destroy each other". 7 
Finally, three days before Independence Day, the'Maharaja 
offered a Standstill Agreement to India and Pakistan. 
*Punjab, Afghans (meaning the inhabitants of the 
North-West Frontier Province, rather than some pretension 
to include Afghanistan itself), Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan. 
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Pakistan signed such an agreement but negotiations with India 
were never completed". Having 5ecured the Standstill 
Agreement, under which Pakistan assumed the responsibilities 
previously held by the British to run the communications 
services for the-State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Pakistan 
Government appeared to be attempting to force accession by 
economic pressure: essential supplies stopped flowing. into 
Kashmir. Pakistan later blamed this on the general disruption 
caused by partition, but an embargo was also put on the sale of 
Kashmiri produce in Pakistan without, it would appear, any 
consideration that such pressure might prove 
counter-productive 17. 
Sheik Abdullah admitted" that there was much to be said 
for accession to Pakistan in addition to religious affinity, 
since most communications went that way and timber especially, 
as one of the Kashmir's major exports, travelled down the 
Jhelum or Chenab Rivers. However, he preferred the 
progressiveness of Indian Congress with its secular notion of 
equal rights for all religions to the theocratic concept of 
Pakistan. He felt that economically Kashmir would be better 
off with the larger market India had to offer for Kashmiri 
handicrafts, and with the tourist trade rich Indians could 
supply. He also was attracted by the third option, 
independence, but fundamentally he believed that with five 
powers - China, the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, as well as 
India and Pakistan - on or close to its frontiers, Kashmir 
could only be independent with the good will of them all. 
On 29th September, in response to popular agitation, and 
possibly also pressure from New Delhi, Sheik Abdullah was 
released from jail. He then arranged meetings in Kashmir at 
which he spoke in terms of Hindu-Muslim-Sikh unity, and 
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demanded a transfer of power to the people who could then 
decide which Dominion they should join. In mid-October he 
visited New Delhi, and in two Press statements confirmed that 
the Punchis were in open revolt against the Maharaja, and that 
he was against joining Pakistan. He sympathised with the 
Indian policy of Hindu-Muslim unity but insisted that no 
decision on accession should be made until a popular government 
was elected". 
Formation of the Azad Army 
The Hindu Maharaja of the Predominantly Muslim people of 
Jammu and Kashmir drew his army mainly from Hindus, Sikhs and 
Gurkhas in spite of the fact that, with the exception of the 
Kashmiris from the Vale, the Muslims were formidable fighters: 
of the 71,667 citizens of the State who served in the British 
forces in the Second World War, 60,402 were MUSliMS20. 
However, the Maharaja did not trust them, and when he refused 
to accept them in his forces after the War and demobilisation, 
_ 
most went back to farming in their home regions of Punch and 
Mirpur. 
The State of Punch was a separate state within the 
territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and owed allegiance 
to the Maharaja of Kashmir. Its people were Muslims but were 
racially akin to the Punjabis rather than the Kashmiris. In 
1947 many Punch tribesmen returned from service with the Indian 
Army to find that their state had been dispossessed of its 
ruler because of a lawsuit, and the vicious system of taxation 
prevailing in the rest of Jammu and Kashmir had been imposed. 
They revolted and State troops were sent in, but the Muslims 
among them went over to those in revolt. Thereafter this 
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force formed the hard core around which the Azad* Kashmir (AK) 
movement gathered strength. On August 15th - Independence Day 
- they celebrated the day as Pakistan Day and displayed flags 
which the Maharaja ordered-to be torn down2l. Apart from this 
Jammu and Kashmir remained relatively calm at the time of 
Independence in spite of the massacres in the Punjab and the 
large-scale population movements between East and West Punjab 
in the weeks following - although, with safe passage afforded 
in both directions, many travelled through Jammu and the State 
had to feed and accommodate large numbers of, people 22. ' , 
During the course'of August and September the people of 
Punch continued to press their demandýfor accession, to -- 
Pakistan, and the Maharaja adopted various stringent measures 
to quell the resulting disturbances, which culminatedýin an 
extension of the communal massacres-that were taking place in 
the Punjab. The worst example occurred in early November when 
two crowded convoys of Muslim evacuees who, had beenýpromised 
safe conduct to Pakistan were set on byýtheir guards and others 
outside Jammu, and menj women and children were slaughtered. 
As a result of this aboutý400,000 Muslims, fled into Azad ý 
Kashmir and at least another 100,000 into Pakistan 23. Soon an 
Azad Kashmir Government, was formed and set'ýup headquarters at 
Muzaffarabad. 
In the meantime some of the "Azad" forces had also escaped 
to Pakistan where'they collecte&money-from sympathisers and 
bought weapons from the arms factories in the North-West 
Frontier Province. Here they told the tribesmen of the plight 
of their fellow Muslims in Jammuýand Kashmir. It did not take 
much effort to, incite these wild frontier men into holy war. 
*"Azad" means "free". 
45 
In the harsh winters they already regularly descended into the 
lower valleys to loot the villages and abduct the women. 
Stories of atrocities against Muslims, probably exaggerated in 
the telling, undoubtedly inflamed their missionary zeal, but 
once the first fanaticism of Jehad had passed there was left 
only the incentive of loot, and the tribal invasion rapidly 
degenerated into the indiscriminate looting and murder of. Hindu 
and Muslim alike. If they had not stopped for two weeks to 
sack the town of Baramula they would have arrived in Srinagar 
before the Indians, whom the Maharaja in desperation had called 
in to repel the attack24. 
The incursions began in a small way in September, and on 
15th October the Maharaja sent a telegram to the Pakistan 
Government requesting an inquiry and warning that if his 
request was not heeded he would have no option but to seek 
assistance. Pakistan nominated a representative but by then 
the Maharaja was saying he would enlist outside help if the 
aggression did not cease. The Pakistan Governor-General, 
Jinnah, believed that the threat to enlist outside assistance 
showed clearly that the real aim was to seek an opportunity to 
join the Indian Dominion by securing the intervention and 
assistance of that Dominion. He said such a policy was 
naturally creating deep resentment and grave apprehension among 
the 85% Muslim population of Kashmir. He repeated the 
proposal for an impartial inquiry but nothing happened23. 
Accession to India 
On 22nd October a major tribal invasion occurred and the 
Maharaja anxiously called. on India for help. Mountbatten, 
insisted that the Act of Accession should Precede the despatch 
of troops. He argued that it would be improper to send troops 
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into an-independent country since Pakistan might then do 
exactly the same2l. Critics of the rushed accession might 
wonder at his reasoning since International Law does allow for 
one country to send, troops into another at that country's 
specific request, but does not grant others the right to do 
likewise at their, own whim. However, on 26th October the 
Maharaja, supported by Sheik Abdullah, signed the Instrument of 
Accession, and in a covering, letter, promised to set up an 
interim Government and to ask Sheik Abdullah to carry out 
responsibilities in the emergency in conjunction with the Prime 
Minister 27. Lord Mountbatten accepted the Instrument of 
Accession but included the-following in his covering letter: 
"In consistence with their policy that in the case-of any 
State, where the issue of accession has been the subject of 
dispute, the question of accession should be decided-in 
accordance with the wishes of the people of the State, it is my 
Government's wish that as soon as law and order have been 
restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared-of-the invader, the 
question of the State's accession should be settled by a 
reference to the people 1128 . 
Indian Intervention 
As the Maharaja fled to Jammu, Sheik Abdullah furthered 
his own popularity by organising the defence of Srinagar,. 
whilst the Indian troops arrived just-inýtime to'beat the 
invading tribesmenýback from, the city. The'Indian AirýPorce, 
assisted by over a hundred civilian aircraft, worked day and 
night for three weeks ferrying troops over the dangerous 
500-mile mountainous route between Delhi and Srinagar. The 
Pakistanis refused to believe that the operation could have 
been anything other than the result of detailed and deliberate 
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planning for, many weeks, but the three British chiefs of the 
Army, Air Force and Navy signed statements asserting that the 
operation was entirely spontaneoUS21*. 
The''question also arises-as to how much assistance was- 
given-by Pakistan to the raiders. -Simply by allowing them to 
pass through her, territory, Pakistan was a party to the, 
invasion, albeit unwillingly. ',, The, British had always used a 
mixture of bribery-and well-armed guards, at, strategic positions 
to keep the tribesmen at bay., The new state of Pakistan was 
in no position to do-either. The (]British)--Governor of the 
North-West Frontier Province, Sir George Cunningham, appealed 
to the Commander of the Peshawar Division for preventative 
action-, but was told-firstlyýthat no Pakistani unit was 
sufficiently formed for action, -and-secondlyýthat Muslim-troo'ps 
asked to repel a tribal invasion of Kashmir, at that time would 
have laughed and Joined the enemy. It'does not seem likely 
that the Pakistan Government had any control over the'raiderý, 
or offered them any encouragement, but certainly they, "r6ceived 
assistance and support-from individual officials, including the 
leaking of supplies and-arms from the regular army'. -' -Then, 
when the Indian Army intervened in what the Pakistanis 
considered to be primarily a civil war, many Pakistani 
nationals joined the Azad, forces. From the beginning of 1948, 
with Indian intentions unknown, ýPakistani regular forces'were, 
increasingly deployed behind the irregular Azad forces, and 
units of the Pakistani Army were encouraged'to--go'-on extended 
*The writer nevertheless remained sceptical until assured 
personally by Ambassador Khub Chand, who was present at the Cabinet Meeting where the decision was made, that this 
was indeed the case. He said-they had even had trouble 
in locating the nearest battalion that could be sent out 
and in finding sufficient aircraft for the purpose - and that it was he himself who had ordered the civilian 
airlines chief that his aircraft should be used. 
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leave to help the Azad movement3O. 
Negotiation 
On November Ist,, with the Prime Ministers of both India 
and Pakistan too-ill to travel to meet each other, Lord 
Mountbatten met Mr. Jinnah in Lahore3l. - Mountbatten proposed 
a UN-organised plebiscite, which Jinnah, rejected and put 
forward a plan by which the two-Governors-General would issue a 
joint proclamation calling for a ceasefire. - If the tribesmen 
did not obey, the two armies would take collective action 
against them, the Governors-General would take control, effect 
demilitarization, and organise a plebiscite". The Indian 
Government rejected this plan. Speaking on the radio on 2nd 
November Nehru said: "We are prepared when peace and law and 
order have been established to have a referendum in Kashmir 
under some such international auspices as that of the UN"33. 
Pakistan then suggested a withdrawal of outside forces and UN 
administratlon of the State until the plebiscite could be held. 
Nehru did not think that the UN, which had no forces in 
Kashmir, could restore peace and order and that a UN role only 
arose after peace and order had been restored34. 
In December the two sides held quite constructive talks 
and there seemed to be the possibility of an amicable 
settlement. The idea of inviting a United Nations Commission 
to make recommendations to ensure a fair plebiscite was 
discussed, but no decision was reached: Liaquat Ali Khan, 
Prime Minister of Pakistan, wanted a neutral administrator to 
be appointed in place of Sheik Abdullah, whilst Nehru felt that 
Abdullah's was the first responsible ministry the State had 
ever had, based on the will of the people, with the National 
Conference analagous to the Congress in India or the Muslim 
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League in Pakistan. Nehru envisaged only a limited role for 
the UN in the form of observation and advice. The talks 
failed when Pakistan admitted she could not force the raiders 
to leave, and1ndia refused to withdraw her troops until they 
did". Mountbatten then suggested that the United Nations be 
called in unilaterally by India as he feared that if a solution 
were not found the fighting might degenerate into open war 
between the two Dominions. Thus on 31st December, 1947 India 
made an appeal to the Security"Council of the'UN36'. 
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CHAPTER THREE - UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT IN KASHMIR 
REFERENCE TO THE UN 
Debate in the Security Council 
An official letter of complaint is a necessary preliminary 
to a reference to the United Nations, and on 22nd December, 
1947 Nehru personally handed to Liaquat Ali Khan, who happened 
to be in Delhi, a letter asking Pakistan to deny all facilities 
to the raiders'. By 31st December no reply had been received 
and the Government of India formally appealed to the Security 
Council of the United Nations Organisationz. In fact, later 
that day a reply was received from Liaquat Ali Khan, with a 
lengthy catalogue of countercharges against India which he said 
Pakistan would, in turn, take to the United Nations. Two 
weeks later Pakistan did indeed make her own submission to the 
UN3. The two sides' differing views, not only on the cause 
and nature of the conflict, but also on ways of solving it, 
immediately became apparent. To, India the cause of the 
conflict was the tribal invasion and Pakistan's participation 
in it; to'Pakistan, however, the hostilities in Kashmir were 
only a part ofthe troubled relations between India, and 
Pakistan, and her, presentation was an exhaustive, account of all 
the problemsýdividing the two countries. She denied direct 
involvement in'the tribal invasion and charged that India had 
acquired the accession of Kashmir by fraud and violence, had 
unlawfully occupied Junagadh and neighbouring states, had 
pre-planned an extensive campaign of genocide against Muslims 
in several parts of India, -and was persistently attempting to 
destroy the State of Pakistan. - Pakistan also cleverly managed 
to have-the matter described as the India-Pakistan, case before 
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the Security Council, rather than the Kashmir Dispute, which 
effectively broadened the case in the eyes of the world4. 
India soon felt that the Security Council was more interested 
in-determining the validity of India's action in Kashmir, and 
studying the charges Pakistan brought against her, than in 
considering her complaint against Pakistan's aggression, and 
putting, an, end to the fighting in Kashmir. 
. 
Security Council Resolutions of 17 and 20 January, 1948', 
avoided all mention of the controversial issues involved, but 
called on the parties not to aggravate the situation, requested 
them to informýthe Council immediately of any material change 
in the situation, and made provision for a-three-member United 
Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) "to proceed 
to the spot as quickly as possible" with a mandate-to 
investigate the facts and exercise a mediatory influence. ý 
However, the Security Council spent four, -months debating, the 
issue before the Commission, eventually composed of five- 
members, was finally established, and it was July before-it 
reached the Subcontinent. Initially India, and Pakistanýwere 
each to choose-one member and those two were to elect the. 
third. India-chose Czechoslovakia, Pakistan Argentina, and 
the President of the Security Council designated the United 
States as the third member when the the other two members 
failed to agree. I- 
Josef Korbel, who became the Czech representative, felt 
that theýSecurity, Council did not handle the-situation either 
adequately orxealistically. ý He thought, that, the time it took 
to get UNCIP out to the Subcontinent was particularly 
inexcusable as with every-day that passed the situation became 
worse and the position of India and Pakistan more entrenched. 
At the very least he felt it should have been possible for a 
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Commission that was agreed upon in January to be on the 
Subcontinent before the snows melted and the fighting resumed 
with full force6. Lord'Mountbatten had'also hoped for an 
early despatch of the Commission, by the end of January at 
latest, and felt that the delay caused by deciding to seek a 
further resolution on the general issues meant a big polAical 
opportunity had been lost, and a serious psychological blunder 
committed'. 
The ensuing debate in the Security CouncilO was prolonged 
by bitter mutual accusations and total lack of consensus 
between the parties. ' A major area-of disagreement concerned 
the roles to be played by Sheik Abdullah-and byýthe-UN,. India 
was determined to maintain Abdullah in power, whereas Pakistan 
felt no'impartial plebiscite could take-place under his, 
Government, and therefore wished the UN to have-temporary' 
administrative authority; India believed, the'UN should have 
only an advisory and observer role. There was, therefore, 
from the beginning, an inherent resistance in India to any 
interventionist role that the UN might assign1tself in the 
Dispute, despite the fact that it was India who had initially 
referred the matter to that body. 
Presentation of the Case 
There-has been much criticism in India of the-Government's 
decision to take the Kashmir, problem, to, the Security Council., 
Py, the end of January, 1948 complaints, began-to appear-in the 
Indian press, andýAlan'Campbell-Johnson, tLord"Mountbatten's 
Press Attache, commented in, hisýdiary: ý`Unless India-can - 
establish some early formal'recognition of her legal title and 
moral grievance as a plaintiff, we can anticipate an early 
disillusionment in Delhi with-the-process-, of-the-new, 
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internationalism". I 
Government leaders and most academics in India blamed the 
Great Powers for creating a, situation around the Kashmir 
question, where India, the aggrieved party and the accuser, was 
made to appear as the accused. Nehru described India's 
reference of the issue to the Security Council as "an act of 
faith": India had nothing to conceal and little realised that 
a simple issue of aggression would get bogged down in world 
power politics". And it does seem that the Security Council 
inclined more towards Pakistan than India in the very early 
days of the Kashmir Dispute. But the Great Powers quickly 
initiated a non-partisan approach, either as a cover for their 
desire to remain neutral in the Dispute for political reasons, 
or in the sincere beliefýthat this was the only way to, gain the 
co-operation of both sides in order to bring the Dispute to a. 
successful conclusion. Nevertheless, the maJor damage was 
already done so far as India was concerned, -, and in any event, 
India believed that to treat the parties on an equal basis 
effectively favoured Pakistan as the wrongdoer. 
However, one Indian academic-specialising in the-United 
Nations, Professor K-. -P. Saksena, believes that it was India's 
mishandling which created the adverse situation: India should 
have known that members of the Security Council are not, jurists 
deciding issues on their merits, but representatives of. 
governments with their own vested interests to serve. In 1948 
Security Council members of both sides in the incipient Cold 
War looked upon India and Pakistan as, prospective client states 
and did not wish to appear partisan; therefore the two sides 
were neutral in the conflict. Writing in 1978 Professor. - 
Saksena, remarked: ".,.. what motivated us to take the issue to 
the Security Council remains a mystery evenýtoday", and went on 
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to describe furthermore how badly India presented her case3l. 
Professor Saksena maintained, that India's arguments were 
self-contradictory and her conduct of parliamentary diplomacy 
so poor that the outcome could not have been any better than it 
was; the initial memorandum, submitted to the-Security Council 
consisted of 15 long paragraphs and was not sent by cable to 
highlight the urgency of the situation, but in a casual, 
routine manner. He describes, India's submission as an attempt 
to Justify sending forces into Kashmir by saying firstly that 
it could not allow a neighbouring and friendly state to be, 
compelled by force to determine either its internal affairs or 
its external relations, and secondly that the accession of the 
State to the Dominion of India had made India legally 
responsible for the defence of the State; Saksena suggests 
that no thou*ght was given to the fact that the first contention 
had no legal Justification in terms of the Charter, and that 
the second one lost much of its validity when combined with and 
preceded by the first one. Further, India's complaint was 
totally blunted by its many reiterations of the common ties 
between India and Pakistan. He says that India's oral 
presentation before the Security Council continued to confuse 
the issue, as her representative argued on theýone hand that in 
view of the Instrument, of Accession Kashmir was an integral 
part of India, and that on the other India was still prepared 
to let Kashmir decide by means of a plebiscite under 
international auspices whether to Join India-or Pakistan or 
remain as an independent stateý Once this choice was offered 
the legality of the accession became conditional,, and Kashmir 
became an international issue in which Pakistan's-interests 
were equated with those of India. Had India merely said 
Kashmir could choose whether to stay with India or not, it 
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would have remained a domestic issue 12. 
Campbell-Johnson had warned Mountbatten that India's two 
representatives to the Security Council were not ideally chosen 
- Gopalswami Ayyangar was unknown and Sheik Abdullah too 
flamboyant and likely to weaken the case if he gave the sort of 
Press conferences he gave in Srinagar. Campbell-Johnson's 
diary subsequently reported that India1ared, even worse than he 
feared she would, with long indigestible speeches by Ayyangar 
and the personality of Sheik Abdullah being irreconcilable with 
the procedures of Lake Success. Furthermore, Sir Zafrullah 
Khan, an experienced and popular practitioner in UN dialectic 
was "as suave and smooth as the Indian delegates were awkward 
and angular". Eventually Campbell-Johnson informed 
Mountbatten that the case had been abominally presented and 
that nearly every canon of public relations procedure had been 
either violated or neglected; nor had enough attention been 
paid to answering Pakistan's case against India". On 12th 
February, 1948 the Indian representative, ýrequested an 
adjournment so that he could return to'Delhi for consultations, 
a move which did nothing to impress on the Security Council the 
urgency of the situation 14. 
In view of the fact that fighting was already in progress, 
India would seem to have been'mistaken also in invoking Chapter 
Six of the Charter in her submission, as this refers-to:, 
situations likely to endanger international peace and security, 
when Chapter Seven, specifically concerned with acts of 
aggression, might have been more appropriate. Certainly many 
Indians have complained that Pakistan, should have been 
castigated as an aggressor. But Nehru held the--subtly 
different view that India had not asked that Pakistan be 
branded an aggressor in Kashmir because "that is not in our 
56 
opinion the way to seek a settlement. What we have pointed 
out was that the fact of Pakistan's aggression should be 
remembered ... in considering this question... "15. In view of 
the, fact that decisions under Chapter Seven are, at least in 
theory, legally binding, whilst recommendations under Chapter 
Six are not, -Josef Korbel maintained that the Security Council 
itself'should have considered the matter under Chapter Seven so 
that its decisions would have had a better chance of 
enforcement as, it would-have imposed on-India and-Pakistan an 
obligation to abide by them*., -Korbel admits,, however, that 
this might have attracted a, Soviet veto; whereas at the time 
the Soviet Union, together with the Ukraine, confined itself to 
refraining from both-the debatesý, and the votes"., 
THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR INDIA'AND PAKISTAN, 
Security Council Resolution of 21st April, 1948 
The Indianýdelegation returnedAo--the Security-, Council-on 
10th March, but not'until 21st, April did the Council, pass a 
further resolutioný, in which, it-called for an end to-, the -- 
fighting and-noted with satisfaction that,, the,, future of, Kashmir 
would be decided through a-free and-impartial--plebiscite. it 
increased the membership of UNCIP from three to, five, 
nominating Colombia and, Belgium as the additional members, and 
recommended that Pakistan should secure the, withdrawal of., 
tribesmen and Pakistan nationals, and that India should 
*After the wars of 1965 and 1971, the Security Council did 
move from the language of Chapter Six to the language of 
Chapter Seven in "demanding" a ceasefire. However, by 
this time the legal authority behind the demand was more 
than somewhat diluted by the knowledge that it was 
unlikely to be followed up by any necessary enforcement 
action. 
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progressively withdraw its forces to the minimum strength 
required for the maintenance of law and order. It suggested 
that a coalition cabinet be formed in Kashmir, representative 
of all major political groups; that measures to be taken for 
the release of political prisoners and political freedom; and- 
that a Plebiscite Administrator be nominated to ensure freedom 
and impartiality in the eventual plebsicite. Notably, it also 
made the first mention of the use of observers in Kashmir: 
"The Commission should establish''in Jammu and Kashmir such 
observers as it may'require of any of the proceedings in 
pursuance of the measures indicated in the foregoing 
paragraphs " 17 
Initially the Indian Government was very hostile to the 
Resolution, believing it did not sufficiently spell out 
Pakistan's obligations, nor take account of Kashmir's accession 
to India and India's duty to-defend Kashmir against external 
aggression. 'In addition India, -feared a coalition government 
would see the collapse of the administration in Kashmir; and 
finally India, objected to the powers being given to the - 
Plebiscite Administrator. Pakistan-was-also disappointed with 
the Resolution, feeling that-earlier ground had been lost by a 
British andAmerican desire to redress the, balance., Pakistani 
newspapers even urged a closer collaboration with the Soviet 
Union". However, in spite of their rejection of the 
Resolution, both India and Pakistan said they were prepared to 
accept the good offices of UNCIP on the Subcontinent. And 
indeed it was emphasized by some members of the Security 
Council that the Resolution wasýonly meant as a recommendation 
to the parties, as a plan submitted for their consideration. 
Although the'ýýCouncil felt that that recommendation and plan was 
the best it could give, it did not. exclude the possibility of 
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the Commission, after studies on the spot and further 
discussions with the two Governments, considering alternative 
solutions". 
Pakistan Troops in Kashmir 
The Commission finally reached the Subcontinent on 7th 
July, 1948, 'accompanied by Erik Colban who, as the 
Secretary-General's Special Representative, acted as a link 
between UNCIP and, the Secretary-General, and also held informal 
discussions with both parties. - An atmosphere of severe 
mistrust on each side, and a situation politically and 
militarily quite different from what the-Security Council had 
thought it to be when it had passed its Resolution, awaite&its 
arrival. ý-The Commission members learned immediately. from 
Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Sir, Zafrullah Khan, that three 
Pakistan brigades had been operating in Kashmir-since May which 
made the, situation-much more 5erious, than either they or the - 
Security Council, had realised. Sir Zafrullah Khan claimed the 
troops had moved inýto protect the territory-of. Pakistan, -, from 
possible aggreS51oni, to prevent a "fait accompli", by-the - 
Indians, and to prevent the influx of refugees into Pakistan2O. 
If UNCIP had been despatched to the Subcontinent immediately it 
had been mooted in January, 1948, it might by-its very presence 
have prevented this offensive, and the continuance of 
large-scale operations. As it was, India wanted the fighting 
to stop before anything was done about the plebiscite while 
Pakistan thought-if the"plebiscite arrangement5 were agreed the 
fighting would automatically stop. The Commission-cabled the 
information to the-Security Council, but did not inform., 
India 21. Sir Girja Bajpai, Secretary-General of the Indian 
Ministry of External Affairs, however, lost no time in-telling 
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the Commission that Pakistan was now using its regular Army, 
and that there was therefore-an undeclared war in progress. 
If the future of-Jammu and Kashmir was to be determined by the 
sword, he said, there was, n6 longer any question of a 
plebiscite. If Pakistan wanted a decision by force andýthat 
decision went against Pakistan, Pakistan, could not invoke the 
machinery of the United Nations, to obtain what it had failed to 
secure by its chosenýweapon of force22. Nehru's view was that 
the Commission could not reasonably demand a ceasefire of India 
when it was notýpublicly admitted that Pakistan troops were in 
23 Kashmir . 
ý This new, and unforeseen situation caused by the presence 
of the Pakistan troops in Kashmir itself forced the Commission 
to spend much time and thought on the question of ceasefire and 
truce independently ofýthe question of the plebiscite 24. *1 
Having anticipated that its main task would be to'influence the 
withdrawal of the tribesmen., which would be followed by Indian 
Army withdrawal and then'a plebiscite, the'Commission now found 
itself with the task of mediation between twoýgovernments. 
Korbel maintains that it gradually won the-confidence of both 
sides but, wasýstill`unable-to bring them together',, ýand in'spite 
of the lack of success in'dealing, with! Nehru, he did not doubt 
that Nehru felt strongly about the righteousness-of India's 
case 25. 
UNCIP Resolutions of 13th August, 1948 and 5th January, 1949 
By 10th August, 1948 there was, sufficient, optimism among 
Commission members for them-to have Colban cable the 
Secretary-General with a request for 20 Military Observers "in 
view of the Possible achievement of a Ceasefire Agreement in 
the near future"24 . On 13th August the COMInisSion adopted its 
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first Resolution, having warned Pakistan that it could not let 
pass completely unnoticed the fact that, still supposedly 
unknown to the rest of the world, it was using its regular 
troops in Kashmir. Under Part I of the Resolution the two 
governments were to agree upon the issuing of a ceasefire order 
within four days of their acceptance of the Resolution, and the 
Commission would appoint Military Observers to supervise the 
ceasefire. Under Part II, regarding a truce agreement, "as 
the presence of troops of Pakistan in the*territory of Kashmir 
constitutes a material change in the situation since it was 
represented by the Government'of Pakistan before the Security 
Council" Pakistan would withdraw her troops from Kashmir, and 
the tribesmen and Pakistani-nationals-ýwould also withdraw; the 
territory thus evacuated was to be administered'by the local 
authorities under the surveillance of the Commission. Then 
the Government of India would begin to withdraw the bulk of its 
forces and, pending the acceptance of the conditions for a 
final settlement of the, dispute, India would maintain a minimum 
force to assist local authorities inýthe-observance of law, and 
order. Under Part III both governments were asked to reaffirm 
their agreement that the future of Kashmir, would-be determined 
in accordance with, the will-of the people 27*. 
Detailed discussion with both parties followed., India 
then accepted the Resolution, accompanyingýher acceptance with 
a number of agreed points regarding its interpretation. 
Pakistan also accepted the Resolution, but with so many 
qualifications and reservations, that the Commission had to 
"tantamount to rejection 
'128 
consider the answeras 
Pakistan's main objection was the absence of detailed 
*See Appendix II. 
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guarantees for a free plebiscite in Kashmir. She was of the 
opinion* that once fighting had stopped, India would be 
satisfied with a de facto division of Kashmir, the situation 
woul -d subsequently become stýbilized, and India would then 
obstruct alree plebiscite. Sir Zafrul'lah Khan said that any 
Pakistan Government who accepted the Resolution as it stood 
would be thrown out of office by public opinion. He believed 
it was not in India's interest'-ýo accept a free and fair 
plebiscite which would be'bound to go in Pakistan's favour, 
whereas if there was no agreement on a plebiscite'India could 
keep'the part of Kashmir which she then occupied, which would 
be to her advantage 21 
The Commission left'-Ehe Subcontinent on"21st September in 
order to draft new proposals to supplement its August 
Resolution. These were presented to the parties on 11th 
December, and were again followed by detailed discussions with 
both sides. To counter Pakistan's'previous objections, the 
Commission proposed to state categorically that "the question 
of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or 
Pakistan will'be decided through the democratic method of a 
free and impartial plebiscite". Provision for the nomination 
of a plebiscite administrator, to be formally appointed by the 
Government of Jammu and Kashmir, so as'not tý inter±ere'with 
the sovereign rights of that state, 'was also suggested3o. 
On 25th December, 1948, Sir Zafrullah Khan wrote to the 
I Commission expressing his reservations and'including a long 
memorandum of clarifications, but bagicallk accepting the 
Commission's revised proposals3l. After long discussions 
resulting in'two long aides-. memoiie", - India'also accepted the 
*Justifiably so in the light of future events. 
62 
proposals, but"requested that the proceedings in choosing a 
Plebiscite Administrator should be kept confidential, for the 
time being, andýthat no public announcement of the name of the 
person selected be made without prior consultation with the 
Indian Government",., -The Indian Commander-in-Chief then duly 
cabled the Pakistan Commander-in-Chief (both British officers 
at the time! ) suggesting a ceasefire, an&this finally came 
intoýeffect on 1st January, 194934-. - - 
On 5thýJanuary the Commission met in New York to embody 
its proposal in a formal resolution* and Josef Korbel, then- 
Chairman of UNCIP, sent a cable to the Indian and Pakistan 
Governments incorporating the agreed principlesýand saying that 
the Commission would'return to the, Subcontinent inýview of the 
fact that the resolution had been accepted by India and 
Pakistan". ýUNCIP returned to the Subcontinent in February 
1949, Korbel having been removed from, his-position by the new 
Communist Government of Czechoslovakia'and replaced by Dr. 
Oldrich Chyle3l**., I11,11 1 
PLEBISCITE, PARTITION OR INDEPENDENCE 
The Plebiscite 
In accepting the Instrument of Accession in October, 1947 
India had agreed to the ratification or otherwise of the 
accession, by "reference to the PeoPle"O., At the, time this 
did not-necessarily imPlY offering them the possibility of 
acceding, instead to Pakistan., Furthermore, had, the choice, 
*See Appendix III. 
**The two events-may be unconnected, but on, '24th February 
Colban cabled the Secretary-General: "Commission agrees 
with me that Czech observers not needed as present quota 
sufficient"37. 
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been restricted as to whether or not the State of Jammu and, 
Kashmir should accede to India, the matter would have been kept 
within the domestic jurisdiction of Indiel. Mention of a 
referendum "under international auspices" was first publicly 
made by Nehru-on-Indian radio on 2nd November, 1947, 
Mountbatten already having--raised the subject at his recent 
meeting with Jinnah*. The-idea was taken up by the UN 
Security Council after India's representative had, perhaps 
rather thoughtlessly, specifically proposed a plebiscite 
offering, the choice of India, Pakistan-or independence 40. The 
Indian Government was thus committedbnlyý'by-degrees, and 
ultimately by its acceptance of the UNCIP, resolution, to the 
UN-spon-Sored plebiscite, which it-, then; became, increasingly 
reluctant to hold. 
tI, 
The Secretary-General's representative, Erik Colban, gave 
a-great deal of thought to theýproblems of holding a 
plebiscite. His conclusions at the'beginning of August 1948, 
written at the time merely-to clarify matters in, his own mind, 
go straight toý. the heart of the. matterp and although, they 
encompass an ex post-facto crystallisation-of India's feelings, 
after her somewhatýconfused early guarantees, his analysis of'. 
the situation, is-, difficult to fault. 
Colban wrote: "It would seem that the approach of the 
plebiscite problem on the part of India'and on that of Pakistan 
has been different from the veryýbeginning. India appealed to 
the Security Council and asked for its intervention in order to 
obtain an: end-to the incursions of tribesmen in the State of 
Jammu and Kashmir; with direct or indirect assistance, and 
perhaps even the participation of Pakistan. ' India's - 
*See page 48. 
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declaration of willingness to hold a plebiscite was from the 
very beginning-conditional upon order having been restored and 
the invaders having been driven out. India seems to have had 
in, view, -a consultation of public opinion, administered entirely 
through the State authorities of Jammu and Kashmir, and 
assisted by such Indian forces as might still, in the view of 
the Indian and Kashmir Governments, be necessary for the 
maintenance of order-and to guarantee the external security of 
the State... -But the-Pakistan'Government-viewed the plebiscite 
scheme in a different light, as dependent upon-the previous 
withdrawal of all outsiders, including members of the Armed 
Forces of the Indian Union, the, restoration and rehabilitation 
of all-Muslim residents of the Jammu and Kashmir State as on-15 
August, -1947, payment to them by, the Indian Union of 
compensation for damage and injuries, the establishment of an 
impartial independent-administration-in the, State of Jammu and 
Kashmir and, fully representative of, the people-of that State. 
The Security Council's resolution of the 21st April, --1948 
appears to have, to some extent, a similar conception 
concerning the-conditions of-the, plebiscite to-that ofthe 
Pakistan Government. The Indianýobjections to, the--resolution 
thus become understandable 1'41; 
In the HeN York Times-, of 16th'June, 1948 Mr. Robert 
Trumbull reported: "The1ndian Press has begun-to lay the 
groundwork, for the rejection of any recommendations that the 
Commission may make unless they favour India-, Dispatche5 from 
Kashmir make it clear that--the pro-India Government of Sheik 
Abdullah is now unwilling to accept even-an impartial 
plebiscite Nehru also seemed already to be moving away 
from the idea of a plebiscite-by the time the Commission 
arrived on the Subcontinent. He said that with the continuing 
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fighting it would be dangerous to prolong the conflict until 
the, following year as the situation might deteriorate, but that 
it. was impossible to get the State sufficiently back to 
normality forýa plebiscite to be held that year 43 . Mohammed 
Ali, Secretary-General of the'Pakistan Government agreed it 
would be impracticable to arrange a plebiscite in 1948 unless 
44* it was restricted. to the Vale of Kashmir The population 
had been considerably displaced along the borders and the 
records in many, villages hadýbeen destroyed when the villages, 
were burned., -It was not even possible to give a very accurate 
estimate of the numbers, of people involved 45, , Sheik Abdullah 
suggested-it would take three years to arrange - and that even 
then it, would be-difficult to ascertain impartially the wishes 
of the people scattered over-large-areas and possibly subjected 
to intimidation 46 ., 
However, the Security Council, whilst not excluding other 
solutions from being investigated as a basis of agreement- 
between the-parties, had laid great stress on the importance of 
the plebiscite-. as a meanst-of stopping the. fighting rather than 
the other way round, and also,, for-layingtthe,, groundwork for a 
continuing and stable peace between India and Pakistan. Erik 
Colban now-doubted this latter, premise, believing that the, 
outcome of any, plebiscite would-not be, sufficiently conclusive 
for the losing side unquestioningly to acceptýthe result, and 
the greater the, minority - which he felt, might well be 
considerable - the greater, zeason to expect further trouble. 
He thought that in spite of the fact that some 78%. of the 
inhabitants were Muslims a considerable percentage of these, in 
*The possibility of then using statistical data to 
determine the wishes of the rest of the State is discussed 
in the section on Partition, page 74. 
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addition to probably the whole of the other 22% of the 
population, would opt for India. Many would look upon the 
question mainly from the point of view of personal, material 
interests, and, the majority were backward, illiterate and 
easily influenced by propaganda. The Vale of Kashmir's prime 
sourceýof revenue was from the tourist trade and Colban felt 
as, more importantly, did'the very influential Sheik Abdullah 
that such traffic might be heavier, from or through India than 
Pakistan, and that that and other economic considerations might 
induce many, Muslims-to, vote for India. Even Mohammed Ali, 
Secretary-General of the Government of Pakistan, admitted that 
this could beýtrue for part of-the population of Srinagar, 
though he thought not1or the cultivators in the Vale-, since 
Pakistan had been the receiver of-some of theirrmain products. 
Colban doubted that a decision based on a very-close vote would 
prove-a means of pacification: should the result-, be'adhesion 
to India, the Azad-forces would-in all probability-not give up 
fighting for at least certain-parts of the-territory to go to 
Pakistan and the tribesmen would also continue to stir up- 
trouble; should the result be adhesion to Pakistan, ý the future 
political and economic relations betweenýIndia, and Pakistan 
might become difficult. -Heforesaw, that even'if the Indian 
Government accepted the, decision as legally binding, ýa campaign 
of cession to India-of at'least, parts of the, territory, of the 
State of Jammu and-Kashmir would be initiated, based upon 
, 'economic and cultural considerations of historical, 
relations". Sheik Abdullah also expressed-to-Korbel his 
doubts about whether the losing party, either India or-: - 
Pakistan, would accept the verdi ct4s. 
I The Commission was initially prevented from visiting' 
Kashmir, and were told the issue, would, be decided in Delhi and 
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Karachi4l. By the time the members were finally allowed to 
visit the State, -in September 1948, they were told that many 
people were prepared to, support Sheik Abdullah's National 
Conference simply because of its success in promoting 
Muslim-Hindu-Sikh unity, claiming that the unity of the 
Kashmiris after centuries of alien rule outweighed any-communal 
considerations. - The influx of the'raiders had changed the 
political views of many of the more influential citizens. Not 
only had the tribesmen looted and killed indiscriminately, but 
also evidence in the form of vehicles, equipment and supplies 
. 
gave the victims the impression-thAt assistance to-the raiders 
had been given by Pakistan. With the flight of the Maharaja 
and, the collapse of the state forces, the police organization 
disintegrated and in the general panic the entire valley was on 
the verge of chaos. Confidence was restored not only by the, 
arrival of the Indian Army but by the organization by the 
National Conference of the defence of Srinagar. As a result 
large numbers who had previously opposed Sheik Abdullah had 
come to have confidence in his progressive unity--programme, 
rather than in those of parties which had divisive communal 
bases. They pointed out that the Azad'group-consisted of 
non-Kashmiris, from the north and west, more akin to:, th6. 
Punjabis than to themselves. -, Considerable support for Sheik 
Abdullah in East Punch was claimed, though-it was admitted that 
the western areas were entirely pro-Pakistah"., ', 
Time and again individual members of the Commission-were 
approached by simple, modest'people-who told them with-, tears in 
their eyes how anxiously everyone had awaited the arrival of 
the-Commission, which was beseeched to undo wrongs and stop the 
political terror and corruption and make it Possible'for them 
to choose freely. Members of the Commission felt that in 
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Srinagar Sheik Abdullah seemed to have genuine popularity, but 
away from there the people were being subjected to what they 
recognised as totalitarian methods of organising a 
.. spontaneous" expression of the people, and they also heard 
shouts for accession with Pakistan5l. They came to the 
conclusion that the, Kashmiris were politically uneducated, and 
that. under any feeling. of pressure they would not express their 
wish freely. Furthermore, the technicality of carrying out 
the plebiscite seemed beyond the scope of reality in a vast and 
rugged country populated by isolated villages. Nevertheless 
they felt obliged to adhere to their brief, and continue in 
their attempts to promote, conditions suitable for the holding 
of a plebiscite 52 
During the course of the negotiations in December 1948 
over the revised UNCIP. proposals it became quite clear that the 
Indians would have much preferred another solution of the 
Kashmir problem than through a plebiscite, but Colban insisted 
that the Commission had to follow the lines of the Security 
Council Resolution and do its best to realize a plebiscite; 
only if the Plebiscite Administrator, in agreement with the 
Commission, were ultimately to come to the conviction that a 
plebiscite would not work, might alternative solutions be 
considered. Nehru maintained_that when he urged the 
submission of the matter to a popular referendum, he had not in 
mind a plebiscite as the only alternative: 
-a 
plebiscite-was a 
means of getting a decision_by "yeses and nos" but that was 
hardly the best procedure and results based upon it might not 
lead to real peace. He thought that election of a Constituent 
Assembly'with powers ! to I decide aftei due'consideration upon the 
organization of the Government'of the State, frontier 
rectifications and other such p roblems might be a bett'e'r 
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procedure". However, in accepting the second UNCIP 
resolution in December 1948, India did agree that a plebiscite 
should first be attempted, whilst making it quite clear that no 
arrangements should be made for it until Parts I and II of the 
Commission's Resolution'of 13th August had been implemented. 
Colban understood this to mean that the Plebiscite 
Administrator could not be formally appointed by the Government 
of Jammu and'Kashmir-until, then, -since, Nehru had agreed that 
India, could not reasonably, oppose immediate preliminary 
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consultations regarding the details of the plebiscite . 
-, The Commission wanted to set'up a headquarters in Srinagar 
with-a Pakistani representative assigned to it, but the 
Government of, Jammu and Kashmir, would not allow such a 
representative. As time went, on the Commission became 
seriously concerned with the non-co-operative attitude of Sheik 
Abdullah, particularly in the matter of refugees and political 
prisoners, but also in connectioný-with the Commission members 
when, on their second visit to Kashmir in 1949 he refused to 
allow them accommodation in the Government Guest House because 
it had to be-kept "for important-visitors 1685 . 
Plebiscite Administrator 
Some weeks, of discussion took place in early 1949, in 
which both India-'and Pakistan expressed disappointment at the 
Secretary-General's list of Possible-Plebiscite Administrator 
candidates. They considered none of the names suggested had 
sufficient standing: Pakistan also--insisted he be American*, 
*The Colombian Representative told the Securityý, Council,, 
during a debateýon Kashmir in 1957, that the Colombian 
delegate to UNCIP had urged that the, Plebiscite 
Administrator be from a neutral country, ideally the 
President of the International Red Cross, as suggested by 
India, since that was the only way to induce India to 
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feeling that that would enable him to take a strong and 
determined attitude where necessary57. Finally the American 
Admiral Nimitz, was chosen. Colban, however, suggested to the 
Secretary-General-that-Admiral Nimitz should not travel to the 
Subcontinent until the Truce Agreement was at least approaching 
completion, which, he thought might take some weeks, and that 
formal appointment should not be made until after the Truce 
Agreement had been, signed, and Parts I and II, of the UNCIP 
Resolution had been carried out5e. 
In mid-April it was announced that Admiral Nimitz would 
arrive on the. Subcontinent on 30th: April, but this date was 
subsequently and indefinitely-delayed because-of lack-of 
progress on the-truce". '- On 10th May Colban*wrote to the 
Secretary-General stressing Pakistan's fears that India, might 
obstruct the formal appointment of Nimitz". bn 6th June 
Nimitz wrote to the Secretary-General attaching his preliminary 
plans for the-Plebiscite but'recommending that, whilst he would 
continue to hold, himself in readiness, the Plebiscite Mission 
which had been formed at Lake Success should be dissolved, in 
the interests of, realism and-economy, -since,, it was apparent 
that a, plebiscite could-not, be held-that year". 
- Colban reported-that-it was, generallyýconsidered that the 
following spring, was the earliest possible date since, in- 
addition to the problem-of the truce agreement, there were 
500,, 000 refugees to, be-returned to. their homes. He himself 
believed also that the atmosphere'. for a plebiscite was not good 
since the propaganda'war had not ceased, in spite of', the 
abide by its agreement on a plebiscite, which had been 
obtained with such difficulty. He said that, - 
unfortunately other delegations had explicit instructions 
to urge for a US citizen; had India's choice been 
accepted, the plebiscite would have been held 56 . 
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physical ceasefire 62. Nimitz, however, felt that if the 
plebiscite was postponed to the indefinite future, India would 
have the opportunity of so consolidating her position in the 
contested area'that the conditions of a "fair" plebiscite might 
never exist, which would create-continuing and even increased 
bitterness between, -the two countries. He already believed, in 
fact, that the entire-question would have to be referred back 
to the Security Council which might then endeavour to find a 
solution other than, a plebiscite63. - 
ý With still'no progress in sight and'at his own suggestion, 
Admiral Nimitz, went; on leave'with pay in May 1950, and on his 
return went on leave without pay "until required to-resume my 
functions as Plebiscite Administrator "64. -In January 1951 a 
member of the British Commonwealth Relations Office suggested 
to Colban, who-, was-, in London, in, connection with the 
Commonwealth Prime-Ministers, Conferencei, that Nimitz might no 
longer be acceptable to Nehru". In September 1953 Nimitz 
offered his resignation to Secretary-General Hammarskjold, and 
the following month told the Secretary-General's Executive 
Assistant, Andrew Cordier, -that, everything he read confirmed 
his'conviction that there would be no plebiscite of,, the kind 
envisaged by the UN so long as Prime Minister Nehru: ýwas in 
poweel. Cordier assured Nimitz that he had-made it clear to 
the Secretary-General and the, US authorities that it would be 
unfair to Nimitz personally, to allow him to become a centre of 
controversy, between India and Pakistan through the UN', s delay 
in accepting his resignation., Pakistan, however, l-was 
reluctant to have him resign47. , Hammarskjold also wanted to 
be sure'that India would agree to a successor, as he felt the 
chances of reaching a solution would otherwise be lessened. 
In December 1953 Nimitz wrote again, suggesting his resignation 
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be accepted before the "so-called" friendship and goodwill 
between India and the United States "reaches a vanishing 
point"68*. Nevertheless, it was not until the end of 1954 
that Pakistan agreed to the resignation, because at this point 
India, seemed prepared to, accept a Norwegian as successor. In 
the event, a, successor was never-appointed. Hammarskjold's 
letter to Nimitz, dated 17th-December, 1954 and accepting his 
resignation; is on file in Cordier's papers". Cordier 
himself, howeveri told the Chief Military Observer in Kashmir, 
General Nimmo, in April-1955 that in spiteýof his wanting to be 
relieved of-the, responsibility, Admiral Nimitz was still 
Plebiscite Administrator, in order, to maintain the status quo 
until there'seemedito be progress atýthe Prime"Ministerial, 
level" 
. 
ý In the meantime, in-, 1950, the, -Commission had been wound, up 
and, a single mediator, Sir Owen Dixon, appointed. to take its 
place. ' j, .111. 
Sir Owen Dixon 
By Resolution 80 of 14th March, 1950, the Security Council 
called upon India and Pakistan to prepare within five months a 
programme of demilitarization and proposed to appoint a UN 
Representative inýIndia and Pakistan-to assist there'. Sir 
Owen Dixon, duly appointed, arrived on the-Subcontinent on 27th 
May and spent a few days each in New Delhi and Karachi speaking 
to the relevant authorities, and then a month in Kashmir, where 
he travelled a good deal in order to gain a further 
understanding of the situation, -and had, several interviews-, with 
12 Sheik Abdullah . 
*The situation as at this time is discussed in detail on 
pages 267-277. 
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- Since the'UNCIP Resolution specifically stated that a 
plebiscite should decide the issue Sir Owen felt that he had to 
follow the course already'taken by the Commission, and the 
Security Council, even if the chances of success were much 
reduced by the previous months-of failed negotiations. Only 
if he were satisfied thatýno agreement could be brought about 
on the prerequisite-conditions-for a plebiscite, including 
particularly'demilitarization, - did Sir Owen feel he could turn 
to some other form of settlement. ' He believed it-was 
necessary to meet many-ýof India's objections but thought that 
if the State Government of Jammu and Kashmir retained all its 
powers, - and could exert, whatever influenceýarose from its 
position, there were the-gravest dangers, to a free expression 
of the will of, the, inhabitants;, --on the other hand, if the 
result were-adver5e to Pakistan, the latter would challenge the 
plebiscite. He therefore worked on-more than one set of plans 
to deal, with the situation'and met'the Prime Ministers of India 
and Pakistan for'discussions. However, --he, finally decided 
that Nehru would never agree to any conditions which would 
permit the plebiscite, in Sir Owen's opinion, to be conducted 
fairly. The two Prime Ministers agreed'there seemed to be no 
hopeýof-reaching agreement on demilitarization or-on conditions 
to follow demilitarization, so Sir Owen made an attempt at , 
obtaining the agreement of India and, Pakistan on a partition 
of the State73. 
Partition 
On 21st July, 1948, two weeks after the COmmission-arrived 
on the Subcontinent, members drafted (but did not apparently 
send) a cable to the President'. of-the Security Council, saying 
that Nehru seemed to prefer, theddea of partition'to'that of a 
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plebiscite, although Zafrullah Khan, Foreign Minister of 
Pakistan*, was against partition 74. At about the same time the 
American delegate to UNCIP distributed confidentially to 
members of the Commission and to Erik Colban a paper containing 
very tentative and non-committal considerations of a possible 
solution through partition7s. - Erik Colban felt that there 
seemed-to be nothing in the Security Council records that would 
prevent the Plebiscite Administrator and the Commission from 
interpreting the-result of the plebiscite in such a way that a 
partition of the territory might be, effected if India, Pakistan 
and Kashmir could agree on such a solution76. I 
Asked whether the plebiscite-should applyý-to the whole 
State, Mohammed Ali, Secretary-General of the Pakistan 
Government, replied, that the result might be-foreseen with such 
certainty, in different parts of the State that it might perhaps 
be superfluous to-apply it in those, parts., He said that it 
would be necessary in the Vale of Kashmir,, whereýit would be, a 
much simpler affair and could therefore, quickly beýheld., The 
combined results of the plebiscite, --in the Vale-and of , 
statistical calculations showing the position in other parts of 
the territory would then lead to the whole of, the-territory 
acceding to one of the two Dominions. He himself did not have 
in view any partition-of the territory, and in fact strove to 
give the impression that it was a foregone conclusion, that a 
fair plebiscite would lead to the accession to Pakistan. 
Colban'5- mind, however, was turning towards the possibility-of 
a speedy solution by means of a plebiscite in the Vale alone, 
that could lead either to accession to one of-the parties or to 
partition, though he admitted that the use-of statistical data 
for the other regions might not meet with-a-favourable 
reception in India. He also believed that if partition was 
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decided upon it was probably better arrived at by negotiation 
rather than by plebiscite, except in the Vale of Kashmir 77*. 
When the Commission visited Kashmir in September 1948 
Sheik Abdullah seemed, in desperation, to be prepared to resort 
to the idea, of partition, since it seemed the only solution to 
stop theýfighting and suffering". The following month at the 
Imperial Conference in London Nehru told the Prime Minister of 
Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, -that some kind of partition was his 
preferred solution to the Dispute 71,, and in January, 1949 the- 
Indian Defence Minister, Sardar Baldev Singh told-Colban that 
whilst he fully endorsed the Indian Government in accepting the 
Commission's proposals relating-to a plebiscite, he would have 
much preferred partition aý3 aýsolution, to the Kashmir 
probleOO. Indian press-editorials sometimes'also mentioned 
the possibility-of partition of the State, but the Pakistan 
press vehemently, attacked the idea". Sir Zafrullah Khan, the 
Pakistan Foreign Minister, always, insisted on a plebiscite and 
was against partition as this would extend the Indian frontier 
with Pakistan and increase the perceived threat to"Pakistan 
from Indie'-. &I 
, Having left the 
Subcontinent with the Commission in 
*It seems unlikely in any event that, even if the 
principle had been allowed, the two sides, would have, been 
able to agree on what the statistics were saying in every 
, case. Ladakh, for example, would have been an area of 
contention. The administrative area of Ladakh consisted 
of three districts: Skardu (in Baltistan) and Kargil, 
populated by about 150,000 Muslims, and Leh (in Ladakh 
proper), populated mainly by 40,000'Buddhists. When the 
Commission arrived on the Subcontinent in the summer of 
1948 none of these regions-had been-involved in the - 
fighting, but by the time of the Ceasefire at the end of 
the year this was not the case. The Skardu district was 
then held by Pakistan, and the Kargil and Leh districts 
were in-Indian hands. Generally speaking it seems that 
the Buddhists of Ladakh would, have preferred independence 
or association with Tibet, but strongly preferred India to 
either Kashmir or Pakistan. 
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October 1949, Colban returned in February 1950, still as 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General, but, no longer 
connected with UNCIP, which ceased to exist from 1st July, 
1950. At the end of the month he wrote a long letter to the 
Secretary-General reporting an "off-the-record" meeting he had 
had regarding partition of the, State with Mr. Vishnu Sahay, the 
Indian Minister for, Kashmir. Mr. Sahay did not feel any 
concern as to whether the Valley of Kashmir remained with India 
or not; what was important was for India and Pakistan to live 
in peace together. , The Azad provinces in the'West were of 
little interest to India and if incorporated would only mean 
endless trouble with the, inhabitants83*. India would have-to 
keep the mainly Hindu Jammu, however, and since the Buddhists 
in Ladakh had expressed, a desire to remain with, India he 
thought there was no reason not to let-them do so. Concerning 
the mountainous and sparsely populated Northern Areas which had 
attracted so much, discussion in the truce negotiations**, he 
denied, they had-any military or economic-value for India and he 
could not see, why Pakistan could not have them. The-real 
reason for India's insistence on its right to garrison, the 
areas and for administration to, revert to the Kashmir 
Government was that there were about'200,000 persons-living 
there who, in the event of a plebiscite covering, the whole 
state, might be a decisive factor. - The-real problem, thus, 
would only be how to deal with the Valley of Kashmir, but since 
it was such a well-defined-area it should be quite pos5ible to 
find out what the inhabitants there would really favour. -- Mr. i 
*The sentiments in the Kashmir Valley proper and the area 
inhabited by Kashmiris-differed from those in the western 
areas where the people were largely Punjabi speaking and 
were descended from settlers from the Punjab. 
**See pages 90-92. 
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Sahay, thought there would be 70% support for his view in India. 
Mr., Patel, the Deputy, Prime Minister, was definitely in favour, 
but not prepared, to-take'any initiative as Nehru's position was 
more-doubtful and, the latter was in charge of foreign 
affairS84. , Mr. 'Sahay also said that Mr. Bakshi, Vice Prime- 
Minister ofJammu-and Kashmir had expressed his agreement with 
the plarPl, 'but a few weeks later Colban said Bakshi seemed to 
have changed his mind, '! having told pressmen that he would not 
be party to the partition of Kashmir in any shape or forM86. 
However, since Sheik Abdullah had, come out against partition, 
Bakshi might have been giving expression to the Prime 
Minister's'view without, necessarily having abandoned his own 
In a further, letter-, -at the end of February 1950, Colban 
suggested, that if a, plebiscite for the whole territory brought 
30% or 40% of-the, population under what they would consider 
foreign domination, the UN-Representative* should be free to 
submit adequate-proposals so as to bring about a solution 
whereby theýwill of the population was truly carried out, 
taking into-account all relevant factors of a political, 
militaryt,, economic.. religious and geographic nature. He 
believed that if this led to partition if would be a settlement 
on a democratic, line inýaccordance with the will of the 
population". In April*1950 Colban became Diplomatic Adviser 
to Sir Owen Dixon, -the first UN Representative in India and 
Pakistan. - His influence with regard to the suggestions 
towards partition, which Sir Owen made in his report is quite 
apparent. Since the Secretary-General was already aware of 
the direction of, ý-Colban's thinking, it can only be assumed that 
he also inclined to such a possible solution of the Dispute. 
*Whose'appointment had not at that stage been formally 
proposed by the Security Council. 
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- After deciding that the possibility of ensuring 
satisfactory conditions for an overall plebiscite did not 
exist, Sir Owen, spent some time in negotiations on a plan for 
taking the plebiscite by sections, or conceding some areas 
where the result was, a foregone conclusion, and confining the 
vote to an uncertain area - the Valley of Kashmir, and perhaps 
some adjacent country; - India was prepared to discuss the 
suggestion providing due'regard was given to geographical 
features and was prepared to allow certain areas to go to 
Pakistan or India without a plebiscite.. The Indian Government 
felt there should beý-a plebiscite, in the-Valley of Kashmir, 
which should include part of Muzaffarabad'District to bring in 
what India regarded, as-the natural, geographic, feature provided 
by the River Kishenganga and its watershed in the north. 
India felt, she should receive, the-Province of Jammu east of the 
Ceasefire Line subject to minor corrections, including a 
reduction in the bulge of the Ceasefire Line between Uri, and 
Punch*. , She. also expected to receive, most of Ladakh but 
allowed that a small part should go according to the, result of 
the plebiscite in the Valley. -, India, was willing that Pakistan 
should have Gilgit, - Gilgit Agency and Gilgit Wazarat, political 
districts and tribal'territory, Baltistan, and that part of 
Jammu to the West of the Ceasefire-Line as corrected. Sir 
Owen told India that such territorial demands were not 
reasonablei-and. Pakistan declined-to attend any conference 
which,, took the above-position as its starting-point, and 
maintained her belief that the fate ofrthe entire state should 
be'decided by plebiscite. Otherwise Pakistan was only tý 
prepared*'to, agree to a-simple and immediate-partition, and-only 
**See Map 3. 
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if she could have the Kashmir Valley, which, of course, was not 
acceptable to India. There thus seemed no possibility of 
bringing the parties together, but as a last resort they did 
agree'that Sir Owen should place a plan before them, subject to 
their modification and based on partition and a partial 
plebisicte"; 
For the limited plebiscite area Sir Owen proposed that an 
administrative body of UN officers should be set up to carry on 
the functions of government in conjunction with the local 
authorities (which he specified as being the existing district 
magistrates) in the area until the poll was declared, and to be 
able to call, on troops from either side if necessary. 
Pakistan was only-prepared to attend a conference to discuss 
the plan if India would agree in advance to this proposition. 
India did not agree, 'on the grounds that it would be to 
surrender to aggression to allow Pakistan to take any part in 
the plebiscite, and particularly - for three reasons - to allow 
in Pakistani troops: the State Government would be superseded; 
only the people of the State should be allowed any part in the 
campaign over the plebiscite; and the security of the State 
would be-endangered. 4 
ý -Sir Owen felt these arguments overlooked the real nature 
of a proposal for partition and partial plebiscite, since to 
agree to such a solution must be to agree that both parties had 
an equal-interest in the result, regardless of what had gone 
before. ýHe believed also that it was not easy to exclude the 
danger that the inhabitants of the Vale of Kashmir would vote 
under fear of the consequences, and suggested the introduction 
of UN officers on a temporary basis. The authority of the 
Government in the rest of the State would not be affected. He 
thought the presence of troops to be unfavourable to a free 
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expression of the people's will and the UN administrative body 
could safely be given powers to decide what was necessary for 
the maintenance of order; it would be unlikely to invoke 
Pakistan, troops without-good cause. However, the UN could not 
be expected-ýto run a plebiciscite that ran the risk of being 
thought unfair, therefore Pakistan's acceptance of the plan was 
essential. 
-Since the. only thing that the two-Prime Ministers seemed 
able,, to agree on was that no'hope existed of an agreement for a 
plebiscite, Sir Owen remained. convinced that-the only solution 
to the problem was partition; but that some means of allocating 
the Valley-had to be found, - The State was not a unitý , 
geographically, demographically-or economically,, and if it 
passed,. entirely to'India there would beýlarge movements of 
Muslims and another refugee problem would arise for Pakistan. 
If the result favoured Pakistan, the-same-would happen, in 
reverse, though there would be fewer refugees. Almost all 
this would be avoided, by partition and thus pointed to the 
wisdom of abandoning the-idea of an overall, plebiscite. , 
Economic and geographic considerations pointed-in the same 
directioni the only difficulty was in forming a sound judgement 
as to where the line should be drawn". 
The Quest for Independence or Autonomy 
The UN Commission briefly,, but inconclusively, discussed 
the possibility of alternatives to a plebiscite as a solution 
to the Kashmir problem, 'especially'the possibility of 
partition, but also that of a co-protectorate under both India 
and Pakistani or of independence for, Kashmix". -The leaders 
of-Azad Kashmir were not enthusiastic about the'idea-of 
independence and suggestedýit might mean two plebiscites, the 
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first forýaccession or independence and then, if necessary, one 
for which country they should accede, to92. The Indian 
Government, -and Nehru in particular, had always been opposed to 
the option of independence, if only for the reason that it 
would encourage other parts-of the Indian Union'to entertain 
the same idea. Sheik Abdullah, on the other hand, did lean to 
the idea from, time to time, despite a basic belief that the 
State was, -too-vulnerable-to become-independent without the 
goodwill of all ofýits'neighbourS13,. - ý In"May'1953 a Working 
Committee in Kashmir, which included, Bakshi and Sadiq - 
subsequent'PrimeýMinisters ofýKashmir - as wellýas Abdullah, 
formally-contemplated independence either for the whole State, 
possibly with joint control of foreign relations, orý 
independence just'for the Vale of Kashmir, although it did not 
14 -ite discount the, possibility of-a-plebisc 
In June 1949 India-announced she proposed to invite four 
representatives'from the-State of, Jammu and Kashmir to her 
Constituent Assembly, 5. Opposed though the'Pakistanis'were to 
this, move, the Azad-Kashmir Government had also been stronglyý 
consolidated.,. The UNCIP Sub-Committeeýwhich visited western 
Kashmir in March 1949 felt the degree of organization already 
achieved by, the, -. Azad Kashmir authorities raised the problem-of 
the consequent consolidation of the territory to the 
disadvantage of-the State-as a whole, about which the 
Government of Indiawasýalready vehemently-expressing itself. 
The subcommittee'was intno doubt that this consolidation was 
indeed taking place, but to some extent it was the only -- 
alternative to chaos in the area. until the-plebiscite was held, 
and therefore it was inevitable96. , Whilst the Azad Government 
was not-officially recognised by Pakistan, the opinions of its 
leaders were taken into consideration by, Pakistan during the 
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negotiations in 1949. In private conversations all members of 
the'Pakistan Government made-. it clear to Mr. Colban and members 
of the Commission that the Azad Kashmir Government was a 
necessary part of any settlement, and the difficulties 
presented by one of the major issues between India and Pakistan 
- the problem of disarming and disbanding the Azad Kashmir 
forces - confirmed thi ST7. 
The State of Jammu-, and, Kashmir did, not Join the other 
Princely-States when-they, decided. to vest all their rights in 
the Indian-Parliament, and was granted special status by 
Article 370 of'the, -Indian Constitution,. which stated that the 
powers of the-Union Parliament wereýto be limited to only those 
subjects as-, were, covered: by the, Instrument of Accession - 
foreign affairs,, defence and, communications., -Mr. Colban told 
the Secretary-General at-the end of February 1950 that Mrý 
Vishnu Sahay, theý, ýIndian Minister for Kashmir Affairs., had said 
his own-, position with the Jammu and Kashmir State authorities 
was now very weak owing to Article 370ýas the-Government of 
Kashmir did not take orders from India, and even simple, matters 
relating to internal affairs of the State, were not 
well-received by-the State authorities". -This provision for 
the-State to run its own internal affairs'meant that-a'separate 
constitution had to be framed for the'State, and, it, was-decided 
to convene a, Constituent, Assembly on the, basis of'universal 
suffrage. Elections were held-in September'1951. Many 
opposition candidates, mainly in the Jammu area, were-told they 
had filled in, their nomination papers incorrectly and therefore 
could not contest the, election, although the National 
Conference would almost certainly have won a large majority, 
and most of any opposition candidates-who did succeed would at 
least have been pro-Indian. Inýthis way the traditional 
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animosity between Hindu and Muslim, so recently overcome, was 
reactivated and the Hindus in Jammu began protesting against 
Kashmiri domination, and agitating for closer ties with India,,. 
. In spite of, arguing strongly in the Constituent Assembly 
in favour of accepting accession, Abdullah seemed to fear even 
any pro-Indian opposition because of, his desire to keep Kashmir 
as autonomous as possible-. -A division soon appeared in the 
National-Conference within the Constituent Assembly, with a 
group headed by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed standing for more ,I 
integration with India. During the following months Abdullah 
became', increasingly autocratic and intolerant of advice from 
the Indian Government. He also seemed to be showing certain 
communal tendencies by-favouring Muslims at the expense of 
Hindus. Matters-, were brought-to a head in the winter of 
1952-53 with agitation by the right-wing Hindu parties, the 
Jana Sangh in Delhi andithe Praja Parishad in Jammu, for full 
integration with India.  Nehru also would have liked such, 
integration, but-felt-that-Pakistan and the Security Council 
could not just'be ignored and-therefore persuaded the Praja 
Parishad to call off the agitation, by explaining that Jammu and 
Kashmir was already part of India, but as the matter was still 
under consideration by the Security Council, a separate status 
had to be maintained for the time being. He alsoýasked 
Abdullahýto desist from making communal-and anti-Hindu speeches 
but Abdullah now became openly hostile to India and used the 
Hindu agitation for integration as an excuse to challenge 
India's secularism, and used this as an argument to demonstrate 
that the complete integration of Kashmir would not be in the 
interest of its Muslim peoples'00. There were suspicions, 
never proved, that he was actively working for an independent 
Kashmir. It seems likely, however, that he would have been 
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prepared to settle for the status quo but was unwilling for 
further integration into India. 
In August 1953, although his popularity amongst the 
Muslims of Srinagar was as high as ever, members of his own 
cabinet, backed by the Indian Government, conspired against 
him. With Bakshi Ghulam-Mohammed replacing him, Abdullah was 
dismissed from; his post and arrested. Apart from brief spells 
in 1958 and 1964-65 he remained in prison until 1968. At 
first there was violent agitation for his release, and he never 
actually lost his hold on his people. He-was exiled from the 
State between 1970 and 1972i but finally, became Chief Minister 
in,. 1975 when India was forced to, acceptAhat he-was still the 
singl6'most popular leader in Kashmir. He, for his part, 
publicly stated he did not dispute the legality of the State's 
original accession to India. 
With Abdullah in prison Bakshi co-operated whole-heartedly 
with-the Indian Government, to help it consolidate'its position, 
but it was not until his successor, G. M. Sadiq, was in power 
at the end of 1964 that the Presidentýof India, acquired powers 
to, take overthe State's administration if he felt thatthe 
constitutional machinery had-broken down. He abrogated the 
special, status of the Head of'State, who became known as 
Governor;, as were the heads of all theýother Indian states. 
Similarly the Prime Minister became known as-Chief 
Minister"'. I 
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CHAPTER FOUR - EMERGENCE OF UNMOGIP 
THE INTRODUCTION OF AN OBSERVER GROUP 
Legal Basis 
The United Nations Military Observer Group watching over 
the Ceasefire Line in Kashmir originally came under the 
umbrella of the UN Commission. Its legal basis can be traced 
back to Paragraph 17 of the Security Council Resolution of 21st 
April, 1948 which stated: The Commission should establish in 
Jammu and Kashmir, such-observers as-it may require of any of 
the, proceedings in pursuance of the measures indicated in the 
foregoing paragraphs'"*. 
Part I, "Paragraph'D of the UNCIP Resolution of 13th 
August,, 1948 stated: "In its discretion and As the, Commission 
may find, practicable, the Commission will appoint military 
observers, who, under the authority of the Commission and with 
the co-operation of both Commands, will supervise the 
observance ofthe cease-fire order"2** . On 3rd September the 
Commission confirmed that "United Nations neutral military 
observers will be-posted on both-sides-of the ceasefire line 
with the object of ensuring-that the conditions of the truce 
are adhered to. -In, case of, a. breach'of any of these ý 
conditions, a report will be made tothe Commission, and the 
Commission, on being-satisfied that action in respect of the 
report is necessary, will call upon the authorities in either 
area to take the desired action". 
On 10th August, 1948 Ambassador Colban cabled the 
*See Appendix I. 
**See Appendix II. 
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Secretary-General with a request for 20 Military Observers "in 
view of the possible achievement of a Ceasefire Agreement in 
the near future 1*4 Confusion was caused when on the same day 
the UNCIP Secretariat sent a cable to the Security Council also 
requesting Observers5, and there was uncertainty in New York as 
to whether the Security Council or the Secretary-General should 
appoint the Observers. The situation was clarified when it 
was explained that the second cable, to the Security Council, 
had been incorrectly transmitted and was for information 
purposes only6, This was follooed by an official report from 
the Chairman of the Commission to the Security Council and the 
matter was placed on the provisional agenda for the latter's 
356th meeting on 30th August, 1948. Following objections 
raised in the Council to the inclusion of the item on the 
grounds that under the terms of the Security Council Resolution 
of 21st April the appointment of Observers was the function of 
the Commission, the (Soviet) President of the Council expressed 
the view that the Council was "in duty bound to consider the 
the question and to decide how and on what principle these 
Military Observers (were) to be selected, -and which, countries 
(were) to send them"; -He concluded that the, Secretary-General 
could not decide these questions alone. However, the 
provisional agenda was not adopted-and-in the absence of 
further decisions by-the, Security-Council, the Military 
Observers were selected,, after various consultations, by the 
Secretary-General7. 
Arrival of Military Adviser and Observers 
, The Ceasefire'came into'effect on 1st January, 1949,. and 
the following day General Maurice Delvoie-l a-lBelgian, - arrived 
on the Subcontinent as Military Adviser to the Commission, and 
87 
effectively to take control of the Military Observers. On 
26th August, 1948 Colban requested 20 Observers, each to be 
accompanied, by a Junior officer, the whole group being as 
homogenousaas possible and only fror4 countries considered by 
both parties as neutral in the conflict. Knowledge of the 
English language was essentialO. On 26th December he cabled 
the Secretary-General requesting that Military Observers be 
sent out, immediately', and during the course of January 1949 
the-Observers, -b6gan to arrive. The Commanders-in-Chief of the 
two Armies met on 15th January and, amongst the other 
arrangements made, agreed to give all facilities to UNCIP 
required for"esitablishing observer teamsýin the State of Jammu 
and Kashmir". 
TRUCE NEGOTIATIONS 
Truce Sub-Committee 
After, acceptance in'December'1948 of its revised., 
resolution of August 1948 by India andýPakistan, the UN 
Commission formed a Truce Sub-Committee which struggled, with 
the aid of the new Military Adviser, to find a basis of 
agreement betweenýthe two Governments. The main problems were 
the disbandment of the Azad Kashmir forces, the question of the 
administration-of the Northern Areas of Kashmir, and the, 
withdrawal-of the Pakistan Army and the bulk of the Indian 
troops. 
-- , Furthermore the Ceasefire Agreement'had Provided that 
troops of the two'armies would remain in the positions they-' 
occupied on Ist January, 1949". However, precise information 
on these positions was lacking, ýespecially in the, Northern 
Areasýwhere communications were hampered by-snow-and the 
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terrain. In most sectors a wide no-man's land separating the 
troops was a constant source of friction and alleged incidents. 
On 17th February General-Delvoie recommended to UNCIP the 
establishment of a truce eliminating all no-man's land, and in 
March the military representatives of India and Pakistan 
reached, an agreement on--a Ceasefire Line except in three main 
areas. These gaps, and the inaccuracy of the map on which the 
line agreed upon was drawn neverthelessýresulted in numerous 
difficulties and disputeS12. 
Disbandment of the Azad Forces 
The Azad Kashmir force was initially composed of recently 
pensioned Muslim soldiers from the British-Indian-Army, whose 
homeland was what was now Azad Kashmir, or who had migrated 
from Indian-controlled Kashmir., Theseýwere well-seasoned 
troops with experience of fighting in both World Wars. They 
had also. been Joined by a coerced and repressed Muslim section 
of the MaharaJa's Army which, had deserted. Subsequently-, 
training centres had been, set up to train civilian recruits, and 
refresh former British Indian Army soldiers in order to provide 
reinforcements. Their main problem was lack of arms rather 
than lack, of recruits". 
-An agreement of Ist December, ý-1948 between the Azadr 
Kashmir Government and Pakistan. had allowed for the Pakistan 
Army to take over, operational control of the Azad forces for 
the duration of the emergency, and thus allowed Pakistan to 
embark on these negotiations, although administrative matters 
continued to beAhe responsibility of the Defence Council of 
Azad-Kashmir". 
On 15th January, the two Commanders-in-Chief-, agreed,, to 
present to their Governments-proposals for the, formatiohi under 
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the Commission, of a civil armed force composed of those 
members of theýAzad Kashmir forces who were nationals of Jammu 
and Kashmir. Pakistan accepted the proposals but India did 
not. At a meeting of the Truce Sub-Committee in March, the 
Pakistan Representative presented a plan for the 
re-organisation of these forcesi but India again opposed the 
scheme'5. -- India'insisted on the'immediate disbanding and 
disarming on a large-scale of the Azad forces. Korbel claims 
that the'Commission's proposals had contained no such 
suggestion, but had made it clear that the Azad disbandment was 
to be effected as-the last measure preceding the actual act of 
plebiscite". Lord"Birdwood, on the other hand, -suggests the 
members of the, Commission had, worked'themselves, into an 
ambiguous confusion over this particular question, with India 
indeed believing that the-Commission had agreed to-the - 
disbandment of the Azad forces and the handing over of their 
territory to Abdullah as the appropriate "local authority" for 
administration, while Pakistan believed that the Azad forces 
could remain on the-groundýto hand, over'to-the Azad-Government 
before withdrawal 17 . Colban'records a meeting between himself 
with Dr. Lozano, then Chairman of the Commission, and Nehrd and 
Bajpai, the Indian Foreign-Minister, which took place on, 22nd 
December, 1948, in which the "large scale disarming" of-the 
Azad was discussed, the term having been'used in a memorandum 
of Bajpai's on their previous conversation. Dr. Lozano felt 
the Indian phrase "seemed a little strong" in contrast with the 
Commission's word "disposal" of-the forces, but after some 
discussion Lozanoj-in agreement with Colban, said that although 
the disarmament of these forces was not foreseen for the truce 
period in the Commission's, resolution, of 13th August,, Jt was 
just in order to, consider, the position with a view-! to the 
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plebiscite that the point had been inserted and that he would 
not object to the term being used in Bajpai's memorandum. He 
said that the Commission had not gone very deeply into the 
matter, feeling that it had to be further studied at a later 
stagela. The question, however, remained a continual 
stumbling block in the truce negotiations, as did the question 
of who indeed were the 'ýlocal authorities", India believing 
them to be onlyýSheik Abdullah's Government,. and Pakistan that 
they included also the Azad authorities. JosefýKorbel 
maintains, that, UNCIP envisaged the localýauthorities would be 
existing local magistrates, 'as specifically suggested later by 
Sir Owen Dixon". Both sides had, in any case, been shown 
copies of the memoranda-and letters from the other side 
regarding the-negotiations of'December-194820, so any 
misunderstandings-that arose cannot be attributed solely to the 
Commission.. 
Northern Areas 
In hi5 minority'report Dr. Chyle blamed the Commis5ion for 
deeply underrating the significance of the Azad forces, and 
failing altogether to take into account the situation in the 
Northern Areas, on which two problems subsequently all, the 
Commission's work kept on foundering. He maintained, that 
instead of taking a firm stand on definite issues, 'the 
Commission preferred-to go by way of "clarification promises", 
thus compromising its own position2l. The Government of India 
had submitted a reservation in respect of the resolution of 13 
August, 1949, expressing the view that the administrative 
responsibility of the Northern Areas, which were not occupied 
by either India or Pakistan asýno fighting had taken place 
there, should revert to the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. 
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The Commission said the question could be considered in the 
implementation of the resolution22. Chyle maintained that 
this was an obligation which should have been included as a 
formal part of the Resolution since Pakistan did not 
subsequently consider the letter to be legally binding. In 
the period between the UNCIP Resolution of August 1948 and the 
Ceasefire of January, 1949, Pakistan took control of many 
strategically importants parts of the Northern Areas under 
question. Thus the rights of the Jammu and Kashmir Government 
to administer''them, and India to defend them, ' became 
considerably more tenuous than during the August 
correspondence. 
In-May General Delvoie went'to Skardu and Gilgit*, partly 
to ascertain for himself if there was any foundation to Indian 
Army allegations of a Pakistan concentration of troops'and 
warlike stores there, of which he found none, and - primarily - 
to study the ground'in relation to Indian claims for garrisons 
in the Northern Areas to maintain the trade routes from Central 
Asia and to defend the area-from possible invasion coming from 
*At Independence there was general apprehension in Gilgit 
that the old laws of the Maharaja-of Kashmir, which had 
been resented by the people of Gilgit and abolished by the 
British, would be reintroduced. In September a petition 
was sent to the Maharaja asking him to accede to Pakistan. 
At the end of October a small section of the Army mutinied 
in Gilgit and took control effectively of the whole of 
Gilgit Agency with the intention of seceding from Kashmir 
and acceding to Pakistan. In the light of general 
approval the attempt was successful, and with only minimal 
bloodshed, although the small states of Hunza and Nagar 
may have felt some reservations. Pakistan quickly 
appointed a Political Agent who assumed the powers of the 
former British Political Agents. The area was not 
considered to be, nor was it administered as part of Azad 
Kashmir23, although-the Azad Kashmiris did agitate for the 
area to come under their contro 124. Pakistan wanted to 
include'Gilgit in the Plebiscite, but the Commission 
thought this put Pakistan in a delicate Position since the 
people had already affirmed their desire to be part of 
Pakistan and were already administered by Pakistan23. 
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the USSR or Sinkiang., He discovered that as the trade route 
from Central Asia to the Valley of Kashmir passes through 
Gilgit and was controlled by the Gilgit Scouts, there would be 
no point in giving India the right to maintain garrisons south 
of Gilgit on that route as such garrisons could not prevent the 
route being cut at will by the Gilgit garrison26*. 
Troop Withdrawals 
In, connection with_the withdrawal of the Pakistan forces 
and the bulk of Indian forces, the problems were to determine 
what constituted the "bulk" of Indian forces, taking into 
account India, 's wish to maintain sufficient forces in the Sta-ýe 
to protect it against external aggression, and to sVnchronise 
the withdrawals in conformity with promises made by the 
Commission to Pakistan27, After consultations with the two 
High Commands General Delvoie, presented a plan which was 
incorporated in truce terms presented, by the Commission to the 
two Governmentson 15th April, and in, revised proposals on 28th 
April. At the request of the Commission General Delvoie , 
personally assured the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army 
of the fairness of the proposals before they were submitted to 
the Governments211., 
On 10th May Colban wrote to the Secretary-General 
str I essing that Pakistan wanted the withdrawal of forces to be 
co-ordinated oriIndia might make an all-out attack on Pakistan. 
Colban was forced to believe that Pakistan officials at least 
were convinced that their fears were Justified2l. General- 
Cariappa, the Indian CIC, not long afterwards told Mr. Colban 
that the Commission should not leave the, Subcontinent because 
*See also Mr. Sahay's remark concerning the Northern Areas 
on page 76. 
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if hostilities were renewed they would not be confined to 
Kashmir, 'and he considered the presence of the Commission a 
guarantee against emergency". 
- Two, furtherýsets of proposals failed to find agreement and 
in June Delvoie submitted a statement, further to one from 
India, in which he showed that the troops India proposed to 
withdraw did not, in his opinion, constitute the bulk of 
India's forces. On 27th'June he discussed the problem at 
length with-General Kalwant Singh, CGS Indian Army, but could 
not reach a compromise as the Indian High Command considered 
that,. since-the time of India's acceptance of the 13th August 
Resolution the situation-had altered3l., It was true that in 
the twelve months, that the Commission had been on the 
Subcontinent, the Azad forces had developed from a loosely-knit 
guerilla group-into 32 disciplined and fully-armed battalions 
which, General Delvoie admitted, represented'a formidable 
force. Furthermore, once, Indian,, troops had been withdrawn-it 
would be difficult to get them back again, but, Pakistani - 
supplies and even troops would-; be easily available-to the Azad 
forces, if the war erupted again". t- 
THE KARACHI AGREEMENTý 
Meeting of Military Representatives 
In June 1949 the-Plebiscite Administrator-elect, Admiral 
Nimitz-clearly expressed his view of-the, situation as it was at 
that-time. He said, that the replies of the Governments of 
India and Pakistan to,, the, latest-proposals of UNCIP were , 
reported to be highly unsatisfactory, and it would appear that 
the suggestion had come UP that a single individual - possibly 
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himself -, might be able to achieve more*. He said there was a 
possibility that a-single individual might succeed where UNCIP 
failed, but said he used, the word "possibility" advisedly 
becauS'e he was convinced that India felt her position was so 
strong vis-a-vis Pakistan that this method would probably also 
fail. ý -He actuallyýfelt little-optimism that either UNCIP or a 
single individual substituted for UNCIP, or indeed the addition 
of such an individual to the-Commission, could do much more 
under the existing framework ofýSecurity Council and UNCIP 
Resolutions, except to attempt to bring Indian-and Pakistani 
representatives to negotiate face to face,,, which so far India 
had refused to countenance. He thought--it inevitable that the 
problem would-have ta be referred back to the Security Council 
for, the latter to re-examine the question and attempt a new 
solution,, and, he believed the Ceasefire would be sufficiently 
durable to permit such extended-consideration in the Security 
Council since it was in the interest of, both partiesto observe 
it. He'believed they would readily agree to consider even 
serious violations as', "local" and "minor" indidents-ý He said 
also that certainly General, Delvoie and his-Military Observers 
should be kept on-the'spot". 
Nimitz, believed there was'still hope for success if the 
two parties could be brought together, at a neutral spot, and he 
thought it important'for UNCIP first--to, explore every possible 
means-of fulfilling the terms of the Truce Agreement in 
accordance with its Resolutions. Failing this he suggested an 
effort be-made by General Delvoie-to bring-it about. Since 
the differences were, primarily in theýmilitary field Nimitz 
thought - no doubt as, a result of his own experience as a, 
*See page 101. 
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military man - that if the military chiefs of India and 
Pakistan were brought face to face in the presence of General 
Delvoie and asked to propose a solution for the truce, with no 
interference from their political chiefs, some advance towards 
success might be possible 34. ý 
Just when Admiral Nimitz was advocating a meeting between 
General Delvoie and-the military chiefs in order to sort out a 
truce agreement, Mr; Leguizamon, then the Colombian Chairman of 
UNCIP, also had the idea of a purely military meeting35. 
General Delvoie had been discussing with General Thimmaya, who 
commanded the Northern Indian'front, and with'General Gracey, 
the Pakistan CIC, the, problem of the wide no-man's land 
separating the troops in most sectors, which was a-ýconstant 
source of friction and alleged'incidents. ý He had-concluded - 
that on purely military grounds, the establishment of a precise 
Ceasefire Line, easily recognisable on the-ground, was an 
urgent necessity, even if no agreement was reached on 
implementation ofýthe truce 36. 
On 2nd July,, 1949,, -, therefore, UNCIP invited the two 
Governments to'send their representatives to Karachi to discuss 
the demarcation of a Ceasefire Line at a strictly military 
meeting which would set all political, questions aside. They 
accepted, and-the Conference was an-unqualified success. In 
addition to the establishment-of-a Ceasefire Line (CFL)*, 
agreement was'also-reached on such matters as the type, of 
constructions that could be built-in areas which would change 
hands-as a result of the Ceasefire Line Agreement. It was 
also agreed that territory to be evacuated by one side as a 
result of the Agreement must be freed of the troops of that 
*See following sub-section, page 97. 
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side within'30 days from the exchange of ratifications, while 
no forward movement into territory thus vacated would be 
I 
authorised, except by agreement between local commanders, 
during the same thirty-day period. Troops from both sides 
were henceforth to remain at least 500 yards from the CFL. 
The Joint military meetings were held from 18th to 27th July 
and resulted in an agreement officially called the "Agreement 
between the Military Representatives of India and Pakistan 
regarding the Establishment of a Ceasefire Line in the State of 
Jammu and Kashmir", but more commonly known as "The Karachi 
Agreement" or "The Ceasefire Agreement "37* The Agreement was 
signed, in three original texts, on 27th July, 1949, by the 
Heads of both Delegations and by the Chairman of the Truce 
Subcommittee and the Military Adviser. It was ratified by the 
Governments of India and Pakistan on 29th and 30th July, 1949 
respectively. On 16th September General Delvoie obtained the 
agreement of the two armies on more precise definitions of 
breaches of the Ceasefire: these also came to be considered as 
I 
part of the Karachi Agreement and are discussed at length in 
Chapter Six - Operation. The Agreement, and certain 
interpretations of it, were thereafter mutually agreed to 
constitute the basis of the activities of the United Nations 
Military Observer Group. The interpretations, though 
formulated by the Military Adviser or subsequent Chief Military 
Observers of the Group, were not unilateral rulings; they 
represented a consensus of the views of the parties after 
discussiorOO. 
*See Appendix IV. 
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Establishment of the-Ceasefire Line 31* 
As a basis for discussion, General Delvoie had drawn a 
compromise line, taking into account the points of view of both 
India and Pakistan, but although the Delvoie Line, as it was 
referred to during the meetings, was by and large acceptable to 
Pakistan, it was unacceptable in important respects to India. 
The Line was discussed in three sectors: from Manawar to 
Keran, Keran to Gurais and Gurais to the glaciers in the east. 
In order to get the discussions off to an auspicious start the 
Chairman took advantage of the fact that more agreement existed 
on one sector than the others and proposed that they should 
begin with that sector. Here all three points at issue were 
settled to the satisfaction of both sides in the course of a 
few meetings and complete agreement reached on the first 
sector. 
Most dissension arose in the consideration of the entire 
second sector and the beginning of the third sector (from Keran 
to Dalunang), which was where the only two major violations of 
the Ceasefire Agreement had by then occurred. It became clear 
that unless both sides were prepared to modify their demands 
substantially the existing divergence of views on these areas 
would lead to the failure of the Karachi talks. The Truce 
Subcommittee therefore initiated a series of informal 
consultations between the Military Adviser and each of the two 
Delegations in an attempt to create a basis for resolving the 
impasse. In the meantime the formal meeting continued to 
consider the remainder of the third sector where agreement was 
quickly reached. 
As a result of his private consultations with both 
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parties, General Delvoie suggested a further compromise Line. 
The positions of the two Delegations then became reversed: 
India found the'"second Delvoie Line" acceptable by and large, 
while Pakistan did not. The Truce Subcommittee at this point 
suggested informal-talks among members of the two Delegations. 
These talks took place and led to informal agreement, but the 
Delegations having thus gone beyond the instructions they had 
received had then to consult their Governments. , 
India the informal agreement meant vacating some 
territory in-the Taobat-Chorwan region, and abandoning her 
previously strongly voiced claims to the Kishenganga line 
between Keran and Gurais and to the Burzil Bai Pass. -For 
Pakistan it meant vacating a relatively'large area south of the 
Kishenganga River between K6ran and Gurais, while still 
retaining a foothold on the southernýbank of the Kishenganga. 
After an adjournment the-meetings'resumed on 26th-July 
when one major point still separated-the two Delegations: 
India, while generally speaking adhering to the line informally 
agreed to before the temporary adjournment, tried to obtain, a 
salient from Chorwan to the south of Minimarg. This was 
unacceptable to Pakistan. - India then abandoned her claim but 
insisted, instead, that Pakistan undertake not to post or 
operate troops in an area roughly corresponding to that of the 
sallent. The Pakistan, Delegation was ready to accept the Line 
itself, but wished to have time-to consult its Government, , 
regarding the Indian proviso, since it seemed to the Pakistan 
Delegation to constitute a departure from the principle of 
applying the same standard to both sides: while Pakistan would 
be called upon to demilitarize an area, no such obligation 
would arise for India., At a second meeting held on 26th July, 
however, the Pakistan Delegation announced that its Government 
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had', most reluctantly, decided to accept this last Indian 
request in order to achieve agreement on a ceasefire line and 
thus io speed up the''time when a free and impartial plebiscite 
could be conducted in the'State of Jammu and Kashmir. 
It was decided that the Ceasefire Line would be drawn on a 
one-inch map and then verified on the ground by local 
commanders of each side with the assistance of Military 
Observers, and that whenever local commanders could not reach 
agreement, the Military Adviser would give a final decision. 
General Delvoie immediately issued instructions to the Military 
Observers to give top'priority'to thistask. 
The Line, more than 500'mil - es long', was I divided into eight 
secto'rs' covering the areas of Man I awar, Kotl'i, Ptinch, Uri, 
Tithwal, Keran, Gurais and Kargil. ' The Military Observers in 
charge of each sector called meetings of ihe'oppOsin' 9 
commanders and survey'e'd with them the Line on the ground, "'- 
making a written description of the natural boundaries and 
establishing signs such as mariý'on trees oý stone cairns. 
General DelVoie wa's called'upon to give his decision in certain 
areas. Because of these differences, and the extremely 
difficult terrrain, the movement of troops waý completed on 
31st October instead of 31st August as had been planned, but by 
1st November, 1949 a Ceasefire Line for the entire state of' 
Jammu and Kashmir had been demarcated on the ground40*. 
Continuing beyond the southern extremity of the Ceasefire 
*Although the term "demarcation" is regularly used, 
uncertainty as to the exact location of the Ceasefire Line 
in some areas remained permanently a maJor source of 
incidents, and in 1981 Observers assured the writer there 
were no markers along the Line. It seems that there were 
few, if any, markers deliberately placed to show its 
position, and for the most part only existing natural 
elements such as rocks and trees, as described in the 
text, were used. 
100 
Line is the, Border between Pakistan and the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir. This Border was not included in the Karachi 
Agreement, but Military Observers had been posted in that area, 
atýJammu and Sialkot, since February 1949. On 11th February, 
1950, at the-request of both Armies, the Chief Military 
Obsbrver agreed that Observers would investigate all Border 
incidents reported to them by both Pakistan and Indian 
Armie54'*. 
Proposal for a Joint Political Meeting 
I In the light of the-co-operative, attitudes of both India 
and'Pakistan in the restricted military field, pf the-Karachi 
Conference, -the Commission decided to try and persuade-the two 
Governments to pursueýsuch joint meetings in*the political 
field42. The-proposalýcame from Dr. Chyle, the Czech- . 
Delegate; 'the Belgian and American delegates, in fact, had 
severe doubts about taking-such'a step because they felt the 
differences between-the-two Governments were too great to be so 
easily bridged, and failure would make thesituation worse; - 
This, view was shared by, Sir Girja Bajpai for--India and Mr. 
Liaquat Ali Khan for Pakistan, though they wereý, prepared, to 
agree-to such a meeting. Sir Zafrullah Khan-thought there was 
nothing to be, lost by trying. Both sides made it clear that 
while accepting the meetings they were not ready to make 
concessions nor depart-from their previous stand. , In, the end, 
since Pakistanýrefused to discuss the two main problems - the 
disbanding ofýthe Azad. -forces, 'and the defenceýof the Northern 
Areas - and, India refused to, go unless, they were discussed, the 
Commission decided to cancel the meeting. The two Governments 
*See page 188. 
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were both very disappointed at the cancellation and Nehru in 
particular felt very bitter towards the Commission as a result. 
The Pressý'was also full of, recrimination. ' Dr. Chyle had been 
stronglyýagainst the cancellation in debate within the 
Commission, but defended it at the time when speaking to India 
or PakistaW3 . 
Proposal for Arbitration 
The American delegate to theZommission, Ambassador 
Huddle, had meanwhile been busy pursuing the'possibility of 
arbitrati OW4. Admiral"Nimitz at first had--said he believed 
that it would be a mistake to use him, to attempt an-arbitration 
of the truce because if he failed'his usefulness as a future 
plebiscite administrator'might be diminished"*'. Ultimately 
he agreed, to act as arbitrator if both India and Pakistan 
agreed to, the suggestioW6. However-, whilst Pakistan was 
ready to accept it, India stated-she would not accept 
arbitration regarding certain crucial 15suesý'' In fact the 
proposal did not really-have much hope of succeeding because 
Nehru was, -furious at learning, about it from an-American 
newspaper before the UNCIP Chairman officially-approached him 
with it, and his fury was compounded by-the fact that Sir Girja 
Baipai, received UNCIP's secret memorandum on the subject only 
at the same time as the British High Commissioners in New, Delhi 
and KarachJ47 . -All the-goodwill generated 
by the success of, -- 
the, Karachi, Conference was thus quickly dissipated, and in 
September 1949 the-Commission left the-Subcontinent and, spent 
the next-few months compiling its report for the Security 
Council",., In-his minority-report, -, Dr,., Chyle contended, that-'' 
*See also Nimitz's further comments, pages 93-95. 
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UNCIP had failed because by proposing arbitration it had 
overstepped its competence 49. He asserted, not without some 
basis in fact, that the arbitration idea was inspired by the 
United States and the United Kingdom-, which emphasised the lack 
of independence, of the Commission. 
ýOn October 10th-Admiral Nimitz wrote*to the 
Secretary-General and reviewed the situation, ' reiterating that 
prolonged negotiations had failed to bring about an agreement 
on the conditions of, a truce which would provide for a 
progressive stabilization of the State and permit the 
organisation ofthe plebiscite. This'. was mainly because of' 
the two, parties' inability to agree on-the administrationýof 
the Northern Areas and the-disposal of the armed forces. ý He 
pointed, out that suchýa delay could only work in India's 
favour, provided that the-delay did not involve the risk of 
war. Therefore India would inevitably attempt to continue the 
delays, in spite of having confirmed her willingness - in a 
letter to UNCIP on-September'Bth - to co-operate-with the 
plebiscite as soon asýher assurances had been-met with regard 
to administration of the Northern Areas (even though they were 
not on-the Indian side of the Ceasefire Line)-ýand-large scale 
disbanding and disarming of the Azad forces. ' Nimitz believed 
that although continued mediation offered many possibilities of 
prolonging the delay, the best course of action still appeared 
to be to propose that mediation be continued - preferably with 
a new mediating agency - with a view to achieving agreement on 
the terms of, a truce, under revised terms of reference which 
would consolidate all'the gains thus made". The UN 
Commission'also considered that in view of the developments in 
the military situation its resolutions were now inadequate and 
outmoded, and suggested that the problem be turned over to one 
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person as a mediator5l. 
A Mission in its own Right 
On 14th March, 1950 the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 80 by which it appointed a United Nations 
Representative in India and Pakistan (UNRIP) who, amongst other 
tasks, was to "exercise all of the powers and responsibilities 
devolving upon the United Nations Commission for India and 
Pakistan "52. The Resolution provided for the termination of 
UNCIP, which was wound up by 1st July, 1950. , General 
Delvoie's contract had also ended and the Secretary-General 
appointed a Chief Military Observer, Brigadier Angle of Canada, 
to-take charge of-the Observer Group. Erik Colban severed his 
links with the Commission when he returned to, the Subcontinent 
in February 1950, but maintained his position as Special , 
Representative of the Secretary-General for a time", before 
becoming Diplomatic Adviser to the first UNRIP-, Sir Owen Dixon, 
in April 1950*. Colban, continued to maintain-an active link 
with-the Military Observer Group which reported to-him rather 
than--to Sir Owen or Sir Owen's Military Adviseriý , At this time 
the idea was beginningýto take hold that it was, preferable to 
maintain a distinction between the Observer Group and. the 
mediating agency, although more than a year elapsed before such 
a policy was formally agreed. During that time Brigadier 
Angle had been tragically killed in an aircrash and, in 
Decemberý1950 Major-General Nimmo, an Australian, had taken his 
place-, a. g. Chief Military-Observer. 
On 30th March, 1951 the Security Council, by Resolution 
91, decided, that "the Military Observer Group shall continue to 
*See pages 72-73 and 77. 
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supervise-, the Ceasefire in the State "54. The question was 
subsequently-raised, in-the Secretariat as to whether General 
Nimmo should also become Military Adviser to Dr. Frank Graham 
who had-become the second UNRIP. On 25th May the 
Secretary-General wrote to Colban and mentioned that he hoped 
it would be possible for Graham to use the services of General 
Nimmo in view of the "outstanding qualities" he had already 
shown". However, the Secretary-General's Executive 
Assistant, Andrew Cordier, who visited the Subcontinent in June 
1951, thought an overriding factor was that the Observer Group 
should be kept distinct from Dr. Graham's mission. In the 
light of the possibility of increasing tension he felt that the 
status of Nimmo and his staff should be left unimpaired. He 
thus strongly put forward the case that Dr. Graham should have 
his own Military Adviser rather than using General Nimmo or one 
of his colonels. He did not discount the possibility of Dr. 
Graham seeking private advice from General Nimmo or the 
colonels on his staff, but felt the Observers should remain at 
their posts and not travel between the two capitals with Dr. 
Graham's mission". It was therefore decided in New York that 
the Observer Group should become a mission in its own right, 
and after certain consultations during June and July 1951 it 
was given the title of "United Nations Military Observer Group 
in India and Pakistan"" . 
Dr. Graham offered the legitimisation for this action in 
his report of 15th October, 1951 by pointing out that the 
debate in the Security Council leading to the adoption of its 
Resolution 91 indicated that it was the intention of the 
Council that the Representative "should deal only with the 
question of the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir"; the UNRIP was "therefore not concerned with the 
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existing arrangements for the supervision of the Ceasefire, the 
responsibility for which the Council had ... placed on the 
Military Observer Group"511. In offering no dissent to this 
statement the Security Council sanctioned the setting up of the 
Observer Group as a mission in its own right. 
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PART II - UNMOGIP IN THE FIELD, 1949-1965 
CHAPTER FIVE - ORGANISATION AND DEPLOYMENT 
CHIEF MILITARY OBSERVERS 
General Delvoie was the first Chief of the Military 
Observer Group and became so more'or less incidentally when he 
was appointed Military Adviser to UNCIP. He had been a 
Cavalry andthen Artillery Officer, during the 1914-18 war, and 
was Military Attache and Air Attache in Paris in 1938 and 1946. 
During the Second World War he wasýMilitary Attache in-London, 
accredited to General de Gaulle and the London Governments of 
Norway, Czechoslovakia and Poland. - '' He took part in the Paris 
Conference of 1946, and in 1947', was Head of the Belgian 
Delegation to the UN Commission'on the Balkans, -. He thus had 
some UN experience before he was appointed to UNMOGIP. ' 
Nevertheless, in spite of what might Ve calledýa successful 
tour of duty in terms of his'achievements, he left-the , 
Subcontinent on 1st November, 1949, only ten months-after his 
arrival, never, to return and under something of-a cloud as a 
result of the so-called "Delvoie Incident"*. General Delvoie 
was followed in February 1950 by Brigadier Angle with the title 
of Chief Military Observer (CMO). Angle died in an Indian 
Airlines air accident in July of that year, and in October 1950 
Major-General R.. H. Nimmo was appointedto the post, where he 
remained until his death in January 1966. - The main part of 
this study ends before the new CMO, Major-General Luis-Tassara 
Gonzalez of Chile, was appointed. 
*See pages 246-252. 
107 
The Role of a CMO 
UNCIP's Press Officer, Michael de Capite, who had been 
left in. New Delhi when the Commission returned to Geneva in 
September 1949 to compile its report, wrote several letters to 
Erik Colban strongly voicing his concern about the problems 
Delvoie's sudden departure in early November had caused the 
Military Observer Group. Whilst not anticipating trouble 
immediately, from the long-range point of view bad management 
from the top was not satisfactory, he said. He maintained 
that although the team of Observers comprised alert men who 
could catch all the details that needed attending to, in the 
end an organisation of 40 men from five different countries 
needed a capable, commander. De Capite did not think "liaison 
work with the Observers, pep talks, orientation circulars, in 
short anything we are able to do, would ever be more than 
amelioratives. The organisation needs backbone... (which) 
cannot be supplied by us: it must be supplied organically, in 
day-to-day details, meetings, administration and personal 
contacts; it must be supplied in a military way because the 
men operate under and think with a military psychology; it 
must be supplied by one of their own kind, a man they had 
confidence in and whose personality will permeate the entire 
Observer organisation "2. 
With the common consent of UNCIP, Colban and de Capite, 
Brigadier Angle, a Canadian, who had greatly distinguished 
himself as an Observer with UNMOGIP in 1949, was chosen for 
this role, in spite of being a more junior officer than was 
anticipated to head the Mission3. Indeed he was promoted from 
the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel to Brigadier, a rank he had held 
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temporarily during the 1939-45 War, at the instigation of the 
UN when his services were requested from the Canadian 
Government4. - 
Angle's experience showed that a Canadian, or officer of 
some other-part of the Commonwealth, had great advantages since 
the Indian and Pakistan Armies, as those of the other 
Commonwealth'countries, were organized on the British system 
and used its nomenclature and methods. Thus, after Angle's 
death Sir Owen Dixon, who was then the UN*Representative in 
India-and Pakistan, was requested by the Secretary-General to 
persuade-, the'Australian authorities to second one of their 
ablest., general officers to serve in Kashmir, and-General Nimmo 
was selected3,. -- 
Major-General Nimmo 
MaJor-General Robert Harold Nimmo, CBE, was born on 22nd 
November, 1893 and graduated from the Royal-Military College, 
Duntroon, in, 1914, to serve in the Australian Army. During the 
First World War he saw service in Gallipoli and Palestine. He 
underwent a course of training in England in 1937-38 and during 
the Second World War commanded-in turn the Ist Armoured 
Brigade, 4th Cavalry Brigade and 1st Australian Motor Brigade. 
As a member of the British Commonwealth Occupation Forces in 
Japan he commanded the 34th Australian Infantry Brigade. - 
After the War he became General Officer Commanding Northern- 
Command, Queensland". 
On 6th November, 1950 the Secretary-General wrote to him 
regarding the terms of his appointment, which was actually 
effective from 28th October, 1950. His status was to be that 
of an international civil servant responsible to the 
Secretary-General and reporting to him through his Executive 
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Assistant, Andrew Cordier, whom he should keep currently 
informed of the work of-the Group, and from whom he should seek 
instructions regarding the handling of major and substantive 
administrative problems"*. Cordier remained effectively 
responsible forýthe Mission at UNHQ in New York until his 
retirement in 1962 when Ralph Bunche took over this 
responsibility. 
Nimmo'5 initial salary-was: US$13,000 which became $10,000 
under the UN Staff Assessment Plan, plus $200 for each 
dependent child, plus-a subsistence allowance of. $12.50 while 
on duty and a travel subsistence allowance-whilst travelling. 
Theýappointment was offered-forýthe duration'of'the Mission 
subject to termination on-30-days' notice,. 
The Secretary-General informed Nimmo that hisýprimary duty 
was to ensure that the Ceasefire-Agreement of 1st January, 1949 
was strictly observed and that additional duties might also be 
assigned to-him, either by the Secretary-General; or his 
Executive Assistant. ý He said that Nimmo"was the only direct 
UN appointee to-the Military Observer Group, ýwhich would be 
under his-direct control for all purposes'related'to the duties 
and functions of the UN Observers". 
Shortly after his arrival at the Mission Cordier wrote to 
Erik Colban saying that Major-General, Nimmo "appeared to be 
doing an, extremely competent job and we are pleased that we 
were able to secure the services of soýoutstanding a soldier at 
a time when the assignment in Kashmir offers little possibility 
*On 21.11.50 Cordier sent Nimmo a letter dated 8th 
November, 1950, identical to the one of 6th November but 
omitting the paragraph requesting him to keep Cordier 
11currently informed", with a covering-letter asking him to 
destroy the first letter, the minor change being for 
"internal administrative reasons". The Secretariat did 
not, however, destroy their own carbon copy of the first 
letterO. 
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of dynamic leadership"". In 1953 Nimmo was offered a 
decoration by the Ministry of Defence in Chile. In writing to 
say-that the Secretary-General had approved its acceptance, 
Cordier assured Nimmo that he fully agreed that Nimmo had 
earned the distinction through his "excellent handling of a 
multi-national team on a difficult-assignment 1112. 
The high regard in which General Nimmo came to be held was 
displayed in 1955 in a memorandum from Andrew Cordier's office 
to-the Deputy'Director of the Office of-Personnel at the UN 
Secretariat, regarding Nimmo's leave arrangements. it 
explained that "after some rather unhappy experiences in 
filling the post"* General Nimmo had been selected and-had 
"fully lived up to the high expectations-which the 
Secretary-General had"-of the incumbent-of the post.. 
Therefore the Secretary-General was "most anxious" to keep him 
at the head of the Groupýfor as long as possible and,, after 
Nimmo, suffered a heart,, attack in 1953, had insisted that he see 
the best possible-available-specialists and spend as, much time 
as possible attending-to his health. The two circumstances, 
the-very high value of-General Nimmo to the Organisation, and 
his, health, were thus the, reason'for aýdecision by the . 
Secretary-General to allow him to accrue an extra number of 
days over and above the ceiling to enable him to return by sea 
rather than air from his leave". 
Inýearly 1953, on his way to New York-for consultations, 
General Nimmo had suffered a heart attack on the boat between 
India and Liverpool and was sent to hospital. for a monthýon his 
arrival in England. The newly-appointed Secretary-General 
HammarskJold,, who was in London for the Coronation of Queen 
*No doubt referring to the Delvoie incident (pages 
246-252) and the death of Brigadier Angle (page 106). 
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Elizabeth II, visited him in hospital and suggested that Nimmo 
go to New York as soon as he was able, but not to worry about 
returning to Kashmir as with the onset of the monsoon there was 
no urgency. In July 1953 it was announced that Major-General 
Bennett'Louis de Ridder, a Belgian who had served as a Military 
Observer in UNTSO since 1949, and as Chairman of the 
Jordan-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission, would, take over as 
Acting Chief Military Observer of UNMOGIP for three months in 
order to maintain the status of the'Mission withýa general at 
the top14. 
, When Nimmo, reached the age of 65, in November 1958, 
Cordier wrote to tell-him that although statutory retirement 
age Was 60, - the Secretary-General could extend the contract 
until-65, and that thereafter-the contract could be continued 
if the-Secretary-General considered that'the services. of the 
staff member concerned were essential to the work of the United 
Nations. - The Secretary-General did-indeed-considerthat 
General-Nimmols service at the head of, -UNMOGIP was in the best 
interests of the United Nations at the'time, and it was 
therefore his intention to continue General Nimmo's contract 
with nd-change in its terms". Earlier that year the Mission 
had been visited on behalf of the Secretary-General by Sir 
Humphrey Trevelyan, an Under-Secretary for Special Political 
Affairs, - and he had commenced hisreport-by saying: "Mission 
successful and working excellently. Morale good; personal 
relations with local commanders excellent and Military 
Observers of different nationalities get on well together, all 
largely due to the personal qualities of General Nimmo"16. 
At the end of 1954 the Australian Army authorities 
A 
promoted Major-General Nimmo to Lieutenant-GeneraJ17 , and'in 
1955 he was Promoted from Principal Officer to Director Level 
112 
within the UN scaless. In January 1964 he was again promoted 
to become an Under-Secretary, which raised him to the level of- 
otherýheads of Para-military missions"*. In 1955 UNMOGIP'S, 
Chief Administrative Officer had pointed out to Cordier that 
although the Mission was then very quiet, General Nimmo had to 
be credited with that success as he had obtained the confidence 
of both-sides by diligent work and patience, and that in 
addition-, to being highly respected he had managed to run the 
Mission on a small budget and restrict his requirements for 
Observers". "-Ralph Bunche in his report-to the 
Secretary-General after a visit, to, the Mission in April 1964, 
by which, time the-deteriorating relations between'India and 
Pakistan had made the situationlagain-very, -acute, described 
General Nimmo as "a highly competent, level-headed and 
efficient-officer,. who is..., completely'dedicated to his, task 
and to the United Nations. " He said-he had 6-, high regard for 
him, that the UN was1ortunate in having'his servicesi and that 
he had observed throughout his tour that General, Nimmo was 
respected and received congenially on both, sides'of the Line 21. 
MILITARY OBSERVERSý 
Nationalities 
-Further to the Security Council Resolution of 21st 
*General Nimmo's successor, General Tassara, was appointed 
to the lower post of Assistant Secretary-General, 
refelecting no doubt not only his own lack of seniority, 
but the hope that UNMOGIF would prove to be progressively 
less important after the signing of, the Tashkent Agreement 
in 1966. In 1972 a slightly changed Ceasefire Line 
became known instead as the Line of Control. Thereafter 
the Indians refused to co-operate with UNMOGIP, thus 
decreasing the Mission's capacity to operate fully, a fact 
which is reflected in the next CMO, Brigadier-General 
Waldenstrom, being taken on in 1978 at both a lower army 
ranking, and at the lower UN grading of Director. 
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April, '1948, which made provision for their introductiod into 
Kashmir, a request for Observers to be sent to the Subcontinent 
was first made by UNCIP in August 1948, when the possibility of 
achieving a ceasefire agreement seemed to be in view; The 
Commission-then asked for twenty Military Observers, each to be 
accompanied by a junior officer, the whole group being as 
homogenous-as possible and drawn, -only from countries considered 
by both parties to be neutral in the, conflict. A knowledge of 
the English language was said to be essential as both the 
Indian and Pakistani commanders spoke English22*.,, 
"By'December 1948, despite some-exchange of correspondence 
on the subject with UNHQ, Colban was still requesting twenty 
Observer teams. He suggested they came from Belgium, Canada, 
Mexico or other Latin American countries, Norway, Sweden or the 
United States of America, but preferably not from more than 
three or four countrieS24. With the-establishment of the- 
Ceasefire on lst, January, 1949 the situation became urgent, and 
Ambassador Huddle, the, US Chairman of UNCIP, - suggested the 
United States might be, able to supply Observers4rom the Far 
Eastern theatre2l. - Later that month these were the first to 
arrive, seven on 24th January and nine, the. -, following week2,6 
In, the meantime the Secretary-General who, -officially at least, 
made the final selection of nationalities,,, approached the 
above-mentioned countries and received favourable replies 
initially from Belgium, Canada, Norway and Mexico - though 
Mexico's contribution did not last beyond 1949, being replaced 
*In April 1949-an attempt was made to have sent home three 
Mexican Observers-who could not carry out their duties 
because they could not speak English. Colban suggested 
Delvoie ask the Mexican Consul to apply for their return, 
but this did not have the desired effect and Delvoie 
decided to keep them on the assumption that they would 
soon pick up essential English". 
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by Chile. Sweden also agreed, to contribute in 1950, Denmark 
in 1951, and Australia, Ecuador, New Zealand and Uruguay each 
supplied Observers for the first time in 1952, though Ecuador 
did not continue to participate-beyond that year. Norway 
refrained from providing Observers between 1953 and 195627*. 
UNCIP had in mind that as many as'25 of the originally 
envisaged 40 Observers might come, from the US or Canada", but 
Mr. Bajpai, the Indian Foreign Minister told Colban that India 
would prefer not so many US Observers, but more from smaller 
countries. He did not, however, ins i5t3*. Colban reassured 
him that at least the Commission, hadýdecided not to ask Great 
Britain to send Observers",, and cabled the Secretary-General 
to the effect that, it was important to have a considerable 
percentage from smaller stateS32. General Delvoie, however, 
soon expressed a preference for US Observers, who were usually 
younger for their'rank, and therefore better fitted-to the 
rigorous conditionS33. The imbalance-this led to in the Group 
subsequently caused some diffiCUltie, -34, a problem which was 
effectively solved when in 1954 US Obse rvers were discontinued 
because they became Politically unacceptableýto India**. , 
-The problem of an imbalance then became'the problem of a 
tendency towards a division between British Commonwealth-and 
non-Commonweatlh Officers, and General Nimmo decided it was 
probably advisable to keep the numbers of Commonwealth members 
down slightly, despite the fact that-they fitted into the work 
most easily because of their common British heritage. 
*In February 1953 the-UN requested the re-a5signment, of, 
one of Norway's officers on account of his age, 
accompanying the request with the words: "General Nimmo 
requires fewer officers in 1953 than in 1952 so no 
immediate replacement is required 1128. 
**See pages 277-285. 
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Furthermore, they were best understood by the average Indian 
and Pakistani soldier, who normally knew at least some 
English". At the end of 1955 he suggested to Cordier it 
would be a good idea to have a more even representation of 
countries by reducing the numbers of Canadian and Australian 
Observers from eight to six and increasing the number from 
Scandinavia36. Cordier's assistant Leo Malania informed 
Cordier, however, that the chances of increasing the 
representation were not good and there were more likely to be 
reductions, except from Canada, which would increase the 
imbalance, and he wondered whether more countries should be 
brought in "despite India's susceptibilities"37 Discussions 
with other countrie-s then took place, although the first 
Italians did not arrive until 1961. In 1963 Finland also 
began to participate 38* 
In his report after a visit to the Mission in 1964 Dr. 
Bunche also suggested giving a wider geographical base to the 
Observer Group by selecting from countries not then 
represented", but later that year he told Nimmo he had sounded 
the two Governments out on the possibility, and that Indian 
reaction had been reported as "negative, primarily (because it 
i 
was) thought to be inopportune to consider any such change in 
practice just now"41. This comment, and Malania's, together 
with India's initial reluctance to have too many US Observers, 
and her refusal in 1954 to allow them at all, indicates her 
extreme sensitiveness to the issue. 
*Belgium, Chile, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Norway, Sweden 
and Uruguay were continuing to supply Observers as of July 
1987, New Zealand having withdrawn in 1976, Canada in 
1978-9, and Australia in December 198531. 
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Numbers 
Of the 40 Observers requested, only 21 had arrived by 22nd 
February, 1949, but Delvoie believed that "owing to the extreme 
goodwill of both opposing parties" he would be able to manage 
with a lesser number than originally envisaged42. By 1st 
April, 1949 he had 35 Observers which he thought was sufficient 
to carry out his mission. But at the end of May weather 
conditions enabled communications with the Northern Areas of 
the front in Kashmir to be re-established, necessitating more 
work and investigation as teams were also sent to these parts, 
and a request to bring the total to 60 was made. By this 
time, also, several officers were already being recalled by 
their armies or sent home for medical or compassionate reasons, 
and although in most cases replacements were sent, the total 
strength of Observers never exceeded 41 in the period to 
November 1949, when General Delvoie left the Mission 43. 
When Brigadier Angle returned to the Mission as CMO in 
February 1950 there were 36 Observers with the Group, and he 
also wrote to tell Colban that as soon as it was possible to 
send Observers into the Northern Areas, the authorised group of 
60 men would be needed. He requested an additional eleven 
Observers from nations other than America, since with the 
arrival of some American replacements already expected, the US 
would be supplying half the authorised number. He said that 
it was becoming increasingly apparent that the mere presence of 
Observers curtailed the number of incidentS44 . However by 
April, far from increasing, the numbers had dropped to 32. 
With the onset of summer and the reopening of those stations 
that were closed in winter, it was impossible to man all 
stations, since it was considered neither practical nor fair to 
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man a post with only one Observer45. 
- When General Nimmo arrived at UNMOGIP at the end of 1950 
there were, 42 Military Observers with the Mission". In 
January 1951 he wrote to Cordier proposing changes, notably an 
increase of six radio, operators, which he believed would effect 
a saving of seven Observers without 1055 of efficienCy47. He 
suggested the following-proportional representation of 
Observers whilst making it clear he did not wish -ýo preclude 
the possibility, of representation by more countries should the 
UN decide to invite others to participate",; . 
United States 17 
Belgium 5 
Canada 5 
Norway 2 
Chile 2- 
Sweden 2 
Denmark 2 
Total 35 
Cordier agreed to this proposal4l , and in the. short term 
the number of Observers decreased, to, as. low, indeed as 29 in 
June and July of that year". However, duringthe course of 
the year tension between the parties increased. Cordier 
visited the area in June 1951' and came to the conclusion that 
the Group needed considerable strengthening, both because of 
the distances which Observers had to cover, and because with 
the increase in tension Observers had to appear very promptly 
on the scene of an incident, as even a slight delay could be 
fraught with dangerous consequences, whereas in quieter times a 
delay, whilst undesirable, was not serious". Encouraged by 
Cordier's views, General Nimmo requested reinforcements t 
bring the strength of the Group up from 35 to 6552. General 
Devers, Military Adviser to Dr. Graham also visited UNMOGIP in 
August 1951ýand agreed it was desirable to have more officers 
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to ensure more adequate supervision of the CFL in the difficult 
terrain. ' He also felt that higher numbers would make it 
possible to roýate the officers more effectively which would 
contribute to better morale and thus higher efficiency" . 
-As a result of requests to the contributing countries as 
well as others, so that Observers arrived for the first time 
that., year from Australia, Ecuador, New Zealand and Uruguay, the 
number of-Observers rose in 1952 to a maximum in September of 
60,, with a minimum number during the year of 4954. The 
numbers were reduced again to an official establishment of 52 
when-quieter conditions prevailed in 195355. In early 1954, 
when India requested the withdrawal of all US Observers*, there 
were 44 Observers on the, Mission, including 18 from the US56. 
By the end of that year-the approved establishment had dropped 
to 35 and the situation was quiet enough for Nimmo to manage 
with 27 Observers, --with a, further two expected37 . -In 1955-56 
the establishment dropped to-as low as 30 Observers. , It rose 
I 
again in 1957 to-become 36,, where it remained, as below, until 
1963- although-in practice the actual' number was often 
lower"': 
Australia 8 
Belgium 3 
Canada 8 
Chile 4 
ýDenmark, -2 New Zealand 3 
Sweden 3 
Uruguay 4 
Norway 1 
Total 36; - 
General Nimmo was always on the watch for opportunities to 
reduce the number of Observers employed because, firstly, he 
knew that it was not easy forýthe contributing countries to 
*See pages 277-285. 
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maintain their quota year after year and, secondly, it was bad 
for morale and for the reputation of the Group to have too many 
officers and not enough work for them to do. Furthermore he 
realised that "life in the field can become dull, monotonous 
and sometimes uncomfortable if personnel are not fully 
occupied. It is not everyone who is suited, temperamentally 
or by training, to withstand these conditions for long, unless 
they are kept reasonably active"31, He also endeavoured to 
reduce the, number of Observers in the winter months by 
deferring replacements until summer stations were due to open 
in order to save costs". One UN official after an inspection 
visit to UNMOGIP in 1958 reported that it would be hard to find 
anyone in whom "persistence in'the search for-economies and 
insistence on the highest-, standards of operational efficiency 
were more plainly allied" than'in General Nimm&'. 
As tension rose-in the 1960s, General Nimmb was-, forced to 
request an additional six Observers in August 1961, and again 
in November 196311, and a further three twelve months 
later 63 . After the 
Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 the number of 
Observers serving with UNMOGIP was augmented-to a'record '9964*. 
Status 
Nimmo-was informed by, the Secretary-General, when he was 
appointed-CMO that the Military Observer Group would be under 
his direct control, for all purposes related to their duties and 
functions as UN Observers, but that Observers were Paid by- 
their own Governments and were under the administration and 
discipline of their respective national commands. If in 
*This was reduced again to 44 in March 196645 where it 
remained even after the withdrawal of New'Zealand in 1976, 
but with the withdrawal also of Canada in 1978 the 
official establishment was reduced to 39 Observers". 
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Nimmo's Judgment any disciplinary measure should become 
necessary, he had the authority to suspend an Observer from the 
performance of his functions as a member of the Group. He 
should then report the circumstances, together with his 
recommendations, to, Andrew Cordier so that any further action 
which might be required-could be implemented in consultation 
with the Governmentýof whose armed forces the officer was a 
member". 
II In, April 1949 the Principal Secretary of. UNCIP informed 
the Indian and Pakistan authorities that--"for the purpose of 
identification, Military Observers, who-wear the uniform of 
their respective countries, are equipped with blue armbands 
inscribed, in white letters with the wordsýUNITED NATIONS. In 
addition the men have been furnished with UN identity cards, 
examples of which have been submitted to both Governments and 
to both-High Commands"60., 'In 1958 Observers also commenced 
wearing-the UN badge and-blue beret". 
Security 
Officers assigned'to UNMOGIP do not carry arms. In order 
to ensure their security when moving unescorted or unannounced 
across', or-in the-immediate-vicinity of the, Ceasefire Line, or 
in areas of military operations, they are required to make a 
conspicuous display of the UN flag,, and also a white flag 
unless they are driving a white United Nations jeep -such 
'Jeeps being painted white in order to stand out, in contrast to 
the camouflage colour'of normal army. transport. Observers, 
instructions require them to take-due care of their personal 
safety: they are not allowed to accompany armed. Indian. or 
Pakistan patrols in forward areas, and in the, event,, of,, 
uncontrolled military operations they are instructed to 
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withdraw to a position where they can be in communication with 
the local authority, or from which they can endeavour to effect 
a cessation of hostilitie S70. 
'During the early 1960s such operations became increasingly 
frequent, and in early 1964 Ralph Bunche checked with General 
Nimmo-as, to whether he had received assurances from both sides 
as to co-operation with the Mission and the security of its 
personnel., ýNimmo informed him that there appeared to be no 
specific written assurances. However, both parties realized 
that they had obligations, and although co-operation was 
sometimes not what it should be, security was always provided 
for Headquarters and for Observers in the field, by means of 
guards, escortsýand guides where necessary7l. 
Attributes 
General Nimmo believed that quality was far more-important 
than numbers in any Observer group and he recommended that the 
fullest co-operation of each contributing country be sought to 
ensure that only, the best available officers were sent as 
Military Observers, both for the sake of the prestige of the UN 
and of each Member Nation. So far as UNMOGIP was concerned, 
he said, the Indian and Pakistan, Armies were highly trained and 
professional-and their members quick to notice or be critical 
of any shortcomings in officers sent to work amongst theM72. 
The American General Devers, Military Adviser to the 
UNRIP, Dr. Frank Graham, in his report to the Secretary-General 
after a visit to UNMOGIP in 1951 suggested that only officers 
with an efficiency rating of superior should be appointed". 
And Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, reporting in 1958, also said that, 
the quality of the individual Observer in the Mission was the 
essential qualification of its success". After a visit to 
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the Mission in 1964 Ralph Bunche suggested that means should be 
devised-of better screening of Observers being recruited, 
particularly as regards personality and English language 
proficiency". The problem of language had recurred from time 
to time*, but otherwise this was one of the few occasions when 
it was even slightly intimated that the quality of the 
Observers serving left anything to be desired. 
The principal requirements considered necessary for an 
officer selected, for duty with UNMOGIP were initially set down 
in a leaflet entitled "Notes for the Guidance of an Observer on 
Appointment to UNMOGIP"7". These were: 
a) -'Professional 
1. 'He must be able to speak, read and write the English 
language. ' I 
2. - He must possess a high degree of tact and commonsense. 
This is'essential in-his Work, as also is an even temper. 
3. ; He must get to'know the customs, organisations and 
functions of, the other armies from which his colleagues 
will have, been, appointed. - -1 ! 
-4. ýHe must be, capable of conducting a, thorough and 
impartial investigation of alleged . ceasefire violations 
and be'able to prepare in writing a, report covering all 
the facts and-circumstances resulting from his' 
-investigation. He must be able to make sound impartial 
*See footnote on page 113. In 1954 General Nimmo 
requested the recall of two Chilean colonels who had 
arrived unable either to write or speak English, but was 
prevailed upon to retain them as the matter was rather 
delicate since these officers were required to know 
English in order to have reached the rank of Colonel. - 
Sir Humphrey Trevelyan also noted that Latin Americans 
often knew little English when they arrived, and were then 
76 
of little use for the first six months . 
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recommendations to the Chief Military Observer based on 
his findings. 
b) Physical 
An Observer must be in first class physical condition. 
'It is necessary for him to climb, on occasion to heights 
ýof, 16,000 feet, and to walk many miles a day. 
Health 
So-many Observers fell ill during the first six months of 
the Mission's work in Kashmir-that General Delvoie requested 
that all officers-assigned to the, Mission in the future be, if 
possible, below 40 years of age and in good, physical . 
conditioel. , This unsatisfactory-health situation was not 
entirely surprising in view of the differences of altitude and 
temperature-, to which Observers were often subjected.. 
Frequently they would be sent from the extremely high and cold 
mountainous regions of Kashmir to the lowlands of Jammu where 
the temperature was above one hundred degrees Fahrenheit. In 
addition hygiene, especially-in some remote areas, was not 
always all that could be desired. Furthermore, some Obseivers 
found it difficult to adapt themselves to eating Indian food 
and were often unable toýobtain Europeanfood 7T . At the end 
of its-first year of operation agitation for a Medical Officer 
to be attached to the Group began. In the two months from 
15th December, 1949 to 15th February, 1950, ýfive of the. 41 
Observers went into hospital, one with an infection and 
pneumonia, one with malignant malaria-and three with ringworm. 
In addition there was a case of luikopalia of-the tongue where 
the patient was sent abroad for treatment, a case of bronchitis 
and several colds". 
On his arrival at the Mission Brigadier Angle requested a 
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medical4officer, but insisted he be a military man or else it 
would be, wiser to continue to evacuate all patients to the 
nearest big centre, either Delhi or Karachi, for the necessary 
medical attention, as they had already been doing. Angle 
maintained a'UN military doctor could freely cross the 
Ceasefire-Line, use army transportation and stay at the camps, 
whereas-a civilian doctor - which the UN Field Service was 
planning to appoint - would always have to be accompanied by an 
Observer, and would encounter many complications moving around 
the Indian and Pakistani military units6l. 
In fact the Mission was provided with a Medical Officer 
for a'few months, but the incumbent of the post, - for reasons 
unconnected with his work, did not prove satisfactory and had 
to be recalled in 1951. The'CMO, then General Nimmo, 'decided 
that the local facilities provided by the Indians and 
Pakistanis were, quite adequate for the Mission's needS82*'. In 
1952 Observers at'Rajauri-Field Station were'not happy with the 
drinking-water and were worried about the dangers of scrub 
typhus, malaria, and snakes, but Nimmo maintained these, were 
normal hazards, and the-Mission could only issue warnings and 
make sure-preven-Eive measures were understood. - Its success in 
this matter may be-measured by the fact that the'incidence of 
ill health decreased. In 1955 General Nimmo assured Cordier 
that if an officer was healthy and fit when he arrived there 
was no reason, why he should no-ý stay for a two-year tour, and 
return for a further tour after a break. -Whil5t he did stress 
the'need for this break, he pointed out that British Army 
Officers and many European civilians had beeft there for 
*Only since 1980 has a Military Observer been attached to 
the Mission as a medical assistant, or male nurse, with 
the function mainly to check up on hygiene and medical 
supplies in the field stations. 
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kenerations. He was more concerned over the question of 
dependants because women and children did not do so well in 
such surroundings, and especially under the conditions under 
which the Mission operated". 
During the period under review, 1949-1965, there were no 
fatal casualties in line of duty among the Mission's Military 
Observers or civilian personnel. There were six fatalities 
resulting from accidents, and one from natural cause S134. 
Personal Relations 
In addition to resolving disputes on the, Ceasefire Line, 
the Observers had to be able to resolve, or preferably prevent, 
disputes arising from amongst themselves. Assigning officers 
of mixed nationalities, with their differing customs and 
training, to spend long-periods together in the heat and 
humidity of a Subcontinental summer is something of aýtest of 
human relations, quite, apart from the tensions inherent in the 
situation of dispute, between India and-Pakistan. On the-other 
hand perhaps the main positive gain to the contributing --ý 
countries'and the officers involved comes from this broadening 
of-experience and horizons over, and above that which was to be 
expected-purely from theýtask of observing the, 'Ceasefire. - 
Discipline and References 
During the course-of the Mission's period of, operation 
very fewýObservers, seem to have disgraced themselves, although 
there may well have been minor breaches of discipline dealt 
with on the spot, but notýserious enough to warrant a mention 
in the correspondence with New York. From thel. endýof 1955, 
whenever an Observer left the Group his country's delegation in 
New York received a Performance evaluation from General 
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NimmoB3. These were almost invariably good and usually 
personalised in some way, such as: "reliable in every way and 
happiest when posted to remoter and more mountainous areas"86. 
,ý Even before these evaluations came to be given 
automatically, -Nimmo went out of his way to see that any action 
conspicuously above the call of duty was specifically brought 
to the attention of an Observer's home authorities. For 
example, in late-1951 a certain Canadian Lieutenant-Colonel, 
Paul Garneau, arrived in an area where there had. been a 
considerable amount of firing. Fearing that any delay in 
settling the incident might develop into a more serious 
engagement,, he proceeded over the open country in his white 
jeep towards theýplace where the trouble had started, and from 
which-he could-proceed to contact the other side. When about 
100 yards from this-point the jeep was fired upon, so he 
returned to cover to deposit two army officers from one of the 
parties who were with him, and then drove on-again. The jeep 
was again fired-on until the firing range was reduced to about 
400 yards, - and then stopped. Garneau, left the jeep to speak 
to the patrol, commander on the one side and the police and 
civilians on-, the other, and then returned to the-original side 
and'arranged a, stand down of troops there*. Nimmo thought his 
action was sufficiently meritorious to be brought to the notice 
Canadian Army HQý- and said it was not only a contribution- 
towards the maintenance of peace, but showed courage, 
determination and a high sense of duty". 
On occasion an Observer has been recalled from the Mission 
on account of his behaviour, but such instances have usually 
been the-result of certain actions being used-by one or other 
*Details of location were not given in the citation 
because of the confidential aspect of UNMOGIP's operation. 
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disputant for political purposes*. One case when this was not 
so serves as an indication of the attitude of General Nimmo and 
also of-UNHQ in such circumstances. On this occasion, further 
to a cable requesting the immediate return home of an Observer 
"for personal and private reasons", which inevitably did happen 
quite genuinely from time to time, General Nimmo explained in a 
following letter that this particular officer had struck an 
Indian driver'several timesýwhilst under the influence of 
alcohol, and then fired a number of shots from a pistol**. 
Nimmo offered him the alternative of requesting his immediate 
return or-a formal and-official military Court of Inquiry and 
he chose, the, former. Nimmo explained that he was a regular 
officer who had given good service to the Mission but that this 
was not the first time he had been in such a condition, and 
often-on such-occasions he became difficult and professed 
afterwards to have no recollection of what happened,. -Nimmo 
had no desireto be the instigator of difficulty with the home 
authorities of any Observer, and gave the impressionýhe was 
equally trying to save the country itself any embarrassment. 
He sukgested--that unless the Secretariat was pressed for an 
explanation-theykept the reason for his early departure 
confidential, -and that should it be necessary to give some 
reason perhaps it would suffice to say that he carried a pistol 
and ill-advisedly fired a couple of rounds in the air. The 
Secretariat agreed not to write to the Mission about the 
incidentOB. 
*Examples are given in Part III - pages 246-262 and 
352-353. 
**It is not explained how he came to be carrying a pistol, 
since the Observers were unarmed. Presumably it was his 
personal property. 
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Preferred Ranks 
The question of which ranks it was preferable to have 
amongst the Observers was a perennial one, the rank of colonel 
being the main bone of contention. During the first months of 
the Mission Delvoie had requested healthy men aged between 30 
and 40, ranking from Captain to Lieutenant-Colonel8l and this 
continued to be the main requirement of the Group. In August 
1951 General Nimmo had inserted in his Field Observer 
Regulations handbook-that Observers should be selected as far 
as possible from officers with the following service 
qualifications": 
1. War Service*. 
2. Infantry company (or equivalent sub-unit) commander, 
rank equal to captain or major. 
3. Infantry battalion (or equivalent unit) commander, 
rank equal-to lieutenant-colonel. 
4. Staff officer, with-field experience, rank-senior 
captain, major-or lieutenant-colonel. 
Nevertheless, -when his Chief Operations Officer, Colonel 
MacDonald, was due to leave in 1955, Nimmo wrote to Cordier 
pointing put that after this departure-there would be no 
observer above the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel and that he 
preferred to have a due proportion of mature and 
well-experienced officers, including two or three colonels 
provided they were still active and physically fit. -At the 
time he considered that this provided a better balanced group 
and helped prestige. Most importantly it helped to satisfy 
*This would have meant service in World War II. Service 
in any war might now be a more difficult qualification to 
achieve, particularly with officers from countries 
acceptable as contributors to Observer missions. 
129 
the susceptibilities of local commanders"*. 
Later that year he added that he would prefer not to have 
more than one colonel from any one country as there was a risk 
of jealousies if there was an undue preponderance of one 
nationality13. He admitted that certain factors had at times 
caused a little friction. It was therefore desirable to 
alternate the more senior appointments among the several 
nationalities present to make for smoother working and harmony 
within the Mission. He also suggested that it would be a good 
idea to limit the length of service of colonels to two years, 
partly because of age- bearing in mind the living and 
operational conditions, but also because of the difficulty of. 
finding postings over a period of more than two years, since 
there were few appoinments available in the Mission 
commensurate with their rank'4**. 
Reporting on a visit to the Mission in 1958 Sir Humphrey 
Treveleyan, Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs, also 
pointed out that it was preferable not to have too many 
colonels, as they were older and less active, and in 
consequence an unfair burden was placed on Junior officers". 
Colonel Ostbye, who became Acting Chief Observer after General 
Delvoie left the Mission in 1949, was an early example. In 
December 1952 the Secretary-General wrote to the Permanent 
Representative of Norway repeating General Nimmo's comments 
*Equally, General de Ridder, who had been Acting CMO when 
General Nimmo was absent in 1953, had suggested to Nimmo 
that it was probably not good policy to have at Field 
Stations Observers of a, higher rank than the commanding 
officers with whom they had to deal at that particular 
stati oe2. 
**Although he must have-been fully aware of-the problems, 
especially in view of his suggestion mentioned in the 
above note, General de Ridder had aggravated the situation 
by his continued presence on the Mission for a further 
year after Nimmo's return73. 
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that in his four years of service Colonel Ostbye had been 
entrusted with important iesponsibilities and had discharged 
his'duties with distinction, showing outstanding qualities of 
courage, initiative and devotion to the aims and purposes of 
the UN. Nevertheless, because of his age (then 67) the CMO 
had refrained from assigning him to field duty, though he 
himself was probably quite prepared to undertake it, and had 
retained him for long periods at HQ or as Liaison Officer in 
Delhi. - The special arrangement, however, raised certain 
administrative problems in view of, the Group's rotation policy, 
therefore-the Secretary-General felt it would-, be-consistent 
with the overall UN policy of compulsoryýretirement at 60 if 
the appropriate, authorities in the Norwegian Government could 
give early consideration to the reassignment of Colonel Ostbye 
in Norway 17 
In July 1959 Nimmo reappraised the situation and remarked 
to Cordier that in spite of attempts to keep the amount of 
colonels to a minimum, the number seemed to increase almost 
without one being aware of the fact until it was too late. He 
then had four, plus another who was entitled to wear the rank- 
of colonel but did not. He now maintained he was convinced 
that the best system was to accept no one for UNMOGIP above the 
rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, and not more than one of that rank 
from any single country, although he did not wish to ask for 
any withdrawals, or prevent any colonel who was more or less on 
his way' from coming". 
Cordier agreed, but later that year informed Nimmo that 
after months of trying to persuade Chile to send lower ranks he 
finally received the explanation that captains were not 
eligible for the necessary special training Observers received, 
and because of duties and courses no majors were available. 
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As a compromise the Secretary-General thanked Chile for "the 
very full explanation" but said that under the actual 
conditions of work in the field he considered that the 
assignment of only one of the officers selected would meet 
adequately the current requirements of UNMOGIP. And he left 
it to Chile to select which one"*. - 
- Despite the above comments, by 1962 General Nimmo had 
established a tradition that a Canadian Army colonel should 
always be the senior Observer in the Mission and act as his 
assistant in all operational matters, and he specificially 
informed UN HQ-that he wished to maintain that procedure""**. 
However, when-his assistant became Acting CMO after Nimmo's 
death in-1966 and wished to appoint a further Canadian ,ý 
*A similar situation arose in 1966, with another 
Latin-American country, Uruguay, who tried to replaceýa 
departing major with a lieutenant-colonel. Ralph Bunche 
then wrote to the Permanent Representative of Uruguay 
saying "our request ... is not the least casual but is based on the carefully assessed needs of, the Kashmir 
Mission... it is precisely because of our past experience 
that we are insisting on officers of, a lower rank... and 
that to have lieutenant-colonels appointed to the same 
positions-(as captains or majors) would lead to 
embarrassment and difficulty... " which might adversely 
affect the smooth functioning of UNMOGIP, particularly in, 
the initial period when they would have to work under the 
direction of a major from another country. He also 
mentioned that owing to financial pressures they had to 
, put more emphasis than ever 
before on the, efficiency of 
UNMOGIP. Uruguay maintained that under its own system of 
ranking majors and lieutenant-colonels could hold 
identical posts, but nevertheless agreed to send a major. 
At this, time, with General Tassara as the new CMO, it was 
felt that the minimum requirement was to have five 
lieutenant-colonels, each one to be a career officer"O., 
-**With. the withdrawal of the Canadian Observers in 1978, 
and since the CMO has no longer been an Australian, his 
assistant has, in fact, tended again to be Australian. 
In 1982 the desired number of lieutenant-colonels was 
considered to be three, mainly in order to give the-, CMO, -; a 
choice for his Chief Operations Officer. All 
lieutenant-colonels had to spend at least six months, in 
the field before being given any other appointment within 
the Mission, and there were no full colonels with the 
Misslon'02 . 
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Lieutenant-Colonel as his own assistant, he was advised by UNHQ 
that he would have to appoint someone of a different 
nationality to himself as it was essential to maintain 
geographical distribution of senior posts in all UN 
operations"'. No such objection had been raised when General 
Nimmo had had Colonel MacDonald, another Australian, as his 
Chief Operations Officer in the earlyý1950s. 
Length of Service 
The'question of what should be considered the optimum 
length of service for an Observer was discussed from time to 
time, and-although no definite ruling was made, aýfairly - 
well-established procedure evolved. Normally an Observer 
served-aterm of office of one year with the possibility, of an 
extension for a further year if the CMO recommended it, and the 
Observer's country was able to allow it. A second tour of 
duty was-also admissible after a break. - It was-considered 
desirable for-some to stay longer than one year, but-for the 
most part'not more than two'", as the advantages-of having 
officers with a thorough grasp of the problems of the area, and 
having established good, personalýcontacts'on'both sides of the 
dispute, not to mention'a saving on travel costs, had to be 
weighed againstýcertain possible disadvantages. As Cordier 
put it, either the responsibilities of the job might become so 
familiar as no longer to present, -a-challenge%-, to the, ingenuity 
and resourcefulness of the officer concerned, or he might 
develop some of the'occupational weaknes5e5 that sometimes 
occur in foreign, service as a result of extended residence in 
areas where life isýon the whole softer and easier than at 
home'05.,. ý General Nimmo, was quick"to refute Cordier's ý 
implication that life on a field station, where most of-his 
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Observers were stationed most of the time, was a softer option 
than at home, and reminded Cordier that the work was also 
tinged with an element of risk'06. A UN official visiting 
UNMOGIP in 1959 also reported that "the Observers work most of 
the time, in the simplest conditions and not infrequently are 
exposed to real hardship as well as danger. - It should not be 
imagined that theirs in any sense is an easy life '-107. 
Nevertheless some people undoubtedly enjoy-the challenges this 
kind of lifeýhas to offer, and others indeed may find in it an 
escape from'the problems of a more conventional life. Over 
the'years only the occasional Observer has been unable to cope 
and has had to be repatriated. It is the case! that the odd 
one has demanded-his return home within days of his arrival'08, 
but the"record shows that very many serve twoýconsecutive . 
terms, and others return for a second tour after an absence of 
a'few years"'. 
General-Nimmo pointed out that inevitably some officers 
retained'their interest and activity better than-ýothers, and 
that, the development of any "occupational weakness" depended on 
the individual. He admitted also, however, that since one 
never knew what a replacement would be like there was possibly 
an understandable tendency to retain the more experienced 
officers whose faults were known. He said that the Mission 
had always depended a great deal on having a framework of 
experienced Observers for employment in the more important 
field stations and, in particular, on the staff at 
Headquarters, and whilst some had been drawn from those with 
under'a year's service, usually the most valuable had been 
those with more than a year. Thus he had always found it 
desirable, to retain a hard core of experienced tried Observers 
who ensured Mission continuity and a uniformity of-policy. Of 
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the four Observers currently at the Mission who had been there 
for more than a year, all had done invaluable work for the 
Mission, and whilst it might have suited them for personal 
reasons to stay on, they had done more work and accepted more 
responsibility than the average Observer"O. 
He thought there was much to be said for appointing 
Observers for, two years straight out but for the fact that 
non-regular officers often found, it, impossible to be absent 
from home for more than one year, for business or other 
reasons, and that it was often difficult for regular officers 
to be spared for that period by their countries, especially 
those with small standing armies. On the other hand such 
countries might prefer to contribute suitable and experienced 
Observers in whom they had confidence for longer than two 
years. Thus, to restrict too rigidly. the terms of service 
might, also restrict the field of choice to the detriment of the 
high standards that the contributing country might desire and 
the Mission require. Experience in-UNMOGIP showed that a tour 
of duty of one year was a suitable compromise, and one, which 
also afforded an opportunity of rejecting more easily any 
officers who wished to stay but were not suitable. For- 
although, as he said, each country endeavoured to send only 
suitable officers, sometimes it was difficult for them to 
foresee how they might respond to the rather unusual role of a 
Military Observer and in unaccumstomed surroundings"'. 
Dependants 
Most Observers tended to be single officers in the. early 
days,, or at least not to bring their families out with them, 
but they were not expressly forbidden to do so. In 1953 only 
twelve Observers had dependants actually in the Mission area, 
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and that was the highest number thus far. At the time General 
Nimmo became concerned about the increase because of the 
additional burden thrown on transportation and other 
facilities, and because of the additional responsibility in the 
event that it should be necessary to move the Group quickly. 
He therefore suggested that the movement of dependants to the 
area should be discouraged'12. 
Nevertheless, as the Mission became more established and 
seemed set to remain for some time, it became quite commonplace 
for the Observers to be accompanied by their families, the cost 
of sending out them out being paid by their own countries, the 
UN only paying for the transportation of the Observers 
themselves. But in 1962 General Nimmo requested that 
preference be given to officers without dependants or to those 
with small families, say a wife and two children at most, in 
view of such factors as accommodation and transportation, 
increasing living expenses, and health and education problems. 
He pointed out that the majority of Observers were only able to 
see their dependants for a few days per month since the 
families were not allowed to visit field stations'". Ralph 
Bunche passed Nimmo's views on to the UN delegations of the 
contributing countries and suggested also that General Nimmo' 
ask the Observers themselves to let their delegations know, 
informally, the various factors which made it undesirable for 
Observers to have more than one or two dependants in the 
area"'. 
Immediately prior to the war in 1965, Nimmo cabled Bunche 
requesting him to ask Member Governments to restrict entry of 
dependants of Military Observers*into the Mission area until 
further notice"'. 
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DEPLOYMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 
Headquarters 
In-1949 General Delvoie, in his role as Chief of the 
Observer Group, quickly decided that'one group of Observers 
should be attached to each, Army, with the senior officer of 
each group establishing a Control HQ under the direct command 
of Delvoiej and in close liaison with the commander of the 
operations theatre on his side. - 'Each group was divided into 
teams of two Observers, to beýattached to the tactical 
formations in the field and directly, responsible-to their 
respective Control HQ. - The plan-weis, put into effect on the 
Pakistan'-side on 3rd February; - 1949-with Control HQ at 
Rawalpindi, and'on the Indian side on-10th February, - with 
Control HQ at Jammu until the weather improved sufficiently for 
it to-move-to Srinagar. The two armies agreed to place 
accommodation and transport facilities at, the disposal of the 
Observers and also allowed them the use of military radio and 
telephone nets". - 
Delvoie maintained his own-Headquarters inýSrinagar during 
the summer'and moved it to Rawalpindi for theýýwinterý 
immediately before his return to Europe, 17. On his arrival'as 
CMO in February 1950 Brigadier Angle'also'decided that the 
Military Observer Headquarters should-move each, 'six months, 
leaving a Liaison Officer on the side from which HQ was absent. 
Angle at first considered spending three of the six months on 
the Indian side in Delhi, where Indian Army Headquarters was 
situated, but decided it was too far from the Kashmir front to 
permit quick and easy contact between Headquarters and the 
Observers in the field. He therefore stationed a Liaison 
officer in Delhi also to serve as a link between Indian Army HQ 
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and the Mission"e*. 
Angle immediately drafted a plan for the reorganisation 
and administration of the Group. The American Army had by 
then organized their officers on duty in Kashmir into a 
sub-unit known as the United States Military Observers in 
Kashmir (USMOK)**, which came under the direct supervision of 
the senior American officer for all administrative matters of a 
purely American Army-nature. It placed a substantial load on 
the officer', -since about half of the Observers were American. 
ýBrigadier Angle considered that the USMOK administration 
could best, be done from a central headquartersý rather than 
through the, two controls set1up by General Delvoie, and'decided 
that when HQ transferred to-Srinagar for the summer, the two 
Control Commands would also move there, and their functions 
threafter become the responsibility of HQ., - After the move had 
been effected in this manner, Headquarters'consisted of the 
CMO, a deputy CMO, an Administrative Group and-an Operations 
Planning-Group. The Observer Teams thenkdealt directly with 
HQ in all, matters 120. 
General Nimmo and subsequent CMOs continuedý'the tradition 
of having UNMOGIP Headquarters spend the six summer months, 
starting 1st May, in Srinagar and the six winter months, from 
ist-November, in Rawalpindi, though the bi-annual move was on 
occasion delayed by weather conditions, and in-March 1958 
*Officially the CMO dealt directly at the highest level 
with the Chief of the General Staff of the Indian Army, 
and with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, 
ýalthough in routine circumstances senior officers of the 
two Armies were delegated to attend to matters concerning 
UNMOGIP. In practice all Observers dealt regularly with 
the relevant military authorities at whatever level might 
be required according to the circumstance of the 
moment' ". 
**USMOK was disbanded in 1954 when the last of the US 
Observers left the Mission. See pages 277-285. 
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General Nimmo moved to Delhi with part of his HQ "to create the 
impression of gaining closer contact with the staff at Indian 
Army HQ", in spite of the fact, as he commented, that he had 
known General Thimmaya, the CIC, and General Verma, Vice Chief 
of the General Staff, very well for years. The reason for 
this move was that he had noticed "an increased edginess and 
exasperation among senior officers over there" as far as the 
Pakistan Army was concerned, and-he therefore thought such a 
move would be helpful'21. - He nevertheless returned to 
Rawalpindi correspondingly early in the autumn in order not to 
reverse the feeling and have Pakistan think UNMOGIP was 
fostering India too much, although the Pakistan Chief of Staff 
had agreed the move would be a good idea 122. 
The Pakistan Government provided UNMOGIP with, a house in 
Rawalpindi for its Headquarters which at first was rent-free, -. 
but as of 1957 a nominal rent became payable. The Indians 
provided a similar HQ in Srinagar and that, and also a liaison 
office in New Delhi, were provided rent-free, with charges for 
electricity and maintenance. The Observers stayed in hotels 
or rented houses when they were in Srinagar, Rawalpindi-or New 
Delhi` .A further policy initiated, by Angle., and 
subsequently continued, was to change the posting of, Observers 
from one side of the Ceasefire Line toý, the other every few 
months. The Liaison Officers in-Rawalpindi or-Srinagar and 
Delhi also exchanged duties with Observers in the, field, every 
three months. The primary reason,. for these, moves was to 
ensure the Observers' impartiality by, giving them an - 
opportunity to become acquainted with the troops and conditions 
on-both sides, and not allowing them, to become too attached to 
one side by always hearing only the-one point of view'24. it 
was also realised that, moving officers around helped to prevent 
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them from becoming stale, and assisted in overcoming any 
personal tensions that inevitably arose amongst men of 
differing nationalities and cultural and military backgrounds 
working closely together in a confined area 125. 
General Nimmols Re-organizations 
When General Nimmo took command of UNMOGIP at the end of 
1950 he succeeded to an HQ divided into an Operations Section 
run by Military Observers and an Administration Section looked 
after by the Administration and Finance Officer, a member of 
the UN Secretariat. There were nine Observers at HQ, each 
with his own task and title, and 31 in the field plus two in 
the New Delhi Liaison Office. Also on the Operations side, 
but actually members of the UN Field Staff, were an 
Administrative Assistant and two secretaries at HQ, and twelve 
radio operators: three at HQ, two in New Delhi and seven at 
field stations. In addition there was a five-man US air 
crew'26. 
In January 1951 Nimmo suggested achange in the 
establishment which Cordier approved. This resulted in a 
reduction in the number of Military Observers to 29 at field 
stations, one in New Delhi (to where one of the UN secretaries 
was then sent) and five at HQ. The latter held the posts of 
Chief of Staff, Operations Officer, Intelligence Officer, 
Administrative Officer (Military) and Assistant Administrative 
Officer (Supply, Transport and Communications). Even allowing 
for additional posts to be manned when snow conditions 
permitted, General Nimmo believed that the saving of seven 
Observers could be effected without loss of efficiency if he 
could achieve improved communications with the posts which had 
previously been without radio. Since radio staff were more 
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readily available than Observers the Mission recruited an extra 
six radio operators including a Chief Radio Operator and a 
radio mechanic, 27* 
After the re-organization only one Field Service member, a 
secretary, remained on the Operations Side, and the 
Administrative side consisted of the Chief Administrative 
Officer and his assistant, a Finance Officer and three clerks 
and three male secretaries from the UN Field Service. - The 
Field Service also provided a Chief Signals Officer to be in 
charge of the radio operators and a Transport Officer and a 
mechanic"'. 
Re-organizations in 1958 and 1959 led to overall 
responsibility for all administrative matters, not Just those 
for which he was directly responsible to the UN, being given to 
a Chief Administrative Officer. The extra responsibilities he 
took over included transportation, movement, quartering, 
commiftnications, leave of all personnel, and health and welfare 
including living conditions at field station5130. At a later 
stage some of the purely military administration reverted to 
the Operations side**. 
Some locally-recruited personnel were also taken on since 
the cost was very low. These were mainly servants in 
accordance with local custom, but qualified clerks were also 
recruited'31, which is perhaps surprising in view of a 
prohibition on Indian secretaries being assigned to the Mission 
by the UN Field ServiCeI32. 
*In the tranquil months of 1955-56 when the Mission's 
strength was down to less than 30 Observers, the number 
maintained on the staff at Headquarters was reduced to 
three but subsequently rose again to fivel". 
**Date uncertain. 
141 
Field Stations* 
In order to maintain close contact with the commanders and 
their staffs in the disputed areas, Observer Teams were 
stationed in field stations located at or near selected 
military control centres, usually a brigade or sector HQ, but 
sometimes a larger formation. Because of lack of roads some 
sectors had to be reached on foot, which could take a great 
deal of time but did have an advantage, which General Delvoie 
noted, that "the presence of UN personnel materializing the 
notion of Ceasefire up to the remotest outposts had a 
considerable moral effect on the troops 
Delvoie placed the first Observer Teams on the Pakistan 
side, with effect from 3rd February, 1949, at Kazibakar**, 
Kotli, Hajira and Domel, and on the Indian side, with effect 
from 10th February, at Jammu, Naushera, Punch and Srinagar, 
this last being abolished at the end of March when Control HQ 
Jammu moved to Srinagar 134 As more Observers arrived, and 
weather conditions in the north permitted, Teams were 
established on the Pakistan side at Sialkot, Jhelum, Batrasi 
and Kamri, and on the Indian side at Uri, Gurais and Akhnur'35. 
In October 1949 a team was sent to Gilgit at the request of the 
Indians'36, but a shortage of Observers in March 1950 caused 
the Mission to withdraw this 
team137. 
Since these early days major field stations have 
invariably been maintained on the Pakistan side at Domel, 
*See Map 4 
**Kazibakar is not to be found on any-map and is not 
mentioned again. It is almost certainly a small village 
close to the Ceasefire Line which served as a forward 
position for the Pakistan Army. It is likely that the 
station was afterwards known under the name of a larger 
village in the area. 
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Rawalakot, Kotli and Sialkot, and from 1952 at Bhimber, the 
latter having previously been nearby at Jhelum. On the Indian 
side the major field stations have been at Punch, Jammu and 
either Naushera or Rajauri - sometimes both - and at Srinagar 
when HQ was at Rawalpindi. There has also usually been one at 
either Uri or Baramula. When the situation between the 
parties began to deteriorate in 1961 a further one was opened 
at Galuthi, and after the 1965 war a Team was sent to Akhnur 
which had been the location of a field station in the very 
early years. In addition field stations at Kargil on the 
Indian side and at Skardu and Astor on the Pakistan side were 
usually opened for three or four months during the summer when 
weather conditions permitted'38*. 
Field stations or sub-stations have also been set up with 
forward companies in the summer at Kel, Minimarg and Marol or 
Gangam on the Pakistan side which were somewhat closer to the 
Line than the Brigade Headquarters at Skardu, Astor and Bunji, 
and at Tangdhar, Gurais and Dras on the Indian side. In more 
active times other field stations also sometimes had 
sub-stations situated with companies much closer to the Line. 
Although the major field stations were known to both sides, the 
locations of such sub-stations on the one side were not 
divulged to the authorities on the other, as this would have 
constituted a breach of security by permitting the opposing 
side to know the location or new location of forward defences. 
For thi5 rea5on a numbering system was used for the 
sub-stationS139. For a; short time from October 1952 a 
sub-station at Mendhar was promoted to a main field station 140. 
*During the writer's visit to-the Mission in 1982 all 
these field stations were in operation except Akhnur, 
Naushera, Galuthi and Uri. 
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Conditions in Field Stations 
According to an official reporting back to UN HQ in New 
York in 1951 the accommodation in the field stations ranged all 
the way from a Majaraja's palace to mud huts or tents"'. The 
following report from the field station in Tangdhar 
subsequently only opened during the summer was received by 
Brigadier Angle in February 1950: "Rations of this Brigade are 
at a very low ebb. Food is very scarce and very poor quality. 
Meat is Just not obtainable as Q rations on the hoof are dying 
from lack of food. There is little possibility of any 
improvement as the only means of supply is over the Nasta Chum 
Pass now covered by 25 feet of snow and from present reports it 
will be May before any vehicles may cross pass. One air drop 
was made and consisted of poor quality turnips. There is no 
bread and canned milk is strictly rationed (2 oz per man per 
day). Fuel is not available in sufficient quantity to keep 
warm. When wood is supplied it is so wet it will just not 
burn without using kerosene which is rationed". Delivery of 
mail also inevitably left much to be desired and apparently the 
Indian officers were if anything even more disenchanted with 
the state of affairs than the Observer who made the report'". 
In 1952 the following details of all the field stations 
were reported. On the Pakistan side Observers lived in dak* 
*Dak bungalows were originally built as overnight, 
accommodation for touring officials. Two months after 
this report the Observers had a new home. It was-built, 
at the instigation of the local Brigade Commander, in only 
three weeks, complete, with terrace and access road for 
jeeps, for 300 Indian Rupees. The architect-builder was 
an American Observer, and an Australian Observer had made 
the furniture. "Perched high above the rushing 
Kishenganga River, it has caused much interest among the 
locals with its hidden lighting effects, shower-bath 
facilities, settees, large bed, curtains, arm chairs, "143 
etc. 
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bungalows at Domel and Kotli and in a Nissen hut at Rawalakot. 
Between them these three stations maintained five sub-stations 
consisting of mud or stone Kashmiri huts. In all cases 
Observers ate at the various local officers' messes and rotated 
on duty for a period of not less than two weeks between control 
and sub-stations, contact between these being maintained by 
telephone. In Bhimber the control station itself consisted of 
only two mud and stone Kashmiri huts, with no electricity 
during the day which meant no fans for relief from the extreme 
summer heat, while in Sialkot Observers lived. in a bungalow 
with electricity and refrigerator on the outskirts of-the 
Cantonment area, and used the Officers'-Mess of the Royal 
Pakistan Engineers. It was proposed to open summer stations 
when the weather permitted at, Skardu, Kel, Minimarg and Marol, 
housed in tents and messing with local wing, HQ or forward, 
companie S144. I- 
On the Indian-side UNMOGIP maintained-a house in Jammu, 
located on the outskirts of the city; which contained in 
addition to the Field Observer team, an UNMOGIP staff, -office and 
also, when HQ was in Rawalpindi, a Liaison-Officer to represent 
the CMO on the Indian side. A civilian contractor provided 
food. The Akhnur Team. lived with an infantry battalion HQ in 
a stone house by the Chenab'-Riverýwhere they-had no electricity 
and experienced terrific seasonal heat. This-was-likewise the 
case at Naushera where Observers lived in a wooden bungalow 
adjoining a brigade HQ, ýand-its sub-station at Rajauri'which 
was located in tents in a divisional HQ area. By contrast at 
Punch the Observer Team, lived in Punch Palace with the local 
brigade, although they also maintained a mud hut sub-station 
with-a battalion HQ. At Uri, they lived,., in, a'dak bungalow in a 
deserted village. The local brigade 17, miles toýthe east ý 
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provided orderlies to cook food. Summer stations due to be 
opened at the time were at Tangdhar, Kargil, with sub-station 
at Dras, and Gurais, each consisting of mud and stone huts, 
with food being taken at the local officers'.. mess'". 
All field stations were provided free of rent by the 
Indian and Pakistan Armies, but little or no furniture was 
provided and Observers bought or rented necessary equipment. 
The quality of the food varied as to quantity and degree of 
spiciness depending on the personal likes and dislikes of the 
senior officer of the mess, although in many cases a sincere 
effort was made to provide "European" food, and Observers often 
supplemented the rations provided with tins of food received 
from their homes. Messing charges were paid for at a daily 
rate set by the mess, and there weretmonthly subscriptions'-for- 
newspapers, magazines and the maintenance of mess equipment'". 
When Sir Humphrey Trevelyan visited the Mission onýbehalf 
of the Secretary-General in 1958 he recommended an allowance 
from the UN of the provision of about $1,000 a year to enable 
the Mission to provide'some badly needed basic amenities,, such 
as showers and fans, and"'noted: "The Observers ... 
live under 
exceedingly primitive conditions (which they) accept so 
cheerfully without com'plaint,. particularly'with the added 
disadvantage of an extremely unpleasant summer climate in a 
number of them. The-armies are supposed to provide 
accommodation, but, their ideas of what is necessary are 
becoming more and more stingy. Theyare-doubtless suffering 
from cuts in their own budgets and are generally unable to 
provide more than labour" 147. 
Inevitably over the years conditions improved as the 
Kashmir Dispute came to be seen as a long-term rather than 
temporary problem. Mud huts and decaying dak bungalows gave 
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way to simple but adequate purpose-built accommodation which 
gave the Observers themselves the incentive to make 
improvements in their off-duty hours to the advantage not only 
of themselves but of those who followed them*. 
*In 1968 the accommodation of all ten current Field 
Stations was described as having been brought up to the 
required standard, a two-year project for new facilities 
for six stations, and renovation of two, having been 
accomplished 149 . 
In 1982 the writer visited Kotli and Sialkot field 
. stations. The stone-built one at. Kotli, attached to a Pakistan formation HQ, consisted of lounge, dining-room, 
office, three bedrooms and two bathrooms, including a 
make-shift shower which the Observers themselves had 
erected, and a sauna bath constructed by a Finnish 
Observer. There was a pleasant, screened-in verandah 
overlooking a lawn with a backdrop of mountains. The 
Pakistan Army provided two batmen and three drivers. -The 
Observers paid for their own cleaner. - Portable fans and kerosene heaters were provided and the office had an 
air-conditioner. The Army also provided a limited amount 
of fresh rations and staple foods, plus a small allowance 
for food and a local cook, who sometimes received cooking 
lessons from the Observers. Observers could also go for 
morning, tea and in the evenings to the Officers. ' mess 
where there was a squash court and a small library. Urdu 
films could be seen at the local cinema. Kotli, situated 
in Azad Kashmir at 2000 feet above sea level and about a 
four-hour jeep ride through mountainous country from 
Rawalpindi, was described in an UNMOGIP hand-out for new 
Observers as "normally relatively pleasant during the 
winter months", but with temperatures often reaching 40 
degrees centigrade from late May to early September, with 
high humidity during late summer possibly resulting in 
,. mildew damage to clothing. 
The Sialkot field station was a very adequate detached 
house, situated in a residential area of the Cantonment. 
, Close to, the Border with Indian-held. Kashmir, the station 
was active in the early years when Border violations were 
a common occurrence, and again during the wars of 1965 and 
1971, but in 1982 was considered a family station, where 
only one Observer was attached as he, was able to have his 
family with him. His main task was to arrange and 
5upervise-the regular cros5ing of Ob5ervers over. the 
Border into Jammu, a crossing which was not generally open 
so that special arrangements had to be made with the 
authorities on both sides whenever it was used. 
UNMOGIP also ran a flourishing PX in Rawalpindi which 
provided members of the Mission, and other UN personnel in 
Pakistan, with many of the luxuries which they might 141 
otherwise lack . 
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CHAPTER SIX - MODUS OPERANDI AND COMMUNICATIONS 
MODUS OPERANDI 
Interpretations of the Karachi Agreement 
Following the Karachi Agreement of July 1949, and over a 
period of time, a number of interpretations of the Agreement 
were made. They represented a consensus of views after 
discussion between the parties and, successively, General 
Delvoie, Brigadier Angle and General Nimmo. These , 
interpretations were incorporated in a Field Regulations Manual 
issued under General Nimmo's* authority, and in which the 
operational activities of the Observers were also defined in 
detail.. A numbered copy was given to every Military Observer 
to serve as his instructions, and a copy was furnished to both 
Indian and Pakistan Armies HQ2. The regulations were thus 
designed not only to instruct the Military Observers, but-to 
make it explicit to the High Commands-of the two partiesýwhy. 
the Observers acted as they did. In-1954, after India had 
questioned the impartialitVýof Observers from the United States 
and requested their withdrawal**, the following phrase was 
carefully drafted into the Manual: "the Observer-is entitled 
to require that acts contrary to the terms of the Karachi 
Agreement be not committed or that they be rectified. He has 
no authority to enforce such demands, He must'rely upon his 
personal ability to settle disputes, locally by direct 
approaches to local commanders... ". 
*The Manual was updated by General Nimmols successor, 
General Tassara, In 19671 . but has apparently fallen into disuse since then. 
**See pages 277-285. 
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According to a background note prepared for 
Secretary-General Hammarskjold in July 1961, the 
interpretations and procedures could not be regarded as an 
agreement binding on the two sides, but the following 
circumstances gave a unique mediatory character to the 
Observers' activities: the fact that both sides were fully 
informed of the instructions issued to the Observers; that the 
Commanders had the right to express their views to the Chief 
Military Observer, indeed were encouraged to do so; and that 
the Observers were stationed at the local army brigade HQ on 
either side of the CFL with their main function being to assist 
local commanders in observing the-terms of the Ceasefire 
Agreement4. 
Development of Procedures by Generals Delvoie and Nimmo 
It had been agreed by both High Commands that-, troops would 
not advance or patrol beyond their forward positions as held at 
the moment of Ceasefire on lst January, 1949,, and that neither 
side would try to increase its military potential by bringing 
more troops or war-like stores into the territory ofýthe State 
or by improving defensive positions3. ý On 24th, January, 
General Delvoie gave his Military Observers written 
instructions which specified that in cases of. breaches of the 
two Armies' ceasefire orders, or in the event of important 
incidents, the Observers were to accompany the local 
authorities in their investigations,, gather as much information 
as possible and report as completely, accuratelyland 
impartially as possible to Control Headquarters. Any direct- 
intervention by the Observers between the opposing parties or 
any interference in-the Armies, orders were to be avoidedl. ý 
At a meeting with the two Commanders-in-Chief on January 
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15th, it had been decided that opposing local commanders would 
meet whenever minor adjustments had to be made to further 
satisfactory implementation of the Ceasefire. The Military 
Observers were instructed to attend any such meetings taking 
place in their respective sectors, and to organise such 
meetings whenever they considered difficulties could be solved 
in this way. They reported, however, that at most meetings no 
practical results were obtained because local commanders did 
not have sufficient authority to take significant-decisions7. 
In March 1949, in an attempt to avoid unnecessary reports 
of alleged ceasefire violations, the Indian Military 
Authorities decided to adopt the policy of supplyingýObservers 
with advance information of all proposed movement of guns, 
tanks and ammunition. However, the number of complaints by 
both sides continued to increase. The importance of the 
incidents in most cases was greatly exaggerated but demanded 
much expenditure of effort on the part of the Observers to 
establish their unimportanceO. In May General'Delvoie assured 
the Indian CIC that only two of the incidents that-had been 
reported since the Ceasefire could be considered major 
violations, and sent the latter 20 of the most, significant 
reports of investigations he had received from Observers. 
General Delvoie also suggested that the two Armies allow their 
local commanders to settle minor incidents on the spot, with 
the help of Observers, without referring them to higher 
authorities, and he submitted a procedure for local commanders 
to follow in reporting alleged violations. This was accepted, 
and subsequently helped to eliminate numerous incidents'. In 
july 1949 he inaugurated a new investigation procedure. This 
required the Observers to carry out a joint investigation, with 
their opposite number on the other side of the CFL, thereby 
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eliminating considerable duplication of work and reducing the 
number-of trips necessary to establish the facts concerning the 
charge'O-ý 
,. In September 1951 General Thorat, the Indian CGS, asked 
for the results of the investigations of certain complaints 
which had been dealt with on the spot so that neither the CMO 
nor he, were aware of the outcome. As a-result General Nimmo, 
issued instructions that all complaints should be lodged in 
writing if investigation were desired. -The Observers were 
then to, give each one a case-number and include them on a 
bi-monthly list of cases to be-sent to the CMO on a certain 
prescribed and, printed form. In thisýway each case, however 
minor, would have a number and its progress would be watched at 
HQ and finally-notified to both side5". -, 
Investigation Procedures 
I -If after aýstudy of a-complaint from either side, it was 
considered that the complaint was in-proper, form,, that the 
necessary information about, the. allegations had been provided 
and that an investigation appeared to be warranted under the 
terms-of the Karachi, Agreement and, related texts, an-,, 
investigation was initiated by the appropriate Observer Team, 
as soon as possible after the incident and as near as possible 
to the place of the incident. Although an investigation could 
take place on one side only, normally Observers from teams 
stationed opposite one another on the CFL, were present. Each 
Army was represented by an officer who produced any necessary 
witnesses". 
An emergency, such as-a prolonged firefight, was handled 
by the local Observer Team Officer-in-Charge who immediately 
contacted the local military authority and tried to arrange a 
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ceasefire. ý He also endeavoured to transmit information about 
the emergency to the Team on the opposite side of the Line, who 
would take similar action, and the CMO was immediately 
informed. An investigation was held as soon as the situation 
was under control". 
- -A detailed'report of every investigation giving a full 
summmary of their factual findings, as well as their 
conclusions as to whether the evidence substantiated the 
complaint that a breach of the Karachi Agreement had occurred, 
was prepared by the Observers on theirýreturn to their station 
from notes made at the investigation-. It was then typed out 
on the specified form and forwarded under "Secret" cover, 
generally by hand, to the CMO. , On the basis of the report the 
CMO decided whether or'not a violation had taken place and 
accordingly whether to "award" a Violation to-Indiaýand/or 
Pakistan, or to-close the case as "No Violation In 1961 
General Nimmo began to receive so many complaints without 
substantive evidence in support of-*them that he informed the 
parties heýhad decided on two further possible decisions. if 
the evidence did not prove it either way he would dismiss the 
complaint; and where, allegations were obviously, unfounded or 
the Karachi Agreement, did not apply, he would reject them, with 
or without, investigation'5. III 
Notification of Decisions 
In order'to ensure the absence of publicity, the CMO's 
decisions were-notified to the Armies on a classified basis. " 
During his, firstfyears at the, Mission General Nimmols practice 
was, to prepare a demi-official (DO) letter* to, the Chief of - 
*The recognized method in Commonwealth armies of, 
conducting correspondence between senior officers. 
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Staff of the Pakistan Army and the Chief of the General Staff 
of the Indian-Army notifying them both of his decision in each 
case. The use of, this type of communication meant the letter 
went personally to the addressee whowould ultimately have the 
communication placedýon an official subject file of appropriate 
security classification. The letters were delivered by hand, 
were usually identical and contained only those facts which 
were necessary to be-known. Howeverl-if the evidence revealed 
some fact pertaining to the cause of the violation, General 
Nimmo generally recommended-to the Army-concerned what action 
he considered should be taken to eliminate-the cause. - If he 
gave a. decision of a Violation-against either side, or if he 
made some comment to one side-or the other, the correspondence 
was classified as "Secret"; 'if, the decision was No Violation 
and-contained no added-comments the correspondence was 
classified "Restricted"". 
In January 1961 General-Nimmo,. informed the parties-that he 
would notify local commands only of his findingst, leaving them 
to notify higher command517. By the end of 1963*, he was 
sending bi-monthly records, of'cases'closed during the period to 
the CGS. These reports were marked ! 'confidential", and 
addressed simply, to the "Chief of the General Staff" and not, 
as with a DO letter, ýto the individually named CGS. Such 
letters contained,, only the case number and General Nimmo's 
decision. In, addition, - in difficult,, or sensitive cases, he 
notified his findings to both sides by DO letter as soon as 
possible. These letters were addressed personally to the CGS 
and clearly marked "DO" and franked "secret" which was 
underscored. To make them more personal, General Nimmo wrote 
*It is not clear at what stage between 1961 and 1963 this 
practice started. 
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the salutation and "yours sincerely" by hand. 'Both sides 
received identical reports". However, in 1964 General Nimmo, 
took to advising, the two sides only of their own violations". 
The reason for this may have been that in late 1963 one of his 
DO letters was leaked to the Indian Press*, and Nimmowished to 
minimise, the future possibility of either party using his 
findings for propaganda purposes. 
The outward appearance of rigid formalism in the term of 
the decision "Violation" or "No Violation" thus did not 
preclude a frank and, personal evaluation of the circumstances 
to the parties' senior commanders in,, the hope that remedial 
action, if appropriate, might, be taken-. - General Nimmo also - 
used to write to both commands confidentially on the general 
situation, including civilian problems in the area; and made 
certain'suggestions for-the maintenance of, peace and good 
order. Frequent personal visits to the Chiefs-of Command on 
both sides also enabled him to exchange views, informally and 
thus to bring a moderating influence to bear on the activities 
of the two-Armies. 
-A, bi-monthly'Operations Report20, normally under the 
signature of the CMO, was-zilso sent, to Andrew Cordier until he 
retired in 1962 and then Ralph Bunche at UN HQ in New York**. 
It usually took the form of a comment on the''general situation 
along the CFL, and a summary of complaints received, disposed 
of and still pending during the current period. It sometimes 
included a summary of complaints over a longer period'and such 
matters-as Order of Battle, % troop movements,, 'and other 
*See Pages 375-376 
**After the death of Dr. Bunche in 1971 
Under-Secretary-General Brian Urquhart maintained overall 
responsibility for UNMOGIP until his retirement at the 
-beginning of 1986. - See also footnote on page 501. 
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activities of Observers for the purpose of supervising the 
Karachi Agreement. These included checks on forward units of 
the respective armies and treks to remote areas of the CFL 
which could not normally or easily be reached. Reports of 
visits by the CMO or his Chief Operations Officer to the 
respective Army Commands or to Observer Field Stations were 
also-'included. 
Observers' Other functions 
An important function, of UNMOGIP was the supervision of 
the requirement of the Karachi Agreement that the quantum of 
forces within'the State of Jammu and Kashmir did not exceed the 
number of forces actually employed by each side at the time , 
when the Ceasefire was accepted on 1st January, -1949. In this 
connection'both Armies periodically submitted to UNMOGIP'HQ a 
list'of'unitsý and their locations within the Mission's area of 
responsibility. As soon as a new disposition of forces was 
received from the appropriate Army it was checked at UNMOGIP HQ 
against'the previous one to determine whether the forces 
reported were within the quantum-of forces allowable, and to 
ascertain whether there had been a change in their 
distribution. The"disposition of forces was then verified on 
theýground by the Officers-in-Charge of the'various Observer 
TeamS21. A general reconnaissance of the area of the CFL by 
the Observer-Teams was also carried out periodically to locate 
and report to UNMOGIP HQ any, new positions which might have 
been constructed 12. - Such-information was, of course, of a 
highly secret nature, and stringent procedures were always 
adhered to to prevent this, 'and any other, classified 
information'made available by the parties'to, Military 
Observers, from becoming known to"the other side23. , 
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In addition to monitoring Ceasefire violations and 
checking on the Order of Battle, procedures were laid down in 
the Field Regulations Manual for the performance of other 
functions by the Observers. These included assisting in 
defining or clarifying the CFL on the ground, reporting to 
Headquarters UNMOGIP any planned military exercises or any 
planned firing or use of explosives within the vicinity of the 
CFL-as notified by their local command, so that the, other side 
might be notified in advance, and facilitating meetings on the 
Ceasefire Line and/or Border between local commanders to 
co-ordinate plans and solve local problemSZ4. An amendment to 
the Regulations Manual on lst September, 1960 authorised 
Observers to attend meetings of-local army commanders, but not 
to become involved inýthe discussions "unless invited to assist 
regarding any points in the-Karachi Agreement which require 
elucidation"23 . 
Good Offices 
A further'. important but unofficial function of the, 
Observers, which promoted a considerable easing of-tension 
along the CFL, 'was-to afford "Good Offices", chiefly, to 
facilitate the return of prisoners; civilians, cattle and so on 
across the-Line. The UN-Military Observers, were allowed to 
carry out these acts of-'Good Offices only because their manner 
of performing them was strictly laid down and specifically 
excluded from, their formal duties. The procedure was that a 
request by one--of the parties for Good Offices was to be ý 
forwarded verbatim to the opposite Observer Team which, in 
turn, was to, pass, -it-on-to its-local command. -The reply, if 
received, was to be passed to the originating local command. 
There was to be no hastening action. If, as a result of the 
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Good Offices, it appeared necessary to arrange a Joint meeting, 
this, was to be done, and UNMOGIP HQ kept informed26. 
Standing Orders in 1965 
On 14th May, 1965, in order to simplify-current standing 
orders which-had been somewhat qualified during the 
deteriorating situation of-the 1960s,. General Nimmo issued a 
detailed memorandum to-incorporate all previous amendments to 
OperationsInstructions for HandlingýComplaints and 
InvestigationS27. This clarified the fact that a complaint 
might, 'be handed'to an Observer on any oneýof a variety of 
subjectsýas well as-those-which were-truly Ceasefire 
complaints, although it was only with these latter that 
Observers were concerned;, An Alleged-Ceasefire Line or Border 
Violation (ACFV, or ABV)-related strictly to the Karachi ý 
III 
Agreement-and its interpretations, -or subsequent agreements 
connected with the Border*. -A "case" was an ACFV or ABV which 
had been accepted by UNMOGIP and on which the Mission was 
expected to take action. The procedure was that a receipt 
would be, given for the letter containing, the complaint, but no 
other acknowledgement, would be sent; 'a complaint, including 
those submitted "for information-only" would be returned to the 
Local Command if it was not based on the terms of the above - 
agreements, or if it contained offensive-or threatening words, 
or if. it, related-to incidents-occurring more than three days 
previously, unless in the-judgment, of theýUN Field Observer 
(UNFO) Team the delay in submission-was Justified-owing to 
communication difficulties.. 
Before action was to be taken, details such as map, 
*See page 188. 
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references were to be checked, and the Local Command was to be 
requested for an assurance that it had already made a thorough 
investigation of-the circumstances. If the UNFO Team was not 
then satisfied that the complaint was valid it was to forward 
it by letter to UNMOGIP HQ with an explanation supporting a 
recommendation of non-acceptance. 
ACFV's relating to firing incidents,, entering within 
500-yards of the CFL-or crossing the CFL were to be discussed 
with the Local Command to, establish whether the incident was of 
a serious nature and whether tangible evidence was available. 
The Officer-in-Chargeýof the UNFO Team could, 'then decide which 
complaints should be further investigated. - Those which 
required no further investigation, including complaints 
submitted"for information only", were, not to be-allotted a,, case 
number, but a-copy was to be prepared, omitting any, information 
which should not be passed across the CFL, and sent to HQ with 
a note of'why no further, investigation was being undertaken. 
HQ might then decide to instruct further-investigation after 
all. 
Complaints to-be investigated-further were to-be allotted 
a case number and forwarded both to UNMOGIF HQ and to-the 
opposite-'UNFO, Team. Neither the originating Local Command nor 
the opposite Local-Command would be advised of which complaints 
hadibeen accepted and which not. When a-particularly serious 
complaint (such as a raid or ambush) was received,, only general 
information relating to-the-Ancident and without a case number 
would, be pass'ed-initially to HQ by radio. Then-full details 
including, case number would be passed to the opposite UNFO Team 
and UNMOGIP HQ by fastest means possible, excluding'radio for 
reasonsýof confidentiality.  
, ACFV's relating to strengthening of defences, increase of 
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forces and use of explosives within five miles of the CFL were 
to be allotted a case number and forwarded by Special Delivery 
Service to HQ Operations Section and to the opposite UNFO Team 
without being mentioned on the radio, and also without Local 
Commands being advised, ihat a case number had been allotted. 
The opposite UNFO Team'would then be responsible for carrying 
out the necessary investigation by checking records and 
ensuring that the defences had notalready been reported in a 
previous case and, if necessary,, by investigation on the 
ground. Complaints relating to"the'area of a previous case 
which, had not been investigated were to'be, added to the initial 
case. 'New field defences which, were the subject of a case 
were to be--included, in the record of'defended localities, and 
new positions which were established and-reported by Observer's 
complaint or by complaint by, the opposite Local Command were 
also-to be recorded. 
%, In, all investigations involving the alleged firing by 
heavy, weapons Observers were to check the record of defended 
localities against the actual presence of these weapons or of 
ammunition for them. Whenever they were discovered to be 
unauthorised separate Observers' complaints were to be 
submitted to HQ. 
ACFV's relating to overflights were not to be allotted a 
case number but forwarded to HQ Operations Section, complete 
with any evidence produced by Local Command. HQ would then 
direct any further investigation thought necessary either 
through the Team concerned or through the appropriate Army 
Headquarters. 
Observers' complaints were to be submitted toýthe CMO on 
an-investigation report form with no case number until the CMO 
accepted the complaint, in the event of which the Team might be 
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asked to inform the Local Command accordingly by letter. if 
it was necessary to inform the opposite Local Command, HQ would 
do so. Names of Observers who had been fired on and submitted 
complaints were not to appear in radio signals. 
The memorandum also modified existing investigation 
procedures due to problems which had arisen as a result of 
having police and/or civilian witnesses--attend joint 
investigations on the CFL, since it was in fact they who were 
most oftenAnvolved in incidents. Only UNýand military 
personnel were to meet on the CFL, and any police or civilian 
evidence, was to be given by the military representatives at the 
CFL. The essentialýpointýwas that neither police nor 
civilians were to be permitted to attend-joint investigations 
on the CFL, nor-were-they to be, interrogated within sight of' 
the opposite side. If either team considered it-necessary or 
desirable to obtain direci evidencei, from police, or civilians 
this was to be done either-in, -a preliminary investigation, or 
in accordance with the procedure laid down for a single 
investigation. 
COMMUNICATIONS 
Ground Transport 
Ground transport and drivers were originallV supplied 
entirely by the two armies, but in 1951 General, Nimmo pointed 
out to Andrew Cordier thatrtheýprovision of transport was no 
small effort for the armies concerned-who have always; -beený 
most generous" and he felt, they should not be, asked formore, 
but that provision should be made by the UN26, 'and-the'Mission 
did thus receive some'vehicles of'its owný- Reporting, torthe 
Missions Co-Ordinating Committee in 1953 after a visit to 
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UNMOGIP, a UN official noted he was impressed by the excellent 
quality of service rendered by the Indian and Pakistan Armies 
which made it possible for the Mission to hold its own jeeps in 
reserve'for possible emergencieS21. In 1956 there were 24 
UN-owned-vehicles and 51 supplied by the two Armies, but 
General Nimmo still felt, that such long-term dependence on 
interested Parties, for-the supply. of transportation was "not 
wholly desirable" and while both Armies had been "most generous 
they were at times hard put to it to keep UNMOGIP properly 
equipped"30. 
-When the Mission began its operation the Observers 
virtually had to maintain the vehicles themselves, although the 
Armies supplied drivers and petrol3l. By the end of the 1950s 
the vehicles were controlled and serviced by two members of the 
UN Field Service -a Transport, Officer and a mechanic --with a 
locally-recruited staff of six mechanics and three, apprentices, 
and they had the use of a workshop well-stocked with spare 
parts. Nevertheless it was felt that the replacement rate-of 
vehicles by, the'UN was-too low since the--terrain-in which they 
were used was difficult, and., frequently, dangerous, the roads 
being in many cases none too reliable and built on precipitous 
mountain sides. -The general strain-on the vehicles was thus 
above average, and. if, for example, an axle broke or a-wheel 
came off, the-results could be more than-normally serious"; 
-When the-rent of the-workshop rose steeply in 1960, theý 
Administrative Officer suggested--that vehicle-maintenance 
should be handled by a Pakistan Army base work. 9hop, under the 
supervision of the UN mechanic,. but Andrew Cordier decided that 
it, was politically unwise to give a contract to one Army and 
not the other and that it wasýpreferable to pay the higher 
rental". 
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Special Delivery Service 
When the Mission began its operations in early 1949 a 
bi-weekly motor cycle service for the transmission of letters 
and documents between the Control HQ on each side of the Line 
was set up. In, July 1949 this became a daily serviCe34. 
Subsequently'a'system known as "Special Delivery Service" was 
established which allowed documents, particularly confidential 
or sensitive ones'including information which could not be 
papgpd ovor tho radio, +. o bo +ýakon from ono point to another by 
UN Jeep3a. 
Aircraft 
- UNMOGIP ha5'normally had an aircraft assigned to it. ý 
With the ownership of such transport so expensive, it is not 
practicable for the UN, as a, whole to acquire a permanent fleet, 
and the Organi5ation has relied mainly on American, Canadian 
and-Briti5h aS515tance, for all of its peacekeeping operations. 
For the-first five years UNMOGIP's aircraft and crew were 
supplied by the American Air Force, and then-from time to time 
by the Canadian Air Force. Charter arrangements with-other 
countries or private companies have also been made. But on 
occasion the Mission has been without an aircraft, usually 
either between contracts or due to'-servicing. ' Such times have 
always been considered most-unfortunate, both on political and 
operational grounds, and they have caused-considerable 
dissatisfaction-amongst the Observers who have maintained that 
it is contrary-to the understanding on'which'they agreed to 
serve". As General Nimmo pointed-out, the'aircraft was one 
of the greatest morale factors on the Mission. It gave- 
members the chance to escape, particularly from outlying field 
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stations, from an extremely hot or cold climate, or from the 
diet, when they had only a few days leave per month 37. 
From the political point of view he believed the 
possession of an aircraft was desirable because the sight of it 
enhanced the Mission's prestige throughout its area of 
operations, and was the only effective means of maintaining 
public awareness of the Mission's activities in New Delhi, 
which it visited at frequent intervals. This was particularly 
important during the winter months when the HQ was in 
Rawalpindi". 
Operationally there was the possibility of the CMO having 
to travel quickly between Army HQ in Rawalpindi and Army HQ in 
New Delhi in the case of a crisis in relations beween the two 
sides. A rare flash of anger was shown by General Nimmo when 
the UN Aircraft was put out of action at such a time during a 
Pakistani attack on the airfield at Srinagar during-the 1965 
war, though he did confine himself to cabling the Pakistan CGS: 
"Your Air Force has succeeded in wrecking our Caribou aircraft 
UN 324 on the gound at Srinagar this afternoon where they knew 
it was parked "31. Aý-replacement arrived a week later and 
narrowly escaped being bombed in an air attack six hours after 
it arrived on Srinagar Airfield". 
In more normal times possession of an aircraft was 
required on account of the slowness, and unreliability of road 
communications throughout the area. Road transportation to 
some field stations at the best of times was so slow that it 
was difficult to maintain the rotation of Observers, 
particularly necessary in, the hot months, -without an aircraft. 
In addition, landslides-and subsidences, floods and snow 
frequently made certain essential roads impassable. Two of 
the field stations could not be reached at all except through 
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Srinagar and even when the roads were open it took fourteen 
hours to reach Srinagar from Rawalpindi by one of the two 
possible roads, and eight to ten hours by the other. By air 
the-same journey could be completed in forty minutes". After 
the winter of 1958-59 the shorter road route became impassable 
when the bridge across the nullah* at the Ceasefire Line on the 
road between Uri and Domel collapsed under the weight of snow. 
The Indian Government were not prepared to go to the expense of 
rebuilding it since, with the lack of communication between the 
two sides of Kashmir, UNMOGIP personnel were the only ones to 
use it. Indeed the Indians thought it would encourage 
infiltration. They did reluctantly agree to build-a 
footbridge which made crossings by Observers for liaison 
meetings and local investigations possible**. At this point 
General Nimmo considered the possibility of using Rawalpindi as 
the main administrative base for UNMOGIP, rather than 
continuing with the six-monthly move between there and 
Srinagar, but ultimately decided this was-politically 
inadvisable". Posse5sion of an aircraft thus became even 
more important to facilitate the six-monthly moves, between 
Srinagar and Rawalpindi. 
Radio 
In July 1949 Andrew Cordier suggested sending out a 
communications officer with a view to setting up a skeleton 
*stream 
**After representation by ACMO Colonel Gauthier the two 
countries agreed, during withdrawal negotiations in 
February 1966 and in subsequent discussions, to erect 
another road bridge. I am unaware whether or not this 
occurred, but certainly the road was not in use at the 
time of my visit in 1982, although any bridge built could 
well have been washed away again. 
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communications system43. At first General Delvoie doubted 
whether this was necessary, but then he did request a radio 
system in order to be able to receive immediate information 
regarding serious Ceasefire violations and the results of 
investigations. Up to that time he had had to rely on the two 
Armies' telephone systems and the Observerst use of Jeeps. He 
told Colban that because of the expense involved he had been 
endeavouring to carry out his duties without the use of radio 
communications. However, with the increase in Ceasefire 
violations and the constitution of Observer Teams in the 
northern mountain areas, where other forms of communication 
would be much too slow, it had become evident that a radio 
network was after all necessary". 
In 1951 General Nimmo increased the number of radio 
officers on the Mission in order to be able to reduce the 
required number of Observers". In 1956 he claimed that 
whilst good radio communications were essential to UNMOGIP's 
efficiency and effectiveness, he felt that the Mission's 
methods and equipment necessitated an excessive number of radio 
operators with all the resultant administrative and personnel 
problems which living in the Mission area normally produced. 
As a result, he said, they were trying to operate with fewer 
radio offficers than would actually provide the degree of 
continuity they would have liked, which was not entirely 
satisfactory. He was therefore considering ways of 
simplifying the system in order to obtain better results at 
less cost". In 1958 he was able to reduce the number of 
radio operators by six with the introduction of voice radio 
equipment which the Observers were able to use themselves, 
rather than the morse equipment which could only be used by 
skilled operators 47 . 
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A UN International Radio station in Karachi operating with 
the permission of the Pakistan Government enabled cabled 
messages to be sent between the Mission and New York and was 
administered by and came under the budget of UNMOGIP, which 
kept a minimal staff there, including for a short period a 
Military Observer. By the late 1950s UNMOGIP was responsible 
for only about 5% of the station's traffic, and in 1958 it was 
suggested that it should be separated administratively from 
UNMOGIP48 However, this change did not take place". 
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CHAPTER SEVEN - PROBLEMS 
ALLEGED CEASEFIRE LINE VIOLATIONS 
In the period from the end of January 1949, when UN 
Observers first arrived on the Subcontinent, to the departure 
of General Delvoie at the beginning of November that year, 272 
alleged breaches of the Ceasefire were investigated, but were 
mainly found to be baseless or exaggerated. Only two of the 
reported violations were considered by General Delvoie to have 
any real military significance, and these were resolved at the 
meeting in Karachi in July'. 
Records of complaints'of Alleged Ceasefire Line Violations 
(ACFV's), and of violations awardedýas a result, were kept from 
ist December, 1949. Border incidents were reported by India 
and Pakistan and investigated by Observers with effect from 9th 
February, 1950, and records kept thereaftex2. 
In October 1952 General Nimmo remarked that it was 
apparent from the figures that Pakistan carefully investigated 
before alleging violations, which resulted in fewer complaints 
but more violations. Out of 223 complaints by India, 40 
violations (45% of all violations) were awarded, whereas out of 
169 complaints by Pakistan, 49 violations (55%) were awarded3. 
In early 1955 he reported that UNMOGIP's statistics had 
recently been exhaustively reviewed and they were fairly 
satisfied about their accuracy from 1951 onwards. ' He thought 
it was only to be expected that the degree-of accuracy had 
increased each year, as turmoil gradually le5sened and office 
procedures improved under the influence of better surroundings 
and more settled circumstances4. ý In the tables which f ollow 
the total number of complaints does not necessarily match the 
total number of violations and non-violations awarded, since 
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some alleged violations attracted a double violation award, 
whilst others may have been withdrawn at a later stage. The 
fact that so many complaints ended with a "No Violation" does 
not give a full picture of the situation as a "Violation" was 
awarded only when incontrovertible proof existed5, From 1961 
the term "No Violation" included complaints that were either 
dismissed or rejected. Slight revisions of the figures were 
also made from time to time. Where no figure is shown, that 
figure was not available'., 
TABLE OF ALLEGED CEASEFIRE LINE VIOLATIONS 1949-1965 
Year Complaints by Violations 
Pak Ind UN Total Pak Ind Non- 
1949* 1405100 
1950 29 53 2 84 14 5 60 
1951 63 98 0 161 11 18 122 
1952 25 50 0 75 46 61 
1953 19 20 0 39 16 25 
1954 11 12 0 23 12 19 
1955 13 16 0 29 54 18 
1956 60 26 54 
1957** 
1958 114 
1959(to June 15) 64 
1960 37 33 0 70 10 16 46 
1961 302 281 0 583 35 56 492 
1962 499 461 0 960 . 107 127 727 
1963 310 317 2 629 163 150 326 
1964 2149 
1965 1969 2274 123 4366 622 511 3389 
*December only 
**Fewer than in 1958 
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TABLE OF ALLEGED BORDER VIOLATIONS 1950-1965 
Year Complaints by Violations 
Pak Ind UN Total Pak Ind Non- 
1950* 17 13 0 30 01 23 
1951 25 20 0 45 37 28 
1952 21 13 0 34 16 25 
1953 380 11 405 
1954 570 12 309 
1955 7 10 0 17 329 
1956 12 12 11 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 12030 
1961 39 36 0 75 76 63 
1962 760 13 00 13 
1963 0000000 
1964 
1965 27 119 2 148 17 11 126 
*Commencing 9th February 
It will be noted that in 1961 there was a sharp increase 
in the number of incidents with 583 Ceasefire Line complaints 
being reported, compared with 70 the previous year and only 23 
in 1954, the quietest year. There was a further huge jump to 
nearly a thousand in 1962. The number was 629 in 1963 and 
then continued to spiral upwards until 1965 when the two 
countries went to war again and the numbýr of complaints was 
well over 4000. 
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INCIDENTS 
Throughout the history of the Mission the majority of the 
incidents which occurred along the CFL involved civilians. 
Such incidents will be discussed at length in due course, but 
first some mention must be made of incidents of a purely 
military nature. 
It was agreed by both Bigh Commands when the Ceasefire 
first came into effect that as from 1st January, 1949 troops 
would not advance or patrol beyond their forward positions, and 
that neither side would try to increase its military potential 
by bringing more troops or warlike stores into the territory of 
the State or by improving defensive positions. This was 
confirmed in the Karachi Agreement7. On 16th September, 1949, 
General Delvoie obtained the concurrence of the two armies on 
the following more precise definitions of a breach of the 
Ceasef ire', and these were thereafter accepted by the parties 
as coming within the terms of the Karachi Agreement*: 
1) Crossing the Ceasefire Line; 
2) Firing or use of explosives within 5 miles of the CFL 
without prior warning to Military Observers; 
3) New wiring or mining of positions; 
4) Reinforcing of existing defensive positions with men or 
warlike stores; 
5) Forward movement from outside into the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir of any warlike stores, equipment and personnel other 
than reliefs and maintenance; 
6) Flying of aircraft over the other side's territory. 
(3-5 are collectively referred to as "Strengthening of 
Defences". ) 
*See page 96 and Appendix IV. 
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Crossing the Ceasefire Line 
Inevitably most of the complaints involving civilians come 
under this heading and will be dealt with later*. General 
Delvoie compiled a report in three parts on the 272 incidents 
investigated during his tour on the Subcontinent from January 
to October, 1949. One section concerned civilians. Under 
another he briefly described the only two major military 
incidents, which concerned one complaint from each side that 
the opposing army was advancing its positiong. Both matters 
were dealt with at the time of the Karachi Conference in July 
1949, rather than by the Military Observers, although General 
Delvoie himself was closely involved in the settlement". 
The remaining complaints came under the heading "Minor 
military incidents", and included complaints of patrolling 
forward, where investigation had revealed that most could be 
attributed to soldiers losing their way, or not knowing the 
exact location of the CFL". 
, Reports of troops crossing the CFL were at times 
substantiated and a Violation awarded against the offending 
party. At other times troops were accused of aiding and 
abetting raiding parties, or of crossing the Line to steal 
goods themselves. Normally it was then claimed that the 
offenders were civilians in military clothing, a point 
difficult to prove, since many civilians did indeed wear 
discarded military dres 512. However, on occasion the 
complaint was vindicated. In April 1952, for example, General 
Nimmo wrote to General Thorat, the Indian Chief of the General 
Staff, regarding a complaint by Pakistan. He stated that the 
investigation disclosed that a raid, in which twenty cattle 
*See especially pages 186-243, and 332-344. 
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were removed, was carried out by civilians accompanied by armed 
personnelýin Indian army uniform. Although the Indian Local 
Commander stated that no Indian troops were in the area at the 
time, the evidence was sufficient to substantiate the findings. 
General Nimmo declared a violation against India and suggested 
that the Local Commander should supervise more closely both 
civilians and armed personnel dressed in army clothing since 
this was not the first incident of the nature occurring in the 
area". 
A short mention should perhaps also be made of another 
reason for crossing the CFL. In October 1952 General Nimmo 
wrote to General Thorat regarding such a case: "Inasmuch as 
these men appear to be deserters, I intend to follow the 
precedent established in a smilar case in August 1951, i e. 
have an Observer interview the men to ascertain if they wish to 
be repatriated". The men did not wish it, and Pakistan GHQ 
returned their weapons, via UN Military Observers, to India 14. 
Firing and use of explosives within, 5 miles of the CFL 
Again the majority of incidentsIreported under this 
heading proved upon investigation to involve either civilians 
or civilian police, and not troops and therefore could not, 
upon investigation, be confirmed as violations of the CF 
Agreement although, as more and more armed police came to be 
used in the area of the CFL, General Nimmo did begin to award a 
Ceasefire violation against the side whose police_or even 
civilians used arms within 500 yards of the CFL*. Often, 
however, and particularly in the early years, such complaints 
turned out to be explosions for civilian purposes, or firing by 
hunting parties, either military or civilian". 
*See page 223. 
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Strengthening of Defences 
General Delvoie reported at the end of his tour in 1949 
that complaints about the strengthening of defences nearly 
always turned out to be merely repairsib. This continued to 
be the case and they were particularly prone to occur early in 
the year when both sides undertook repairs and "spring 
cleaning" of their forward posts after the winter rains and 
snow". Worsening relations in the 1960s brought forth a 
spate of verifiable incidents", but even in August 1951, 
during his first year with the Mission, General Nimmo 
circulated a memorandum to all Observers pointing out that 
while complaints of strengthening of defences usually turned- 
out to be repairs, Observers should be alert to the possibility 
and order cessation and destruction, of any new work foundi and 
therefore to make frequent inspectionsýof forward areas". - 
Thus even in more tranquil times the'Observers always 
endeavoured to investigate these complaints-and allay anyýalarm 
they caused. And on occasion they were well-founded. In May 
1958 Nimmo reported to Cordier that Observers had-, discovered on 
the Indian side in one area not only a minor work, but a 
concealed group of 14 strong defensive bunkers". - -, 
Inevitably also if one, side suspected the other, -to, -be 
strengthening its defences, it was tempted in turn to do the 
same. In August 1959 General Nimmo reported two, complaints, 
one that Indian troops had been seen digging new trenches, a 
complaint that had been outstanding since the previous October, 
and for which General Nimmo was still awaiting an explanation 
by the, CGS India, and the-other that Pakistan military 
authorities had built a new bunker in the same area. The 
latter helped-force the issue and General Nimmo awarded, aý--, 
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Violation against both parties2l. 
Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, who visited the Mission area as 
Personal Representative of the Secretary-General in 1958, when 
General Nimmo felt that political pressures were growing, 
reported that: "A number of complaints, often of an 
insignificant nature, relate to the construction of new 
defensive positions, but there is no attempt on either side to 
reinforce forces substantially above the-permitted maximum. 
The Pakistanis-are not now taking much trouble over making up 
their roads, an indication that they do not consider operations 
likely in the future "22 
Brigadier Angle first brought attention to the problem of 
road building in a letter to Ambassador Colban-in 1950, saying 
that both sides alleged that such improvements, which included 
also the erection of bridges and construction of, storehouses, 
were necessary to maintain the civilian population-in'the area. 
He argued that if a decision had been requested-regarding 
action in such a matter which might or might not-be construed 
as'a breach of the Ceasefire Agreement', ' commonsense had ruled' 
that if the other side had followed-a similar course then a 
violation of the Ceasefire Agreement was not awarded, although 
that may have been contrary to a legal interpretation of the 
Agreement. But he wished to place on record hisýview-that the 
military situation was nevertheless-improved in the proces 523. 
One particular instance of this kind did cause ,ý 
considerable disagreement. On 23rd January, - 1950 the Mission 
received a complaint from India that Pakistani-civilians were 
constructing a bridge on the Mendhar River with the aid of 
explosives". Colonel Ostbye, then Acting Chief'Observer, had 
several meetings with the Chiefs of Staff-of, both Armies, and 
on 9th February the Indian-, CGS, General, Kalwant Singh,, agreed 
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that the Pakistanis should be permitted to rebuild the Bridge 
to carry three-ton trucks but nothing heavier, with the 
provisos that the rebuilding of the Bridge was technically a 
breach of the Ceasefire, that an Indian Engineer Officer should 
be permitted, with UN Observers, to inspect the bridge during 
construction, and-that if the Indians decided from a tactical 
point of-view that they must cover the Bridge, they be allowed 
to move troops and/or weapon523. Further discussions followed 
with both sides. The reaction of General McCay, CGS, 
Pakistan, was that India was insisting onýthe letter rather 
than the spirit of the Ceasefire Agreement. On 5th March 
Angle showed General Kalwant Singhýsome photographs and pointed 
out that the General had been poorly-informed on the problem. 
General Kalwant Singh was forced to realise that the Pakistanis 
could in any case move tanks across the river, except in high 
water, without the aid of a bridge. Even so, later that 
month, Angle wrote to General McCay asking him to'have the, 
newly-constructed abutments and pillars erected within'the 
500-yard zone of the CFL destroyed. Meanwhile, at the'end of 
March General Kalwant Singh admitted that-his Legal-Department 
had agreed with the Observer Group that theretcould, be no legal 
objection to the Pakistanis building a'bridge-at, Mendhar so- 
long'as the site was outside the 500-yard restricted zone. 
Angle informed McCay they could therefore proceed., the , 
understanding being also that the new bridge would be, such that 
it could not be used by tanks. Pakistan engineers then 
dismantled the first bridge and moved the. --materials to, the new 
site". 1,1 1 
In September 1956, after a series of complaints relating 
to road-building, General Nimmo decided to, take the question up 
with Andrew Cordier, and requested a legal opinion on the whole 
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matter. He said that he had told both sides that in his 
opinion, the term "increased military potential" was often 
loosely applied in'relation to the Ceasefire Agreement. 
Whether a road, track, bridge, tunnel or any other improvement 
to existing communications had been built was beside the point. 
Many had been built or improved in Kashmir since January 1949. 
The relevant point was whether they were used to build up the 
number of troops or amount of warlike stores in an area over 
and above the number or quantity, permissible under the 
Agreement; it was conceivable that a road or track in a 
forward area could be regarded as a strengthening factor and 
therefore could, be the subject of a, justifiable complaint, and 
that such cases would-have to be judged on theirýmerits. He 
had suggested that in-case of doubt any proposed construction 
would be better referred to the Chief Military Observer 
beforehand". 
The legal opinion Nimmo subsequently received agreed with 
him that road-building could not be, considered a breach of the 
Karachi Agreement per se, but, only'if^it could, be regarded as a 
strengthening of defences., Indeed, - the,. opinion concluded 
after a lengthy exposition, it would be unreasonable to hinder 
unnecessarily the normal development, ofýthe State of Jammu and 
Kashmir" 
In April 1965 General Nimmo wrote to, the-Chief of-tthe- 
Indian Army Staff expressing the view that the construction of 
a new airfield in Kashmir Valley was a violation of, the 
Ceasefire Agreement in that it represented a major increase in 
the military potential in theýarea. In replyzhe was informed 
that the airfield had been constructed as a-satellite airfield 
to the Srinagar Airfield, and would be necessary because high 
performance Jet aircraft were to be introduced in the civil air 
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services to Srinagar. Further, the airfield's secondary role 
was to meet the threat from China*. General Nimmo thought the 
matter should be placed on record in New York, but felt there 
was nothing that could be done about it29. 
Forward movement into the State 
-. According to the Karachi Agreement, the number of troops 
allowed to be stationedin the State of Jammu and Kashmir 
should not exceed the number stationed there at, the time of the 
Ceasefire on 1st January, 1949, -and both Armies regularly 
furnished the Mission with a copy of their Order of Battle 
which was checked, so far asýwas possible, by Observers when 
they visited the'various army locations. However a few 
uncertain aspects of the Agreement came to light in, the early 
months of 1950. Both India and Pakistan withdrew troops, from 
Kashmir "for rest and administrative convenience", Since both 
claimed that this was not a, breach of the Agreement, Angle - 
accepted their interpretation of, the, Agreement-. - However, he 
argued that a battalion withdrawn from, the front line; sent to 
a training area, re-organized and-returned to its original - 
position in Kashmir did improve the military position, and-he 
wished to place this point of view on record". In those days 
there was still optimism that a settlement of the Dispute was 
imminent, but as time, elapsed Angle's view would, inevitably 
have become untenable., I 
In January 1950 Lt. General McCay, -the Pakistan Chief of 
Staff, wrote to Acting Chief Observer, Colonel Ostbye claiming 
that during the previous few weeks there had been-very 
considerably increased movement of Indian Army convoys near the 
*India fought a war with China in Ladakh in 1962. See 
pages 305-306.1 1 i. 
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Ceasefire Line, which he admitted might be due to reliefs. 
However, -, he requested a categorical assurance that there had 
been no increase of forces contrary to the Karachi Agreement 
and furthermore asked for confirmation that if any such breach 
of the Agreement had or did occur, and was not rectified, within 
a specified time, the Observer Group-would inform the other 
party of the full details3l. 
, It was not until-the end of April that he received a 
written reply, although Brigadier Angle - who was by then, Chief 
Military Observer - had'discussed the subject with him several 
times. Angle concluded that the convoys were not a breach of 
the Ceasefire Agreement and gave-assurances that there had been 
no overall strengthening of Indian forces within the State 
since the Ceasefire Agreement. - He-said-that readjustments 
made to conform to the Demarcation Line Agreement might have 
strengthened some sectors, but weakened others, and this 
applied to both sides. Angle would not commit the Observer 
Group to informing the other party of full, details, of any 
breach of the Agreement in respect of force levels and, stated: 
"The policy followed by this, HQ in one case where a violation- 
of the Ceasefire Agreement had not been rectified immediately 
was to report the matter to Ambassador Colban, the - -, 
Representative of the Secretary-General to United, Nations. 
This case was then taken up on Governmental level 
McCay had also inferred that a build up of'Indian troops 
evenýclose to the State of Jammu and Kashmir'shouldibe", 
considered a breach of the Ceasefire Agreement since it was 
also'close to the Pakistan border33 , and in'March 1950, the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, General Gracey 
suggested Observers should investigate Indian troop 
concentrations and dumps of warlike stores in East Punjab and 
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Bengal, about which he was greatly alarmed. He felt the 
Indians might create an incident so as to excuse military 
action by their troopS34. Brigadier Angle cancelled all leave 
for Observers except annual leave, but explained to General 
Gracey that unless ordered to do so (presumably by the UN 
Secretary-General), he could not investigate Indian activities 
in Punjab or Bengal3s. And he made-it clear in his letter to 
McCay that a large concentration of troops by either country 
outside the State could not be considered within the scope of, 
the Ceasefire Agreement36. However, he told Colban that all 
the military problems in India, Pakistan and Kashmir were so 
inter-related that it was difficult to draw a firm dividing 
line between what did and did not concern the Ceasefire 
Agreement, although he and Colban both agreed that the 
Observers could not undertake any task of a military nature 
outside the State territory". 
On occasion the CMO was able not only to allay, the fears 
of one side that the other had introduced further troops into 
the State, but also to use his unique position toýbring the 
attention of one to the other of fears he had been told of, but 
which were outside his area of Jurisdiction., In this, way he, 
was able to facilitate an easing of tension. , For example, -in 
July 1951 General Nimmo wrote to General Thorat referring to a 
communication he had received from him the previous May, -in .ý 
which General Thorat had expressed concern about certainTtroop 
movements and activities both in Azad Kashmir-and in the 
Sialkot area. General Nimmo pointed out that he-had been able 
to allay the other's feelings about the former, but was in 
difficulty about the latter because the area, in question was in 
Pakistan territory and therefore outside his terms of 
reference. However, in order to correct any mistaken 
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is 
impressions, he had felt Justified in going to the length of 
explaining to the Indian Liaison Officer attached to his HQ 
that as far as he could ascertain there were no unusual 
military activities in the Sialkot area. He also mentioned 
this fact at a Conference with the Commander-in-Chief. He 
continued:. "Today, from my position as a neutral observer, I 
see the situation reversed and Pakistan GHQ concerne&about 
reported troop movements and concentrations in Jammu and over 
the Border at Pathankot". He had informed them that there had 
been no Ceasefire, violation in Jammu in respect of an increase 
of, forces but as regards Pathankot he was in a similar 
difficult position as previously in relation to Sialkot, and in 
any-ca5e, not having visited the area, as he had Sialhot, his 
only knowledge was what he had seen in the Press of both 
countries.. He went on: "Realizing the dangerous situatlon 
which can, develop out of alarms and what I feel sure-are 
misconceptions... I would urge that you-might consider 
communicating with Pakistan GHQ on this matter... I suggest this 
action because the area is close to Jammu and I think it would 
be in keeping with the spirit of the Ceasefire Agreement"39. 
, With the eventual reduction of force levels by. both sides, 
the question of the quantum, of forces ceased-to be, uppermost in 
anyone's mind, but UNMOGIP continued to receive details of and 
check upon the Order of Battle. Then, 'in, 1962, theýIndo-China 
War gave the matter a new dimension, although this does not 
seem to have caused the problems that, might, have been 
expected*. In August 1962 General Nimmo reported to Dr. 
*It was Perhaps neither reasonable nor feasible to prevent 
India from introducing extra forces into the State when 
the defence of the whole of India against a third party 
seemed to be at stake, particularly when the troops wentý 
straight to Ladakh. The latter, although 
administratively part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, 
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Bunche that over the previous year the Indian Army had been 
strongly reinforcing its military position in the Ladakh region 
to counter Chinese military activity in the area, and had 
created a new ground and air administrative support system 
taking advantage of the new roads and airfields that had 
recently been constructed, to the extent of being in 
contravention of the Karachi Agreement. However, UNMOGIP felt 
certain that the build-up was indeed a reaction to the Chinese 
forces in the area, and, not directly a threat to the Pakistan 
forces In the Northern Areas. Moreover,,, General Nimmo felt 
sure that the Pakistan Army was fully aware of the increase in 
the Indian Army military potential, but "for reasons best known 
to themselves" were reluctant to raise a complaint. It was by 
then difficult also for UNMOGIP to obtain permission to visit 
the area or insist on seeing the Order of Battle for that 
region. Other than informing the UN of the potential source 
of trouble, General Nimmo felt it best to take no action unless 
forced to do so by changing events". In, September 1963 the 
Indian Chief of the Army Staff informed General Nimmo verbally 
that they were considering the introduction_, of an additional 
Corps HQ into the State, one for control of the area north of 
the Pir Panial Range plus Ladakh, and the other for the area 
below the range. General Nimmo could see, the Indian point of 
view, but drew attention to the difficulties this could cause 
and thus a part of the territory under - dispute I with 
Pakistan, was racially and geographically quite distinct 
from the Vale of Kashmir, which was the real prize being 
sought in the Dispute. The Buddhist inhabitants of Ladakh 
had already made it clear they would not stay if their 
land became part of Pakistan. Pakistan, in any case, 
probably had little interest in such an inhospitable and 
distant area, and indeed was in the process of negotiating 
away to China similar tracts of neighbouring territory. 
Pakistan was also under pressure from the West not to make 
extra difficulties for India during her war with China. 
See page 306. 
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under the terms of the Ceasefire Agreement, since it might be 
regarded as a threat to Pakistan. The Chief of Staff later 
told General Nimmo that he had changed his ideas so that one HQ 
would have a clear-cut responsibility towards Ladakh and the 
Tibetan Border, whilst the other would cover the remainder of 
the State as had always been the case. General Nimmo wrote to 
Dr. Bunche that he "felt this to be more satisfactory from our 
point of view, however much one may regard the proposed 
increase to be an unnecessary embarrassment. I take the view 
that there is little we can do about it except to hope that 
dispositions are only aimed at meeting a Chinese threat and do 
not-disturb the status quo along the Ceasefire Line in the 
Kargil Sector. I say hope advisedly because as you know we 
are unable to observe the Ladakh area or the build-up of the 
forces therein " 40 
. 
Flying of aircraft over the other side's territory 
This was not a major problem during the early dayi of the 
Mission, although it did occur, --but, during the late-1950's the 
number of complaints about aircraft violations considerably 
increased. In January 1959 General Nimmo reported that of 18 
cases-then pending, 12 involved high-flying'aircraft4l. In 
July 1957 the Indians alleged that a'Pakistan aeroplane had 
flown over Indian-occupied territory along-the Kishenganga 
River. General Nimmo gave a No Violation award since it was 
practically, impossible, without special-training, for ground 
observers to fix the position of an aeroplane in flight, so 
that it could not be determined beyond, reasonable-doubt whether 
the aircraft had-actually crossed the CFL. However, General 
Nimmo wrote to the Chief of Staff, Pakistan; deploring the fact 
that an aeroplane-should fly so-close to the Line "as to cause 
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doubt and suspicion "42 . The issue was further complicated by 
political allegations regarding foreign air base5. Indeed one 
overflight complaint made by the Indians and denied by the 
Pakistanis, and which was given a No Violation award, was 
subsequently believed from information from-outside sources to 
have derived fromýan American overflight43. General Nimmo 
told Andrew Cordier that he "intended strictly to avoid 
involvement-in any such controversy "44. 
In August 1957 16 complaints about overflights were 
lodged. , However, six dealt with the flight-of one aircraft 
and two with another. -The six-complaints concerning the 
alleged flight of the same Pakistan aircraft over the CFL were 
each lodged with a-different UNFO Team, -but were given a single 
case number, 'and the investigation was co-ordinated by a senior 
Observer. ' It was confirmed that, the flights took place but 
the 'plane could not be identified even after examination of 
available air logs. Pakistan high level authorities denied 
any participation-by their, aircraft.,, Aý-declaration, of No 
Violation against Pakistan was therefore made, and General 
Nimmo asked both High Commands to attack immediately this "new 
and''difficult problem 1143 
Nevertheless the problem-continued. - Evidence-produced 
during the investigations of six cases involving, high-flying 
aircraft in January 1959 indicatedýthat jet aircraft-were 
flying in the areas, and at the,. times-mentioned in the 
different complaints, but in each case both sides denied having 
had, any-aircraft in the areas at-the times mentioned. 
Further, no evidence as to the identity of the aircraft was 
produced at-any of the investigations. Therefore the sixý 
cases were again closed with awards of, No ViolationW. _' 
General Nimmo discussed with the Indians, who were the 
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more vociferous in their complaints about overflights, the 
difficulty of proving whose aircraft were flying when often all 
that was seen was a vapour trai 147. He sent an Observer to 
various air stations in both India and Pakistan to conduct 
enquirie5, -the results of which, after about 600 miles travel 
in, each country, 1were 
inconclusive even though logs and 
squadron flight plans were freely made available. He 
considered repeating the operation when further complaints 
arose, but decided it was unlikely to produce results 
commensurate with the time and expense involved. Short of 
stationing Observers permanently at all air stations, outside 
Kashmir, whiclý would first haveýto have been proposed and then 
agreed by-both partiesi he felt there was not much which could 
be done by UNMOGIP beyond the local enquiries, it-already - 
conducted. He did, however, suggest that if both Air Forces 
frequently reminded their formations to keep well-awayýfrom 
disputed areas, and thus be certain they did not cross the CFL, 
a lessening of the-number of-complaints would be achieved48. 
Occasionally an identification was possible, or other firm 
ground5-for declaring a violation established., In January 
1960 a civil aircraft hired by-the Pakistan Government to 
conduct an aerial survey of the-river system in Azad Kashmir 
was seen flying over Indian territory, and inevitably it was 
likely that-photographs had been taken. 'A, Violation-was I 
awarded against Pakistan since any aircraft-,. whether civil or 
military, was deemed to violate the Karachi Agreement if it 
flew over the CFL, as information of military*value could be 
obtained by eitheev. 
,,, In another instance a'Royal Pakistan. Air Force Pilot was 
driven off course while flying from Lahore to Rawalpindi in bad 
weather. The pilot was forced to land on an airstrip at 
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Naushera owing to shortage of petrol, but was permitted to take 
off again as soon as the weather allowed. General Nimmo 
reported: "the co-operation and hospitality shown by the 
Indian Army to-the Pakistan pilot, together with the facilities 
and arrangements for the prompt return of the pilot and 'plane 
were not only highly satisfactory, but in the best army 
traditions". A Violation was nevertheless awarded by General 
Nimmo, against Pakistan'O. 
Observer Incidents 
Incidents termed by the Mission as "Observer, -Complaints" 
included any violation of the Ceasefire which was witnessed and 
reported by an Observer rather than by one-. of the parties. 
These inevitably tended to be few as neither side was inclined 
to breach the Karachi Agreement under the very noses of those 
who were there to safeguard it. Thus, in the normal way, 
Observers were only witnesses to breaches during serious 
incidents which continued after their arrival on the scene as 
the result of a report or complaint. 
- There were very few incidents of a-purely mi'litary'nature 
which could be said to have been deliberately directed against 
Observers, although they were at times caught in'the crossfire, 
as happened during the Nekowal Incident*. ' In March 1959, 'fire 
was opened from the Pakistan side of the`CFL into an area'where 
Observers displaying a white flag were. moving towards the CFL 
for a pre-arranged meeting for a Joint investigation. ' The 
Observers were forced to take cover and a Violation was 
subsequently awarded against Fakistan0l. Similarly-in 
September 1961, in moving forward for a Joint investigation 
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Observers came Under fire from the Indian side whilst standing 
in-the open near their white jeep and under the white UN flag, 
but such'incidents were rare52. In October 1959 a UN Jeep 
being driven by'an Observer ran over a mine in the Punch area. 
He was not hurt, and it was in any event suspected that the 
mine was meant for'the local Indian-Brigadier who had driven 
over the-road a few minates before". As the 1965 war 
approached the Observers found-themselves in danger more often, 
and several incidents'-occurred in 1964. On one occasion two 
Observers were seriously hurt when a grenade exploded near 
their jeep'when'they were'present, to observe the withdrawal of 
Indian and Pakistani'troops after a brief-bout of-fighting in 
the Border area'. It'seems unlikely, however, that this 
grenade was planted by the military or specifically aimed at 
the ObserverS54. In August 1964 an Observer investigating a 
heavy firing incident near the CFL on the Pakistan side started 
to follow a trail of blood caused by a body having been dragged 
away by the Indians. ''He came under, heavy Indian fire which 
continued for one hour in spite of the white UN-flag, blue- 
beret and prior assurance from the Indian Local Commander that 
it wa's safe for him to enter the area. General Nimmo 
requested Dr. - Bunche'to inform the Indian delegation that the 
Secretary-General was being informed of the unwarranted, action 
and, to-demand the immediate removal, ýof, the offending commanding 
officer and unit'responsible. The"Indians ordered a Court of 
Inquiry into'the affair, but the result is not knowW3. 
However, in November that year Indian troops again opened fire 
at Observers who were carrying out, investigations on the- 
Pakistan side of the CFL after informing the Indian Local 
Commander concerned. As always they were wearing the UN blue 
berets and arm bands and displaying white flags. The Indian 
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Local Commander afterwards apologised for the action of his 
troops". 
, As the situation became still worse Observers reported 
being fired at on three separate occasions in May, 1965 by 
Pakistan troops or para-military-elements while carrying out 
investigations on the Indian side, and once they came under 
fire from an Indian poSt57. When war-finally broke out, 
although buildings'in'which the Observers-were situated were 
affected by the crossfire, -there-was,, no question of firing 
being deliberately directed-against them. However, Observers 
were-at times impeded from carrying out, their duty by Local 
Commanders, ý seemingly for political reasons, but with the 
excuse thatýit was dangerous, for them to move in the area*. 
THE BORDER 
Armed Raiders 
UNMOGIP's brief was to concern itself purely, with the 
activities, of the military. But throughout the history of the 
operation-the majority of incidents along, the Ceasefire Line 
have had some civilian involvement. ' In many the trouble arose 
between the police of one side and-civilian5 of the other, and 
there was no military involvement at all. - Occasionally troops 
were involved with civilians, buVýin-an-unofficial-capacity, 
and to make matters more complicatedi civilians sometimes wore 
military clothing. 
Inthe early years these-incidents used to be particularly 
common on the'Border between Pakistan-and Indian-held Jammu, an 
area outside the Mission's terms of, reference since the 
*See pages 403-405. 
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Ceasefire Line, with which the Group was concerned, lay wholly 
within the Statb of Jammu and Kashmir, and ended at Manawar, at 
the point where it came into contact with this Border*. 
During the hostilities in 1947-48 few military operations had 
taken place in this area. Accordingly few units were 
garrisoned in the area, and the security of the Border, was 
entrusted to the civilian Pakistan Border Police Force, and to 
just a few Indian troops. Duringýthe troubles of 1947, gangs 
of cattle thieve5', basing their activities on both sides of the 
Border, took advantage of, the unsettled conditions to operate 
in the frontier villages. . 
When the first UN Observers arrived 
in the area on 11th February,, 1949, a l15t, of armed raids which 
had occurred since the Ceasefire was submitted, to them. They 
concluded that as the incidentsýdid not involve members of the 
Army, they could-not be termed, breaches of the Ceasef, ire5a. 
, The raids increasedý-during March-and April and serious 
casualties occurred among the local population. On 15th April 
General Delvoie suggested to the, CIC,,:, Pakistan, that some 
Pakistani regular troops be moved to-the area, and also 
recommended that the Indian Army move some troops forward to 
the Border5l. - Constant patrollingýof the area by troops of 
both sides succeeded in reducing the number of incidents-for a 
time*, although-one incident in-the lAte: summer resulted in an 
open firefight between Pakistan Border-Police and-Indian 
troops", and a second in the wounding of one and killing of- 
another Indian soldier 62. A period of comparative, quiet-, -, 
followed, but in November 1949 a new series of such incidents 
commenced,, not only as a-result of-raiders, but-also as 
civilians attempted to carry out their: own-, innocent activities 
*See Map 3. 
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on either side of the Border. It-was recommended that the 
problem be brought to the attention of the Pakistan and Indian 
Governments as a civilian matter endangering the object of the 
Mission" 
, In January, 1950, another major incident occurred, when an 
armed, gang of about 50 raiders attacked a Border village, 
firing indiscriminately in all directions. Four people were 
killed and one wounded, a boy was kidnapped and cash, ornaments 
and cattle stolen14. Thus with Brigadier Angle's arrival as 
the new Chief Military Observer, the questionýof Border - 
incidents-was one of the first items discussed with, both Army 
HQ. - It-was agreed in early February,, between the CMO and the 
two sides separately, that Border incidents would-,, be reported 
by the Armies and investigated by UN Observers; following the' 
same procedures as for incidents occurring on the CFL, with the 
proviso that if the Observers' investigations'revealed that no 
troops from either side took part,, -the finding would be 
reported to, the two GHQ. Thus the matterýwould then-be 
outside the Jurisdiction of the Observer Group, -and be 
considered as a domestic affair" . 
On 6th March, 1950, Mr. Vishnu Sahay, -Secretary-for 
Kashmir Affairs, Indian Ministry of States, wrote to Erik 
Colban suggesting that UN Observers should deal with incursions 
of armed men into the territory even when they were not made by 
troops. He Justified this suggestion on the grounds that the- 
UN's object was to preserve the integrity of the Ceasefire 
arrangements, which could Just as effectively'be disturbed by 
personnel who look like armed civilians as by raidsýby troops 
who could in any case masquerade in civilian dress-if making a 
raid". Colban forwarded the letter to Brigadier Angle who 
made an intensive study of the subject on the basis of-local 
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police records, information from Border Police officials on 
both sides, and from history books. He came to the conclusion 
that as Border incidents had occurred for several decades, they 
could not be viewed as resulting from the prevailing 
circumstances. Raiders had indeed taken advantage of the new 
situation, --but their motive was invariably theft and plunder, 
and Angle thought it was most unlikely, that Indian or Pakistan 
commandersýknew about the raids prior to their execution, or 
would be aýparty to the incidents. He felt that it was 
impractical for his small group of 39 Observers to take on the 
additional'role of Border policemen, and that in any event an 
attempt to do so would probably be resented by the police, and 
would be liable to cause confusion. He agreed that the raids 
could be made-by troops who looked like armed civilians as well 
as by armed civilians who looked like troops, but could not 
understand how a small group of Observers could be expected-to 
produce more information, and offer greater obstruction to 
raiders, than could the Border police forces of the two 
nations- He thought the only manner in which the'Observers 
could assist was by acting as -liaison officers, between the two 
Border police forces. The Mission thus agreed to, render its 
Good Offices in this way in an attempt to maintain peace and 
minimise tension". 
,, In December 1951 General Nimmo reported to Andrew Cordier 
that incidents on the Border were of a much more serious nature 
than on the CFL, and took the nature of raids on villages, 
lifting of cattle, and injury to or killing of inhabitants. 
He felti however, there was very little the Observersýcould do 
when civilians wearing uniform-like clothing and carrying- 
weapons could only be treated as civilians and not as military 
personnel. He told Cordier, and the CGS of both Armies, that 
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if civilians on both sides of the Border were to'be officially 
provided with weapons and ammunition by the respective armies, 
which appeared to be the case, it seemed fair thatýthe Armies 
should assume responsibility for the actions of the civilians 
concerned, and that the Observers could treat them as 
semi-military personnel. He said he also considered that the 
very issuingýof weapons to-civilians,,, and even their training 
in'the handling of them, on either side of the Border, ýwas very 
much apt to lead to raids and lootingvýalthough he realised 
that'looting and cattle-stealing had been more or less a 
tradition in-the, area for many'yearsbo-. He-suggested to both 
Army HQ that if they could not agre'e'to the, --re'cognition of -- 
these civilians as semi-military personnel, the weapons already 
issued to them along the Border'should, -be, taken back, and only 
the police forces in addition'to military-, persoiinel should be 
armed". Neither this recognition"nor'the withdrawal of the 
arms was, however, 'forthcoming and General Nimmo-was able only 
to use his discretion, initially'in a small way, by awarding 
violations-against the country whose armed police! had-- 
flagrantly violated the Border, -or Ceasefire, Line. - At the, end 
of 1958, when the problem had becomeýmore serious-and-spread 
along the Ceasefire-Line', he informed, -both sides-that he would 
award violations against any armed-person, civilian or police 
as well as military, 'who resorted to firing within 500 yards of 
the CFL*. ' 
Good Offices 
Although Most of the incidents on the'Borderiinvolved, 
civilians, they were not, always--causedýby armed civilian raids. 
*See page 223. 
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Often civilians would stray over the Border, either innocently 
or deliberately, in the normal course of their lives, whilst 
grazing cattle-or cutting grass or timber and so on, 'and would 
be chased back by troops or police of the other side. , 
Sometimes shots would be fired, injuries caused and complaints 
made of Alleged Border Violations (ABVs), which might or might 
not-be-, confirmed by Observer investigation7O. There were, 
however, instances of co-operation between-the two sides: in 
March, 1954 the Pakistan authorities approached the UNFO Team at 
Sialkot with a request that the UN use its Good Offices to 
effect the repair-of an irrigation canal'which had been 
breached on the Indian side for a few days and was in danger of 
ruining crops, in the area. -The, following day the UNFO Team at 
Jammu was able to report that the, Indian Army had itself 
successfully undertaken the repairs. General Nimmo told 
Cordier that he-wa5 particularly gratified; at the full and 
immediate co-operation extended by the Indian Army, and had so 
informed the Pakistan Chief of Staf f7l. 
-. In the wake of the subsequent 
haze of goodwill, the 
GeneralýOfficers Commanding Sialkot and! Jammu requested their 
local UNFO, Teams to arrange a meeting on the Border in, - 
September 1954. ý Army, police and civil representatives of - 
both sides attended, and the Border situation was discussed in 
a friendly atmosphere. Topics included recent cattle-lifting 
cases, Border cultivation encroachment, and'the possibility, of 
the, Indian Authorities passing Chenab River-Ba3in flood- , 
warnings to the Pakistan side., It was hoped that the meeting 
would result in a diminution of Border incidents and a-better 
understanding in the areez. As an immediate result Of the 
meeting cattle, involved in two cases were returned to their 
original owners, with UNFO Teams assisting in the exchange". 
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In-April 1955 General Nimmo reported that since both India 
and Pakistan were keen to use the Good Offices of the Mission 
to settle and adjust civilian matters of this type, the 
attentionýof Observers in the Border area had been increasingly 
engaged with the wanderings of civilians over the Border and 
cattle-lifting'and straying incidents. In an endeavour to 
forestall the possibility of more serious Border incidents 
developing from what were originally very minor civilian 
matters, General Nimmo had agreed to assist-where possible in 
achieving rapid-exchange of "strays". iHe noted that 
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co-operation at Army level, was very, good 
As the months passed a regular-system of Flag Meetings 
evolved, at which Junior Commanders in differing sectors and at 
different times discussed many minor,, problems,, and also 
attempted to overcome and eliminate some indiscriminate firing 
that had been recurring; The two sides, often also met-at 
Brigadier-, level on the Border. - Bothý'types, of meeting worked 
well, and appeared, to be beneficial. ý UNMOGIP's. policy was to 
make, it clear it, tookýno responsibility, -for the subjects 
discussed or for their implementation, -but was prepared to-- 
offer. the Good Offices of the UN to help, reduce discord or 
alleviate suffering and hardship along-the Border, with a view 
to reducing local tension and lessening the, risk of armed 
clashe S73., 
The situation began to improve asýcultivation was extended 
almost up to, the, Border, -and the forces were withdrawn-some 
distance on both sides". Apart from, a, few somewhat prolonged 
disputes concerning its exact location77 , the Border then 
remained comparatively quiet until, -war broke out in 1965,. -- It 
was largely unaffected by the threatening situation along the 
CFL in the early 1960s. 
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CIVILIANS ALONG THE CEASEFIRE LINE 
An Analysis of the Problem 
As on the Border, so on the Ceasefire Line, the majority 
of incidents involved civilians. At the end of May, 1952 
General Nimmo reported that of the 80 incidents investigated 
since 1st January, 1951,37 had Involved civilians only, 22 
involved civilians and troops, and 21 incidents alone had 
involved only troops. He thought also that, many civilian 
incidents were not reported for investigation as-no troops were 
suspected of being implicated, and therefore the incident could 
not be considered a breach of the Ceasefire under the terms of 
the Karachi Agreement71l. 
In early 1951 General Nimmo instructed his Observers to 
make themselves aware of any major crossings of the CFL as such 
moves could form the basis for strife and hostility in the 
areas adjacent to the Line, and he did not want the Observers 
to be "caught napping" should they everýbe called upon to 
investigate any happening which arose from suchý-causes. The 
intention was to deal with the matter in a broad way, and not 
be concerned with minor movements and civil police matters, and 
in particular to be concerned only with the military aspects of 
the civilian movements, and not with political., 
cons iderati onS79. 
Looting and raiding, as on the Border*, were common 
practice, and the very presence of the Ceasefire Line made it 
difficult to trace the criminals. However, General Nimmo also 
pointed out to Andrew Cordier on more than one occasion the 
unsuitability of the Line as an economic or, 'administrative 
*See page 189. 
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boundary. "Its unfortunate location in many places, " he 
remarked, "is the chief cause of most of the Ceasefire 
II so violations we have... . In a more detailed analysis he 
said, "there is a good deal of unrest caused by the 
restrictions the Ceasefire Line imposes on normal intercourse 
between groups of civilians who have lived in these districts 
for generations. There is also much human suffering and 
hardship. The Line in certain places cuts across farming and 
grazing lands; divides communities living in the same valley; 
cuts off food grain areas from their former grist mills; 
blocks natural access rouies used by communities in the 
mountains, forcing people to climb thousands of feet to get in 
or out; renders valuable stands of timber unobtainable by 
either side; and so on. In other words the-Ceasefire Line, 
whilst serving to keep apart two opposing military forces, is 
proving more and more to be a most unsuitable civil boundary 
and is, in my opinion, a very real source of tension and 
irritation among the people on both sides. - Rather than trying 
to prevent all movement across the Line, -I think by the-, 
exercise of a little generosity on both sides, -a spirit of-give 
and take (subject, of course, to the requirements-of military 
security) it should be possible to obtain some relief for the 
people whose interests lie in the immediate zone of the 
Ceasefire Line"91. 
Despite this view, and the fact that the handling of 
civilians was not covered by the Karachi Agreement, General 
Nimmo repeatedly pointed out that more stringent control of 
civilians would become a concern of the Armies unless steps 
were taken to stop them from crossing the CFL62. From the 
very beginning it was the Indians who objected to the crossing 
of the Line by civilians, no matter how innocent the motive for 
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the crossing might be, 13. The Pakistan side took the view that 
the Line was merely intended to separate the two Armies, but 
that civilians, as Kashmiris, could go anywhere in Kashmi X44. 
At a Conference on the subject in July 1952* a representative 
from the Pakistan Ministry of Kashmir of Kashmir Affairs 
promised the full co-operation of his Government, but said it 
would be very difficult to take strong action against civilians 
crossing the Line". 11 
Evacuation of the Indian side of the CFL 
As-the two sides became more entrenched in their 
positions, the Indians seemed to be aiming, at making the Line 
into a definite frontier. GeneralýNimmo remarked in 1958 that 
for all Pakistan's objections the Line, was indeed becoming more 
and, more a border8b. Whilst Pakistan, encouraged cultivation 
right up to the CFL on the one side, -the Indians discouraged it 
on the other. It became an offence'under Kashmir State law to 
cross the CFL, and considerable amounts were, spent on roads and 
bridges in forward areas, particularly around Punch sector, to 
facilitate patrolling by troops and police. Indian police 
acted vigorously against Pakistan civilians who crossed the 
Line, to graze cattle or cultivate either their own land, or 
land made fallow by the evacuation of civilians on the Indian 
side. - Eventually almost the wýole of the 500-yard zone 
prohibited to the military, and sometimes up to a mile or two 
away, was cleared of all cultivation and houses in the 
*Pages 334-335. 
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western* portion of the CFL on the Indian side". 
In August 1957 General Nimmo again drew the Pakistan 
authorities' attention to the need for strict control of 
civilians in areas near the CFL, saying, "their lack of 
adherence to a firm decision as to which side of the Line they 
wish to live on is a source of provocation to troops in the 
area". But the situation did not improveae. One week in 
September 1959 six complaints were received in quick 
succession, each one associated with harvesting, always a time 
of increased civilian activity, which caused a rise in the 
number of complaints received. General Nimmo wrote to 
Cordier: "The local Kashmiri, living on or near the CFL, 
displays little or no intere5t in its exact position - 
especially when his own land is involved. The resulting 
encroachment infuriates the Indians and is a source of 
satisfaction to the Pakistanis (at least unofficially)"". 
Differing versions from the two sides often made it 
difficult to establish the true facts of an incident involving 
civilians even after investigation. Although General Nimmo 
did not suggest that senior Army Authorities were conniving in 
any form of deliberate deception he told Cordier that "evidence 
from civilian sources has in the past proved most unreliable 
and cannot be accepted without strong corroboration""'. 
*Adjoining Azad Kashmir, as opposed to the northern 
section adjoining the Northern Areas, which were under the 
direct control of Pakistan. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT - NEKOWAL -A CASE STUDY 
- -Nekowal, -in spite of 
being situated on the Border, is a 
particularly good subject for a case study within a thesis on 
UNMOGIP, because-, in a little over five years this tiny village 
encompassed to a lesser or greater extent many of the problems 
encountered by the Group along the-whole 500-mile length of the 
CeasefireýLine over a much longer period, and served as an 
indicator of the dangers that might, arise-if the major problem 
of civilians along the Ceasefire Line was not solved. it 
shows that-the situation of recurrent clashes between civilians 
and armed police was not one that developed in. the-worsening 
situation of the 1960s, but was inherent, from the beginning. 
The history of Nekowal offers more to the researcher on UNMOGIP 
than any other owing to a combination of circumstances. 
Although the village had been-occupying the Mission? s attention 
from 1950, a serious incident occurred in the vicinity-in 1955. 
This was followed by a leakage to the Press, of. part of General 
Nimmo's findings* which, as a by-product, caused more material 
on-the, incident itself to be available in the files than on 
other incident., Thus the history of Nekowal graphically 
illustrates firstly, the situation endured by villages close 
together, but on alternate sides-of the Ceasefire Line/Border, 
and secondly the United Nations MilitaryýObserver Group'sý, 
attempts to calm a-serious situation. ý It also offers a deeper 
insight'into one of their investigations. Furthermore-it not 
only highlights the activities ofthe Observers and, the. i55ues 
they-'encountered, but does so to some extent, in the context of 
the political background against which, the Group was working-. 
*This episode will be discussed at length in Chapter 
Twelve, Pages 360-372. 
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The reason for this is that it draws attention to the 
unsatisfactory position. of civilians affected by the dispute, 
and gives some idea of the attitudes of the two sides at both 
the political and the military level. The co-operation 
exercised between both armies and UNMOGIP is demonstrated, and 
also how much less disciplined the police were-than the 
military. The extreme efforts made by, -Observers to bring 
about a ceasefire once firing hab erupted is focused upon, 
recording the extent to which they were prepared to act at 
great personal risk over and above the, call of duty in the 
interest of re-establishing peace. Finally, the difficulties 
Observers faced in establishing the truth of what happened when 
confronted with conflicting stories is, shown. - ,? 
The Question of Control 
Nekowal was situated in southern Jammu on-the Border, with 
Pakistan. It was about eight miles east, of the'Pakistan town 
of Sialkot'in a small pocket of-land bulging into Pakistan 
territory. Its population consisted of approximately 1000 
Moslems in about 200 houses who'supported themselvesl, from the 
Pakistan side but did not claim allegiance"to either, the, State 
of Jammu and Kashmir or to Pakistan. On the Pakistan side of 
the border was the-village of Umranwali, and. the people of the 
two villages were closely'related. On 3rd November, 1948 
(before the Ceasefire went into effect) the'village-was 
attacked by Indian soldiers and local people,,, claimed many lives 
were lost. -. The, inhabitants moved to Umranwali, Later-some 
returned to Nekowall. - In March 1950 Brigadier Angle, reported 
that the inhabitants of, both villages. -were terrified-of Indian 
troops, 'but investigation showed that no actual threats-had 
been made by the Indians2. 
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In February 1950 General Kalwant Singh, the Indian Army 
Chief-of-Staff, requested Brigadier Angle to have Military 
Observers talk to the people of Nekowal and ascertain their 
reaction toýthe proposed use of officials from the State of 
Jammu and Kashmir to check if they were bona fide residents, 
and to'collect taxes. , Observers went to investigate and 
reported that the villagers were prepared to pay their taxes, 
but-were afraid of being, evacuated from, theii, homes, and would 
resist any, attempt to do so3, 
At-the end of February Observers also-visited the Pakistan 
brigade, at Sialkot to explain that-efforts were being made 
through the Mission for-a peaceful settlement of-the Nekowal 
situation. They outlined the following programme suggested to 
Brigadier Angle by, the Indian Army: - that the villagers-. be 
notified through Pakistan, -channels of communication, that a land 
check would be madeto determine whether-Oor not the people--in 
the village were legal residents; ýýthat the, local Indian, - 
commander would visit-the village to explain-the programme; 
that those who were unable to establish bona fide residency- 
would probably be moved out; and that if an Indian post were 
established in the village, Observers-would-be'pre5ent upon 
occupation4 .,, ý-1, -1 1: - 
The Brigade Major, to whom they spoke inýtheýabsence-of 
the Local Commander, asked--what would happen if the people 
refused to co-operate. The", Observers, -having assured him that 
the UN was interested in a peaceful settlement, ýpointed out 
that asýthe-village-was in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, what 
happened there was of no concern to the-Sialkot Brigade as long 
as the Pakistan border was not crossed by Indian troops, or 
Pakistan-lives or property endangered., -Further, if the Indian 
Army was fired upon or the villagers refused to co-operate, the 
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Indian Army was legally justified in using any necessary force. 
The Major seemed convinced that the village would, be forcibly 
evacuated by the-Indian Army in spite of the Observers' 
repeated insistence that-if the villagers caused no trouble, 
and were able to establish the fact that they were legal 
residents of the village, they would be allowed to remain. 
He, in turn, insisted the villagers were armed and would, not 
allow Indian troops to occupy the village, and furthermore he 
claimed that the Pakistan Army, would-take steps to protect 
Pakistan life and property upon the first-indication of Indian 
troops forcibly occupying the village5. -. 
Following their visit-the Observers, received a letter, from 
the Major-which, as they maintained, erroneously-stated-that 
they had informed him that Indian troops, would ultimately 
evacuate the village, if necessary by force. - The, Major- 
accepted that Nekowal was in the State of'Jammu andýKashmir, 
but since Umranwali and Nekowal were only two hundred yards 
apart, and the whole area around both villages4was cultivated, 
with Pakistani nationals working in the fields touching' 
Nekowal, any military action in Nekowal was bound to involve 
violation of Pakistan territory and damage to Pakistan-life and 
property. Fire directed at Nekowal from, any point in the 
State territory would inevitably fall'into Pakistan territory, 
as had happened when Indian troops attacked the village in 
November 1948, and killed six Pakistan nationals. 
, The Major went on to suggest that in-the'event of military 
action the residents of Nekowal would in. any case withdraw into 
Pakistan territory which would lead to further-complications, 
and he stressed that in the event of any direct or indirect 
violation of Pakistan territory, or damage to, Pakistan--life or 
property by the Indians, Pakistan troopsýwould-reluctantly be 
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obliged to intervene. In order to avoid an unpleasant 
situation he thus requested the UN to approach the Indian Army 
authorities and ask them to agree to a procedure whereby the 
bona fides of the residents could be checked jointly under the 
supervision of the UN Military Observers without the use of 
f orcel. 
- The Major may have missed the point of the Observers' 
visit to him, but he quite succinctly stated the problems 
surrounding any attempt that might be made by the Indian 
authorities to occupy the village. Angle informed General 
McCay, the Pakistan Chief of Staff, that the Brigade Major's 
report was at variance with that of his Observers, who were 
emphatic that neither the Major nor the villagers-had been told 
that they were to be evacuated7 . General McCay had also 
received word that the Indian and Jammu and Kashmir State 
authorities intended to evacuate the Nekowal villagers, which 
would be likely to cause high feelings and border incidents, 
and had requested the CMO, to use his-influence$. Angle 
pointed out that there had been no repercussion, -on the 
Indian 
side of the border when Pakistan troops had recently occupied 
the Umranwali area, so there was no reason to surmise there 
would be in the reverse instance. On that occasion the 
Indians had simply informed the UN that as Umranwali-was in 
Pakistan territory they did not propose to counter the movement 
of Pakistan troops into the area, and as Nekowal was in Kashmir 
territory Angle presumed that Pakistan would adopt the same 
attitude". He was-perhaps being somewhat, unfair-to the Major 
in that the Major was talking about the real possibility of 
firing being initiate&by the villagers, not simply the 
movement of troops. However, Angle told McCay that-in his 
opinion the Brigade Major was himself the prime agitatorýof the 
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locals in the area, where tension was being raised by rumours 
of prospective Indian military action against the villagers. 
McCay offered to remove the Major, but it was decided that he 
should Just receive a warning"'. Angle agreed that the 
Major's suggestion of an approach by Observers to the Indian 
authorities was a sensible one: it, had also been made by 
Observers, and was being acted upon. Observers had also been 
instructed to visit the villages in question at least once 
every week". 
A Land Check on the Village 
On 17th March, after an initial discussion between 
Ob5ervers'and'local commanders, a meeting was held in the 
presence of four, Observers at which about 50-villagers were 
informed by the-Indian Brigade Commander that a land record 
officer from Jammu and Kashmir would'come with UN Observers to 
check their legal right to remain in the village. He assured 
the villagers they would be treated fairly, their rights-would 
be protected and there would be no religious discrimination. 
At the Observers' suggestion he added that the villagers should 
not be influenced by misleading statements of political 
agitators". I 
Most of the villagers, including the leader,, had been 
noncommittal during the meeting,, but a-small group of three or 
four had made violent objection to being included'in the State 
of Jammu and Kashmir, saying they did not trust Sheik, , 
Abdullah's Government and they would prefer to remain neutral 
until the dispute was settled. They'admitted they'had been - 
told by someone from Pakistan that they would be forcibly 
ejected from the village. Observers were in no doubt'that 
attempts were being made to raise objections to the whole 
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attempt towards a settlement of the Nekowal problem, but it was 
agreed that the land check would be made on 31 March13. 
General Kalwant Singh made his appreciation known to Angle 
for all the UN had done to keep the peace at Nekowal and he 
and, -subsequently, the local Brigade Commander promised there 
would be no movement of Indian troops towards the village 
without the presence of UN ObserverS14. Brigadier Angle also 
visited-the Pakistan Brigade Commander at Sialkot and suggested 
that tension in the area would be lessened if he withdrew his 
troops from the neighbourhood. The Commander agreed and 
immediately gavethe necessary order, assuring Angle of his 
co-operation 
ý On 31st March, 1950 a check was made at Nekowal by Jammu 
and Kashmir Government land officer in the presence of UN 
Observers. The, villagers were friendly and co-operative and 
the land officer was satisfied that those present were bona 
fide residents of the village, and were the owners of the land 
in the area, -although the Observers believed there was probably 
a number of people living there who were not actually bona fide 
residents". 
After the. 1and check the villagers restated emphatically 
they did not trust the Jammu and Kashmir Government or Sheik 
Abdullah and would under no circumstances pay taxes-to it nor 
recognize its authority. They were determined to maintain 
this attitude and be independent of anyýGovernment until the UN 
Security Council had solved the Kashmir problem, and only then 
would they be willing to abide by the decision'that would 
finally be agreed to. In the meantime they felt they belonged 
to no government and, had so far. got along quite well on their 
own without, any aid from Jammu and Kashmir. since partition. 
They further stated-that if they-, recognized theýauthority of 
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the Jammu and Kashmir Government the Pakistan Border Police 
would''prevent them from crossing into Pakistan in the course of 
their business. They stated that should the Jammu and Kashmir 
Goverment or Indian Army attempt to force them to evacuate or 
recognise the authority of the Jammu and Kashmir Government 
they would join'the Azad Kashmir Government, and would resist 
to the last man any encroachment by the Jammu and Kashmir or 
Indian Army. They further stated that they would open fire on 
any Indian troops who attempted to approach and enter the 
village". 
The Observers present recommended that the villagers be 
allowed to remain in their village: for the-time being on 
humanitarian grounds. They felt that to make an issue of the 
situation would only cause a further increase in political 
unrest at the time, which could result in a serious border 
incident developing. They suggested the Indian-'Army should be 
approached at the highest level with a view to preventing 
military personnel approaching the, villagele. -- 
Political Considerations 
On 15th April Mr. "Vishnu Sahay, Secretary for Kashmir 
Affairs to the Indian Government, -requested-a, meeting with the 
Secretary-General's Special Representative, Erik Colban, to 
discuss'the situation. He said the position was-becoming 
embarrassing as'Nekowal had been occupied-by'many so-called 
"Azad" people, some said to-be armed, who refused to obey the 
authority of the Jammu and Kashmir Government". He accepted 
that-the land check had shown that a great'number ofýthe 
villagers appeared to be natives of Nekowal, who were entitled 
to remain there, but he was still concernedýthat they were 
armed. At the same time he was reluctant to advise-his 
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Government to do anything that might lead to a "disagreeable 
development" at a time when a conference between the two Prime 
Ministers had given such good hope of a better political 
atmosphere*. It was decided to leave the matter with the 
Observer Group for the time beinel. 
On 17th April General McCay agreed to detail a police 
officer-to talk to the Nekowalis in-the presence of UN 
Observers. -They would be told that they would not be 
supported by Pakistan troops if they resisted the entry of 
Indian troops into their village, and should obey the 
instructions of the Indian officials, who were-acting on behalf 
of the legal authority22. McCay had already made, it clear to 
the Sialkot Brigade that the people of Nekowal had to obey the 
lawful authority represented by India 23 
Brigadier Angle and other senior members of his Mission 
dined'with the Indian Commander-in-Chief, General, Cariappa, on 
20th April, -and the latter said he intended to establish 
picquets in and near Nekowal to prevent-infiltration. of 
Pakistan nationals into-India. Angle asked him to delay a, 
week-to allow, the Observers time to arrange a "peaceful" 
occupation. He agree&4ý. Arrangements were thus made, 
through both Army HQi whereby the Indian Army would enter the 
village and the Pakistan Army would refrain from action should 
any firing start. All military weapons would-then be taken 
from the villagers". --However, in advance of this happening, 
on 22nd April an Indian patrol exchanged-5hots with Pakistan 
Border Police, - and it was decidedýto inve5t the village which 
was already*stirred up by the incident. I 'It was feared that 
*The Prime Ministers reached agreement later that month on 
'various problems-that had arisen between the two 
countries, and agreed to differ on Kashmir, trusting that 
ý, the Dispute would not spoil an eraýof friendship". . 
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a serious situation could result, leading to the involvement of 
both armieS26. Angle sent a cable to General Cariappa 
imploring him to keep his troops away from Nekowal until he, 
Angle, had discussed the matter with him again2l. He also 
cabled Colban and said he was convinced that the only guarantee 
that no incident would occur which would lead to a 
"disagreeable development" at the time of the Prime Minister's 
conference was to ensure that Indian troops did not advance on 
the village2S . Colbah approached Sahay on the subject, but 
meantime General'Cariappa had already agreed that no action 
would be taken until Angle had'been to Indian Army HQ and 
discUssed'the problemý". Angle flew immediately to Jammu to 
visit the Indian-Brigade HQ-which controlled the Nekowal., area. 
He showed General, -Cariappa's telegram to the, Brigade Major and 
insisted he-send out-orders to, his battalions to conform with 
the signalý Angle then droveto Sialkot to see the Pakistan 
Brigadier, who also felt that the Nekowal, fire-fight might-be 
the start-of a. "shooting match along the whole, front", and 
proposed, the establishment of-a 1000-yard restricted zone in 
the Nekowal area`*. III 
, On'26th April General-Gracey, the Pakistan- 
Commander-in-Chief, told Angle that he had presented the 
Nekowal problem to Liaquat Ali Khan, the Pakistan Prime 
Minister, and had asked him to pass it on to Nehru. Liaquat 
agreed somewhat reluctantly as he considered India had every 
legal right-to, take over the, area where Nekowal was situated. 
General Gracey-had also endeavoured to have the Nekowalis 
evacuated, -but they did not wish it3l. The same day a UN 
Observer and the Pakistan Acting Commissioner, -. of Border Police 
had a meeting with the Nekowalis, who-had again suffered a 
change of heart to the extent of agreeing to pay theirttaxes 
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and obey the orders of the local authority. But they said 
they would still resist to the last man any attempt by Indian 
troops to enter their village32. 
Investigations by Observers left very little doubt that 
the Indian patrol involved in the firing incident had wandered 
within two hundred yards of Nekowal when they were driven off 
by rifle and light machine gun fire". General Thorat, the 
new Indian CGS, expressed his concern to Angle that troops 
should have gone'so close'to the village contrary to his 
orders-, and apologized for the fact that the Indian patrol had 
upset all the*plans for a settlement of'the problem. He said 
the'Indian Army was considering'the whole problem as a civil 
administrative affair, and might hand it over to'the Jammu and 
Kashmir Government. Angle-thought the latter might not be 
able to*handle the situation in which'case it would have to 
call on Indian troops in aid of-the civil power, which he said 
would be'disastrous. He felt that either the'UN should see 
the Indian troops into Nekowal peaceably or a restricted zone 
should be agreed by'-both sides. The General said he would' 
refer the matter to higher authority34-. ' Brigadier Angle's 
death; in July 1950, 'occurred before the subject was raised 
again. 
General Nimmo's Good Offices 
One of General Nimmols first letters'to Andrew Cordier 
after his arrival at the Mission; 'writtefi'on 20th December, 
1950, said that after'taking uP his dutieg and having had'time 
to'familiarize himself with the area he'had'discovered that one 
of the most pressing problems'was that, of Nekowal, and he had 
wondered whether the Observer Group had been justified in 
concerning itself in such detail in a purely domestic problem, 
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to do with a village that was not even on the Cea5efire Line. 
He came to the conclusion that it would be wrong to involve the 
Mission too deeply in the matter as it would most certainly be 
accused of taking sides and helping the Indians, and this would 
be fatal toýthe prestige and standing of the Group as far as 
Moslems were concerned. He also, felt that the use of 
Observers to help settle problems of a domestic nature would 
create a precedent which would get them involved in a large 
number of disputes with which they should not deal. However, 
in view of the commitments made by Brigadier Angle in his 
general desire to maintain peace, General Nimmo-felt morally 
bound to do what he could to influence both sides3s. 
During November 1950 the subject of investing the village 
had again been brought up by the Indian Army, and the local 
commander had admitted to a UN Military Observer that if the 
Nekowal villagers-started firing and fell back into Pakistan 
territory, the Indian Army would make a limited penetration 
into Pakistan if necessary to quell the firing. General Nimmo 
informed the local-commander that the Observers would play no 
part in helping the Indian1rmy invest the village, and 
suggested that the Indian and Pakistan Governments should 
resolve'the problem. He urged that they-should be given time 
to-do so, and stated that he also proposed to have a conference 
on-the matter with the Indian Commander-in-Chief, to whom he 
made it clear theýthe, Group would act in a purely observer role 
so as to be able-to render factual reports of any Border 
violation. The CIC said the decision had been made to go 
ahead, but two days later Nimmo heard that the investment would 
be indefinitely postponed. Nimmo, told Cordier that he did not 
know whether or not his action was the cause of the 
postponement of the operation by the Indians, but he rather 
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thought it was. Only an hour after receiving news of it Nimmo 
learned that a Pakistan unit was moving up to the village. He 
took the matter up with GHQ Pakistan who stated they knew 
nothing of it and would order the withdrawal of troops as such 
movement was contrary to previous instructions3l. 
Nimmo felt certain that a serious incident had been 
avoided for the time being at least. He could understand the 
desire of the Jammu and Kashmir Government to bring the Nekowal 
villagers into line, -but police action there, supported by 
military force would almost certainly involve the Umranwalis 
which could easily result, in much bloodshed as many of the 
civilians were armed and intended to fight to the last. He 
still maintained the problem was a matter for the respective 
governments to-resolve as peacefully as possible 37*. -ý 
Cordier agreedýthat Nimmo was Justified in taking the 
course-he'chose,, even-, if it did not come within his terms of 
reference, ýif it prevented a serious Border incident. He said 
that it was often difficult to know where to draw the line 
between questions which lie clearly within the scope of an 
Observer Group's function, and those which lie outside, it. But 
experience had shown with other Missions that, the. moral - 
authority of an Observer Group was4extremely-high especially 
when the Group had succeeded in maintaining a position of ý, 
absolute impartiality, and when-its-members had shown by the 
manner in which they had handled'various, questions that they 
understood both the military issues involved and their 
political implications. Cordier felt that in a case where it 
*Fifteen years later he was still insisting it was 
'necessary for the Governments of India and Pakistan to 
come to some political agreement about the fate of 
civilians of the State of Kashmir who straddled the-Line 
dividing those parts of the State administered by India 
from those administered by Pakistan. 
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was clear that action by one side or the other on what was a 
domestic problem might involve a breach of the ceasefire, it 
would seem quite proper to bring some influence to bear on both 
sides". 
'General Nimmo felt that the best solution to the Nekowal 
problem would be for the status quo to be allowed to remain 
untilýthe final settlement of the Kashmir problem. Failing 
agreement,, the civil police of both-sides should act together 
by Mutual arrangement". Cordier suggested the best method in 
maintaining the status quo was for Nimmo, to hold a watching 
brief and inform UNHQ by confidential telegram, if the situation 
developed to the point where urgent intervention by the 
Secretary-General would be required". 
ý On 26th December, 1950, at the request of the Indian 
General-Officer-Commanding in Jammu, the Observers arranged a 
meeting of the GOC most closely concerned on both sides of the 
Border. Discussions were friendly and it was-agreed that both 
sides, would co-operate in an endeavour to clearýthe matter up 
through the local civil authorities 41 . Six-months later, 
however, Observers at Jammu reported-thatýthe local commander 
was insisting that his troops enter the, village to'collect the 
taxes, which the villagers had maintained they were willing to 
pay'. -Nimmo feared there would be trouble if it was the Army 
which went in to collect them, and wrote to General Thorat ý 
referring him to the agreement between the local commanderS42. 
As a result of his intervention there was no incident-on this 
occasion'. 
followed a period of calm in the Nekowal area, but 
in December 1953 there was a recurrence of the problem when the 
Indian Army proposed-to establish a-post some 300-400 yards- 
away from the-village in order to protect the activities of a 
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State-operated collective farm which was reclaiming land that 
had lain fallow along the Border since the war in 1948. A 
meeting was again arranged between the two opposite commanders 
by the UN Field Observer Teams at Jammu and Sialkot, and the 
Indian Army agreed to do nothing to jeopardize Border relations 
before discussions had taken place 43 . Nevertheless some 
months of tension passed before, on 30th April, 1954, it was 
agreed-at a meeting of the two commanders that the Indian Army 
would, patrol approximately 300 yards from-Nekowal, but would 
not enter the village itself., The Pakistan Army would 
instruct the Border Police not to interfere with, the patrols 
and, further, would take action to tellýthe Nekowalis that it 
was in their best interest to foster good relations with the 
authorities of Jammu'and Kashmir, epecially-in regard-to the 
supply of water, and generalýcivil serviceS44., 
These incidents show that with-the help of,, -, and, perhaps a 
little-pushing by the UN Military Observer Group, the two 
Armies were only too willing to*co"oPerate in order to minimise 
tension whilst a political solution was being sought. - At-the 
same time the Observers had to be continually onýtheir guard in 
order to spot a situation that could develop into-trouble, in' 
order to nip it in the bud,, and also to ensure-that the, Armies 
kept-to the promises made. -1 
In spite of the endeavours on, all, sides to maintain the 
peace, - in 1955 the long-feared serious,, incident did occur at 
Nekowal, 'and had greater ramifications than was at-first ý 
anticipated. Colonel A. N. -MacDonald, General Nimmo's Chief 
operations Officer, who was closely, involved in, the 
investigation of the incident was due to leave the Mission soon 
afterwards; but General Nimmo, who was himself about to go on 
leave; -requested an extension for him in view of his-seniority- 
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at the Mission, his knowledge of the incident and, 
particularly, because the Indian Commander had specifically 
requested his presence and supervision at the investigation". 
The Nekowal Incident" 
On 7th May, 1955 the UN Military Observer Team at Jammu 
received a message from the local command that there was 
shooting in, the Nekowal area, and subsequently received a 
complaint claiming that a party of civilians, ploughing the 
land-near'Nekowal of the Indian Central Mechanized'Farm of 
Nandur; and accompanied by a small protective army patrol, had 
been-fired upon by heavy bursts of automatic fire from the 
north, south-, and west. Five soldiers, including. an officer, 
and six civilians had been killed. The rest of the-party ' 
fired back to extricate themselves, and later to recover-the 
casualties, but could not move up due to to incessant heavy 
automatic fire from the Pakistan side. 
Immediately upon receipt of the first message the 
Observers radioed their counterparts in Sialkot asking them to 
get in touch with their local command to have the firing - 
stopped, an&then, themselves went to the spot. They requested 
the Indian battalion commander not to aggravate the situation 
by involving more troops. The latter felt he, had to-bring 
more in from his HQ, but promised there would not'be any more 
firing or forward movement to the Border unless it was, 
absolutely necessary. The Observers then went towards the 
firing which was still intermittently to be heard. The 
Sialkot Observers also drove quickly to the spot once they felt 
satisfied that orders for a ceasefire had been issued, 
following their report of the incident to their local command. 
-On'the way they saw several Pakistan Border Police with rifles 
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and ordered them to stop firing. Frequently during the 
afternoon all four Observers were themselves under fire. At 
one point the jeep in which two of them were travelling was hit 
by a bullet in spite of its flying the white UN flag. 
The Observers were ultimately able to tell the Pakistan 
Police Captain, whom the Local Command had arranged to go to 
Umranwali to meet them, that the Indian Command had said that 
if the firing stopped his troops would also stop firing, and 
they requested him'therefore, to issue ceasefire orders to the 
Pakistan Border Police-on the south flank. He said he was 
reluctant to do this if the Indians were advancing, 'but he 
wanted to respect the, UN. The Observers assured him the 
Indians had no intention of advancing into Pakistan territory, 
and were-concerned only with extricating their woundedý. 'The 
Captain signed the necessaryýorder and two Observers-duly 
delivered it to-one post, whilst the Captain relayed it to 
others, -and-finally the', firing stopped. The two Observers 
then'joined'an Indian, officer and doctor"to recover the bodles 
from the-scene of the original incident, but found only large 
blood-stains. - They then helped to arrange the return from 
Pakistan of the dead and, wounded, who were-eventually handed 
over-at about'dusk. II. 1! 1, 
- By the end of the day seventeen deaths had occurred. - -The 
Observers estimated that one company of Pakistan Border Police 
took part in the fighting, some"of whom they saw on the Indian 
side ofthe Border, but no-Pakistan Army personnel were in 
evidence. tI 
Investigation of the Incident47 
An investigation of the incident took place over the 
following two days. The Pakistan Border Police-claimed, that 
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the incident had occurred because the Indian farm employees 
working close to the Border, accompanied by a strong Indian 
patrol, had an argument with civilians from Nekowal. The 
patrolýchased these civilians, ýfiring shots across the Border 
and killing a Pakistani-'girl, and then crossed the Border 
themselVe5. Observers reported that the girl was shot from 
her front, as a wound on her breast showed, and she could have 
been accidentally shot by the firing from the Pakistan patrol. 
According to the Pakistan Border Police, of the three of their 
number who were close enough to the Border to witness the 
scene, only one was still-alive, and the Observers found him to 
be an unreliable witness. The story of another Pakistan 
witness was, totally discounted by Observers, who concluded that 
the Pakistan evidence that, the-,,, Indians were-overwhelmed by one 
man close by with a riflei and, four others from 150 to 300 
yards away was extremely dubious., Furthermore, as their 
evidence could not be taken before the second day,. and the 
Pakistan representatives had knowledge of the Indian evidence, 
they were inýa position to brief their witnesses. All 
Pakistan witnesses in the vicinity had the same story about the 
argument, and, they mentioned, words of conversation which they 
claimed-to have heard, irrespective of their--position at the 
time, despite the noise of the diesel tractors. All-Pakistan 
witnesses-claimed to have, seen the girl-shot, '-and all claimed 
that they had, shouted to-the-Indians not. to cross the Border, 
and alleged that it was-not-until-they had done so and shot the 
two Border Police that the other, Border Police-opened fire. 
There wa5-no conclusive proof that Indian soldiers had crossed 
the Border; moreover Observers hadý-seen large-blood stains on 
the Indian side of the Border. The-Observers found-the 
Pakistan story very unlikely, and though they admitted the" 
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evidence did not prove conclusively who fired the first shot 
across the Border, since this would inevitably be difficult to 
determine in such circumstances, they felt that the state of 
the area in which the Indians were killed and its tactical 
disadvantage to them indicated a preconceived design in which 
preparation by the Pakistan Border Police was an essential 
preliminary. General Nimmo thus declared a Border Violation 
by the Pakistan Border Police. The fact that the Pakistan 
Police were not within the Jurisdiction of UNMOGIP was not 
mentioned by General Nimmo, and the Pakistan authorities do not 
appear to have made an issue of the matter, possibly because 
they accepted that-the seriousness of the incident warranted 
theýaward-of Violation. 
General Nimmo subsequently told Cordier that his. usual 
policy-in dealing with investigations of complaints-was to 
write as little, as possible to each commander, merely giving a 
brief factual summary to each side, together, with his decision. 
He explained-that in this incident, as occasionally occurred, 
he went further as-regards the comprehensiveness of his summary 
so as to'give a correct and unbiased picture to the responsible 
authorities on-each side. Even so he omitted certain aspects 
which he felt would only intensify ill-feelings., For that 
reason he had also taken the unusual step of furnishing, 
]ýersonally and confidentially,,, the Pakistan Chief of Staff, with 
details from the Observers' reports to enable, him to get the 
true-picture rather than depend on, the BorderýPolice and, 
civilians for information - no Fakistan'Army-personnel-having 
been-'present. Indian Army officers were present and could 
therefore render reports to their own HQ. Nimmo also said he 
was greatly relieved that there was not a fiercer outcry from 
India than there was, and he felt some credit was due to the 
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Observers for this as they did their best to calm the natural 
feelings of those around them. They had described the event 
to'Nimmo as "plain murder" and he thought it fortunate that 
stern reprisal did not eventuate on the Border 4a . 
Indian 
reaction was, in fact, perhapsmuted by the fortuitous 
imminence of another meeting of the two countries' Prime 
Ministers*., 
Aftermath 
After the incident the Indian General Officer Commanding 
the-area wrote to General Nimmo asking him. to convey his 
appreciation to'the four Observers for their efforts to bring 
about a ceasefire under the mostýtrying conditions. He said 
their work undoubtedly saved many lives on both sides. He 
also said he was grateful for the help and co-operation given 
by Colonel MacDonald during the subsequent negotiationsi and 
suggested that GeneralýNimmo might commend the services of 
these officers to UNHQ49. 
In his regular Operations Report covering-the incident 
General Nimmo wrote-that the commanders on both sides of the 
Border were conferring regularly with the assistance of, 
Observers in an endeavour to improve relations along the, 
BordeeO. - In the"following report he stated that theýIndian 
Army had indicated that in order to exercise control over the 
village of-Nekowal they intended to patrol the lands of, 
Nekowal, including the village itself, and would notify UNMOGIP 
of the exact date from which the, patrolling would commence. 
The Pakistan Army maintained that the question of patrolling, 
or any deviation from previous agreements, was under 
*See page 287. 
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consideration by the two Governments at Ministerial level, and 
strongly recommended to the Indian Army that the status quo be 
maintained until the results of inter-Governmental negotiations 
were known7l. 
, At the end of May 1955 General Nimmo 
departed on leave, 
leaving Colonel MacDonald in charge of the MjSSion52. On 2nd 
and 3rd June, 1955 Lt. General Thapar, the Indian GOC, called 
on Colonel MacDonald in Srinagar and expressed his intention to 
have the Army patrol right up to the village of Nekowal as from 
5th June. He requested arrangements be made for his local 
commander to explain the intention to the villagers to allay 
their fears. He also asked for adequate observation to be 
undertaken by the Military Observers to help break the tension 
during the initial stages of patrolling. MacDonald made 
arrangements for Observers to be in the area, purely for 
observation purposes, and called on both Pakistan and Indian 
GOC to request their assurances that they had given full 
instructions to their subordinates in order to prevent a 
possible incident. The first few days of patrolling passed 
under observation and without incident and MacDonald thought 
the tension had eased53. However, at the end of June he 
reported that all the villagers had moved to the Pakistan side 
of the Border. Nekowal was deserted, and the dwellings had 
been either demolished or removed. During the removal 
operation the Indian Army did not interfere in any way and kept 
their patrols away". General Nimmozvisited the area in 
December of that year and reported that the village was still 
deserted and in ruins; the previous inhabitants were all 
living in Umranwali and neighbouring villages and farms, 
effectively as refugees. General Nimmo thought there would be 
no further trouble so long as the Indians remained at a 
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distance and did not try to farm the lands adjacent to the 
Border in the close vicinity of Nekowal since this would cause 
further deep resentment even if open hostility were 
suppressed". And indeed there does not seem to have been any 
further complaint concerning the village of Nekowal*. 
*However, repercussions arose ' elsewhere 
from the, Nekowal 
Incident during the course of the summer of 1955. These 
are described in Chapter Twelve, pages 360-372. 
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CHAPTER NINE - INCREASING ACTIVITY ALONG THE CEASEFIRE LINE, 
1961-1965 
ARMED POLICE AND ARMED CIVILIANS 
India's fears of infiltration 
India's fears of infiltration from the Pakistan side of 
the CFL began as soon as the Line was established. B. N. 
Mullik, Nehru's Director of Intelligence, ýwrites that in 1951 
he was confronted with the problem when many of those who had 
fled from Jammu and Kashmir in, 1947'were returning: some to 
see their families, some because they could not settle in 
Pakistan, but some who were being trained and infiltrated back 
by the Pakistan authorities for the'purpose of organizing 
subversion and-sabotage. - Betweeni1949 and 1953 he claims that 
several thousands of people wereýinfiltrated back from Pakistan 
and, resettled mainly, ý but not only, in, their original-lands; 
many were listed by counter-intelligence staff, 'but because of 
political pressuresýon the Government only-a'few could be 
forced back. The military authorities complaine&that the 
infiltrators had fairly easy access into Indian territory 
because the Army posts had large gapsý-betweewthem and, under 
the terms of the, Karachi Agreement, the 500-yard zone up to the 
CFL could not be'patrolled. Thus, so as not to contravene the 
Karachi Agreementý, 500-Jammu and Kashmir Home'Guards were-- 
deployed. They prove&to be inadequately trained and 
insufficient in number and eventually Indian armed police 
battalions were used'., - 
General Nimmols representative at a conference in Pakistan 
on the problem of civilians in July 1952 made the point that 
GeneralýNimmo realized it was not practicable for troops alone 
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to control civilian movements since they were not permitted to 
enter the 500-yard zone. Therefore it seemed to the CMO that 
civil police must be made available to do this2. However 
General Nimmo did not have in mind a situation which, only a 
few years later, compounded the existing problems when, instead 
of-the normal civil police force, these special armed police 
were increasingly introduced to deal with the situation along 
the Ceasefire Line. As early as February 1953 General Nimmo 
suggested to General Thorat that the use of special armed 
police might well raise the issue of whether they constituted 
an addition to the military forces of the State3. 
Introduction of Special Armed Police 
In-May 1957 General Kalwant Singh, GOC Western Command, 
India, informed Nimmo that it was proposed to man the Indian 
military posts on the Border progressively with armed 
constabulary, withdrawing regular troops into back areaS4. In 
July 1957, Nimmo reported to Cordier that the employment byý , 
Indiaýof special armed police all along the CFL was increasing, 
and at any time he, might have to decide, 'in the event of an 
incident, ýwhether or-not they should be classified as military 
personnel, and included in the Order of Battle". . They were 
well-armed, billeted with the Armed Forces and almost 
indistinguishable from the latter apart from the fact that 
their uniforms were khaki rather than olive green'. Recently 
a complaint had been received from-Pakistan that an Indian 
military Patrol had entered the forbidden 500-yard zone along 
the CFL, whereupon investigations had disclosed that it was a, 
special police patrol. The Indians admitted that their orders 
to enter the forbidden zone had been issued by the military 
post commander, and freely expressed the opinion that as they 
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were police they were not restricted by the Ceasefire 
Agreement. General Nimmo wrote to the CGS, Indian Army: "As 
the patrol did not cross the CFL, the action in itself does not 
constitute a breach of the Ceasefire under any of the six 
headings mutually agreed in 1949. Nevertheless, I think it is 
opportune to invite attention to the Karachi Agreement*, 
Section II, E, which I know you consider to be very important 
for the preservation of a peaceful atmosphere along the CFL. 
Whilst the Ceasefire Agreement applies only to military 
personnel and not to civilians, I find it difficult to detect 
any practical difference between a patrol of special armed 
police carrying rifles and a sub-machine gun, wearing uniform 
and steel helmets and acting under military orders and a 
military patrol. I think you will agree that the essential 
thing is to avoid any danger of armed clashes in the vicinity 
of the CFL 
"7 
He told the CGS on several further occasions that he saw 
little difference between an armed police patrol, and a patrol 
by the Armed Forces themselves. It was his opinion that if 
the police committed any act falling within the terms of the 
Karachi Agreement they would be guilty of a violation of the 
Agreement**. He also referred the matter to Andrew Cordier, 
and requested legal advice. 
I 
", *See Appendik IV. 
**General Palit, Director of Military Operations on the 
Indian side from April 1961-January 1964 agreed in 
principle that a shot by an armed policeman-was Justýas- 
much a breach of the ceasefire as a shot by a soldier. 
However, he said, it was neither economic nor tactically, 
possible to string an army all along the CFL with all the 
support it would need. Therefore police, which do not 
have support forces, were used. Before the police were 
introduced*the Army was doing a para-police job which was 
not cost effectives. 
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Counsel's Opinion 
UN Legal Counsel agreed with Nimmo, and also suggested 
that Nimmo should investigate whether or not the presence of 
the police in the State, and the withdrawal of regular units 
which they had replaced, had been done in a manner which itself 
amounted to a breach of the Ceasefire Agreement*. Counsel 
maintained that whether or not armed police utilized by any 
State formed part of its military force was in general a 
question to be decided by the municipal law of that state. 
However, the status of armed police in this connection was not 
relevant in the present case. The i ssues were whether the 
employment of such police by India and their acts were 
consistent with the terms of the Agreement, taken in their 
proper context, to which India was a party. If the Agreement 
was relevant, it wasnot open to India to evade her obligation 
by characterizing a force of-special armed police as 
non-military. The Indian intention, reported by General 
I- 
Nimmo, to man military posts with police would appear to rule 
out any possibility that the police were to be used solely for 
police purposes. Legal Counsel drew the conclusion that the 
Agreement specifically drew a distinction between "persons 
acting as military personnel" and "persons acting as 
civilians", therefore not only was General Nimmo correct, but 
the movement of these police into the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir might be considered against the provisions of the 
Agreement and agreed interpretations". There is no evidence 
from the correspondence, however, that the UN raised the matter 
*General Palit stated'that the police could-not originally 
have fought as an army to warrant their being included in 
the Order of Battle-, but-later when they were, given 
machine guns, such an accusation was more valid" . 
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-l/ 
with the Indian Government on an official basis. 
Extension of Karachi Agreement 
On 16th September, 1958 General Nimmo listed a number of 
activities by the police which could be classified as Ceasefire 
Violations, and on 29th September announced to both parties 
that resorý to firing in the vicinity of the CFL by armed 
persons of any category, including civilians, would be liable 
to classification as a breach of the Ceasefire 12,. 'ý In further 
letters on 15th October, 195813 and 22nd January, 19591" he 
emphasised the point; The Indians agreed that Nimmo's list of 
activities of police forces which-could be classified as 
Ceasefire Violations appeared to be reasonable and, necessary35. 
General Nimmo-told the Indian CIC, General Thimmaya, in 
February 1959 that-he felt that the tension along the CFL 
during 1958, was mainly due-to the unrest among the civilians 
and the counter-operations of the considerable numbers of 
Indian special armed police". 'However, his widened 
interpretation of the Karachi Agreement had little effect. In 
his Operations Report for the period 16-31 May, 1959 General 
Nimmo stated that police activity continued to be the main 
problem along the CFL17. 
Unidentified Armed Groups 
On 20th June, 1959 General Nimmo wrote identical letters 
to Major-General Yahya Khan and Lt. General Sen, the CGS of the 
two Armies. He saidýthat in reviewing the record of Ceasefire 
Complaints he had, been struck by the increasing number in which 
armed police had been involved. The obvious conclusion was , 
that there had been a considerable increase of armed police in 
the zone leading to this unwelcome number ofýincidents, which 
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included firing and casualties on both sides. He went on; 
"The original framers of the Ceasefire Agreement seem to me to 
have placed much importance on the maintenance of a buffer zone 
of 1,000 yards between the armed forces of the two parties. 
This, allied, with the training, discipline and good sense of 
the average Army unit, has resulted in only a minor proportion 
of 'troops versus troops' incidents. A situation can easily 
be envisaged in which the number of armed police (or, for that 
matter, groups of armed civilians) allowed to enter the 
Ceasefire Zone could be such that far more serious clashes 
could occur. - Such a situation would be contrary to the spirit 
and intention of. the original Agreement, and, I feel it my duty 
to hold either., party responsible if the factual-finding-in any 
investigation, warrants my doing, so, otherwise the Ceasefire 
Agreement-will break down and hostilities, even on a guerilla 
scale, recommence. The following figures are-interesting: 
No. in which 
Year Total ACFVs Armed Police Percentage 
Involved 
1951- 151 
1954 22 
1958 114 
To 15.6.59 64 
2 
2 
34 
18 1 
9.1% 
29.8% 
28.1% 
"It should be noted that 1959 could very well out do any 
previous year if local commanders do not exercise, a stricter 
control over the actions of, armed forces of any kind-in forward 
areas"16. 
On 6th July General Yahya Kahn replied that the Pakistanis 
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entirely agreed. They were themselves very concerned about 
the prevailing state of affairs, and had already expressed 
their views to General Nimmo. He said also that an analysis 
of General Nimmo's decisions in the 56 incidents mentioned as 
involving armed police indicated that Azad Kashmir Police were 
involved in, only seven incidents, and that further examination 
of, these incidents suggested that the actions of the AK Police 
were mainly directed towardsýthe protection of AK civilians 
against Indian Police incursions". No mention, of course, 
was made of the possibility of armed civilians emanating from 
the, Pakistan side causing the Indian Police to retaliate. 
General Sen of India did not immediately reply directly to 
General-Nimmo's letter,, ýbut countered with an exceptionally 
long letter written by Major-General Son Dutt of his staff. - 
The latter stated-that the-Indians were forced to the 
conclusion that existingýprocedures'had neither discouraged 
Pakistan authorities from resorting to violations of-the, 
Ceasefire Agreement, nor'-assured the-necessary protection of 
Indian civilians and troops,. -One of-the-contributory factors 
to the situation, they felt, was UNMOGIP's acceptance of 
so-called "unidentifie&armed groups" as an-entity but' 
unconnected-with'Pakistan. No Violations-had been awarded' 
against Pakistan, in-several cases-where firing was proved-, in 
spite of General Nimmols declarations-, that he would make awards 
in cases of, breaches of the Ceasefireýby armed persons of any 
category. Often the line taken-was that, the identity of armed 
gangs could not be established. felt very ,- 
strongly that more vigorous efforts should have, been made, and 
would have to be-made-in the future, -toýtrace the identity-of 
these, armed gangs, and that the Pakstanis-could not'disown such 
gangs in order to avoid verdicts of-violations. - It was 
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inconceivable that armed gangs could find rifles, automatic 
weapons and grenades and operate without the knowledge and 
connivance of the Pakistan Army- Equally, someone must be 
training them in the use of military weapons, minor tactics and 
techniques of sabotage. The Indians had always ensured that 
no gangs operated from their side of the Ceasefire Line, as was 
confirmed, -Son Dutt claimed, by the fact that UN investigations 
had not revealed any so-called unidentified Indian groups", 
General Nimmo, however, maintained that unless members of 
the armed civilian groups were caught-and identified, or at the 
very-, least had been-seen to be emerging from over the other 
side ofýthe-Line, it had to be assumed that they, belonged to 
the-side from, -which they operated, since-armed gangs could 
originate from-within their-own territory, particularly under 
conditions of civil, unreSt2l . -His policy was to assess any 
case on its-own merits, awarding-aýViolation in the case of 
armed civilians-only if they actually used their arms, and only 
if it-were proved that, they came from the other side of the 
Line. He-therefore stressed the necessity, of providing 
definiteýproof ofýthe identity of armed groups before a, 
violation could-beýgiven, and the only'effective way of 
establishing, guilt was-to shoot or apprehend the miscreants 22. 
General. Sen's, response--was'that the groups operated mainly in 
hours of darkness. ýThey could therefore only be apprehended 
by Indian'troops, in the foward areas firing small-arms and 
verey lights in'order to locate them, which would be a 
technical violation of the Ceasefire Agreement". General Son 
Dutt had-already complained that on, one'occasion, not only had 
General; Nimmo not'awarded a Violation againstýsome'intruders 
because it was not Possible to establish their identity, but 
further he had awarded a Violation against India for admittina 
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having fired aýverey light and a few rifle shots. He said 
that it was manifestly unjust that a party which complained of 
being attacked should not only be denied the right of 
self-defence but should be penalised for what General Nimmo 
considered to be a technical breach of the Ceasefire Agreement, 
whilst the aggressors escaped on the grounds of difficulty of 
identification 24 
In March 1960, General Nimmo sent a memorandum to the 
Officers-in-Charge of all Field Stations stressing that 
Observers should continue with their normal functions of 
observing, assessing and reporting in a frank and open manner, 
realizing that they were not police spies or agents of-any 
kind. He reminded Observers that they should keep an open 
mind on the subject of armed civilians and guerillas operating 
in Ceasefire areas and on accusations of stocks of arms, 
ammunition and'bombs being continued to be held, by civilians 
withýthe connivance of the authorities. Being impartial, the 
memorandum noted, Observers must realize that such allegations 
need not necessarily be confined to one side only, and they 
should deal with each case as. it arose on its, own merits and in 
the light of the terms of the--Karachi, Agreement2g. ,. I 
- In March 1960 General Nimmo sent copies of his 
correspondence, with General Sen* to'Andrew Cordier for-advice, 
but even before he had received Cordier's answer-he was able to 
report that the CICs of the two armies were meeting in Delhi 
which he felt should be a good augury for', the future, 'a fact 
that was supported by another'encouraging sign in-, the form of 
the-repatriation of-six prisoners each-, from India and Pakistan 
in the presence of Observers. Some of the men had', been in 
*See also Chapter 11, Pages 336-346. 
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captivity for five years in spite of requests by both sides at 
different times for UNMOGIP to try to effect repatriation". 
There, was also a sudden drop in the number of complaints along 
the CFL, which Nimmo felt could not be accounted for purely by 
the bad winter weather 27 . At the end of 
March 1960 he 
reported that the atmosphere was "very tranquil", although this 
tranquillity proved to be deceptive 28. 
Balakot/Tarkundi 
- 'By'the end of 1960 civilian-unrest was increasing again 
and-after numerous complaints and firing affrays in the 
Kotli-Galuthi Sector throughout the early part of 196121, on, 
12th June, that year Indian'police established,. andi, occupied two 
strongly manned and fortified postsýin the Sectori, oneýeach at 
Balakot,, and, neighbouring, Tarkundi, and both within the-500-yard 
zone, of-theýCFL30. -This was the first of several serious 
situationslýwhich developed in the early'1960s,. and which 
culminated in war in September 1965.1 1 
, The progress of the police towards these, places was 
opposed by fire from, civilians and Pakistan police, who had 
crossedthe CFL and taken up positions, 350 yardsýon the Indian 
side of the Line-, and-supported by fire, from two Indian Army 
patrols"which remained outside the 500-yardýzone 31. In-the 
period from-16th to-30th June, of the 54-complaints lodged with 
UNMOGIP, 47 referred to firing affrays between Indianýpolice 
and, civilians in these two-valleys, and, by 15th-July 109 
complaints had been received from the'are &32., ý General Nimmo 
declared a Violation by-India for carrying out a combined 
military and armed Police operation forward to the vicinity of 
the CFL, and for firing contrary to-the Karachi Agreement: he 
did not accept the-Indian claim of firing-in self-defence., - He 
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also declared a Violation by Pakistan for having allowed 
Pakistan police to cross the Line and resort to fire3s. In 
his letter to the two Armies giving his decisions Nimmo said 
that the fire-fight which ensued had increased in intensity day 
by day and was of a very serious nature, several persons having 
been. killed or wounded, and he feared that both Armies might 
become involved. He noted that he had stationed Observers at 
the forward positions on both sides hoping that their presence 
would bring calm to the area, but this had not been the case 
and he had to '-'conclude with regret that the spirit which gave 
rise to the ceasefire agreement. is no longer discernable. " He 
said that force was preferred to far better methods still open 
to all concerned and, that it was his duty--to, report both the 
incidents. and his conclusions to-the Secretary-General34.,, 
Further to this report Andrew Cordier wrote to General 
Nimmo to say that as the main burden of assisting-the-parties 
in maintaining the Ceasefire rested on-UNMOGIF, and on Nimmo in 
particular, the Secretary-General and he felt-they-should not 
at that stage intervene with the, Indian and Pakistan 
Delegations except on General Nimmo's recommendation and to the 
extent-he considered it necessary to do so. , HoWever,. their 
general concern with the problem had been mentioned tothe 
Indian, Delegation. It would therefore be for General Nimmo to 
indicate whether further action, should be taken at HQ, and if 
so the precise points he would wish to have emphasised; 
Cordier also felt that short of-a direct personal intervention 
with,. Prime Minister Nehru, -any approach, except, 'to-the 
Permanent Representative in a matter of extreme urgency,. would, 
not be-productive35., 
- In the following, two and a half-years-firing occurred- 
almost every day, in the region, taking the form for the M05t-' 
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part of civilians firing from the Indian side at Indian police, 
supported by a few Azad Kashmir police in the Valley, or Indian 
police, and on occasion troops, firing into the Valley from 
their positions on ridges. Civilians were strongly armed and 
reinforced and kept the police under continuous attack with 
rifles, light machine guns and grenades. About forty people, 
mainly civilians, were killed altogether. Observers remained 
inýforward positions on both sides, hoping to calm the 
situation and above all to restrain the Armies from any 
temptation to enter the field, though from time to time nearby 
Army picquets were reported as participating in the fighting36. 
General-Nimmo kept in contact with New York as'events occurred 
and made strong representations to'the Headquarters of both 
Armies, but, succeeded in establishing only occasional and 
short-lived-lulls in the fighting". ' As the. new posts -I 
violated the Karachi Agreement by-constituting a strengthening 
of defences, he-wrote to the, CGS, ýIndian-Army, 'asking to have 
them withdrawn and, the fortifications demolished, but the 
Indian-Army Authorities claimed Justification of, the posts in 
defence of their territory against hostile elements from 
Pakistan". The Pakistan Army authorities took the view that 
the police posts were, for the purpose of coercing and harassing 
residents in clean-up operations". General Nimmo felt, that 
neither side was offering much co-operation". 
On 10th August, 1961 he wrote tWthe CGS,, India and Acting 
CGS, ý Pakistan and suggested a meeting to-find practical ways of 
stopping the firing and restoring the peace. 'He suggested the 
meeting should be at a place remote from the'troubled areas and 
that it should be held on a personal basis without publicity so 
that they would be free to explore in a confidential manner any 
practical military steps that were open to consideration 
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the Karachi Agreement. His own suggestion, as a basis for 
discussion, was that there should be no fire-arms of any kind 
within 500 yards of the CFL. He felt this would be a big step 
forward and that practical means could be evolved to implement 
it under the active co-operation of both sides with the 
assistance of'ObserverS41. The Indian CGS was willing for the 
meeting to be held, but the Pakistan side considered that such 
a meeting would not bring any useful reSUItS42. 
With reports indicating that, the Indians were reinforcing 
their troops and re-occupying formerly unoccupied positions, 
which technically they could do since their overall defensive 
potential remaine&the same 43 , on 17th August'General Nimmo 
requested a further sixýObservers to help with-the 
deteriorating situation44. 
For the first time-since UNMOGIP started its operation a 
backlog of complaints was accumulating, with the number of 
outstanding cases in hand having risen to 199 during the last 
fortnight in August 196 143, compared with nine'in'January of 
that-year". Nevertheless Observers who had spoken to Local 
Commanders said, that neither side wanted to extend the scope of 
the conflict and it was understood'that the matter had been 
taken up by both sides at Government leve 147. ' General Nimmo 
also continued'his"own representations. - He'wrote to the 
Indian CGS referring to a statement theý1atter had made to the 
effect that'it was'not possible for the Indians to'agree to 
move-the police posts unless law and order were fully restored, 
and suggest6d-that the first essential was to cease fire' 
everywhere; 'then the police posts could be removed and' 
substituted by other methods Of-carrying out normal'civil 
police duties, 'as were evident elsewhere". He received, no" 
answer 49 
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II In 1962 a total of 973 complaints was lodged with UNMOGIP, 
which was an increase of 67% over 1961, and exceeded the total 
number lodged during the period 1949-1960 inclusive. Of these 
973 complaints, 72% related to Balakot/Tarkundi. Of the 234 
violations awarded (127 against India and 107 against 
Pakistan), 80% related to Balakot/Tarkundi, an increase of 125% 
over 1961, and more than during the whole period 1949 to 
196050. When pointing these figures out to the two sides 
General Nimmo-said he felt that such readiness to resort to 
armed force when UN Observers were easily available, and had 
demonstrated, their willingness to mediate at their own personal 
risk, was indeed deplorable. He insisted that the statistics 
revealed, a decidedýdeterioration in-attitude as well as in 
application of the-principle of the Karachi Agreement, and it, 
was his earnest desire that both, parties should., exert every 
effort to restore-peace and tranquillity, throughout the area 
without delay: sincere, co-operation was needed for this 
effort, and a willingness to deal, ýfirmly first-, of. all--with 
their own forces, including auxiliaries, such as arme&police 
and armed civilians3l. 
In April 1962 he sent an identical cable to both sides 
suggesting he set up a permanently manned UN Observer post, 
complete with radio, at Balakot in place of the-unauthorised 
Police post, and onýthe condition that no armed police be 
admitted, into the 500-yard zone. Pakistan agreed and 
suggested a similar post at Tarkundi'12, but the Indians "f elt 
it was difficult" for-them to accept the-proppsals". In June 
Nimmo cabled Ralph Bunche, who had taken over from Cordier, 
saying that-the-situation had deterioratedto such an extent 
that half the Mission'sýObserver strengthwas already, deployed 
in-the area. He was fearful for the safety of, theýObservers 
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stationed there, and felt that unless a Ceasefire could be 
arranged immediately he should withdraw all Observers from the 
vicinity. He pointed-out that without the full co-operation 
of both armies UNMOGIP could not operate, and suggested that U 
Thant request the two Delegations to re-affirm their intention 
to abide, both, by, the terms of the Karachi Agreement and by his 
decisions and recommendations without wrangling. He also 
suggested-that, India be requested to remove-its, police posts, 
and Pakistanto-restrain its civilians and remove their weapons 
in-Ceasefire areas. - -He thought that-. unless urgent action was 
taken-the situation might get out of hand and spread to other 
sectors of the CFL 54 
Ralph Bunche-duly approached the Dele8ations, on the 
subject, and-told Nimmo that'the Indians had indeed re-affirmed 
their intention to abide by the terms of the Karachi Agreement 
and UN decisions'and-recommendations to maintain it, but they 
were not prepared to remove the'police posts. The Government 
of India-claimed the conditions which made-them necessary still 
persisted, and "ventured to suggest it was the-responsibility 
of the, CMO to ensure that the Government of Pakistan restrain" 
armed civilians in the Ceasefire aree3. 
, Bunche's approach, tO the Permanent'Representative of 
Pakistan-resulted in the latter's sending'a-letter to the 
Secretary-General concerningthe-situation at Balakot and' 
Tarkundi". 'Asked, to comment on the letter-General Nimmo 
stated that the Pakistan letter was a "clear and factual 
analysis of the difficult situation". ' He reiterated that the 
Indian Army was adamanto-it had-a perfect right to, establish a 
fortified police Post-wherever it saw fit, whilst his position- 
had always been that there was no objection to civil police 
entering, within 500-yards of, the-CFL in pursuance of, their 
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legitimate police functions of law and order, 'provided they 
were not stationed in that zone. However, the construction of 
new fortified positions which were tactically sited and 
supported by nearby military posts only served to increase 
tension and incidents, and were in fact violations of the 
Ceasefire Agreement. He felt he had explored every 
conceivable approach to the problem with the Indian Army and 
had been unable to obtain agreement to any suggestions made by 
UNMOGIP, whereas the Pakistan Army had agreed to all his 
suggestionS57. U Thant passed Nimmo's letter to the Permanent 
Representative of India for his Government's comment, but 
received no reply; aftera reminder the Permanent , 
Representative expressed regrets but said-, his Government was 
rather preoccupied with the Sino-Indian frontier3a. 
Nevertheless, either as a result of these-interventions in 
New York, or of Nimmo's stationing yet another Observer-in an 
Indian picquet north of Balakot", a-steady improvement'began 
at this time, although the police posts remained in existence 
and continued to be targets for sniping fromtareas 
unapproachable by Observers. ýDuring the last two weeks. of 
October-1962, with only 15 complaints being recorded from 
Balakot/Tarkundi compared with between 60,., and 70--at-the height 
of the troubles, oand new commitments arising-An otherýsectors, 
General Nimmo decided to withdraw Observers from the forward 
picquets in the area and have, complaints investigated in the 
normal: way". 11 1ý 
, -In both the spring and autumn of 1963, by, which time 
General Nimmo had awarded several Violations against India for 
not removing the police, posts, periods of intense activity were 
again experienced in the areel. 'In October 1963 he 
complained that neither of the opposite-unit, commanders in the 
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area was displaying any serious desire to maintain a peaceful 
ceasefire, and that the Pakistan unit commander had proved 
evasive and quite unco-operative during investigation of some 
alleged incidents. To cope with this lack of co-operation he 
had issued instructions that where representatives of either 
Army failed to appear as previously arranged for an 
investigation, the investigation would not be postponed, and 
where the defaulting representative was of the complaining side 
the cases concerned would be cancelled. Five Pakistan cases 
were cancelled-as a result during that one two-week period42. 
At the, end of October General Nimmo was visited by the 
Indian Chief of the Army Staff, General Chaudhuri, and the 
Indian Local Commander. General Nimmo felt, General Chaudhuri 
was anxious to see the Balakot policeýpost withdrawn if 
stability could-be restored to the-area. Nimmo-pointed out to 
him that not only was the latter a festering sore, but also a 
direct refusal to accept a ruling given by the Chief Military 
Observer, which in turn weakened UNMOGIP's position, in 
Pakistan's eye S63. This was followed by a visit to the 
Pakistan, CGS and further discussions with the IndianýLocal 
Commander", as a result of which General Nimmo was able'to 
announce that the two sides had accepted his, suggestion of a 
ceasefire experiment in the area, and the number of incidents 
considerably decreased's. 
Finallyl after one more request" to the Indian CGS for 
the-demolition of the police posts, General Nimmo was informed 
in January 1964 that steps were being taken for, their removal. 
He then arranged for-the co-operation of the Pakistan CGS so as 
to avoid any'untoward incident during the demolitior, 67. The 
situation in the'area continue&to remain tense with incidents 
occurring fromýtime-to time, but other sectors were, --also 
by now 
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showing signs of even more intense activity. In the last two 
weeks of July 1964 there were only 12 complaints from the 
Kotli-Galuthi s6ctor as opposed to 37 from Rawalakot-Punch and 
26 from Bhimber-Naushera6g, and at the end of September 
Kotli-Galuthi had only three complaints whilst 11,25,46 and 
48 complaints were received respectively from other sectors". 
Jammu/Bhimber Sector 
As intimated, other parts of the Ceasefire Line also began 
evincing increased activity in-the early 1960s. In 1961 
Indian and then Pakistan-police were introduced into the 
Jammu/Bhimber sector, 'a fifteen-mile stretch of the CFL which 
ran across cultivated lands belonging, to civilians who did not 
necessarily live on, the, same side as their land'. Thepolice 
tried to prevent these civilians from crossing, the'Line, and 
heavy firing ensued. Observers were stationed in forward army 
picquets, on both sides of-the'Line in an endeavour, to limit 
incidents and'find a solution, but tensionýcontinued in the 
area throughout-1962 and into 1963". 
-In April 1963 General Nimmo reported one particular 
complaint which involved the deliberateishooting by an Indian 
patrol of an unarmed local inhabitant who was watering cattle 
near the Ceasefire Line, and noted'it was the-kind-of, 
to premeditated-and-ruthless procedure'which, has been all too'' 
common on the Indian-side and which appears to-have the 
concurrence of-higher authority as a warning against what is 
called trespass "71. In-May 1963 he noted that there appeared 
to-beýa pattern of incidents-developing as-two Pakistani ý 
civilians had been-killed and two injured as the'result of 
deliberate shooting at short range by Indian patrols, -in spite 
of the fact that the civilians were engaged in peaceful 
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activities on their own side of the Line. General Nimmo felt 
these individual acts were not coincidental but seemed to arise 
from an established poliCy72 . However, in October of that 
year, with only seven complaints being lodged for the 
Bhimber/Jammu sector during the previous two weeks, General 
Nimmo expressed the belief that the worst of the current 
tension in the area was over". 
Punch/Rawalakot Sector 
A new troublespot developed towards, tbe end of 1962 at 
Polas in the Puncb/Rawalakot Sector, with firing incidents 
occurring almost daily, and an Observer was posted to a forward 
Indian, picquet in that area74. However, in spite of the 
problems from Balakot/Tarkundi-, Jammu/Bhimber and-Polas, the 
remainder of the Ceasefire Line was'still relatively quiet". 
At the end of 1963 tension developed in another. part of - 
Punch/Rawalakot sector overýthe distribution of, water between 
towns and villages on opposite sides of-the Ceasefire Line. 
The original cause of the trouble was drought,. which caused the 
water level-of a stream on, the Indian side to fall below the 
entrance of a channel cut to supply villages on the, Pakistan 
side. The Pakistanis, believing this to have been caused by 
Indians blocking the channel, ýcut another channel which 
supplied-water, from a stream on the Pakistani side for use by 
Indian villages;, A crisis occurred when similar-action was 
taken with a water channel, which was used, to generate 
electricity for the town of Punch on-the Indian side. - Indian 
civilians-moved to-restore, the-supply, -supported, by, Indian 
troops. 'Heavyýfiring then broke out during which-two ý, 
Observers, had a very narrow escape. Fresh troops were brought 
into'the-area and-it-became apparent that, the Indians were 
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prepared to restore the flow of water by force., At great 
personal risk, and after a most difficult period of negotiation 
and restraint of impulsive individuals on'both sides, the 
Observers succeeded in having water restored to all areas 
concerned, and in bringing the opposite local commanders 
together". 
Tangdhar/Domel Sector 
Two serious'firing'incidents occurred in February 1964 in 
the Tangdhar-Domel sector, and subsequently both sides lodged 
complaints alleging reinforcements of troops in that sector 77. 
Nimmo alerted all Observers and requested both army commands to 
avoid any reinforcement or to-withdraw immediately if, such had 
already'been carried'out, and notified them that the 
Secretary-Gefieral was-being kept informed 70. 
In'May 1964 there was'an-incident at-, a remote village 
called Kutan'Bachi. - ýThe village wasýlocated on the Indian 
side of the Ceasefire Line, but was under*Azad Kashmir de facto 
cofitrol". - Investigation by'Observers ascertained that 
lumbermen from Azad Kashmir had been cutting vast quantities of 
timber deep on-the Indian'side of the Ceasefire Line under the 
protection of-military picquets*'before the Indian, attack, in 
which four Azad Kashmir soldiers were, killed and two more 
wounded and captured. , One of the latter admitted to Observers 
that-the Pakistan brigadier at Domel-had given them, their 
orders and supplied, their'weapons and uniforms. -General Nimmo 
expressed his real concern to the Pakistan CGS as-he rejected 
the Pakistan complaint that the Indians-had fired on civilians. 
He pointed out that whilst he realized the Ceasefire-Line was 
not an established border, the fact remained that the territory 
on-either side was occupied and controlled by theýmilitary and 
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neither side permitted entirely free and unrestricted movement 
of civilians from one side to the other. Thus he could not be 
expected to insist on one way traffic from the west into the 
large area under reference, and still less to support the 
setting up of defended posts across the Ceasefire Line, or 
indeed the crossing of the Line by any armed forces. Once 
again he underlined-that what was urgently required was for the 
two parties tolget together and formulate-some ground rules for 
genuine local inhabitants in, the ceasefire area so that they 
could live in peaceeo. 
A General Increase in Activity 
From early 1964 increased activity was experienced all 
along the western and southern sectors of the Ceasefire Line 
and General Nimmo-felt tbatýthere was a stepped-up policyýof 
activity-on the part of both sides. In addition-to firing 
incidents, raids carried out on the Indian side were--followed 
by retaliatory action-by the Indians and there were also 
alleged, overflight complaints"'. 
There was a sharp increase in-activity in June 1964, 
mainly in-the central section. - 91, complaints were receivedý 
during the-last twoýweeks-of the month, 68 relating to firing 
incidents in which nine people were kille&and 23 to 
strengthening of defences. 'Between 19th and 21st June 
Pakistani armed civilians crossed the Ceasefire Line'in four 
different sectors and in theýprocess put two Indian"unit 
headquarters in danger. Jn the Tangdhar/Domel sector a 
Pakistani force estimated'at one platoon plus one section 
penetrated, to a depth of approximately 1000 yards across'the 
Ceasefire Line'and ambushed a party,, of Indian police, --killing 
three and wounding, three others. General Nimmo reported that 
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the planning and execution of the ambush indicated the use of 
regular troops and he feared such provocative actions would 
bring about a retaliatory effort by the IndianS82. 
General Nimmo's Warnings 
Oný29th June, 1964 General Nimmo cabled Ralph Bunche 
about the general deterioration in relations, and said that 
recently in letters received from both Armies UNMOGIP had been 
urged to do something-about the situation "otherwise they would 
not stand idly by and so on". He said that the growing number 
of firings and raidings by AK irregulars or armed civilians, 
sometimes deep into Indian territory, was'a dangerous game as 
the Indians, would strike back if provoked. He warned it was 
becoming a situation similar to that at the*time of the 
ceasefire, and suggested that anything that Ralph Bunche might 
be able to do with delegates at HQ would be helpfU193. 
The first fortnight in July 1964 was "no doubt the most 
active' 15-day period in the history of the Mission", a phrase 
which General Nimmo was to use with-monotonous regularity 
duringthe coming month5. * There were 240-complaints of which 
168 related, toýfiring"incidents, ýtwo to crossing the Ceasefire 
Line, one to the use of explosives and 69 to the strengthening 
of defences. General, Nimmo-temporarily-opened two 
sub-stations in the Tangdhar/Domel, sector, where most of the 
activity was occurring, in the hope of-stabili5ing the-area". 
, The heavy activity in the north-central section of the 
Ceasefire'Line slackened-off during the, following two weeks 
only to be replaced-by a. marked increase in the southern 
sectorslll, ýwhere heavy and persistent firing continued daily 
into-August and-September. There was an escalationýof,,; 
hostilities by both regular, and irregular forces crossing the 
241 
CFL and ambushing and attacking opponents during the last two 
weeks of September, which were again described as the most 
active ever experienced by the Mission86. On 29th October 
General Nimmo requested an additional three ObserversI37. 
By the end of 1964 a record number of 2149 complaints had 
been accepted for the year, and there had been 337 casualties, 
as follows"; 
India: Army/Police ..... 129 - Killed: 77 
- Wounded: 52 
Civilians ........ 24 - Killed: -11 
- Wounded: 14 
Pakistan: Army/Police ...... 26 - Killed: 14 
- Wounded: 12 
-Civilians ....... 157 - Killed: 81- 
- Wounded:, 76 
The situation remained disturbed on into 1965 and General 
Nimmo continued to report sharp increases in the number of 
Ceasefire complaints as firing across the Ceasefire Line 
"became a habit"91. He noted that itýhad become a matter of 
routine, and was mostly ineffective and of'a harassing and 
retaliatory nature, meant merely to impress and-keep up 
morale". Many cases were dismissed, he-said, not so much due 
to lack of physical evidence but rather to the fact that many 
positions were so riddled with bullet holes, and'had been the 
subject of so many complaints, that it was impossible to 
establish whether any new firings had taken place'"., The 
Indians therefore began merely to report firing incidents 
rather than filing a complaint in cases where physical proof 
was unlikely to be available, thus slightly reducing the number 
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of official complaintS12. Both sides used the firing and 
incursions across the CFL to justify continued strengthening of 
defences". 
During that first five months of 1965, known casualties 
for the two sides were 59 killed and 119 wounded. A total of 
2,231 ceasefire complaints was received, mainly firing 
incidents but also numerous incidents of'crossings of the CFL 
by sm I all armed parties of up to platoon, company and, in one 
case battalion strength. Of the proved crossings, 23 were by 
Pakistan, of which 12 were for attacks by fire on picquets, 
ambushes of patrols or water parties, and raids on military 
posts, and eight were by India, including six raids on villages 
in which there were nine civilians killed and 15 wounded. The 
other two Indian crossings consisted of an attack by fire on a 
picquet and a battalion scale attack in the Kargil area*. 
There was a great deal of strengthening of defences on both 
sides but new wiring, mining and reinforcing with warlike 
stores was mainly on the Indian side. India was also by this 
time reaching its permissible force limit under the Karachi 
Agreement, whilst Pakistan strength in Kashmir remained much as 
before with no appreciable reinforcement". (Pakistan was in 
a better position to bring in forces quickly from outside 
Kashmir in the event of major hostilities than was India. ) At 
the end of April the Vice Chief of the Army Staff (VCOAS), 
India advised General Nimmo that it was proposed to move an 
additional infantry brigade of three battalions into the 
Naushera-Galuthi-Punch area, for the purpose of providing rest 
and relief for troops in the area. The addition was not in 
excess of the Permissible limit under the Karachi Agreement, 
*The Kargil Incident is described on pages 392-397. 
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but General Nimmo told the VCOAS that any reinforcement of 
troops was to be regretted as it might lead to similar action 
by the other party". And indeed, on 14th May, General Nimmo 
received a complaint from the Indian Army claiming that 
Pakistan wasýin the process of moving 5000 infantry soldiers, 
16 
equipped for mountain warfare, into the State . On May, 21st 
General Nimmo told Ralph Bunche that he would not be surprised 
if some-serious military clash were to occur in May or June ? 7. 
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PART III - ATTITUDES OF THE PARTIES 
CHAPTER TEN - GOVERNMENTAL ATTITUDES 
Governmental attitudes impinged only indirectly most of 
the time on UNMOGIP. Apart from the comparatively rare 
occasions when the UN Secretariat in New York became , 
immediately involved in an issue, insights into the-political 
manoeuvring behind the scenes are to be found mainly in 
UNCIP/UNMOGIP documents relating to the early months, when the 
Secretary-General's Special'Representative, Erik Colban, was on 
the Subcontinent, and before-UNMOGIP became a mission in its 
own right. Colban acted effectively as a-link not only 
between the-respective Governments and the'Secretary-General 
during 1948 and 1949, when the-UN C6mmission was attempting to 
find a solution tolthe'Dispute, 'but also, between the 
Governments and the Observer Group during 1949-and 1950, when 
General, Delvoie and, Brigadier, Angle were, in turn, in charge of 
the Military Observers. ý 
One of, the few', times -fperhaps, the only'time - that an 
overtly political decision to leave a sensitive matter in the 
hands of the Observers can be seen to, have been made was during 
the early days-of the problems with the'village of Nekowal, 
when Ambassador Colban was-approached on the subject by the 
Indian Minister for KashmirýAffairs*. , When Ambassador Colban 
left the Subcontinent in'August 1950, and the Mission lost its 
link with the political-authorities, -, it'-is questionable whether 
the latter'-gave the Observers-much thought at, times when their 
involvement might have been appropriate, or at-least helpful. ' 
*See page 204. 
245 
As a matter of policy UNMOGIP dealt solely with the 
military authorities, and was kept quite distinct from Dr. 
Graham, who was the United Nations Representative in India and 
Pakistan, from 1951 onwards, and who negotiated with the 
political authorities*. General Nimmo, Chief Military 
Observer for the major part of the period under review, rarely 
mentions having had contact with the latter although, from the 
many-social functions he attended, he was personally quite well 
acquainted with a number of, them'. It seems likely that they 
took the opportunity of these occasions to make their views 
known to Nimmo, whichýmust have enabled;, him to gain a broad 
understanding-of the latest political trends in the Dispute. 
However, such was hisýdiscretion that rarely did-he report on 
these conversations. Rarely also did he stray from his 
military brief to make any political comment of his own, apart 
from noting-regularly that for the sake of the Kashmiri people 
a-settlement should urgently beýreached, and requesting that in 
the meantime an-agreement be made between the-parties 
concerning those civilians whose lives were directly affected 
by the presence, ofý-the Ceasefire Line**. -This, ýof course, is 
not to say that UNMOGIP-was not, at least indirectly, affected 
by political relations between the parties. The present 
Chapter is therefore interspersed with sections on the general 
political background showing, in particular, the state of 
relations between the parties at a given time. 
It was indeed realised-from time to time that UNMOGIý was 
working-at a disadvantage in having no political contact. - In 
1953 Andrew Cordier, referring to the fact that UNMOGIP had 
neither political officer nor, information officer, maintained 
*See pages 262-266 and 293. 
**See pages 194-5,240,302 and 389. 
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in a memorandum to the Secretary-General: "If a criticism of 
the present staffing of missions can be made, it is-that in the 
interests of economy there has often been... too severe a 
curtailment of services in the light of the seriousness of the 
problems involved and the objectives of the UN in the area in 
question... Estimates of future needs are at best only 
well-informed, guesses.,.. Who can predict the future course of 
events in Kashmir? "2 . In 1958 General Nimmo suggested it 
might be-advisable to have a political adviser with the 
Mission, and in 1963 he,, requested a raising of the status of 
UNMOGIP for the purpose of negotiating with the political as 
well as- military- authorities3, but -when he was promoted to the 
rank of Under-Secretary in 1964-there was no suggestion'that it 
was indeed for"this purpose., 
- The usefulness of a political link when problemsý 
concekning'the Groupýitself occurred is demonstrated below in 
the historyýof the Delvoie Incident, when Michael deýCapite, 
UNCIP's'Press Officer- , -was'able-to-intercede with-the 
Authoritie5-on Delvoie! s behalf. -De Capite was deputising, for 
Erik Colban when the latter'and the Commissionýwere in Geneva 
preparing UNCIP's Report to the Security-ýCouncil., 
THE POLITICAL SITUATION AND POLITICAL EXPLOITATION 
The Delvoie Incident 
In November 1949 General, Delvoie,, Military Adviser to the 
United Nations Commission to-India and Pakistan (UNCIP), and 
head of the Observer Group,!, left the Subcontinent under 
something of a cloud and did not return. Apparently in all 
innocence, and quite openly but with the UtM05t indiscretion, 
he had taken seven sealed boxes from Srinagar across the 
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Ceasefire-Line to their owner in Rawalpindi, where she was then 
living. It was alleged that the boxes contained items of 
value. He himself understood them to contain fishing tackle 
and warm clothing, and it was never proved otherwise. He 
claimed he was acting in good faith as a neutral between the 
two Dominions and would have done the same in the other 
direction if he had been, asked4. The Kashmir Authorities made 
haste to seize on the incident for several reasons: in an 
attempt to-discredit Delvoie, whose impartial military views 
were, not always to their tastes; -- likewise to discredit the 
Commission just as it: was., preparing its last report to the 
Security Council',; - and,, more general1y, -to undermine the faith 
of the-people of-India in the United-Nations since the State 
Government of Kashmir had never fully accepted to the idea, 
embraced by the United Nations, of a plebiscite in Kashmir*. 
-, Delvoie's action was only questionably, contrary to-a 
Kashmiri law, of which he claimed ignorance 7, forbidding 
property"of refugees, from leaving, the State. -- The owner of the 
goods, -Begum, Effendi, 'was an Afghan citizen who later asserted 
that she had left Srinagar before thecommencement-of -- 
hostilities andýhad, been informed, that her property, had not 
been declared-evacuee property, as had that of her husband who 
had been named an enemy of the Stateg. At all events, the 
Kashmir State Government, with-the aid ofthe Press, ýblew-the' 
matter up, and whilst itýseems likely that the Indian 
Government might have acted more-diplomatically, and quietly 
asked Delvoie to leave, there was little it could do after the 
matter had been so heavily-publicised. 
When the first Press stories appeared Mr. Michael de 
*See page 64. 
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Capite, UNCIP's Press Officer, called on Mr., Vishnu Sahay, 
Secretary to the Government of India for Kashmir Affairs, to 
learn that the latter had received no documentation on the 
subject and was inclined not to take the matter, too seriously'. 
Two days later-, after further Press reports, he became rather 
more, excited about it and said the Indian Government was taking 
a serious view of the situation". - Finally he, said his 
Government did not intend to take an extreme stand but the wide 
publicity made matters difficult and they would therefore 
present documentation to the Commission, -and, leave the 
Commission to take whatever action it deemed necessary". De 
Capite-also spoke to Sir Girja Bajpai, the Foreign Minister, 
about'the hasty and'extravagant, publicity-given to the incident 
andý, pointed out that some had related to Delvoie's impartiality 
and honour". Bajpai, and Sahay both, said'the Indian 
Government could not control Kashmir's actions in internal 
matters, and also could-, not-take lightly a matter which was 
against the known,. laws, of the State. They promised they would 
make it clear to the Press that they were placing, the matter in 
the hands of the Commission, and Bajpai said he would try to 
quiet future reports. He said he would point out, the abuse of 
diplomatic immunity,. to-UNCIP, but-. promised to make clear that 
the Government of. India--was not impugningýthe honesty of the 
General". ' The subsequent letter of 3rd October from Sahay to 
the Commission, whosetMembers were then-in Geneva, said exactly 
this". Sahay admitted-to de Capite that he believed the 
General innocentýof any premeditated act, but he also suggested 
that he thoughtýnevertheless the. Commission would have no 
alternative but to ask for Delvoie's resignation., Meanwhile, 
until the Commission convened and, took a-, decision he,, expected 
Delvoie to continue-1his duties". 11. 
249 
, De Capite stressed that although the Commission had left 
the Subcontinent for Geneva, the work of the Military Observer 
organisation was most important, and nothing should harm the 
successful demarcation of the Ceasefire Line, which was still 
being undertaken, and the continuing bbservance ofthe 
Ceasefire. Mr. Sahay assured him that the Observers would 
continue to, be given full and steady-co-operation", which 
proved to be the case. II 
Indian Press reaction to the letter was unanimous that 
Delvoie should resign, or beýremovedll. However, he continued 
his work on the demarcation of the Ceasefire Line whilst 
waiting to hear from the Commission, and his relations remained 
excellent with the-Indian military", who wanted him to remain 
as Military Adviserll. ý Genera1ThimayVa arranged a guard of 
honour for him when he returned to'Delhi from Pakistan and. 
wrote-, a report favourable to himFO, ýand General Kalwant Singh 
interceded with the'Indian States Ministry2l. - 
In both Geneva, and New York there was consternation over 
what action should be taken, and even at first over-who was 
ultimately responsible. -, rIt was-then agreed that-, 
responsibility lay with the Secretary-General rather than the 
Commission as-it was-he. whohad appointed Delvoie 22 . 
The 
Belgian-Delegation to-the-United Nations also had-to be 
consulted inýview of any-possible diplomatic repercussionS23. 
The-Commission's1etter referring the matter-to the 
Secretary-General admitted the, action was imprudent, but it was 
carried out neither covertly nor in bad faith, and, ý the # 
Commission believed, warranted only a-caution to exercis6 the 
greatest discretion in the future. The Commission felt the 
State of Jammu and Kashmir had-treated the matter "in a most 
unusual manner", contrary to normal diplomatic, practice'and "in 
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terms to which the Commission cannot but take exception"24. 
Mr. Sahay subsequently wrote-to explain to the Commission that 
the matter had been taken up by, the Press because the Effendi's 
caretaker had been talking about it and, in view of the rumours 
flying, the State Government felt it better to release the 
correspondence between itself and Delvoie23'. This was 
probably more of a diplomatic attempt to smooth things over 
than a satisfactory-explanation of-a situation-which had been 
set in-motion-before the Government of India was aware of the 
incident, which-it, therefore had little hope, of controlling. 
In fact,, -the Indian Government did appear to succeed in 
quietening down the Press. - When Delvoie was-recalled to 
Geneva at the end, of October, de Capite-was able to report that 
the Press was absolutely quiet about the General's-movements, 
but "gave-excellent publicity" to the announcement that the 
demaraction of the Ceasefire Line was completed24. ,- 
Sahay told de Capite-the-Kashmir Government would not 
accept too much complaisance'in the affairl'and he-had to be 
influenced by them, but he would have no Objection to the 
Commission or the Secretary-General puttingýthe facts straight 
as they saw them once the issuewas''settled27. , On 25th - 
October the Commission met-and accepted that'while its members 
regretted it, , it seemed inevitable that Delvoie could not 
remain at his post-. - Since the Government-, of India had made 
it so clear he was now persona non grata, the problem became a 
question of arranging his resignation in-such a way as to give 
rise to no doubts concerning his good faith and integrity". 
-, Delvoie showed a marked reluctance-to resign his post 
without his honour being-properly satisfied, either by a more 
positive'statement from India about his good faith and 
integritY, 'or by the offer a post of equal status'within the 
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UN30. The UN had no such post to offer, and did not "believe 
it practicable" to ask the Indian Government for a more 
positive-statement, though Indian Government officials promised 
to assist3l. This they would do through Indian news and other 
channels, giving a proper interpretation of the whole affair, 
and particularly avoiding the impression that, Delvoie had 
either resigned voluntarily or been forced to resign. At the 
same time the'Belgian Government promised, to provide an 
alternative assignment32. I 
- The incident conveniently and coincidentally came to a 
head at the time of both the completion of the demarcation of 
the Ceasefire Line, which Delvoie had initiated, and UNCIP's 
report to the-Security Council, which could possibly result in 
a modification of the UN organizational arrangements-in 
connection with the Kashmir issue. It also coincided with the 
completion of a full year-of duty-, by Delvoie, which was the 
normal term for a temporary assignment under Mission 
regulations at the time. Thus on 30th November theý 
Secretary-General-wrote to Delvoie as follows:, "I wish to take 
the occasion of the completion,. on 9th December, of your year 
of service as Military Adviser to UNCIP to express my deep 
appreciation of your work with the United Nations. You have 
made an important and, valuable contribution toýthe 
stabilization of the military position-in Jammu and Kashmir 
through the demarcation ofithe Ceasefire, Line which has been 
conducted under Your immediate supervision... "33 . 
Delvoie 
took, the-hint and three days later Ambassador Colban cabled 
from Geneva to tell the Secretary-General that Delvoie 
appreciated the Secretary-General's kind words and understood 
his appointment-ended on 10th December34. -The Commission, 
however, felt-he should be asked: to accompany it to Lake 
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Success where he could render good service". The Permanent 
Representative of Belgium to the United Nations also suggested 
this should happený&. Accordingly the Secretary-General 
extended Delvoie's, term of service to enable him to go to Lake 
Success with the Commission37. 
A further incident occurred at the time when the Delvoie 
publicity was at its height, and broke in an Indian newspaper, 
according to Michael de Capite, "with great fanfare on Friday, 
7 October", the story "being, killed" the following day with 
only a single paragraph in the, same newspaper. According to 
de Capite, "the incipient campaign to, smear the, Commi5sion and 
the Observerswas so obviousin, the handling-of this incident, 
which was clearly the result of carelessness on the part of 
Smith, that the story was quashed"36.. The story concerned 
the fact that an RAF Wing-Commander stationed in Karachi . 
hitched a lift to Srinagar on a UN aircraft. Unfortunately he 
had inadvertently allowed his permit-to enter Kashmir expire 
and he would thus have been unable to enter the state had he 
travelled in a more authorised manner". Once again it was 
the Kashmir authorities who blew, the matter, up, and protested 
to Mr. Sahay that UNCIP officials had smuggled the 
Wing-Commander into the State. Once again it was the Indians 
who tried to smooth matters over., Wing Commander Smith was, 
given his permit and even spent two days in Delhi as guest of 
an Indian Air Force, Air Marshal, whilst a statement doing, 
justice to him appeared in the Pres S40. In December 1949 
Prime Minister Nehru, in answer to a question in Parliament, 
stated that enquiries had shown there was nothing mala fide in 
the incident". Nevertheless, Mr. Sahay did feel compelled to 
write to the Commission regarding the desirability of using UN 
aircraft for official purposes only, in spite of the fact, as 
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Ambassador Colban informed the-Secretary-General, most of the 
lifts they had previously given to persons outside the UN had 
gone to Indian Army officers and their families, Indian 
Government, and even Kashmir State official542. In5truction5 
were then given that use of the UN aircraft henceforth would be 
restricted to-UN per5onnel". 
Mediation 
In its final report in December-1949-the United Nations 
Commission suggested that the Kashmir problem should be passed 
to a single individual to act as-mediator, between the 
partieS44. After a brief and unsuccessful attempt by the 
President of the Security Council, General McNaughton of 
Canada, to act in this capacity", the Security Council, on 
14th March, 1950, adopted a further Resolution, which called 
Upon India and Pakistan to prepare within five, months a 
programme of demilitarization". --Sir Owen Dixon was appointed 
UN Representative in India and Pakistan (UNRIP) to, assist 
them*. There was optimism that his mission might meet with 
success owing to a recent thaw in'relations between, the two 
parties, whose Prime Ministers met in April 1950 and reached 
agre ements over waterways, trade, refugee and, propaganda 
problems, though they had only "agreed to differ" on Kashmir47, 
but this optimism was ill-foundedý - In the wake of his failure 
to bring them to a consensus, -Sir Owen suggested that Pakistan , 
*Sir Owen's main proposals have already been covered 
(pages 72-73 and 78-80), but essentially he reached the 
conclusion that, since the two Prime Ministers admitted 
that there seemed to be no hope of, reaching agreement on demilitarization or on conditions to follow 
demilitarization, there was no possibility of holding a 
plebiscite, and the only solution was partition. His 
suggested method of partition-was, however, also'not 
agreeable to them. 
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and India should be left to negotiate bilaterally instead of 
throwing the whole responsibility onto the Security Council, 
since without their mutual agreement there was no possibility 
of settling the matter. He also pointed out that the 
continued maintenance of the two armies facing one another 
across the Ceasefire Line must constitute a danger to the peace 
and, apart from mutual mistrust, there was no reason for 
keeping them there, since the Ceasefire Line, was a boundary 
which might be kept by check posts and the like, in the same way 
as any frontier between countries at peace. -: He thought it was 
hard to believe that the Indian, and Pakistan Chiefs of Staff 
would have any difficulty in arranging for a concurrent 
reduction of forces if they were instructed by, their respective 
governments to meet for the purpose, and he suggested to both 
Prime Ministers that this should be done. - India stated she 
did not consider it desirable to arrange a meeting with 
Pakistan, but would reduce her own troops by-20-25%. Sir Owen 
recommended that the UN Military Observers, should stay in 
Kashmir for the foreseeable future and that the Security 
Council should press the parties to reduce the military 
strength holding the Ceasefire Line to the normal, protection of 
a peacetime frontier; : Indeed, he felt that since India and 
Pakistan could not come to an agreement,. a division'of the 
State along the Ceasefire Line might be a solution-which would 
at least stabilize the situation and bring about peace, even if 
it neglected the Justice of determining from the people 
involved their will for their nation411 '. I 
Erih Colban, told the Secretary-General that he believed 
Sir Owen's recommendation that the two sides had bilateral 
talks would not work, and that they needed the assistance of a 
UN Representative. He said that what Pakistan really, wanted, 
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was a strong resolution from the Security Council imposing on 
India the duty to co-operate in bringing about suitable 
conditions for a plebiscite, including the withdrawal of Indian 
forces, and that it was very concerned'at the delay in 
discussing the Kashmir question in the Security Council". 
Josef Korbel, a former member of UNCIP, sympathised 
generally with Sir Owen's conclusions, but thought that if the 
Security Council adopted his recommendation to leave the two 
countries to settle the matter bilaterally, it would be a 
humiliating admission of the UN's impotence and a grave blow to 
its prestige and authority. Furthermore, such an admission of 
UN failure was-likely to cause Pakistan and - particularly - 
Azad Kashmirýto renew their efforts by means of force rather 
than to'submit to such-an unsatisfactory state of affairs. 
Already the deadlock in negotiations was having a serious 
effect on India-Pakistan-relations, with resumed attacks on 
each other in the Press of, both countries, and articles were 
appearing calling for the withdrawal*of the case, -and'even both 
countries, from the United Nations"O., 
General Nimmo, who had arrived at the Mission as the new 
Chief Military Observer in December 1950, also noted in January 
1951 that public-speakers and the Press continued to feature 
the Kashmir problem with increasing virulencyi and that the 
Observers had noticed that the subject was talked about quite 
openly and frankly in officers' messes in forward areas far 
more than it used-to be, and that there was a growing 
determination-that something would have to'be done before long. 
Nimmo assured Cordier, that he and his Observers avoided 
discussions onýsuch matters with outsiders, but-he'had no doubt 
that the situation could become very serious by the summer if 
the tribesmen continued to be stirred by such speeches5l. In 
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March he returned to the subject, saying that he hoped the two 
Governments would be able to get together because there was a 
growing sense of frustration on the Pakistan side, and he 
feared some sections of the people would be difficult to 
restrain from violent action if nothing was accomplished52 
The next attempt at mediation occurred during informal 
discussions at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in 
London in January 1951. The Commonwealth Prime Ministers put 
forward three proposals, none of which India accepted"; 
1) British Commonwealth to provide a force, at its own 
expense, during the plebiscite; 
2) A Joint Indo-Pakistani force under a single command; 
3) A local Kashmiri force raised by the plebiscite 
administrator, enabling all other forces to be withdrawn 
from the State. 
At a Press Conference in London following the meeting 
I 
Nehru reaffirmed India's intention of letting the people of 
Kashmir decide, but said religion should not be brought in as 
it would upset the equilibrium on the matter already generally 
established, and would hinder the healing of wounds over 
partition 54. 
On 19th February, 1951 the Secretary-General's Assistant, 
Andrew Cordier, wrote to Erik Colban to terminate (with 
gratitude) his contract5s. The matter again returned to the 
Security Council, and - further to Resolution 80 of 30th March, 
195106 - on 30th April Dr. Frank Graham was appointed as the 
new UN Representative in India and Pakistan. Dr. Graham, a 
distinguished American and former senator, described by Andrew 
Cordier as "one of the best negotiators that the US has at the 
present time"57, retained the position until his death in 1972. 
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The Cadwalader Incident 
The Resolution of 30th March, 1951 instructed the new UN 
Representative "to proceed to the Subcontinent and, after 
consultation with the Government of India and Pakistan, to 
effect the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir 
on the basis of the United Nations Commission for India and 
Pakistan Resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January, 1949" and 
to report to the Security Council within three months from the 
date of his arrival on the Subcontinent. It further called 
upon the parties, in the event of their discussion with the UN 
Representative failing to result in full agreement, to accept 
arbitration upon all outstanding points of difference by an 
arbitrator, or a panel of arbitrators, to be appointed by the 
President of the International Court of Justice after 
consultation with the partieS50. India had firmly rejected 
the idea of arbitration when UNCIP had recommended it in 1949*. 
The Resolution also criticised India for sanctioning the 
convening of a Constituent Assembly by the All Jammu and 
Kashmir National Conference". 
Nehru condemned the Resolution as "highly 
objectionable"60, and in Kashmir demonstrations were arranged 
against the United Nations and Dr. Grahael. Sheik Abdullah 
went ahead with his plan to have his Constituent Assembly 
confirm "the final accession of Kashmir to India 
1162. With 
incitement to war in the Pakistan Press, Nehru declared that an 
attack on Kashmir would be treated as an attack on the whole of 
India"'. Defence measures were taken accordinglY and during 
the summer of 1951 the two countries were again on the brink of 
wae". Andrew Cordier visited the Subcontinent in June 1951 
*See-, Page 101. 
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immediately prior to Dr. Graham's arrival and the Prime 
Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, told him that Pakistan 
would go, to war rather than allow Sheik Abdullah to persist 
with his plan for a Constituent Assembly and the establishment 
of, an elected'Kashmir Government, in defiance of the Security 
Council Resolution. Liaquat also thought that if the Graham 
mission was-unsuccessful the, tribesmen might take matters into 
their own hands". The atmosphere awaiting Dr. Graham's 
arrival could scarcely-have been worse, and, the, effects 
rebounded on the Military Observer Group, -, resulting in an 
affair similar to the Delvoie Incident, though somewhat less 
serious. IIý 
General Nimmo, noticed a hostile atmosphere, as soon as his 
HQ moved from Rawalpindi to Srinagar inýMay 1951., --- 
Difficulties-were made about obtaining an entry permit-for a 
Canadian Observer's wife; comments in the Press described the 
Observers as agents-of the Anglo-American bloc, smugglers and 
so on; -mail was, censored; and UNMOGIP personnel, were closely 
watched by the, Criminal-, Investigation, -Department6l,. - At the 
same time, senior Indian Army Officers were friendly enough, 
and the Commander-in-Chief, General Cariappa, invited General 
Nimmoýto be his-guest at his home for, a few days in Delhi&7. 
In-fact it was he who warned Nimmo of the impending trouble and 
tried to advise him how best to deal with it". - A message 
that an Observerýhad carried across the Ceasefire Line from 
father to daughter had been-discovered. The message was 
innocuous enough and it was several weeks, after it was known to 
have been discovered before the-authorities decided to make an 
issue of it", a fact whichýin itself suggests some form of 
political timing., 
-Early in July 1951 General Cariappa gave General, Nimmo-a 
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note written on a menu card from the Majestic Hotel in Srinagar 
stating: "I have a message for Koulsoon, daughter of M. A. 
Sabir, -, from her father, and would like to deliver it. I will 
stop by again". It was signed J. Cadwalader, Commander, UN 
Observer 70 . At General 
Cariappa's suggestion Nimmo wrote 
immediately to Mr. Gopalswami Ayyangar, the Indian Government 
States Minister, and explained*that Commander Cadwalader, US 
Navy, -was one of-his bestýofficers and-he-was sure-he had no 
other purpose in mind than doing'a simple favour. He now 
fully realised the danger of such a move and General Nimmo was 
certain-it would not be repeated. He went on to say that a 
few weeks previously he had-warne&all, his'personnel against 
such seemingly minor actions, and Commander Cadwalader had 
actually informed-, him then about the message he, had carried, 
not having realized its possible significance until Nimmo's 
warning7l . 
- -Ayyangar replied that he hoped Nimmo was right, -but 
evidence had since come into his possession of conduct on the 
part of Cadwalader about which, -Nimmo would'hear separately72. 
Following this letter Nimmo received one from the Indian 
Foreign Secretary saying-that in addition to'having conveyed a 
message from a person known to be hostile to the Government of 
Jammu and, Kashmirt which was a clear breach of immunity, ' it had 
come to their knowledge that Commanderý-Cadwalader had used the 
most offensive language against the Prime Minister of India. 
In the, -circumstances they had requested the Indian Permanent 
Delegation at the UN in New York to make a report-to the 
Secretary-General and ask for Cadwalader's recal 173. Nimmo 
replied that he had asked Mr. Cordier at, the UN to recall 
Commander Cadwalader as he was persanaýnon-grata to the -. 
Indians, but he was still ignorant of anything Cadwalader may 
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have done or said74 . Cadwalader submitted aýlong memorandum 
recalling the events and complaining that the Indian Government 
had given him no opportunity to answer the charges against him. 
He had acted on a humanitarian basis as well as. on a policy of' 
establishing goodwill with the civilian population. He noted 
that he had been told when he visited the hotel again that his 
message had been taken by the CID within'ten minutes of his 
leaving it, and he had expected to be-questioned at the time, 
but was confident he had a reasonable explanation. - Since 
nothing had come of the incident for three months he assumed 
that nothing would, but it appeared "that-it was, saved up as an 
embarrassment for the UN during the mission of Dr. Graham". 
All he could suggest about any statements he had made about the 
Prime Minister was that since he had discussed him with no one 
outside the UN, his letters home, in which his estimate of Mr. 
Nehru had indeed been included, must-have-, been, opened, in, spite 
of Indian denials that personal letters of UN personnel had 
been opened75 .ýII 
Cadwalader admitted that regardless-of how, his-, views were 
discovered, since the Indian Government was aware of them it 
was justified in not wishing him to act as an Observer. He 
maintained, however, that if having an, opinion on the question 
as a whole disqualified one from deciding the rights and wrongs 
of an alleged ceasefire violation, there would be no Observers. 
He wasý just as ready to find a Pakistani-guilty of stealing a 
goat or firing at a patrol as he was-an Indian, as he believed 
would be substantiated by the recordsýof his investigations". 
Nimmo forwarded the letter to Cordier and said that if the 
Indian Government were prepared to withdraw their objections he 
would be pleased to keep Cadwalader who, was keen, ýenergetic, 
attentive to his duties and with a personality which made him 
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popular on both sides of the CFL, in fact one of the best 
officers in the 
GrOU]ý77. UNHQ felt there was no alternative 
to recalling Cadwalader, but Nimmols letter was passed to the 
US Mission to the UN with a request that it be placed on 
Cadwalader's personnel file". Nevertheless Cadwalader, 
whilst grateful for the way Nimmo championed his cause, felt 
the UN Secretariat should have stood up to India on behalf of 
one of their Observers". In fact Cordier told Nimmo 
privately that they would have been prepared to resist India's 
request since it was not well-substantiated. But their hands 
were tied by Nimmo's commitment to request Cadwalader's recall. 
Furthermore, they would never countermand-any decision of this 
nature by the CMO, who was in the best position to judge 
whether the continuation of an officer was likely to detract 
from the effectiveness of the Mission. He also assured Nimmo 
that his mentioning the point was not in any sense intended to 
be a criticism of Nimmo's action: facedýwith the alternative 
of supporting an officer against whom insufficient evidence was 
produced, and a commitment, even an indirectýone,, by the CMO, 
they had chosen the latter alternative, and felt--sure that if 
Commander Cadwalader were ever in the position of CMO he also 
would feel it essential to have the assurance of complete 
backing from HQ in such decisions or commitments as, h6 found it 
necessary to makee". 
Nimmo replied that although he thought the Indian 
Government's request was harsh and unnecessary, since they 
would not discuss it there seemed no alternative, especially as 
tension was then acute and it would be unwise to involve the 
Mission in any dispute "when there was undoubtedly an air of 
suspicion surrounding us all in Srinagar at that period". - He 
said he had explained it to Commander Cadwalader who was quite 
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satisfied and no longer concerned about the incident, and had 
continued to do excellent work, remaining one of the best in 
the Group and, incidentally, having won many friends in the 
Indian Army". 
The fact remains that the incident seems to have been 
manipulated and blown up again out of all proportion to its 
size, initially by the Kashmir State Authorities, but with the 
ultimate support of the Indian authorities, in an attempt to 
embarrass the UN at the time of Dr. Graham's arrival. 
However, by the end of the year the atmosphere became less 
suspicious and more friendly, and General Nimmo and members of 
his HQ began to be included in official functions held by Sheik 
Abdullah, Prime Minister of Kashmir, including on the occasion 
of a visit by Mr. NehrU02. Even a matter they might well have 
picked on did not seem unduly to disturb the authorities, 
although it was the Indian Representative at the UN who first 
brought it to the notice of the Secretary-General. A very 
extreme and tendentious article which could only be expected to 
cause anger had appeared in a Danish newspaper and was 
apparently based on an interview with a former Observer". 
Nimmo admitted he had heard something about it from Army HQ but 
went on to say: "In spite of this, I feel that the air of 
suspicion which surrounded us in Srinagar early last Summer has 
eased considerably 11 64 
The easing in the atmosphere was no doubt largely 
contributed to by the fact that, India found Dr. Graham's first 
report, 
lto 
be quite fair, Pakistan was less happy with it. 
Dr. GraharOo 
The demilitarization programme suggested by Dr. Graham on 7th 
September, 1951 and reported to the Security Council on 15th 
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October, 19519', took the form of a draft Indo-Pakistani 
agreement providing-for "a single continuous process" to be 
completed in 90 days, during which the-following steps were to 
be taken: 
1) On the Pakistan side: withdrawal of tribesmen, 
Pakistani nationals not normally resident inýKashmir and 
Pakistani, troops, plus the large-scale-disbanding and 
disarming of-Azad Kashmir troops; ý 
2) On the-Indian side: withdrawal of-the bulk of Indian 
troops followed by further withdrawals or reductions of 
Indian and State Armed-Forces. 
India made her withdrawal conditional-on the, -complete, 
disbandment and disarming of Azad forces, -Ieaving-on the 
Pakistan side of the Ceasefire Line only an armed civil police 
force of 4,000, of which only halfýcould be followers of the 
Azad Kashmir-movement, and to'be commanded by UN, not 
Pakistani, officers. - 
Pakistanýwas prepared to accept "large-scale-disarming and 
disbanding of-Azad Kashmir forces" but only on condition that 
the "balance", and not merely some of the, remaining Indian- 
troops, would be withdrawn-after the 90-day period. Pakistan 
preferred the retention of four infantryýbattalions, on both 
sides of the Ceasefire Line, but was prepared to accept "some 
slight difference in the strength or description of-the two 
forces". 
, Dr. Graham'suggested that India should ensure the formal 
appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator by the-Kashmir 
Government "not later than thelinal-day of the -- , 
demilitarization: period". India believed the appropriate time 
for his'appointment would be "as soon as conditions on both 
sides-of the Ceasefire-Line permit", and that, therefore 
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provision for his appointment should be omitted from the draft 
agreement. Pakistan wanted his appointment "as much in 
advance-of the final day of demilitarization as possible". 
Dr. Graham recommended to the Security Council that 
negotiations-be, continued. India's reaction to his report was 
quite favourable. Pakistan's was not, though official 
reaction was delayed because the Pakistan Prime Minister was 
assassinated the day after publication of the report. 
On 10th November, 1951 the Security Council adopted a 
further Resolution'instructing Dr. Graham to-. continue his 
effortS07. In his second report, in December 1951111, Dr. 
Graham had to admit-that he had not secured agreement on any of 
the four major points, of difference. , The only, changes he 
proposed were that the demilitarization should be completed by 
15th July, 1952, instead of after 90 days, and that the forces 
remaining after demilitarization should be-"the lowest possible 
number... based in proportion on the number of armed forces 
existing on each side of the Ceasefire Line onýlstZanuary, 
1949". Pakistan was even less happy about this report than, 
o 
Graham's first. - Nehru-said India would abide by its agreement 
to hold a plebiscite, - but renewed his warning-that if Pakistan 
invaded there would be full-scale, war between the two 
countries". 
On 22nd April, 1952 Dr. Graham informed the, Security 
Council that he, had-again failed to break the deadlock, ý 
although'there had been some progress. Troops on the Pakistan 
side now totalled les5 than half the number-in Kashmir at the 
time of signing the Ceasefire Agreementýand Pakistan had 
announced the departure from the State of the tribesmen and all 
Pakistani nationals not normally're5ident there. India had 
agreed to withdraw sufficient troops to ensure that the 
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remainder would total less than half the number there when the 
Ceasefire became effective. India had also decided to 
withdraw forces which it had concentrated on Pakistan's 
frontiers, in t he summer of 1951. Pakistan too had returned 
its forces to-their normal peacetime stations. - With respect 
to the plebiscite, the chief remaining obstacle was the 
difference over, the number and character of forces to be left 
on each side of theýCFL at the end of the period of 
demilitarization9o. Subsequent negotiations between May and 
July 1952, followed by a fourth report in September,. 195291, 
did not enable Dr. Graham to resolve this difference. His 
failure again caused dissent in Pakistan. 
Nevertheless a further resolution, sponsored-by the UK and 
US, was passed by the Security Council in December 1952 T2, and 
urged settlement on the basis of Dr. Graham's proposal, noting 
"with gratification that the, United Nations Representative has 
reported that the Governments of India and Pakistan have - 
accepted all but two of the paragraphs of his-twelve-point 
proposals; 'that agreement on a plan of demilitarization of the 
State of Jammu and Kashmirýhas not been reached because the 
Government of India and Pakistan have not agreed on the whole 
of paragraph-7 of the twelve-point proposals". -, The Resolution 
urged the two Governments "to enter into immediate negotiations 
under the auspices of the United Nations Representative for 
India and Pakistan in order to-reach agreement on the specific 
number of forces to remain on each side of the Ceasefire Line 
at-the end ofAhe period of demilitarization, this number to be 
between 3,000 and 6,000 armed forces remaining-on-the Pakistan 
side of-the Ceasefire Line and between 12,000 and 18,000 armed 
forces remaining on the India side..., as suggested by the 
United Nations Representative in his proposals of 16 July 
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1952". 
On 23rd January, 1953 Dr. Graham informed the Security 
Council that the two parties had agreed to make another effort 
to resolve the impasse". His suggestion to them was a 
further compromise on the number and character of forces which 
should remain in Kashmir at the end of the demilitarization 
period: "On the Pakistan side... an armed force of 6,000 ... 
separated from the administrative and operational command of 
the Pakistan High Command with no armour or artillery", and "on 
the Indian side an Indian armed force of 21,000 including State 
armed forces without armour or artillery. 
India accepted the figure proposed for its forces, despite 
previous insistence on 21,000 troops excluding the Kashmir 
State Militia of 6,000, but she rejected the suggestion of 
6,000 armed troops in Azad Kashmir, proposing instead a force 
of only 4,000. She expressed the willingness to agree to 
"some increase" in this force. She also demanded the removal 
of Pakistan appointed officials and of the Azad Kashmir 
Government from the Azad area, and insisted that there should 
be no connection between the local authorities in Azad Kashmir 
and the Pakistan Government. 
Pakistan was far more critical. She termed Graham's 
proposals in contravention of the Security Council's resolution 
of 23rd December, 1952, and accused the proposals of "having no 
other object than to meet India's wishes... ". At this point 
(March 1953) Dr. Graham did not request an extension of his 
mandate and like Sir Owen Dixon before him, recommended that 
the Indian and Pakistan leaders undertake direct negotiations 
to solve the impasse". Such bilateral talks did then take 
place. - I 
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The Arrest of Sheik Abdullah 
0 
In spite of Dr. Graham's failure to gain the two sides' 
agreement in early 1953, the mere fact of bringing the leaders 
together face to face had beneficial effects. There was a 
general improvement in India-Pakistan relations and feelers 
were being put out as to the possibility of holding bilateral 
talks even before Dr. Graham recommended such a move in his 
fifth report in March 195313. Nehru, especially, was now 
I 
making it clear he preferred to have no outside interference on 
the Kashmir issue, blaming the fact that it had not been 
settled long ago on this interferencelb. 
The two Prime Ministers held meetings between 25th and 
27th July, 1953 in Karachi in an atmosphere of goodwill. The 
Pakistan Press praised Nehru on his arrival, and crowds lined 
the streets and gave him a tremendous ovation. The general 
optimism persisted immediately afterwards, and further talks 
were envisaged for the near future, possibly the end of August. 
However, on 9th August Sheik Abdullah was dismissed by the 
Kashmir Head of State and arrested*. The Pakistan Press 
became hostile to India again and published highly exaggerated 
reports of what was happening in Kashmir 97. 
Mohammed Ali, the Pakistan Prime Minister, hastily 
arranged to go to New Delhi to attempt a quick settlement of 
the Kashmir problem in order to ease the situation before the 
recent hopes were totally dashed. Nehru said a hasty solution 
was neither Possible nor a good idea, but told the Indian 
people in his Independence Day** speech to welcome Mohammed 
Ali, as indeed they did. Meetings took place between 17th 
I 
*See page 84. 
**15th August. 
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and 20th August, but the atmosphere was now much less 
propitious, with, the Pakistan Press still reacting strongly to 
Abdullah's'arrest, - although Mohammed Ali showed a deliberate 
attempt not to, be influenced by'it". In a Joint Press 
Release on 20th August the two Prime Ministers said that 
progress towards a plebiscite had not been made in the past 
because of lack of agreement-in regard to preliminary issues, 
but it was their firm opinion that the Dispute should be 
settled in accordance-with the wishes of the people. The 
Prime Ministers agreed to, consider these issues directly with 
the aim of being able to appoint a Plebiscite Administrator by 
April 1954". 'Pakistan was pleased that the,. Plebiscite 
Administrator, had again been agreed'to, in principle,, and India 
that the United-Nations was, being kept, out of the picture, but 
that they were-still deeply divided on these issues was - 
demonstrated in the protracted-correspondence between the Prime 
Ministers which followed-their meetings*. 
Meanwhile there were widespread disturbances in Kashmir, as 
the people demonstrated in support of Abdullah. General 
Nimmo, recovering-from a heart attack at the time, was not on 
the Mission. Major-General de Ridder arrived as Acting CMO, 
just as the Indian Press was, suggesting. that UN Observers were 
passing information to Pakistan, and saying that, the Government 
of Jammu and Kashmir had lodged a protest, -with the Government 
of India, and, that Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, the new, Prime 
Minister, had accused UN Observers of inciting demonstrations, 
and was therefore'threatening to withdraw their diplomatic 
immpnity'00. * The, Ti2es of Karachi maintained editorially: 
"the UN cannot-allow these, charges of complicity to go 
*See pages 273-277. 
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unanswered without tarnishing its reputation and prestige. To 
redeem its honour the world organisation Must immediately order 
the institution of an impartial inquiry to, discover the truth 
or falsity of these allegations"101. 
General de Ridder wrote to tell General Nimmo that from 
newspaper accounts in Pakistan it appeared that the general 
situation was serious, but he found, on arrival in Srinagar that 
the accounts had been exaggerated and that although the police 
had dispersed crowds of people only, a few - contrary to reports 
- had been killed. He had been approached immediately by 
General Attal, GOC, Western Command and informed, apparently 
reluctantly, that the new Prime Minister-objected to the 
association of a-certain person on UNMOGIP's staff with a 
western writer staying in Kashmir; because they had been seen 
together taking notes and photographs at the scene of civil 
disturbances. He objected also to Observers taking 
photographs of the disturbances. - ', Heýalleged. that Observers 
had held a conference, and then sent one of-their number'-on a 
tour of theý-city to find out what4was, happening, and he 
questioned their right to do '50102. 
The liaison with a western writer was ended and the'staff 
member concerned posted elsewhere, but after, inquiries, General- 
de Ridder informed General Attal, that the-other accusations 
were groundless. Indeed he himself had suggested that Colonel 
MacDonald, his Operations Officer, make a tour of the City, but 
on the advice--of the Indian Army-he, had not-done so. 
Nevertheless de Ridder put the,.. City out of bounds for the 
duration of the emergency'03. 
In a further demonstration in Srinagarýpolice'drove 
demonstrators through some UN houseboats which were slightly 
damaged., , No harm came to UN personnel, but two or three local 
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people were drowned. General Attal promised General de Ridder 
police and Indian Army protection, and assured him that the 
Mission enjoyed the same high regard it always had so far as 
the Indian Army was concerned, and-that its function had been 
fulfilled efficiently and to their-complete satisfaction. 
However the Press continued its attacks, -the substance-of which 
was apparently released at a Government Press-Conference. The 
articles quoted Jammu and Kashmir Government spokesmen 
threatening to restrict UN movement, but-no official notice to 
that effect was received'04. I-II- 
-Andrew Cordier subsequently complimented de Ridder on his 
handling of a difficult situation without prior experience of 
the area'05 ý Nevertheless, it was de Ridder himself who came 
close to causing another difficult, situation.,, 
Major-General de Ridder 
'Since 1949'Major-General de Ridder had been an Observer 
N with UNTSO, and latterly Chairman of-the Jordan-Israeli Mixed 
Armistice Commission, in which post he had been accused by 
Israel of being pro-Arab'". , Whilst this fact had never been 
officially'accepted, politically-conscious onlookers,, could not 
but have-been-aware that General Nimmo's illness, had-provided a 
fortuitous excuse for movingide Ridder away from an area where 
he-may have been causing some-embarrassment'into a conveniently 
higher status, but only temporary, -post elsewhere "with, his 
outstanding record unblemished by, recrimination"207. ' De 
Ridder had'been quite agreeable to the movei-even to the extent 
of saying he was prepared to-stay, on at UNMOGIP at the end of 
his three-month temporary assignment when General'Nimmo 
198 returned to Kashmir . And this indeed he did, to the 
discomfort of the UN who expected him tct leave at the end of 
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the three months, but did not feel they could insist upon his 
departure'09. 
On his return to the Mission General Nimmo reported that 
de Ridder, in spite of being effectively displaced, had been 
very cordial and showed no reluctance to accept orders from a 
man of equal rank, but after de-Ridder had mentioned at a 
cocktail party in Rawalpindi that he was being posted to Delhi, 
the Pakistan Commander-in-Chief had apparently questioned him 
and said he-would speak to Nimmo. Nimmo, being on good terms 
with the Pakistan-Chief-of-Staff, asked the latter about this 
and wasý, informed that the CIC, had no wish to-interfere in any 
way with the workings of UNMOGIP, but merely to give Nimmo a 
personal and-friendly tip to the-effect that de Ridder-was 
well-known to favour the Arabs, and the Indians-had recently 
seemed on very friendly terms with Israel. He thought India 
might be watching for a chance to embarrass not only Nimmo, but 
the UN'through UNMOGIP "particularly, in view of the-Delvoie 
case" since both de Ridder and Delvoie were Belgians"O. - 
I- Nimmo discussed the problem with de Ridder and'decided to 
delay his-posting whilst he made discreet inquiries as to the 
attitude of Indian-Army HQ.. He was then-reluctantly told by, a 
senior Observer-that the de Ridders had let it be generally 
known that Nimmo had been "ordered by the CIC to keep'them in 
Rawalpindi". Seeking further-information Nimmo discovered, 
that the de Ridders had always beenývery outspokenly pro-Arab, 
a fact-'which could not have-been missed-, by, the Indian officers 
who-no doubt thought "pro-Arab, -ýtherefore pro-Muslim and 
anti-Hindu"". ý Nimmo limited, himself to a veiled warning to 
de Ridder'. "In view, of the comments of the Pakistan 
Chief-of-Staff and also the Commander-in-Chief as to your 
posting on the Indian side, I am sure you are aware how 
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important it is to avoid any reference to conflicting events in 
Palestine and your experience there 
"112 
. In fact no untoward 
incident occurred as a result of de Ridder's presence on the 
Mission - possibily because the political authorities did not 
become-aware of his outspoken views, and the military were less 
inclined to cause trouble., General-Nimmo did try to sound out 
Indian reaction'when'he visited Delhi, but Major-General 
Chaudhuri-merely'remarked that it seemed redundant to have two 
Major-Generals on a small Mission'". De Ridder finally left, 
albeit reluctantly, a year after Nimmols, return"4. 
- However, in July/1954 - whilst de Ridder, was still with 
the Mission - another potentially serious issue, -arose regarding 
yet another Belgian who-had formerly been an Observer with 
UNMOGIP:, the latter, was nominated as hi5-countrys'Ambassador 
to New Delhi. Relations between UNMOGIP and India were in any 
case rather sen51tive-at the time as what was probably 
UNMOGIP's'major problem on the purely political side was 
reaching its climax*. Andrew Cordier approached the Belgian 
Permanent Representative, to the, UN and, pointed out, that the 
prospective Ambassador might beýput-in a rather delicate 
position-because ofthe confidential information he would have 
on the Kashmir situation and the Indian and Pakistanýforces, ' 
especially, in view-of-the position recently taken by India 
towards Military Observers. Furthermore-the situation might 
also give India and Pakistan cause to doubt*the position of 
other Belgian Military Observers still-serving. He made the 
point'that he was not submitting an official requestj but the 
Belgians appreciated the concern and agreed the appointment 
should not-go ahead"5. 
*The Question of the US Observers, pages 277-285. 
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THE QUESTION OF THE USýOBSERVERS 
Bilateral Relations 
,- The new nation-of Pakistan, born in 1947, lost its 
founding father and first Governor-General, Mr. Jinnah, in 
1948, to be succeeded by Ghulam Mohammed., Then in October 
1951 Liaquat Ali Khan, the nation's first Prime Minister, was 
assassinated. - Thus Pakistan lost its most prominent leaders 
before the nation had, really-become established. A period of 
political instability set in, which lasted until the military 
takeover by General Ayub Khan in 1958, and which was not 
conducive to-5ettlement of the differences between India and 
Pakistan.. Khawia, Nazimuddin succeeded Liaquat, to be followed 
by Mohammed Ali early, in 1953. It has been suggested that the 
less competent hands which succeeded, the first leaders decided 
to persist with thelcomplicated political line which had been 
evolved with. Nehru, - one-of shunning the-road to co-operation 
and yet not creating a situation which would lead to 
conflagration'". At the same time the two nations' foreign 
policies, -which had been largely similar or perhaps 
unformulated, also; began to diverge, %as India insisted on a 
policy of non-alignment in a divided world, and Pakistan moved 
towards the western camp. 
On 27th August, 1953-, following-their meetings, in July and 
August Of that, -year, Mohammed Ali wrote to Nehru. This was 
the start of a long period, of correspondence "throughout which 
they framed their-accusations-in the language of courtesy and 
good manners"197, and which was eventually published by both 
Governments in the, form of, White Papers"O. 
Mohammed Ali referred to Nehru's suggestion of selecting a 
Plebiscite Administrator from a smaller state in place of 
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Admiral Nimitz. Nehru felt an Administrator from a smaller 
country would be more appropriate, particularly in view of the 
recent problems, in Korea: he did not want Kashmir to become an 
arena of Great Power rivalry. He did not question the merits 
of Nimitz as an individual, but in the four and a half years 
since Nimitz-had been chosen, the world had consolidated into 
two camps. IHeIelt not only that the whole situation had 
changed, but also that both the United States Government and 
Admiral Nimitz must have appreciated such changed 
circumstances, and that Admiral Nimitz would have quietly 
dropped out of the'picture, had Pakistan not made such a fuss 
about it. , Mohammed Ali was reluctant to drop Admiral Nimitz, 
who was generally-held in high esteem and would-be difficult to 
replace"'. - At this point it became public knowledge that 
Admiral Nimitz had offered his resignation to the 
Secretary-General'24)*. 
Mohammed Aliýalso made certain suggestions regarding 
administration of the State, for the promotion of an atmosphere 
of freedom and trust so thatlthe, people could vote without fear 
of pressure: 
1) Supervision, over the administration during, -the 
plebiscite should be in the hands of an impartial 
-authority or a-joint'Indo-Paki5tan commission; 
2) Exclusionýof-troops of either country from the 
ýplebisicte area, or the presence of a Joint force; 
3) The-Plebiscite Administratorý-should have all the 
powers he con51dered necessary for-organ15ing, and 
conducting the plebiscite. 
Nehru, continued to insist that, -there, could be-no change in 
*See pages 71-72. 
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the administration of the State, so there could be no question 
of Pakistan or any outside authority sharing in it in any of 
the ways Mohammed Ali had suggested. He maintained that the 
UN Commission had accepted that: the whole basis of the UN 
approach had been recognition of the authority of the 
Government of Jammu and Kashmir, which was why the Plebiscite 
Administrator was to be formally appointed by the State. 
Nehru made-it clear that he did still expect the Plebiscite 
Administrator to function under UN supervision, but that any 
settlement had to depend upon the consent and co-operation of 
Indiaýand Pakistan' 21 
- Rumours regarding negotiations onýthe subject of US 
military aid to Pakistan then began to circulate. Nehru not 
only felt this as a specific threat to India but, in view of 
his non-aligned policy, was also-opposed in principle. On 
10th November he sent a personal letter to Mohammed Ali saying 
it would be'seen, as an unfriendly act in India and would change 
the psychological atmosphere for the worse, and that the- 
situation in Kashmir in particular, would change'22. Onýfth 
December he repeated his warning. in a formal letter, saying 
that the whole issue of demilitarization which they had been 
discussing for so long-would "change-its, face completely if 
heavy and rapid militarization of Pakistan itself is to take 
place. It is a relatively small matter, what forces Pakistan 
maintains within the State of, Kashmir as'it isi-doing at 
present. They can withdraw them 30 or 40 or 50 miles into 
Pakistan territory., These forces can come back at a few 
hours' notice. If, however, they are backed by an increasing 
armed power in Pakistan itself, that is, ýof far greater moment 
than the so-called demilitarization of Kashmir-State. In fact 
it becomesirather absurd to talk of-demilitarization if -, 
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Pakistan proceeds in the reverse direction with the help of the 
United States "123. Mohammed Ali pointed out that India's 
military potential was much greater than Pakistan's and India 
allowed three times as much as Pakistan in her defence budget, 
therefore it should be Pakistan worrying about India arming 
herself rather than the other way round, and anyway the 
question of strengthening either Pakistan's or India's defences 
had nothing to do with the question of demilitarization in 
Kashmir 124 . 
In February 1954 the Kashmir Constituent Assembly endorsed 
the proposal that the State of Jammu and Kashmir accede to 
India, much to Pakistan's fury. Nehru said in Parliament that 
it would be wrong of India to repudiate the decision of an 
elected assembly, but that India Still Stood by. her 
international commitments "unless something else happens 11123. 
On 22nd February the formal announcement of US military 
assistance to Pakistan was made. Nehru wrote to Mohammed Ali 
and said: "Now that the presence of arms has taken the place- 
of a peaceful and co-operative approach... we can take no risks 
now as we were prepared to take previously and we must retain 
full liberty to keep Such forces and military equipment in the 
Kashmir State as we may-consider necessary in view of this new 
threat to us", and he refused to. proceed with theýappointment 
of the Plebiscite Administrator. Mohammed Ali claimed 
Pakistan's acceptance of aid was in the interest of India and 
all Asia also, but to Nehru such a commentýonly exemplified 
their differing outlook: India did not fear attack from any 
country, but lining up with one of the powers brought 
insecurity and danger, and was a move away, from-peace124. 
President Eisenhower pointed out that under the US Mutual 
Security legislation the US was bound to take action if the aid 
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was misused: aid could only be used for internal security127. 
Nehru said in the Indian Parliament on 1st March that he was 
convinced that President Eis enhower bore no ill-will to India, 
that he wished India well, and that he would not take any steps 
to injure, India. However, he also said: "It is not a 
question of motives, but rather of certain results that follow 
certain actions". He accused Pakistan of aggression in 1947 
and'-said similar action might occur if conditions promoted it 
in spite of the desire of the United States to prevent it*. 
He said the US Military Observers should be withdrawn from 
UNMOGIP as they could no longer be considered neutra1128. 
Unparalleled Tranquillity along the Ceasefire Line 
Whilst the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan pursued 
their bilateral negotiations during 1953'and, 1954, the Military 
Observer Group experienced a-period-of unparalleled 
tranquillity along theýCeasefire Line. In November 1953 
General Nimmo reported that, *as an indication of the excellent 
relations obtaining at the time between the military 
authorities of the two'countries, there was to be a mutual- 
exchange of-prisoners captured since the ceasefire on a 
voluntary repatriation basis. The exchange was carried in the 
presence of Military Observers, as requested by, the two Army 
HQ1211. In February-1954 General Nimmo reported that relations 
along the Border and Ceasefire Line had'never been better 
despite the Political friction caused by the "so-called" final 
accession of Kashmir to India and the question of US military 
aid to Pakistan. The Pakistan Army had invited the Indian 
Army polo team to play in a tournament at, Lahore the following 
*And indeed India's worst fears were realised in 1965. 
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week, a sure sign of improved relationSI30. 
Perhaps surprisingly, in the light of the new political 
situation and its repercussions, the Ceasefire Line continued 
to remain calm throughout the year. The personnel and 
administrativd problems experienced by the Mission as a result 
of India's demand for the withdrawal of all US Observers from 
UNMOGIP were therefore considerably less than might otherwise 
have been expected. 
Impartiality of Observers 
In March 1954 there were 44 Observers on the Mission of 
whom-18 were American,, as also were the Personnel of the US Air 
Force aircraft which was-chartered to the Group*., Cordier now 
requested Nimmo to place the US Observers as much as possible 
where they would, not come, into contactýwith the Indian Army and 
asked for Nimmo's-appraisal, of their impartiality and - 
conduCt132. Nimmo said the majority were amongst the best in 
the Group and their impartiality was no different-from that of 
the others. But he admitted they could have problems from 
being so, numerous on the Mission, and also that-coming, from so 
powerful a nation any statement or action of theirs was more 
closely watched than those-of the others. - He suggested a 
gradual reduction to ten as aýfirst step and the, elimination of 
USMOK 133** . The Secretary-General and Cordier initially 
accepted Nimmo's suggestion, but Cordier told Nimmo that 
*Coincidentally, Nimmo had only recently suggested that 
another country should be, found to relieve the United 
States of the burden of supplying the aircraft after such 
a long time'31. 
**United States Military Observers in Kashmir, an - 
administrative organisation within the Mission which 
looked after the large American contingent. See page 
137. , 
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Rajeshwar Dayal, India's Permanent Representative to the UN, 
had made it clear, while not making a formal* protest, that his 
Government expected the Secretary-General to withdraw the US 
Observers completely. Krishna Menon apparently presented the 
case to the UN Secretariat, unofficially, in more extreme 
term5134. 
Hammarskjold insisted that it was his right to choose the 
Observers**. Dayal told him: "I know the right of the 
Secretary-General to decide the nationality of the Observers, 
but once they are inducted they are supposed at least to 
profess to take orders from the UN"135. However, Dayal has 
admitted that the request for the US Observers-. to be withdrawn 
was, purely political, and that there was no evidence that they 
were not acting impartially136. 
A UN legal expert gave his opinion to Hammarskjold that 
although the-Secretary-General APPOINTS the Chief Military 
Observer, he REQUESTS a country to supply Observers,, therefore 
it seemed that when confronted with a situation relating to a 
Military Observer he should dispose of the matter-with the 
131 Government concerned . Thus! the United States was 
brought 
into, the picture. At first Cordier and Hammarskjold'seemed to 
believeýthat India would indeed accept a reduced US presence in 
UNMOGIP, which was important not-only as a matter of, principle, 
but also because it appeared that Pakistan would insist on the 
US being represented in the-Group'38. On 29th March'the 
*The lack of formal protest may be the reason for a lack 
, of information in the files, which gives-rise to an 
element of guesswork surrounding what information is 
available. 
**In fact, when Observers were first being'chosen for 
Kashmir in 1948, the Commission made a point of saying 
they should be from countries considered by both parties 
to be neutral in the conflict. ý See page 113. 
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Secretary-General sent important policy letters regarding the 
role of Observers, with special reference to their 
impartiality, to Dayal and Nimmo. Each also received a copy 
of the other's letter and, in addition, a copy of a note to the 
Secretary-General from the US Permanent Representative 
outlining United States' policy regarding US personnel in the 
Subcontinent'", The move, it was thought, had "Provided at 
least some satisfaction to the Indians without abandoning the 
principle of preserving US representation among the Observers". 
Since the Pahistanis, were prepared to accept a reduction to ten 
US-Observers, it was hoped that the-Indians would accept that 
"conception of balance as a reasonable response to their point 
of view 111411 .I 
- The US note included the words: "With respect to the 
statement-of Prime Minister Nehru of India on March 1,, 
concerning United States members of the United Nations Military 
Observer, -Group-in India and Pakistan, -the United States rejects 
as entirely'unfounded any implication of lack of impartiality 
on the part of. -these members. In-the viewýof theVnited 
States Government, -'It is within the authority of the 
Secretary-General to determine what-steps, if any, are 
necessary in the, matter"141 . 
, In his letter to General Nimmo,, Hammarskjold referred to 
the Field Observer Information File*, and stated that the 
position it set forth regarding obligations incumbent on 
Military Observersýin the performance of their functions fully 
corresponded to and corroborated his-view, of, their status. He 
particularly noted the paragraph: "On appointment Observers. 
work exclusively-for the United Nations, and, although 
*The name by which the Field Regulations Manual (see page 
147) was known at this time. 
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recognised as military personnel of their respective countries, 
are assigned for service with the United Nations". And: 
"... the Observer must be completely objective in his attitude 
and judgments. He must maintain a thorough neutrality as 
regards the political issues in the Jammu and Kashmir disputes. 
Acting on behalf and under the orders of the UN Chief Military 
Observer, the Observer is an official representative of the UN. 
He is under the operational control of the Chief Military 
Observer'. - His status is approximately equivalent to that of 
an,. "international civil servant. He represents the UN and not 
his own government.... " And: "A member of an UNFO Team must 
remain completely-neutral and do nothing to-assist either side 
by rendering advice on training, strategy or tactics in the 
implementation of hisýassigned mission 11142. 
- The Secretary-General said he had also noted Regulation 
3-6 "which underlines the responsibilityýof every Observer to 
safeguard any military information that is-normally transmitted 
to anýUNFO Team by the-local army command". Furthermore, he 
noted "these principles of objectivity and, impartiality 
underlie the specific instructions in the Manual on a variety 
of'matters of--procddure, such as the handling of confidential 
messages and documents... the restrictions on the taking of 
photographs and restrictions on the subjects appropriate for 
discussionýbetween the Military Ob5ervers, and the officers of 
the-Armed Forces of the parties, involved". - His conclusion was 
that "the United Nations Observers, in spite of some 
differences in the construction of their offices, are wholly 
under UN, direction in the performance of their, task,, bound to 
this-organization and in duty bound to act, accordingly. ' In' 
the present situation I feel that it is desirable that this is 
in the most serious way brought to the attention of Observers, 
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establishing as it does the very basis for their work as agents 
of-the United Nations". Finally he expressed his appreciation 
of'the fine, record which the military and civilian members of 
the UNMOGIP had established in living up to the "specific 
standards of impartiality imposed on them by the integration in 
an-essential United Nations operation as agents of that 
"143 
organization,... 
.- In his letter to Dayal, Hammarskjold confirmed that in 
recruiting new-Observers or in providing replacements for those 
whose assignments had-been completed, he-would consult with the 
Governments of India and Pakistan, which, would then have an 
opportunity to'develop the considerations they felt should be 
taken into'accountl44. But, Cordier said to Nimmo, this did 
not mean-thatýan, objection registered by either party in the 
case'of a, new recruit would be regarded by the 
Secretary-General as'sufficient reason-for inaction, but rather 
thatAhese opportunities for consultation would give the 
delegations concerned an, opportunity to state their general 
views-regarding principles for the selection of nationals, as 
well as the, overall, balance and distribution of various 
nationality group5145 
A Compromise 
Nevertheless,. it seems that the'Secretary-General was 
compelled to-make'a greater compromise--than anticipated, in 
that althoughino US-Observer then stationed on the Mission was 
prematurely withdrawn, equally no replacements were-sent for 
those-leaving, -and from theýend of 1954, onwards there were no 
US Observers'servingý'with UNMOGIP. ý On 6th April, -in order to 
reduce the number of US Observers, * and hopefully to help 
promote India's acceptance of such a reduced number, General 
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Nimmo said he was prepared to go without replacements for those 
immediately due to leave the Group, and even up to the end of 
July if necessary, although that would cause operational 
difficulties. He felt that in view of the favourable 
situation on the Ceasefire Line at the time he could manage 
with only 40, Observers for the rest of the year 144*. On 9th 
April, Cordier confirmed to-the US Mission to the UN that all 
outstanding, requeSt5 for replacements of US Military Observers 
should be-cancelled, including four who had already received 
instructions"'. At a Press Conference on 10th May, 1954, in 
answer to a-question regarding the "formula" under which 
Americans would be removed when their time of office was up 
Hammarskjold stated: "Formula is a gross over-simplification 
because-what I said-and which goes without saying is that I 
would whenlreplacing-people leaving, consult the two, 
Governments-concerned -India and Pakistan... 
Generally-speaking..., the-tradition has, been-that in the case 
of Observers of that type you consult initially the Governments 
concerned as to the nationalities that can be used. But that 
has not been extended, to the point where you consult in the 
course of operation on possible switches of emphasis or changes 
of set up and so on. In view of the conflict-which has- 
developed-in, this caseýI felt that such, anýextension, of the 
consultation was-perfectly appropriate and all right and 
therefore have told the two-Governments'that when replacements 
come-up for consideration, they will be discussed on both 
sides. -It is likely that a full understanding between the two 
parties will lead to certain-. changes, but it, is an entirely 
different--matter'to change when they should be changed, i; e. 
*The established number then being 45. 
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when somebody leaves and comes up for replacement, than to kick 
them out, which I have refused to do ... that is point one. 
Point two is to make a change when a man comes up for 
replacement in consultation with the two parties concerned. 
So when comments were, that I promised to replace them, it was 
really not true to the facts "146. 
" So far as Nimmo was concerned he was still sufficiently 
unclear as to exactly what was happening, to write on 11th June: 
"I am assuming that it is not the intention to assign any more 
US Military-Observers to this Mission and would appreciate 
confirmation of this for planning purposes". He reminded 
Cordier that by the end of July there would only be six US 
Observers. on the Mission, -three, by the end of August, and the 
last one would leave in November 14T. Cordier replied, that , 
after consultations with the'US Mission, the Secretary-General 
had requested that all Observers whose terms expired in August 
and November be extended until the end of the year 150. Nimmo, 
however, feared-that would revive local Press criticism-, and he 
preferred to handle the matter on the spot, retaining just a 
few suitable officers'53-. , Both UNHQ and the US Government 
agreed to this'procedure"12., 
,, Thus it, would appear that the only concessions India made 
after requesting the withdrawal of US Observers, wasito allow 
those already-servifig to finish their term and - in order to 
overcome the difficulty of finding a sufficient number from 
other countries at such short notice - to allow a few to have 
their terms extended. -- It can only be assumed, that between 
them the US and UNHQ, persuaded, Pakistan-to give up her original 
insistence on a US representation on the Mission6 When the 
last US'Observer left at the end of 1954, Nimmo-paid a final 
tribute to them, saying that 123 officers of the US Army, Navy, 
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Air Force and Marine Corps had served with the Mission, usually 
making up about half the Group and sometimes even more. In 
addition aircraft and crew were furnished by the the US, and in 
the early days much of the equipment and some of the vehicles 
used by the Mission as well: "For five years they have done 
excellent work-and their absence is. very much regretted by all 
members of UNMOGIP" 153 . 
- ýThere was, however, some sympathy from an unlikely 
direction for India's antagonism. Chester Bowles, a former US 
Ambassador to India, pointed out that the US was 
over-represented in the UN's efforts to solve the Kashmir 
dispute, with both-Dr. Graham, the UN Representative, and 
Admiral Nimitz, the Plebiscite Administrator elect, being 
American, as well as-'so many of the Observers. He-went on to 
say:, "Despite the high-calibre, of--these men and all the 
goodwill in the'world, the UN effort to achieve a, Kashmir 
settlement inevitably took on the'character of a US, operation. 
In a situation where passions, run high, we have not only: failed 
to achieve a settlement,, but have inevitably, come'in for-sharp 
criticism... It is a deeply emotional situation which we must 
seek to-understand sympathetically and objectively. Since our 
aim is-to seek peace and*friendly co-operative action between 
India, and Pakistan,, it will be a, grave mistake4or, ýus to become 
partisans of either "134 
The end of bilateral negotiations 
'ý Notwithstanding the problems over the-US Military 
Observers, 1954 was the Mission's quietest year so far as 
breaches of the Ceasefire'Agreement were concerned, with only 
23 complaints being submitted, out of which three violations 
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were awarded*. One wonders whether the adversaries were 
simply content to vent their aggression in the verbal battles 
in New York, or whether they felt it was politic to keep a low 
profile on the ground precisely because the matter was so much 
to the forefront in New York. General Nimmo was optimistic 
that it was due to the fact that experience of operating on two 
sides of the Line had taught the commanders how to keep the 
situation under controll". However, a continuing 
deterioration in relations between the parties caused pressures 
to re-emerge on UNMOGIP. 
A relentless Press campaign followed Pakistan's 
announcement of her acceptance of US aid, and as the 
divergences in foreign policy became apparent at the 1954 
Conference of Asian Premiers in Colombo, where Pakistan upheld 
the western view that neutralism in Asia, was-only helpful-to 
Communism, and that a nation that was not with them was against 
them'". In August 1954, Nehru made it quite, clear that 
because of Pakistan's deal with the UnitedýStates India could 
not withdraw anything like the originally intended number of 
forces from Kashmir, and therefore it did notýseem possible to 
settle the preliminary issues which were a prerequisite to 
going ahead with the-Plebiscite, 57. As a result Mohammed Ali, 
who believed that the-US'Military aid issue was mere'ly an 
excuse, decided to end the bilateral negotiations and refer the 
matter back to the Security Council""'. Nehru, in his last 
letter continued to assert that disputes should, -be solved 
between themselves and not, by outside interference""'. 
Pakistan's decision to Join the Southeast Asian Treaty 
organization (SEATO) in-September 1954 further, vitiated the 
*See Table of ACFVs, page 167. 
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atmosphere, the more so as Pakistan threatened not to sign the 
pact if the aggression envisaged was only Communist aggression. 
Pakistan's point was conceded, although the United States, in a 
separate statement after the pact was signed, made it clear 
that the US was committed only against Communist aggression"11. 
A new Pakistan government came to power in October 1954. 
This was followed by a fresh spate of friendly statements on 
both sides, and the thread of negotiation was taken up again. 
However, by the time a new round of talks began in May 1955 the 
wide divergences in the two countries' foreign policies had 
again emerged, this time at the Bandung Conference of Asian 
Leaders in April. Furthermore the Governor-General of 
Pakistan, Ghulam Mohammedj was taken suddenly ill and was 
unable to attend the talks. As a personal friend-of Nehru his 
presence was important to effect the necessary goundwork before 
the arrival of the Pakistan Prime Minister. In addition the 
Nekowal Incident had Just occurred*. On arrival inýDelhi 
Mohammed Ali immediately expressed his regret about the latter 
and promised stern action against the guilty if UN Military 
Observers held Pakistanis to blame, and to pay an ex gratia sum 
of Rs. 100,000. for the relief of the victims families. 
Although Pakistan subsequently denied its responsibility for 
the incident, in spite of the Observers' findings', at the time 
the gesture was considered satisfactory on the Indian side. 
The talks ended with a brief communique on 18th May which 
showed that whilst progress had been made on other issues, 
there appeared to be little with regard to Kashmir. But 
further talks were promised, and rumours followed that the 
Kashmir Dispute would be removed from the Security Council 
*See pages 212-213. 
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agenda, and a new approach to the issue would include a 
stabilisation of the situation on the basis of the CFL161. 
In April 1956 Nehru confirmed that he had suggested to the 
Pakistan leaders that India would agree to the partition of 
Kashmir along the CFL and renounce her legal claim to the whole 
state: India had no desire to take it by fighting and had 
largely ruled out the question of a plebiscite, both because 
the pre-conditions, had not been fulfilled, and because the US 
military aid to Pakistan, had changed the situation in that 
Pakistan was now in a much stronger position to attack India. 
Indian Press and public opinion generally welcomed the 
statement'". 
The Pakistan Press became very critical when theýrumours 
circulated-in May 1955,, and the Pakistan Government had to back 
down. - On 26th May at a Press Conference Mohammed Ali-made it 
clear that, there was-no question of withdrawing the issue from 
the UN,, and admitted-that no Government could exist for more 
than 24 hours in Pakistan if it agreed to a settlement of the 
Kashmir dispute in a way unsatisfactory to the people'of 
Pakistan. The Press demanded an end to bilateral talks, and 
Mohammed-Ali was forced to put a time'limit onthe-talks, 
saying--that if agreement was not reached at--the next meeting, 
negotiations would be closed andýthe matter would revert to the 
UN163. Rather than concentrating the-minds of both sides on 
the issue this-simply caused India to-stiffen her attitude, a 
fact also contributed, to by-Pakistan's announcement on 30th 
June of her, intention to,, join the Baghdad Pact. - On 8th July 
the Indian Home Minister said, publicly that he could-not see 
the tide being, turned so far as that part of-Jammu and-Kashmir 
that was with India was concerned'64. , The chance of resuming 
the talks thus quickly receded. - They were not specifically 
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repudiated, but they did not take place, possibly ultimately as 
the result of the fall of Mohammed Ali 165. 
Early in 1956 General Nimmo wrote to Cordier in a 
despondent vein saying that for a long time he had felt that 
any hope for a solution of the Kashmir problem had been slowly 
but surely diminishing. Piecing together the unsought 
comments he had heard expressed since the end of 1955, he felt 
stagnation'was, complete and there was an apparent tendency in 
many quarters to accept the situation and take no further 
interest', 'an attitude'which'could not be more dangerous 
"because one side will certainly not be satisfied, and an 
explosion will occur some day". He added that UNMOGIP could 
now be expected, to'remain-in Kashmir for an indefinite time. 
UNHQ's reaction was: "not surprised"". ,ýI. 
Ghulam Mohammed-left Pakistan for medical treatment after 
the talks in May 1955 and soon Iskander Mirza took his, 'place as 
Governor-General, ýbecoming President with the launching of a 
new constitution in 1956. . In-August 1955 Mohammed Ali 
resigned - to be succeeded, by another Mohammed, Ali, who had 
been General Secretary of the Pakistan Government at the, time 
of the UNCIP mission. ý -Between August-1955 and October 1958, 
when General Ayub Khan took control, Pakistan had four Prime 
Ministers. The Pakistan internal political situation was such 
that no Government was-strong-enough to take unpopular 
measures, and-with so many changes was not-well-placed to 
follow any, coherent policy at all, 67. During this-period , 
relations between India and, Fakistan continued to deteriorate 
as both sides became firmly entrenched in their, opposing 'views. 
I 
, In December 1956j after nearly four years of fruitless 
attempts to solve-; the-problem bilaterallyý, -Pakistan brought 
Kashmir Dispute to the attention of the General Assembly of 
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United Nations, and in January 1957 formally approached the 
Security Council again. The ostensible reason was the 
completion of the labours of the much-abhorred Kashmir 
Constituent Assembly. But Pakistan may have thought the 
timing was opportune in that she was popular in the West for 
having supported-, the western powers over Suez and Hungary, when 
India's popularity in that direction was at an all-time low as 
a result of her steadfast policy of non-alignment'". 
KRISHNA MENON AND OTHER PERSONALITIES 
The Jarring Mission 
The UN Security Council re-opened the Kashmir Question at 
Pakistan's request in'January-1957, having been kept out of the 
picture; -for four years. -c- Pakistan's immediateýconcern was that 
Kashmir! s accession to India was about to be'ratified following 
the State's adoption of a new Constitution. -The Pakistan 
Foreign, Minister, Malik Feroz Khan Noon'reported on the failure 
of the bilateral talks which, -he said, Pakistan hadýinitiated 
in order to co-operate with the Security Council. He demanded 
the withdrawal of Indian troops from Kashmir and the holding of 
a plebiscite"'. 'In a-speech extending over three'sessions 
Krishna Menon, for India, said that India did not ask for 
Pakistan to, be formally condemned or to be declared an 
aggressor because she did-not want to aggravate the situation, 
India'simplY wanted the'ending of a-wrong. As regards the 
plebiscite, India's desire was initially-a wish, not an 
international commitment,, based on political rather than legal 
grounds. Ifthe, country had not been divided by the ceasefire 
it would'have been possible to do something. If an offer, is 
made and not accepted at the time, it cannot be held for 
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generations over the heads of those who made it. He took the 
positionýthat Kashmirs accession was valid and final, that the 
Kashmir people had expressed their desires in the elections of 
October 1951, and that those elections ended India's 
obligations in the matter of a plebiscite. The actions of the 
Kashmir Constituent Assembly were merely declaratory: an 
adverse, opinion would have had no legal validity because there 
was no provision in the Indian Constitution for secession by 
one of the constituent unitsýof the federation that would 
need, an Act of the Indian Parliament 174). 
-- On-21st February, after considerable debate and a Soviet 
veto of-one draft resolution, a resolution was adopted 
requesting the President of-the Council, Gunnar Jarring of 
Sweden, to, examine with the two Governments proposals likely to 
contribute-towards the, settlement of-the disputel". In, 
accepting the mission, Jarring, who had previously been 
Sweden's Ambassador to Delhi, made it clear that his acceptance 
was based on the express understanding that the parties were 
willing to co-operate with him"z, but in the event the extent 
of co-operation was insufficient. - Jarring held discussions 
with both, sides between 14th-March and 11th'April and submitted 
his report ont, 29th April, 1957. He said, that although "both 
parties are still desirous of finding-a solution... " he-was 
unable to suggest "any concrete proposals which ... are likely 
to contribute towards a settlement. .. "173. His major 
suggestion was a reference to arbitration to determýne whether 
or-not Pakistan had-implemented Part I of the UNCIPýResolution, 
as Pakistan-claimed but India-denied. - India still would not 
accept any*form of, arbitration, though Pakistan did accept 
after some hesitation' 74. On the other hand, whilst Pakistan 
again felt disillusioned by the ineffectiveness of the UN, 
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India welcomed Jarring's realism'75 when he said: "The Council 
will be aware that the implementation of international 
agreements of an ad hoc character, which has not been achieved 
fairly speedily, may become progressively more difficult 
because-the situation with which they were to cope has tended 
to change '1176 . 
The Jarring Report came up for discussion in the Security 
Council on 24th September, 1957. India was again represented 
by, Krishna Menon who made more long speeches, including another 
three-session one. He listed new acts of aggression by 
Pakistan, in the form of subversion and sabotage*, and asked 
what the Security Council was doing to stop it. His vehement 
opposition to the resolution being debated resulted in another 
Soviet veto in support of India 177. A milder-resolution was 
adopted; after an amendment by Gunnar Jarring; requesting the 
UN Representative, Dr. Graham, to visit the Subcontinent again 
and make further ; ecommendations"11. The Soviet Union 
abstained'79. 
From then on it was--apparent that the Security Council 
would not be able to pass any Resolution which was totally 
unacceptable to India, and many Indians felt that for the first 
time the Indian representative had come out victorious. 
However, ý C. S. Jha, India's Permanent Representative to the UN 
said that although Menon was "possessed of' brilliant intellect 
and eloquence", he also had serious defects. As someone 
remarked at the UN, he was "an outstanding statesman but the 
world's worst diplomat". Jha believed that Menon's-lack of 
diplomatic finesse and the abrasive manner, -in which he 
projected India's views needlessly caused offence, did India's 
*See pages 340-344. 
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and Nehru's image much harm, and contributed greatly to the 
cooling of relations between India and the United States, 80. 
Another Indian, Air Chief Marshal Lal, said that if it had not 
been for Krishna Menon's bad manners India might have stood a 
better chance in the Security Council"'. Andrew Cordier 
described Menon on 25th February, 1957 as "a man of 
considerable talent on the one side, but Most unpredictable on 
the other""'. Philip Noel-Baker maintained Menon had some 
strange hold on Nehru, who kept him at the Ministry of Defence 
long after everyone wanted him out, and sent him to the General 
Assembly of the UN when he was the most unpopular member of the 
Assembly*. 
In his resulting and final report, in March 1958, Dr. 
Graham recommended that India and Pakistan reaffirm the 
integrity of the Ceasefire Line and refrain from crossing it, 
and that a prompt study be made, under his auspices, of the 
methods of administrating the territory which would be 
evacuated by Pakistan. He also proposed a conference of the 
two Prime Ministers under his auspices'84. Pakistan accepted 
the recommendations but India objected to several features of 
the report, in particular Dr. Graham's suggestion that Pakistan 
had implemented Part I of the UNCIP Resolution'03. Dr, 
Graham's report was never debated in the Security Council". 
*Noel-Baker admitted Menon sometimes did useful things, 
such as in assisting in the conclusion of a truce in the 
Korean War'83. 
**In 1967, approachingýhis 81st birthday, Dr. Graham went 
on paid sick leave, and then on leave without pay, 
suffering from advanced-heart disease'06. He appeared as 
UNRIP in the UN Yearbook until his death on 16th February, 
1972. His post was described as "vacant" in the UN Year 
Books for 1973-1975, since when it has not been mentioned. 
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General Ayub Khan 
In spite of Dr. Graham's failure to achieve any progress 
there was a brief improvement in relations in the summer of 
1958 and agreement was reached on the East Pakistan border 
question, which had been a major problem. Before the 
improvement could continue, however, in October 1958 the 
Military Regime took over in Pakistan, and a period of 
uncertain policy towards India and Kashmir followed while 
General Ayub Khan consolidated his power at home'87. 
On 10th April, 1959 an Indian Air Force Canberra was shot 
down in Pakistan and the crew arrested. India said the 
aeroplane had strayed by mistake so Pakistan's action was 
unwarranted. Pakistan claimed the crew had admitted to spying 
and felt an apology was due rather than prevarication and abuse 
from Krishna Menon; but both sides exercised restraintles. 
With tension between India and China increasing after China's 
suppression of Tibet, Ayub Khan took the opportunity to attempt 
an improvement in relations with India, and opened the issue of 
Joint Defence of the Subcontinent. For a time the emphasis 
was on Indo-Pakistan co-operation; on 1st September, 1959, the 
two sides met in New Delhi and discussed mutual problems, but 
Pakistan wanted a solution to Kashmir as a pre-condition for 
joint defence, and little resulted from the talksM. 
Not until September 1960 did Nehru return the visit, on 
the occasion of the signing of The Indus Waters Treaty. And 
during the five days of talks Nehru and Ayub "did not find 
themselves temperamentally akin"-,. They did not meet again 
apart from casual contact at international conferences. 
Better frontier demarcation leading to fewer border affrays 
arose from the 1959-60 meetings"", but otherwise relations 
'I I. 
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immediately took a turn for the worse - possibly because in 
their private talks Ayub Khan, a newcomer to the political as 
opposed to the military scene, had realised how divergent their 
views on Kashmir still were. On October 6th at a public 
meeting at Muzaffarabad in Azad Kashmir, he declared Pakistan 
could not trust India until the Kashmir question was solved, 
and that the Pakistan Army could not afford to leave the 
Kashmir issue unsolved for an indefinite time. India, not 
surprisingly, took this as a threat, 92. 
Krishna Menon 
By the time., of the military takeover in Pakistan in 
October 1958, GeneralNimmo was under the impression-that there 
were increasing-political pressures being placed on the*Army on 
,, 
the Indian side'93. After Martial Law was declaredýin 
Pakistan the line between the Government and the Military must 
have become very thin therefore there was less'liklihood of the 
Government putting pressure on the Army to act in a way 
different from its own inclination. In fact there is no 
indication that the conditions the Pakistan military , 
authorities worked under were any different after the military 
takeover than before. It is possible that the Army had always 
had reasonable autonomy as the Government was weaký This 
weakness worked against UNMOGIP in that it caused the 
Government to have less control over its civilians than did 
that of, Indiaq- and civilians were-the, major cause of strife on 
the Ceasefire Line. But it did-make, dealing with the 
authorities an easier matter. Furthermore General Nimmo knew 
Ayub-Khan personally, thus it is likely, that the personality 
factor would have worked in General Nimmo's favour on the 
Pakistan side at this time, which was certainly not the case on 
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the Indian side. 
Krishna Menon thought all peacekeeping operations, apart 
from UNEF, had been a dismal failure. He maintained that the 
Indians would never have agreed to the Ceasefire Line or a 
plebiscite if they had known the whole business was going to go 
on for so long, and had he not been away in London* in 1949, he 
would have suggested a time limit. As it was, by 
misinterpretation'and disregard of the decisions, assurances, 
and pronouncements of the UN itself, the situation was used 
against Indial". In May 195T, after the Jarring Mission, 
Nimmo was invited to a reception at the house, of the Prime 
Ministerýof Kashmir, Bakshi-Ghulam Mohammed, in honour of a 
visit by Krishna Menon. Menon spoke for three quarters of an 
hour making references to Britain, the United States and also 
Australia: at this point he glanced at Nimmo, who was an 
Australian. He, stated that six of the members of the Security 
Council facing him around the table in New York were allies of 
Pakistan. He again emphasised Pakistan's aggression, and 
insisted, that India had no intention of using force, and that 
Pakistan had broken the Ceasefire Agreement in regard to 
military'force. At the end he shook hands with General Nimmo 
and said he hoped he had not embarrassed him-3. 
In July 1958 General Nimmo wrote to Cordier requesting a 
visit from the Secretary-General or his representative to 
reassess the role and composition of UNMOGIP because political 
considerations were becoming increasingly evident in nearly all 
the Ceasefire problems. Relations between India and Pakistan 
were worsening, and he felt the prestige of the 
Secretary-General might have a steadying effect. He thought 
*As Indian High Commissioner 
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political pressures were being put on military commanders so 
that complaints were not so satisfactorily dealt with, and many 
were used as propaganda. He suggested a civil component might 
be advisable, or a reconstitution of the Commission"'. 
The Secretary-General delegated his Under Secretary for 
Special Political Affairs, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, to make the 
visit. Sir Humphrey was on secondment to the UN from the 
British Foreign Office and had previously seen service in the 
Indian Civil Service and the Indian Political Service, and in 
1946-47 had been Joint Secretary for the Ministry of External 
Affairs in New Delhi'97. Before departing for the 
Subcontinent he noted that at all costs the UN should avoid 
blowing up the Kashmir question into a difficult political 
issue by treating it as one, and particularly avoid re-creation 
of the Commission. He thought the most that might be 
advisable would probably be the appointment of a political 
adviser to General Nimmo, so that points of difficulty which 
could not be settled in the field might be taken up by the 
Secretary-General with the Representatives-of India and 
Pakistan in New York, a procedure which was apparently followed 
in UNTSO"'. 
Sir Humphrey met the Most senior Government officials and 
Army officers in India and Pakistan', including both the 
President and the Prime Minister of Pakistan and the Head of 
the Kashmir State Government, and received no complaints of any 
kind against UNMOGIP. Both sides agreed that the Mission was 
useful and appeared to contemplate its indefinite continuation, 
saying that if it were not in Kashmir incidents would 
undoubtedly multiply. However, on his return he called on 
1 
Krishna Menon, who happened to be in New York, and Menon said 
the UN was against India and some members of UNMOGIP were 
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biased against the Indian side. He referred particularly to 
the Australian Observers and, to a lesser extent, the 
Canadians. He said that, like Englishmen in the past, 
Observers from these two states found that it was easier to get 
on with Muslims than Hindus. He hinted the Indians might 
demand the removal of the Australians, as they had the US 
Observers*, and thought they might have to ask for Burmese and 
Indonesian Observers. He was apparently somewhat contemptuous 
of General Nimmo, but not hostile. He dismissed Sir 
Humphreyýs arguments "as childish" and said he had given 
instructions that no complaints against the Mission were to be 
made to Sir Humphrey during his visit to save him from being 
involved in anything beyond the proper functions of the 
Secretariat. Arthur Lall, the Indian Permanent 
Representative, was embarrassed and later implied that Krishna 
Menon should not be taken too seriously. The fact remains 
that Krishna, Menon, with his deep antipathy to the West which 
coloured all his thinking, was in a powerful position"'. 
- Sir Humphrey and General Nimmo decided that the 
introduction of a civilian. element into UNMOGIP would arouse 
suspicion on both sides. It might also compromise, ýthe 
Mission? s relations, with the armed forces, which were already 
under some strain on the'Indian-side - directly, it was felt, 
because of Menon's attitude2OO. In'his letter of appreciation 
regarding Sir Humphrey's visit General Nimmo remarked that such 
an important envoy, could, not fail to raise the, prestige of the 
Mission-in the eyes of both parties concerned and should do 
much to remind them of the, importance the Secretary-General 
attached to the continued observance of the Karachi- 
*S6e pages 277-285. 
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Agreement201. It was not apparent, however, that in spite-of 
his perceptive report to the Secretary-General, Sir Humphrey's 
visit made much difference to the situation in the Mission 
area. Nor, indeed, did a short visit by the Secretary-General 
himself the-following year during the course of a tour of Asia. 
The political overtones of this visit were such that it was 
strongly stressed that the visit was only to General Nimmo and 
his Mission in order to discuss administrative matters, and not 
to the, State'of Kashmir. The intention was that he should not 
be besieged by local party leaders wanting to put their case to 
him. He-would, of course, Cordier told Nimmo, have detailed 
discussions on Kashmir with the leaders, of India and Pakistan 
in New Delhi and KarachJ202 . 
Continuing Political Pressures 
Between July 1959 and February 1960 General Nimmo was at 
odds with the Indian CGS, General Sen, on the problem of armed 
civilians and, armed police along the Ceasefire Line. It was 
apparent then, from the'long interludes between the letters, 
and the nature of their contents, that General Sen was being 
carefully briefed, both, politically and legally*. Ultimately, 
in March 1960, General Nimmo sent copies of-the correspondence 
to Andrew Cordier "for the information of the IýII 
Secretary-General". At the same time he, told Cordier he would 
be grateful, for any comments or advice he might wish to give 
regarding the points raised, and1went on to say that he felt 
ceasefire matters were receiving more and more attention by 
authorities other than purely military, which pointed to the 
necessity of UNMOGIP staying firmly within its terms of 
*The correspondence is discussed in detail on pages 
223-227 and 336-346. 
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reference, and not being diverted into political controversy. 
He also suggested that the UN might wish to reconsider his own 
retention of the post of CMO as his views did not coincide with 
the wishes of some Indian authoritie s2OZ, Cordier replied 
that the position taken by General Sen should not cause alarm 
since it reflected a point of view he had every right to hold, 
and-the1act that it differed from General Nimmo's was not 
necessarily an expression of lack ofýconfidence in Nimmo's 
judgment. He agreed that UNMOGIP should-not be diverted into 
political controversy, but said it was sometimes difficult to 
draw a clear cut line between military and legal problems which 
might in turn reflect political considerations, and he thought 
this was'the case with regard to the present question, of 
self-defence*. Cordier also offered to check the draft-of any 
of Nimmo's communications to either of the parties for possible 
political implications, but said he felt the line Nimmo was 
following seemed to be cautious, patient and firm, and that the 
Secretary-General and he extended their-good wishes in theý 
handling of this delicate phase of-the work of UNMOG IP204. 
In July 1960 Nimmo mentioned noticing inýthe 
Secretary-General's Report of September 1959 that UNMOGIP was 
on a lower grading than UNTSO and-UNEF., - He courteously asked 
Cordier to consider the effect making this public would have on 
the status and influence of UNMOGIP in the eyes of, the two 
parties "now that a representative of one of them is a UN 
Commander" and another a military'adviser-to the ý 
Secretary-General"***ý -He thought that any, tendency, for the 
*Pages 345-346 
**General Gyani, Commander of UNEF 
***General Rikhye 
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Observer Group to lose importance, or be pushed into the 
background, would not be at all desirable in the context of the 
current situation203. Cordier said there was no way of 
accounting for such discrepancies except by considering the 
context in which the various missions were conceived, their 
purpose and the present stage of their activities. A 
complicating factor was that UNMOGIP maintained a status quo 
until the Plebiscite Administrator had conducted a plebiscite, 
with the result that there was a kind of freeze as regards 
UNMOGIP. There was also a reluctance to alter the existing 
arrangement in, any way, since any alteration was bound to raise 
questions asýto why it was being made, and was bound to be 
evaluated in political terms, and perhaps misinterpreted2O6. 
- Nimmo accepted Cordier's arguments and added, "I suppose 
one has felt the political pressures behind the simple military 
problem more so than, formerly "207. In March, 1960 he reported 
that on the Indian side the determination-to resist 
"encroachment" from acrossýthe Line persisted, -and grew even 
stronger, as was evidenced by increased numbers of Indian (not 
Kashmiri) armed police in forward areas. Inevitably it was 
claimed that these were necessary in order, to deal with 
"infiltrators" and "saboteurs", 'and to protect peaceful, 
citizens. Pockets of, civilians living on the Indian side but 
sympathetic to Pakistan came under increasing pressure, and 
were harassed in some-areas, even to the extent of feeling 
obliged to leave their homes and fields, and flee to the other 
side. There were also civilian feuds between those willing to 
submit to the Indians and those-whoýwere not. This natural 
tendency was Probably encouraged by agents from-both side S206. 
On the Pakistan side, civilians pressed against the-CFL 
and overflowed it in places much to the annoyance of the 
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Indians. In some areas local Indian commanders tried to 
ignore their activities as much as possible, but political 
pressure was exerted on them to take action. Azad Kashmir 
troops and police, naturally sympathetic, did not seriously try 
to stop the civilians continuing their farming and grazing 
operations, and claimed that the status quo should continue as 
far as the local inhabitants were concerned as the land was 
theirs. The stage was set therefore for constant clashes and 
the opportunity was not missed by local hotheads to fan the 
flames. Civilians had firearms which were not officially 
approved, nor normally in evidence, but which were produced 
when the occasion demanded2o, .- 
Nimmo told Cordier that he fully understood his 
responsibility to avoid involvement in the political aspects of 
the Kashmir problem, but he felt it his duty to keep him 
informed of the facts of the case as reported above. He 
thought that in view of the serious possibilities ofthe 
situation a meeting of Governments had--to come-sooner or later,, 
and the sooner the better if the United Nations was to avoid 
another difficult problene". Cordier thanked Nimmo for his 
analysis but said that there did not appear to'be any 
initiative they could usefully take 'at that stage, and that 
unfortunately the existence of the United Nations 
Representative for India and Pakistan was not likely to 
contribute to an easing of the situation since the Security 
Council had not at that time considered Dr. Graham's most 
recent report which was submitted in 1959. All Cordier could 
suggest was that if the situation deteriorated still further, 
it might become necessary either to transmit some of the 
relevant material to Dr. Graham, or for the Security Council to 
undertake some steps with the partie, --0213. 
303 
Nimmo remained convinced that political pressures stemmed 
largely from Krishna Menon, who still occasionally made public 
remarks against the Mission. In April 1962 Nimmo told Dr. 
Bunche that they did not let Menon's remarks influence them in 
their work in the slightest degree, but endeavoured to maintain 
their, -impartiality and friendly relations with both armies212. 
His'letter, was provoked by a speech of Menon's on the eve of a 
UN debate on Kashmir, in which Menon again questioned the 
impartiality of the Group213. In the same letter General 
Nimmo mentioned various social meetings he had had with Indian 
army officers and then said he-was-convinced many local 
commanders along the Ceasefire Line were obliged to submit as 
many-complaints as possible which were used as grist to the 
political MJ11214. This suggests that officers he had met had 
privately admitted so. -, - 'He-went on to say that, with a limited 
number of Observers operating in very difficult terrain this 
made-their-task almost, impossible. I In pase after case they 
could find no actual supporting evidence and "one often wonders 
whether such complaints were genuine or-whether they were not 
at least highly exaggerated in content and-expression-I have 
always tried to meet their wishes by holding an investigation 
into every complaint at the place of the incident, even if 
hours, or even days are required for Observers to reach the 
spot". Lately, however-o'he said, -, they had had to get tougher 
and reject or decline to accept a few complaints which seemed 
to offer no basis for proof-5. 
Krishna Menon was removed from-his post at the end of 
1962, but with the situationýbetween India and-Pakistan 
continuing to deteriorate, it cannot be said that his removal 
reduced the number of, alleged ceasefire violation complaints 
which UNMOGIP received. 
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VISIT TO THE MISSION BY DR. BUNCHE 
Indo-Pakistan Attitudes to each other 1961-64 
During 1961 India continued to reiterate the view that any 
settlement of the problem could only be possible on the basis 
of the CFL, saying India would talk at any time on such a 
basis. Pakistan would not accept this. Ayub talked of "other 
means" if a peaceful settlement proved impossible 216. The 
deterioration in-India's relations with the West resulting from 
her takeover of Goa in December 1961 caused Pakistan to think 
it opportune to refer-the Dispute to the Security Council 
again217. On 10th January, ý1962 India offered bilateral talks 
to Pakistan regarding all outstanding problems between the two 
countries. ý Pakistan was not prepared to withdraw her referral 
to the UN even ifýthese talks were to take, place;,, so India 
decided the talks would-be-fruitless-8. In early March 
Pakistan warned the Security-Council that unless UN procedures 
were capable of halting India's dangerous policy "the people of 
Azad Kashmir and Pakistan may, in, desperation, turn to other 
"219 methods The Security Council, however, seemed'reluctant 
to take up the matter again and suggested the parties instead 
use the good offices of Eugene Black, President of the-World 
Bank, who had played an important role in-the negotiationsýon 
I 
the Indus Waters Agreement. India again refused such 
arbitration, insisting the Dispute should be solved 
bilateral . 
1y220 The Security Council met on 27th'April. - 
Zafrullah Khan returned on the Pakistan side and spoke for two 
days, but the Soviet delegate prevented any attempt at a 
Resolution' - 
The question of their common boundary had always been a 
point of issue between India and China, in spite of their 
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professed friendship and India's belief that her own policy of 
non-alignment would ensure there was no danger of aggression 
from the Communist states. However, after China's suppression 
of the'revolt in Tibet in 1958-59, strains arose to the point 
of minor border clashes by 1960222. Before the Indians were 
even, aware of it, so little did they control the area, the 
Chinese had-built a 300-mile long road across the Aksai Chin in 
Ladakh. Krishna Menon*, as-India's Defence Minister, gave 
orders in late 1962 that the Indian Army should go and repel 
the Chinese Army from the area,. The Chinese defeated the 
Indians, and immediately withdrew to what they considered to be 
their own side of the border. The Indian Government, fearing 
a much more serious situation, -sought the military'assistance 
of the UK, and US- throwing aside her non-alignment, according 
to-Pakistan, who, was much displeased-when'the arms were sent, 
since the majority of India's army still faced-Pakistan rather 
than China. Pakistan then turned increasingly, towards 
China'". 
, During the short war Pakistan newspapers and demonstrators 
insisted this was the moment for settling the Kashmir problem. 
*In Lord Noel-Baker's words: "The vehemently 
anti-imperialist Krishna Menon worked on a British map 
which, on British imperial principles, put the frontier a 
long way to the north of the frontier shown on Chinese 
maps 11223 . In fact the Tibet-Ladakh frontier was supposed to have been defined by Commissioners appointed by-the 
British and Gulab Singh when the latter acquired Kashmir. 
The Commissioners were unable to reach the frontier owing 
to a rebellion but believed the line was already 
sufficiently defined by nature, and recognized by custom. 
A second commission attempted to secure the co-operation 
of the Chinese, but the Chinese delegate failed to appear 
and the demarcation of the frontier had to be abandoned. 
Nevertheless a Chinese map published by Peking University 
in 1925 excluded the Aksai Chin from China's frontiers, 
although later ones include most of it. India claims 
further that in their mutual negotiations relating to the 
definition of the Border, China claimed a larger area in 
1960 than she did in 1956224. 
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The official position was more cautious. Friendly letters 
were passed between Nehru and Ayub Khan, and whilst Pakistan 
did little to alleviate India's predicament, she did assure the 
Western powers she would not herself move militaril Y226. 
As a condition of Western assistance in the war, India was 
persuaded to enter bilateral negotiations again. Six meetings 
were held between 27th December, 1962 and 16th May, 1963. 
Pakistan as usual pressed for a plebiscite, or at least a 
partial plebiscite, limited to-the Vale and preceded by a year 
of, international control, of the Vale. India repeated the 
contention that circumstances had changed since 1949 and that a 
plebiscite was no longer feasible, and. again suggested 
partition of the State. On that basis Pakistan, wanted not 
only the Vale, -but also large parts-of Jammu. An agreement 
announced in March 1963 between Pakistan and China on the 
demarcation of their mutual boundary in Kashmir* - discussions 
on which had started in 1961 - not only soured negotiations, 
but also denied them any validity-in the-context of Ayub's 
proposal in 1959 for a,, joint'defence policy against'China. 
India vigorously protested against Pakistan's disposal of 
territory that was in dispute, although Pakistan assured her 
that the boundary would only remain as defined if the area 
became part of Pakistan227. Early in'May 1963, the American 
Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, and the British Secretary, for 
Commonwealth-Relation5, Duncan Sandys, -offered their services. 
Contrary to its normal, policy, the-Indian Government accepted, 
but Pakistan did not226 . On 16th May, 1963 a joint communique 
announced that the-two'Foreign Ministers, Mr. Z. A. Bhutto and 
Mr. Swaran Singh recorded, with deep regret that no agreement 
*See Map 1. 
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could be reached229. 
Nevertheless, Mr. Bhutto felt the negotiations had been 
useful, if only to bring the matter before the public eye 
again, and to demonstrate that the problem continued to exist. 
India had been endeavouring to maintain that this was no longer 
so, and that Kashmir was now an integral part of India. 
Furthermore the matter had lost its urgency as far as the 
United Nations was concerned. Bhutto maintained that India's 
admission in their joint communique that agreement could not be 
reached, proved that there was indeed still a dispute 230. 
Nehru reported in the Indian Parliament on 13th August, 
1963 that they had told Pakistan that while India was as 
anxious as ever for a settlement, there was no question of 
considering any proposals for the internationalisation or 
division of the Valley, or joint control of Kashmir and that 
the concessions they had offered Pakistan were no longer 
open"I . 
With the failure of the talks, Pakistan again approached 
the Security Council, which met on 3rd February, 19642". By 
May 1964 the Security Council had come to no unaninmous 
agreement except to express concern at the continuing lack of 
agreement between India and Pakistan 233, The expectation of 
further bi-lateral talks in 1964, at the instigation mainly of 
Sheik Abdullah, newly released from prison, were dashed when 
Nehru died before they could take place. Shastri, his 
successor, showed no desire, or perhaps felt he had 
insufficient authority, to resume direct negotiations with 
Pakistan, and in May 1965 re-arrested Sheik Abdullah as a 
result of the latter's contacts with China 234. 
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General Nimmo Requests an Enlargement of UNMOGIP's Role 
The major problem of civilians in Ceasefire areas, 
involving in particular the question of civil administration up 
to and even across the Ceasefire Line, culminated in a series 
of communications from General Nimmo to Ralph Bunche between 
October 1963 and'January 1964233 General Nimmo's stand was 
that the use of armed force in any form to promote the policies 
of the respective sides could only be wrong in the eyes of the 
UN, as it ignored the spirit and intention of the Ceasefire 
Agreement relating to the demilitarized zone along the 
Ceasefire Line. Nevertheless, in November 1963 he said that 
threats by both sides in this regard were the greatest menace 
to peace at the time 236. 
In October 1963, General Nimmo had what he subsequently 
described as a "frank, friendly and constructive discussion" 
with the Indian Chief of the Army Staff, General Chaudhuri, 
primarily regarding the troublesome fortified police posts at 
Balakot and Tarkundi*. General Chaudhuri who, Nimmo reported, 
certainly saw the need to curb as far as possible the 
activities of armed police and civilians, indicated that 
although he would try his utmost to have the military terms of 
the Karachi Agreement observed by his side, there were aspects 
of the situation which were above his, or indeed General 
Nimmo's power to control. He also wondered "whether the time 
had not come when the Secretary-General might not deem it 
necessary to ask a few pertinent questions of the Governments 
and point out their responsibilities and obligations towards 
the Ceasefire 11237. 
Spurred on by this discussion and as a consequence Of his 
*See pages 228-236, particularly page 235. 
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general concern with the deteriorating 
ýituation, 
General Nimmo 
suggested to Bunche that the Mission needed to enlarge its 
scope by means of a change of terms and status if it was to 
continue to be effective. He reminded Bunche that a few years 
previously Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, and subsequently the 
Secretary-General, had visited UNMOGIP when Nimmo had suggested 
the possibility of broadening the scope of-the Mission*, but it 
was-decided at, the time that, the situation did not Justify such 
a step, and that-the Group should continue simply to hold the 
fort. Since neither he nor the military commanders could any 
longer solve the day to day problems from'a purely military 
standpoint, he now suggested that the status of UNMOGIP should 
be raised sufficiently to allow himself; or whomsoever was 
considered best fitted for the role, to be-vested with 
authority to approach certain Ministers, such as'Kashmir 
Affairs and Defence, not with-a view-to settling the Kashmir 
Dispute,. but at least to, iron out some of the problems of the 
ceasefire and thus help to induce a better feeling and 
understanding among members of Governments in-relation to 
ceasefire matters. He felt that if he had a'Deputy to handle 
the daily ceasefire problems and other-operational matters in 
detail he could, with the requisite status and authority, 
have 
more opportunity and be better equipped to interview not only 
Army HQ but also Ministers and Government officials in both 
countries. ý He already knew many personally and had known 
some, including'President-Ayub Khan for many yearS230. 
In November, fearing, that it might appear that he'Was 
seeking promotion for, its own sake, he-emphasised that it was 
purely an enlargement of the scope of the Mission that he was 
*See pages 297-299. 
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suggesting, and the Secretary-General might prefer to send his 
own Representative again, even temporarily, to discuss and 
advise as well as to contact Government authorities in 
person 231 As a result of a letter to both CGS regarding the 
Chaknot situation* being made available by India to the 
Security Council, Nimmo again reiterated to Bunche in January 
1964 his opinion that unless the Mission was elevated to the 
point where ministers and government leaders could be made 
responsible there could only be further-deterioration in the 
situation. He suggested he-should visit UNHQ in New York to 
discuss the situation as soon as possible240, In fact the 
result of his approaches was that in, January 1964 he was 
promoted to the rank of Under-Secretary24t, though there is no 
suggestion in the files that this specifically gave him the 
extra-authority heýwas requesting, 'and instead, -6f his visiting 
New. York Ralph Bunche made a visit to the Mission, which took 
place in April of that year. 
,- On-20th March the Security Council appealed for calm in 
the area, but on, 2nd April Nimmo reported there had been 31 
ceasefire complaints since the appeal which, to his mind, was 
further evidence-thatýneither Government had taken the 
Council's appeal very serious ly242 ., II 
Dr. Bunche's Report 
Dr. Bunche was favourably impressed by-Nimmo and the - 
functioning of UNMOGIP, and thought that in'the prevailing 
conditions the Mission was indispensable to the maintenance of 
the Ceasefire. Agreement. In, his report to the 
Secretary-General he said, the purpose of his visit was to see 
*See pages 349-353 and 375-376. 
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the operation at work, appraise its efficiency, and explore 
possible means of increasing its effectiveness. He verified 
that not only General Nimmo but also the Governments of India 
and Pakistan had urged that the visit be made at that time, and 
all had given their full co-operation 243. Furthermore, both 
India and Pakistan favoured strengthening the operati on244. 
As well as speaking to General Nimmo and all important 
governmental and military people on both sides, including 
President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Nehru, Bunche followed 
the Ceasefire Line along most of its length and spoke to all 
but one of the 38 Military Observers then serving with the 
Mission. He hadýextensive discussions with Indian and 
Pakistani commanding and senior officers in each-sector he 
visited. He said that, -the latter were friendly and 
co-operative and that the Observers were well--thought of by 
them and on friendly terms with them245. 
He confirmed that most of the difficulties stemmed from 
the fact thatýin the 500-yard zone'on the Indian side from 
where civilians were-excluded, armed police were regularly 
stationed, whilst on'the'Pakistan side armed civilians were 
cultivating right upfto the Line*, a concurrence of factors 
which increased the liklihood of incidents. - 'He reminded-the 
Secretary-General that whilst the Ceasefire Agreement provided 
that military personnel should be kept-out of a 500-yard zone 
on each sideýof the Ceasefire, Line, it did not specifically 
exclude armed police or armed-civilians. -He suggested 
exploratory approaches should be made, to, the two. Governments 
about a revision of the Ceasefire Agreement so, as td exclude 
all armed personnel, including-armed, police and armed 
*See pages 195-196. 
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civilians, from the 500-yard zone246, but if such approaches 
were informally made they were unsuccessful. 
Bunche recommended better communications facilities in the 
form of portable two-way radio telephones, and an increase in 
the number of Observers from 40 to 45, but pointed out that 
only. a, peace force, which the Observer Group was not, could 
hope to-police the Line. He thought-the effect of the 
increase in numbers would be largely psychological, and that in 
fact an increase in the mobility of Observers would be more 
helpful than an increase in their numbers. He suggested a 
study be made of the feasibility - logisticalýand economic - of 
providing one or more helicopters for the-operation, and 
mentioned the situationýwas at least to beImproved-with the 
imminent arrival of a new, aircraft, as the-Mission had, been 
without-one'for the previous year247. Whether his'suggested 
study was made is not known, -but the helicopters-, were not in 
any, event forthcoming. He also suggested giving a wider 
geographical base to the Observer Group by selecting from 
countries not then represented, examination of means of 
obtaining Observers for tours of duty of not less than two 
years, and that means should beýdevised of better screening of 
potential Observers, particularly as regards personality and 
English language proficienCy240. 
- Bunche advised there should be a more active back-stopping 
of the, operation at Headquarters, including demarches - 
informal or-formal as the need might be - to the Delegation 
whose, country was responsible for each serious incident; he 
said this had never been done. He thought a more, deterrent 
effect from the findings on serious breaches of the ceasefire 
could be achieved by a follow-up letter from the 
Secretary-General to the Government found responsible for the 
313 
breach, calling attention to the implications and, when 
considered necessary, circulation of the finding to the 
Security Council or making it otherwise publ JC241. 
Approach to the Indian and Pakistan Delegations to the UN 
-General Nimmo welcomed Bunche's report and agreed that a 
little more, logistic support would not come ami S5230. It is 
difficult to find examples of any changes that actually came 
about, apart from representations being made to the two 
Delegations at the UN as the situation worsened, but events may 
have overtaken diplomatic discussions. -There were sharp 
increases in activity along-the-north-central section of the 
CFL in June and July, which slackened off only to be replaced 
by an even greater increase in the southern sector*,. On 22nd 
September, 1964, as heavy and-persistent firing continued daily 
along, the southern-section, -and, firing and raiding incidents 
increased in other-sectors,, Nimmo cabled-Bunche: "Obviously- 
some deep political game is-being played, as, both-Army Commands 
seem either loath or powerless to intervene. - It is no 
exaggeration to say that an undeclared-war is-going on in Jammu 
and Kashmir". Hundreds ofýthousands of rounds of fire were 
being expended, he said, in spite of Observers' efforts and his 
frequent awards of violations against both sides, and on many 
occasions Observers had come under heavy fire, which further 
indicated that the situation was getting out-of hand. He- 
urged that the Secretary-General be informed and that the . 
strongest pressure be-exerted upon, the Governments to declare 
whetherýthey intended to observe the ceasefire or not. He 
also suggested that the USA and others be informed of the use 
*See page 240. 
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to which their military aid was being put so that they might 
exert strong pressure"'. 
The Secretary-General did formally approach the 
Representatives of India and Pakistan at the UN, a fact which 
was mentioned in the Press of both countries. He also 
personally requested a, further assessment of the situation from 
Nimmo252 . Nimmo repeated the 
facts concerning the parties' 
conflicting policies towards civilians: Pakistan contended 
they had a right to pursue their normal activities in their 
traditional land irrespective of the Ceasefire Line, whilst 
India resisted their crossing of the Ceasefire Line and 
introduced armed police to ensure administration up to the 
Line, a move which had caused frequent clashes involving 
troops, police and armed civilians. Pakistan, he said, 
claimed that the Indians fired to dominate the Ceasefire Line 
and harass civilians, whilst India claimed Pakistan fired to 
harass their troops and force attention on the Kashmir problem 
to keep it active. The most serious incidents were raids and 
ambushes conducted from the Pakistan side across the Ceasefire 
Line, but on occasion India had counter-attacked253*. 
Nimmo suggested that the best way the Secretary-General 
could usefully support the Mission's long-standing efforts 
would be to persuade the parties on three counts: to agree on 
a sensible policy towards civilians in ceasefire areas, which 
would require Government agreement and directive to their army 
commands; to have the Governments reaffirm the ceasefire and 
order compliance by commanders, including respect of the 
500-yard demilitarised zone; and to cease the extensive firing 
which inflamed tempers and caused needless casualtieS234. In 
*See page 239. 
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January 1965 he wrote again to Bunche expressing his concern 
that the situation continued to deteriorate. He suggested 
that the Secretary-General might wish to consider informing the 
members of the Security Council of the casualty figures and 
urge the Parties once again to search for ways and means of 
resolving their'difficulties and eliminating the waste and loss 
of'life, which was continuing"'-- and which, indeed, continued, 
culminating in war in the September of that year*. 
*See Chapter 14. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN - MILITARY ATTITUDES 
ATTITUDES TO UNMOGIP 
Early Attitudes 
The attitude of the Military Authorities to UNMOGIP was 
reflected to some, extent in the attitude they were taking to 
each other at a given time, which for the most part was 
dictated by the political scene. But, as shown in Chapter 
Ten, the'political background impinged more strongly on the 
attitude of the Indian Army to UNMOGIP than that, of the 
Pakistan, Army, particularly after Krishna Menon became Defence 
Minister in 1957. In the first years, however, any political 
embarrassment directed at UNMOGIP seemed to be instigated by 
the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir rather than 
the Indian Government.. Thus the Indian-Army officer5-were 
free to offer every assistance to the Group: the most senior 
officers were quick to support Delvoie when he was in disgrace 
at the end of his term of office; General Nimmowas advised by 
General Cariappa on how best to deal with the, Cadwalader 
Incident; and General de Ridder received General Attal's help 
during the disturbances in Srinagar in August 1953i*when he 
first, arrived on the Mission*. Even when the political 
difficulties were,, inspired by the Indian Government, in the 
case of the request for-the withdrawal of, all US, Military 
Observers in 1954**, General Nimmo reported that in spite of 
the publicity given the matter in the Press,, the, status of the 
US Observers with-the Indian and Pakistan, Armies-had notýbeen 
*See pages 249,258 and 268-270 respectively. 
**See-Pages 277-285. 
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affected. They were still able to carry out their duties in 
an impartial and satisfactory manner, and he felt they retained 
the confidence and respect of the Commanders on both sides of 
the CFLI . Nevertheless 
in July 1954, as the crisis over the 
US Observers was coming to an end, General Nimmo reported that 
the CGS India, General Chaudhuri, had spoken to him on a social 
occasion about-the possibility of the Indians being involved in 
peacekeeping in Indo-China, and said he would like to talk 
about some aspects of the Job with him if it came about. 
General Nimmo thought this to be "quite a change of outlook as 
most of the criticism we ever have comes from their-side 112, 
though it may be that he was referring to criticism from the 
political rather than military authorities. He was, of 
course, in. any-event pleased to help General Chaudhuri in any 
way he! could3. 
In, fact. -both sides regularly expressed the high esteem in 
which they-held the Group-and its Chief Officers. At the 
Karachi Conference of Military Representatives in 1949, which 
had been preceded, by much adverse criticism of UNCIP in the 
Press*, - the two, Delegations paid tribute to the admirable and 
completely impartial manner in which the Truce'Subcommittee in 
general,, and-General Delvoie-in particular-, had performed their 
difficult task. 4. 
I When Brigadier-Angle arrived-at the Mission in February 
1950 he was, well-received by-the two sides: General Cariappas 
the-Indian Commander-in-Chief was pleased with his plans to 
visit each Army HQ every two weeks and gave the opinion that he 
thought that the personal contact would be of benefit both to 
the Armies and the UN Observer Group. General McCay,, the 
*See page 357. 
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Pakistan Chief of the General Staff, likewise expressed 
approval of the plan, and also of Angle's intention to change 
Observers from the Indian side to the Pakistan side, and vice 
versa, every three months to ensure their impartiality'. Both 
CICs told Nimmo on his arrival at the end of that year that the 
presence of the Military Observers had had a most helpful 
stabilizing effect in the forward areas6. On separate 
occasions in 1956 both the Indian CGS, General Srinagesh, and 
General Chaudhuri, then Commander, of the Indian Forces in Jammu 
and Kashmir, -and later COAS, expressed themselves well-pleased 
with the fairness always experienced from UNMOGIP, and the 
confidence they felt in the Group7. 
During his short term of officei. Angle reported to Colban 
that senior headquarters on both sides had been most 
co-operative, both on-the question of ceasefire violations and 
administrative probleM5, -although some subordinate commanders 
had not taken the Observers, into their confidence. -This, had 
not only made the task of the Observers more-difficult,, but "it 
had not created the trust and. -mutual confidence which should 
have existed, between the Observers'and, the two armies". ý 
Nimmo,, however, reported within a few months of his arrival 
that the co-operation extende&to, him at conferences and during 
visits, had ironed out the several petty grievances-and 
misunderstandings which used to exist9. But the attitude of 
the Indian commanders hardened afterýthe appointment of Krishna 
Menon'as Defence Minister. 
A Hardening of Attitudes 
Social relations with both sides almost invariably 
remained good. General Nimmo and his Observers made a point 
of attending as many as possible of the local functions to 
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which they were invited, including army tattoos, parades and 
sports as well as social functions as this made for a happy 
relationshiplo. It also enabled General Nimmo to have 
unofficial discussions which must often have helped to ease the 
way out of difficult situations, but which only occasionally 
appeared on the record. However, although the Indians 
remained courteous, they seemed, as Sir Humphrey Trevelyan* 
reported in 1958, "to be frightened, of (Menon) and were said to 
have instructions not to be too-friendly with the Mission, 
which was not treated with the same cordiality and 
open-handedness as in previous years". Trevelyan maintained 
that, the-, calibre, of the commanders had deteriorated**, and they 
no-longer admitted openly that the Ceasefire Agreement had to 
be observed. - They had written some foolish letters, 
apparently because they were afraid of being taken to task for 
not being tough enough in dealing''with incidents in Kashmir". 
The more cautious dealings withýthe, Group were thus'combined 
with'increased criticism, time-wasting complaints, which'did not 
stand up to investigation, downright deception on occasion and, 
ultimately, a refusal to abide by the decisions of theýCMO on 
serious breaches of the Ceasefire, or-at least without many 
months of difficult negotiation***. 
Sabotage in-the shape, for example, of small and somewhat 
amateurish'attemptsýto blow up bridges began to take place on 
the Indian side when it became apparent-thatýIndia did not 
intend to hold a-plebiscite, and,, had hopes of settling theý 
*Details of Sir Humphrey's visit to the Mission are given 
on pages 296-299. 
-**See also pages 325-326. 
***For example, see the Balakot/Tarkundi situation, pages 
228-236. 
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Dispute on the basis of the status quo. General Nimmo 
discussed the sabotage with the Pakistan Commander-in-Chief who 
said, his forces were not involved, but the incidents could be 
the work of-Azad Kashmiris. The Indians, though increasingly 
concerned and making vague threats of retaliation, could not 
catch the perpetrators or produce any evidence of 
responsibility. However, keen younger Indian officers made 
complaints for which there was no evidence and then blamed the 
Observers when for this reason a No Violation, decision was 
giVenl2-. Krishna Menon also used this'as a means-of 
discrediting the Observers, suggesting-thatýthose from 
Commonwealth countries in particular were partisan towards 
Pakistan'3* .- However, General Palit, Indias'Director of 
Military Operations between 1961 and 1964,, expressed his 
conviction that'General Nimmo, was absolutely, even-handed; that 
India placed great reliance on UNMOGIP's presence as aý 
peace-maker; and-that there could no aspersion cast against 
the Mission, for not detecting infiltrators, either immediately 
prior to the war in 1965 or earlier. If the, infinitely 
greater force of the Indian Army-tstationed by the Ceasefire 
Line could not detect them, such a small group-as UNMOGIP could 
not be expected to do S014. 
Relations between senior Army7officer5 and General Nimmo 
only once became bad at a personal level. Between July 1959 
and March 1960 General Nimmo had two concurrent series of 
fairly acrimonious correspondence with the Indian CGS, General 
Sen. - General Sen was taking a strongly legalistic approach in 
his attempts to further a policy with which he had been 
presented, and it is possible that'General Nimmo took too 
*See page 298. 
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personally a genuine difference in point of view. The letters 
were not numerous, but were lengthy and there were long 
intervals between them during which time General Sen had 
obviously carefully deliberated his response and sought legal 
advice., Thiý legal-input makes them a particularly useful 
study of the attitudes of the Indian side on certain issues, 
all connected with, the question of civilians along the 
Ceasefire Line. They serve as an illustration of how policies 
formulated by the political authorities were reflected by the 
military, -and in particular policies regarding civilians which 
were those which most affected-the operations of UNMOGIP*. 
--In Apri'l-1964, as the situation deteriorated badly prior 
to the 1965 War, General. ýNimmo told Ralph Bunche that-whilst 
the-procedure-for investigating incidents which occurred on the 
Ceasefire Line had always'been respected in the past, because 
Local Commands were collaborating sincerely with UN Observers 
to find out who was responsible for the incidents and to take 
corrective action if requiredi, this collaboration no longer- 
existed. Incidents-were not-often, investigated by Local 
Command before complaints were made, and frivolous complaints 
were frequently submitted. 'The result was that with the 
exceptionýof a few with a'strong-personality the Observers had 
lost their restraining influence and advisory role, and their 
work consisted merely of investigating and reporting"'. ' 
ý- 'By this time difficulties, were also being experienced at 
the operational level-on the Pakistan side**. And when war 
was approaching, deliberate difficulties were made for the 
*General Sen's communications are dealt with not only in 
the present Chapter (pages 336-346), but insofar as they 
concerned relations between armed civilians and police 
they are also referred to in Chapter Nine, pages 223-227. 
**See pages 235 and 352-353 for examples. 
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Observers by the Local Commanders on the Pakistan side rather 
than the Indian side,, but probably for pragmatic rather than 
personal reasons, since whatever the complexities of the 
Kashmir Dispute as a whole, the war was primarily instigated in 
the final instance by Pakistan*. 
ATTITUDES OF THE ARMIES TO EACH OTHER 1949-58 
In the Aftermath of the Ceasefire 
In the initial atmosphere of mutualýgoodwill and 
enthusiastic approval of the Ceasefire of lst January, 1949, 
India withdrew certain troops and aircraft, and Pakistan sent 
the tribesmen back, but as a truce and a formal reduction of 
forces, w4s not'then forthcoming, the inherent instability of 
the situation-began to make itself felt as the officers'and men 
on bothýsides became more'uncertain about whether they'were 
goingto be sent home or were to be called-on to fight again. 
They thus became inclined to make the most of tiny incidents 
and to try to improve their position with a view to a possible 
resurgence of the fighting"., ý Local commanders mentioned all 
alleged violations in daily situation reports addressed to 
their Army HQ who, in turn, informed the opposing Army HQ and 
General Delvoie. This-practice of bringing the most trivial 
incidents, to the knowledge of, the CICs and of the Governments 
contributed greatly to the deterioration of relations between 
the-two Armies". By the end of March 1949 the goodwill which 
had existed immediately after the Ceasefire had depreciated 
considerably, and there was an increasing number of minor - 
incidents and also a reluctance-to carry outthe exchange-of 
*The situation at this time is discussed more fully in 
Chapter Thirteen, pages 403-405. 
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prisoners-of-war agreed upon by the two CIC's16. During the 
nine-month period from when Military Observers first arrived on 
the Subcontinent until General Delvoie's departure at the end 
of-. October 1949, of the 272 complaints investigated only two 
were considered by General Delvoie to have any real military 
significance", but the two sides tended to over-emphasise the 
importance of incidents, thus increasing the tension in the 
atmosphere". A Pakistan Divisional Commander told Brigadier 
Angle. soon after his-arrival as CMO in February 1950 that most 
of-the complaints of the Ceasefire Agreement were petty and 
should not be reported", whilst an Indian Commander shortly 
afterwards admitted that. he-knew his Junior officers were prone 
to exaggerate their alleged ceasefire violation reports22. 
At the thirteen-meetings held in Karachi in July 1949* for 
the two Armies to reach a-temporary agreement in lieu of a 
final-political settlement, there was an attitude ofýmarked 
friendliness, with senior, officers of'the two Armies calling 
each, other by their first names. On the relatively infrequent 
occasions-when their conflicting claims introduced a note of 
tension;, the civilian observers of both delegations made 
successful efforts to calm rufffled tempers, indicating perhaps 
a strong political desire on. the part of both Governments to 
achieve, a, purely military agreement23. Agreement was thus 
reached on what activitiesýwould constitute'a'breach of the 
Ceasefire, -and for demarcation of the, Ceasefire Line. - 
Generally speaking the spirit of Karachi prevailed in the 
ensuing months, ý although some local Indian Commanders refused 
Pakistan-officers access to all fortified areas in Indian-held 
territory to enable them to perform their agreed duties in 
*See page 95. 
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demarcating the CFL24 . 
When Brigadier Angle arrived at the Mission as CMO in 
February 1950, both General Cariappa and General Gracey, the 
Commanders-in-Chief of the two Armies, as well as other senior 
officers Angle met in his first few days, disclaimed any desire 
for further war and pointed out that the commanders on the 
other side were their friends as they were all serving in the 
same, army so recently". However, at the end of of March* 
General Cariappa told Ambassador Colban, strictly in private, 
that relations were-deteriorating to a point he, considered 
really dangerouS26 , General Gracey expressed great alarm to 
Brigadier Angle at Indian troop concentrations in East 
Punjab27-, and Angle received a note from his Liaison Officer in 
Delhi--saying that the'French Military Attache was concerned 
over the increased movement of Indian troops which he, viewed as 
indicating a feeling on the part of the Indian Army that 
further outbreaks were likely. He_thýught there was' 
increasing discontentjýparticularly on the part, of the Indian 
civilianS28. General Srinagesh, GOC in Charge-Western Command 
of the Indian Army, likewise, expressed the view that civilians 
were more apt to, provoke an outbreak of hostilities than the 
Indian soldiers who did not want to fight Pakistan". 
Inevitably Pakistan also Joined in with troop concentrations", 
but fears of an immediate-t-resumption of hostilities died down 
afterýa successful meeting between, the two Prime Ministers in 
April 1950**. ý 
General Grinagesh also asked Angle to compare the present 
situation-in Kashmir with the situationýthe previous year when 
*See also pages 176-178. 
**See page 205. 
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Angle had been stationed there as an Observer. Angle replied 
that the relationship between both sides at the top was good, 
but that the relationship at the lower levels had deteriorated, 
mainly due to new troops taking over the forward sectors and 
not being properly briefed by the troops being relieved3l. 
Angle told Colban, moreover, that an Observer posted at 
Tangdhar field station had reported that every young officer 
arriving at the Brigade directly from the Indian Military 
Academy at Dehra Dun had "a most obvious and peculiar attitude 
towards even his own superior officers. He has an attitude of 
infallibility and cockiness and is decidedly critical of the 
experience of his seniors in the pre-Partition army. It is 
quite apparent that these young officers are being taught 
intolerance to the nth degree. This point is causing grave 
concern to the Brigade staff officers"32 The Observer's 
report was given added interest by reason of the fact that 
Brigadier Angle had previously had a conversation with General 
Kalwant Singh on the same subject". Furthermore, a senior 
Pakistan officer told Angle he "deplored the rapid promotion of 
Indian officers", and said he felt the lack of trained and 
experienced senior officers was the weakness of the Indian 
.I 
Army". 
The situation inevitably did not improve. In 1955 Lord 
Birdwood visited the CFL and noted that a Pakistan captain 
referred to the Indians as the "enemy". Lord Birdwood 
pointedly remarked that the officer had received his commission 
in 1950". Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, who visited the Mission in 
1958, also commented that relations between Indian and Pakistan 
forces were deteriorating because the younger officers brought 
up post-Partition were more strongly imbued with narrow ideas 
of nationalism, and were more aggressive in their attitude to 
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the other side than were the senior officers who remembered 
officers on the other side as colleagues34. 
Increasing Tension 
When General Himmo became CMO at the end of 1950, he 
described the situation as "undoubtedly an explosive one": 
although quiet on the-surface, there were strong underlying 
influences which could cause some minor incident to flare up in 
a very short time. He saw the main stabilising factors as 
being the restraining influence of bothýHigh Commands over the 
troops, and through them the civilians, on both sides of the 
CFL, and the presence of Observers acting as umpires in the 
area., He pointed out that the troops had been facing-one 
another across the CFL for a long time. Their life was hard 
in the mountains, especially in winter, and they were apt to 
become restless-. Lord Birdwood tells how the 
above-mentioned captain spoke, in 1955, of the comic relief of 
a rather dreary daily round: they propped up some logs and 
with a little ingenuity made them look like mortars. A, few 
days later along came-a UN Observer, summoned in, a message from 
the Indian side. ý, Lord Birdwood hoped he saw the Joke!, 
However, Lord Birdwood was also told that the-Pakistan 
commander had ordered that there should be no saluting on the 
CFL as that gave away-the presence of an officer, and a wary 
enemy might make some kind of deduction from the number of 
officers coming up to the front lineu. Thus the patrols,. in 
the area were regarded. more seriously than as mere routine even 
at this quietest period in the CFL's history. 1ý 
In spite of the, problems over the US Observers and a 
renewed cooling in-relations between India and Pakistan*, in 
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1954 the number of complaints received by UNMOGIP was the 
smallest since the Mission began. General Nimmo felt it was 
because the Commanders in the forward areas had made it their 
business to ensure strict observance of the terms of the 
Karachi Agreement within their sectors. At the same time 
UNMOGIP maintained its policy of keeping the Ceasefire 
Agreement and the UN role before the field commanders by active 
association and personal liaison on the part of the 
Observers". At the start of 1955, after the departure of the 
final US Observer, General Nimmo was able to report that 
although the current approved establishment was for 35 
Observers, the actual strength was only 27 with two more 
expected, yet this was deemed sufficient in view of the 
satisfactory situation4o. 
His optimism was nevertheless somewhat ill-founded as the 
number of'ceasefire complaints was never again as low as in 
1954. , In April 1956 General Nimmo remarked in his Operations 
Report that the slight increase in the number of complaints 
received was indicative of the tenseness and general hardening 
of feeling between the two sides which had become noticeable 
and was undoubtedly due to recent political declarations made 
I- 
in reference to the Kashmir question4l* . In January 1957, 
after Indian-held Kashmir had been more cl o5ely integrated with 
India, there were widespread protests in Pakistan and Azad 
Kashmir and General Nimmo noted that a number of statements had 
appeared in both Indian and Pakistan newspapers alleging that 
the two sides were building up their troops in Kashmir. He 
himself, whilst travelling between Jammu and Rawalpindi, had 
noticed a large number of civilians with their cattle and 
*See, page 288. 
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personal belongings moving towards Jammu from villages near the 
Border - an indication that they feared trouble. Observers 
made special in'spections throughout their areas but reported 
only normal activity and no increase in troops". 
Nevertheless speculation about such build-ups, in particular in 
the Northern Areasý, continued in the newspapers throughout the 
year. One Observer made a special trip to the Northern Areas 
covering-500 miles by road and 300 miles by foot; mule and pony 
and reported that no such activity was. evident43., But after a 
field trip in April 1958 Nimmo's report confirmed his 
previously formed impression thatýthe atmosphere of tension had 
increased among the commanders and troops in the whole, area, 
particularly on the Indian side, and was obviously a result of 
heightened political feeling between India and Pakistan over 
Kashmir 44. 
Location of the Ceasefire Line 
When tension was high in the summer of 1958P General Nimmo 
felt he was receiving a number of requests in connection with 
the redefinition of the CFL which he felt were not occasioned 
by military reasons. ' He therefore-had Observers refer all 
such requests-to him and await instructions in order to, ensure 
deliberate and co-ordinated action acceptable to both parties, 
and to lessen the danger of mistakes in definition4.5. A few 
incidents which occurred in May 1960 serve to illustrate the 
confusion that still remained over the exact location of the 
Ceasefire Line more than ten years after its demarcation. 
They show also that co-operation between the Armies Of the two 
sides still continued to manifest itself on occasion, but that 
a certain laxity that had'been displayed in the Northern Areas 
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was unlikely to continue, due perhaps as much to India's 
deteriorating relations with China as to those with Pakistan. 
Two similar complaints were reported by the Pakistan side 
to the Skardu Observer Team. They comprised only the 11th and 
12th in over ten years of UNMOGIP's presence in this sector, 
although 37 complaints had been lodged with the Kargil Team on 
the Indian side, suggesting a greater sensitivity on the part 
of the Indians. The following incidents indicate that in 
these Northern Areas the latter nevertheless showed 
considerably less concern about the inviolability of the CFL 
than they had been demonstrating along its western stretch*. 
One complaint claimed that four armed Indian-riflemen and 
ten other ranks had approached the CFL within the, vicinity of a 
nearby village with a viewýto kidnapping locals on the Pakistan 
side, but had withdrawn when spotted by the Pakistan checkpost. 
Since the area in question had been awarded to India by the 
Acting CMO in a letter ten years previously, and this was 
agreed by both sides, General Nimmo closed-the case with an. 
award of No Violation against India. At the, time that the 
village was awarded to India, the new location of the CFL was 
described only as "the-north border of the houses". Over a 
period of years it had developed that the local authorities on 
both sides considered the CFL to be a man-made water course 
running along the northern side of the village. Nimmo thus 
asked the Army authorities to advise their local commanders 
that a joint meeting should be arranged so that the location of 
the CFL could again be specified and agreed to. The 
noteworthy aspect of the whole matter, which was highlighted 
during the investigation, was that Pakistani military personnel 
*See pages 195-196. 
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had been allowed to take their leave in the village, a fact 
which General Nimmo pointed out was legally, if not morally, a 
breachýof-theýKarachi Agreement, and he requested the practice 
be stopped". 
ý The other complaint concerned an incident arising from the 
use of a water point about 150 yards on the Indian side of the 
CFL by four soldiers and a coolie*1rom a Pakistani picquet. 
Such use-had been made at intervals over a number of years and 
had never been authorised, nor had it been, officially objected 
to, In this-incident two of the sepoys were armed with 
rifles. ý A detachment of Indian troops was ordered forward to 
observe., capture if possible, and-fire if necessary. Some 
firing, from both sides took place, and one wounded-Pakistani 
soldier and the coolie, were captured near the water, point. ' 
The Pakistanis accused the Indians, amongst other things, of 
abducting the-two Pakistanis, but-a Violation was declared 
against Pakistan for crossing the CFL. The Observers decided 
there was too much confusion-in the stories for anything else 
to be determined. General Nimmo remarked, however, that the 
Indian troops could also be said to have, laid themselves open 
to the charge of entering, within 500 yards of the CFL, and with 
firing, when there were other ways of dealing with the 
situation within the letter and, spirit of the Karachi 
Agreement". 
Another incident in May 1960 resulted in a complaint being 
submitted from each side, and concerned a known trouble-spot, 
Sudpura in-the Tangdhar-Domel sectors. The CFL in this area 
ran through cultivated fields which had been farmed for 
generations by villagers now living on both sides of the Line. 
*Labourer 
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For some time after the Ceasefire the villagers continued to 
farm their lands regardless of the possible need to cross the 
CFL, the exact location of which they had also sometimes 
disputed. When the hardening of attitudes led to restraints 
on the farming of their traditional fields efforts were made by 
the-villagers to exchange land'50 that each could farm on their 
own side, but inevitably there were a number of farmers who 
were dissatisfied and felt cheated. With no civil means of 
arbitration, the civilians resorted to force in an effort to 
farm their traditional land. This in turn led to the, 
appearance of armed police, and subsequently incidents 
involving them also. On this particular occasion a Violation 
award was made against India, because Indian personnel fired 
across the CFL. -- -The cheering aspect of the incident was that 
the local commanders of both-sides, assisted by Police of both 
sides, thenýgot-together-with great co-operation and redefined 
the CFL in a practical, way in order, to solve the-problem so far 
as the local inhabitants were concerned 49. 
Finally, an incidentýoccurred when Pakistan armed forces 
approached within 500 yards of the CFL in order to-protect 
civilians who were harvesting along a disputed section of the 
Line. In awarding a Violation against Pakistan General Nimmo 
remarked that it was unfortunate that patience was not 
exercised by the local Pakistan-commander until theýproblem was 
solved; However, he thought it was also worth,: noting that the 
problem-was subsequently amicably settled, at. a meeting the two 
sector commanders 41 'II 
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ATTITUDES TO CIVILIANS 
Limited Co-operation 
ýIn 1949 and the early 1950s the Armies tried to co-operate 
with UNMOGIP and, for the most part, each other in an attempt 
to'ease the difficult situation caused, by civilians along the 
CFL., However, their hands were considerably tied by political 
considerations, both at the top and, 1ocally, and by the 
anarchic attitudes of the'civilians themselves. 
I At a. UN Conference on 6th September, 1949 Mrs. Pandit, 
India's Ambassador to Washington had, claimed that Moslem 
inhabitants-of six villages along the CFL, five of which were 
in the, Tilel Valley, had opted for India inýthe presence of 
Pakistan and Indian military representatives and UN Obervers, 
all of whom were present to demarcate the CFLOO. - 'As a result 
of the propaganda publicity aroused-by this speech Lt. Colonel 
Angle*, one of the Observers present, sentýa note to General 
Delvoie stating that in one of the villages-the dominating 
factorýwas the enmity of two brothersi-one of whom had a larger 
following than the other., Thus the villagers' opting for 
India had little to do with their feelings in regard to-the 
Indo-Pakistan conflict, and in fact the, Indian as well as the 
Pakistan4military representative had tried, unsuccessfully, to 
persuade the villagers to return to, their village which would 
be on the Pakistan side of the Line. In two of the other 
villages it was the Pakistan officer who persuaded the 
villagers to remain in their village, which would come under 
Indian administration, ýand in one at least positive affection 
for the Pakistan'representative was shown at the time of their 
*Later CMO, Brigadier Angle 
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agreement to stay. Apart from this the Observers formed the 
opinion that the villagers were more concerned with being 
allowed to harvest their crops and continue with their normal 
lives than with the political future of their village. The 
relations between the military representatives at the time were 
friendly and cordial and both considered the villagers to be 
unreliable and untrustworthy". 
At a conference which the Indian CIClinvited General Nimmo 
to attend in Srinagar in June 1951, one local commander stated 
that there were no serious breaches of the Ceasefire Agreement 
in his area: his two main troubles were agricultural 
encroachment onto the Indian side, and, large-scale civilian 
infiltration. On three occasions during the previous two 
months groups of between 40 and 65 people had crossed the Line 
and been sent back by Indian troops. He and another Local 
Commander mentioned incidents when about 50 Pakistan personnel, 
on one occasion dressed in uniform, and the other carrying 
arms, had entered Indian territory and stolen cattle,, but the 
Commanders had accepted that investigation by UNMOGIP had shown 
they were not Pakistan troops*. The CIC said he could stop 
both infiltration and encroachment by-force but, was averse to 
doing so, and would be grateful if General Nimmo wouldtake up 
both matters with the civilian authorities, otherwise he would 
have to use force. He had given strict orders, that no , 
retaliatory raids were to be permitted, as then theArmys 
object to maintain the peace could not be achieved54 
*Many civilians Possessed uniform-like clothing because 
when they were released from the British Indian Army at 
the time of Independence they had been given two khaki 
outfits each52. Furthermore both General Delvoie and 
General Nimmo expressed the opinion that Pakistan Border 
Police might have participated in the raids, or at least 
turned a blind eye to them73. 
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General Nimmo had already been in touch with the Pakistan 
authorities and agreed to continue with his approaches". 
Twelve months later, in June 1952, and further to a note from 
the Assistant CGS, India, regarding the cultivation by Pakistan 
civilians on the Indian side of the CFL, General Nimmo 
contacted the Pakistan CGS in order to discuss more stringent 
control of civilians along the CFL56. The Pakistan CGS 
expressed concern; but pointed out that with the restrictions 
placed on the troops of both, sides not to patrol within 500 
yards, of the CFL, the handling of civilians within that area 
was a matter for the civil authorities, and in'spite of 
stressing to the civil agency concerned that more control must 
be exercised, he had been-unable to, obtain concrete results. 
He did, however, arrange with the appropriate Ministry for a 
conference on the subje Ct57 .-r 
- The conference was duly held on 12th July, 1952, in the 
presence of senior Army personnel,, Deputy Secretaries from the 
Ministries of Defence'and Kashmir Affairs, a Border Police 
Commandant and a UN Military Observer. Disturbance of ' 
economic, life was the main-reason put'forward for the crossing 
of the Line by civilians,, even when they knew their lives would 
be in danger as a result. Other reasons: suggested were 
retaliation for raids emanating from the Indian side, and 
provocation by the Indians. It was explained that as the 
Indians had disturbed the watersheds, the fields on the - 
Pakistan side which relied on irrigation by this water could no 
longer be cultivated. Thus the villagers had toýchoose 
between starvation or crossing the CFLýin order to cultivateý 
the better fields, at the risk of being killed by Indian 
troops. The UNMOGIP Representative asked for details of 
watersheds in order to contact the Indian authorities to have 
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the normal water courses re-established 
58*. 
The Pakistan Chief of Staff pointed out that the Army had 
no legal authority to control civilians but promised its full 
co-operation. The UN Observer in turn stated that as the 
Karachi Agreement did not apply to civilians, the problem of 
the movement of civilians was equally not, under the control of 
UNMOGIP. 'But as the crossing of the Line seemed to be 
increasing, the CMO felt that if some positive action was not 
taken quickly at a high Government level, tension would mount 
and real strife and bloodshed occur, with-clashes beween troops 
an&civilians. He stated further that UNMOGIP understood that 
Indian forces had orders to resist infiltrationýby civilians, 
and from what the Group had observed"they had so far carried 
out the orders with restraint under the influence of senior 
local, commanders. Obviously it was not practicable-for troops 
alone to control civilian movements since they were not 
permitted to enter the 500-yard,, zone. - Therefore it seemed to 
the CMO that civil police must be made available to do this. 
Further, since many civilians wore khaki, it was very difficult 
for UN Observers, when investigating a complaint, to be sure 
whether or not the Army was involved3l. 
The Observer reported-that the meeting was-held in a 
spirit of co-operation, but that the Pakistan Army was in a 
very difficult position as it had no legal authority to control 
the civilians and did not want to be involved in civilian 
affairs". The Pakistan CGS suggested that UNMOGIP might 
organise local meetings between India and Pakistan under the 
control of UN Observers, since the Army was willing to find'a 
peaceful solution to the problem. The best results might be 
*The outcome' is not known. 
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obtained from such small meetings as Local Commanders were in 
the best position to suggest what action might be taken". 
General Nimmo thus instructed his Observers that if the Local 
Commanders desired it, they were to be prepared to arrange such 
meetings provided there were only military personnel present". 
Some time later Andrew Cordier agreed it was worth trying to 
forestall the possibility of more serious incidents developing 
from minor civilian matters, so long as the Observers engaged 
in'the, effort had Nimmos's approval, -and so long as Nimmo felt 
"the friendly intervention of the Observers-was*welcomed by the 
parties and helps them inýmaintaining the ceasefire"63. Such 
meetings did take place, and in this, way many; problems were 
resolvedi, particularly in the area of therapid exchange of' 
people and, ýcattle who had-strayed across the Line and been , 
imprisoned or impounded or, indeed, who had been, abducted or 
stolen*. Nevertheless, civilian incidents continued to-form 
the basis of, the majority of complaints submitted to UNMOGIP. 
Legal Issues 
, Between July 1959 and March 1960 General Nimmc) had a 
series of somewhat, acrimonious correspondence with'ý'the Indian 
CGS, General Sen**. One set of the correspondence started 
*In November 1964 the Pakistan side briefly raised some 
opposition to the use of the UNMOGIP Good Offices cliannel for 
the exchange of prisoners, indicating that they Would pref er to 
have the problem dealt with directly by the two 
Governments. 
General Nimmo told the CGS that he f elt this would tend to 
close the existing channels f or the exercise of 
UNMOGIP Good 
Off ices in relation to persons of any category, and which 
previously- had resulted in many repatriations. ' 
lie suggested 
UNHQ could perhaps be used instead f or the exercise of their 
Good Offices through the DelegationS64. In f act t1le two sides 
continued to accept the Good Offices of the Mio5iOll: in 
February 1965 a 9-year-old boy was handed over f rom 'the Indian 
side to the Pakistan side 65. 
**See also pages 223-227. 
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badly as General Nimmo's first letter on the subject, in July 
1959, was not quite clear and "lacked personal comment", as 
General Sen pointed out" . General Nimmo wrote again 
apologising for his omission. He explained that the matter 
had originated in May of that year when the Indian commander at 
Naushera had asked UN Observers to stop civilians from the 
Pakistan side approaching the CFL. The Observers contacted 
their opposite Team at Bhimber who made representations to the 
Pakistanis-and received, in return, a letter with a request 
that it be passed to the other side. General Nimmo sent 
General Sen an extract from the letter which stated that the 
CFL was a temporary line agreed to cease operations with a view 
to solving the Kashmir issue in a peaceful manner. -The CFL 
had no, bearing on the properties owned by the State subjects 
who, in an effortto make ends meeti, plbughed the land they 
owned. General Nimmo checked with the CGS, Pakistan, to 
ascertain that theletter'expressed his'views. The lAter 
, took the view that-if civilian problems were, not controlled , 
they might become the forerunner of'serious incidents, but that 
civilian problems were not within the scope of the Karachi 
Agreement, and under existing circumstances the Army could not 
be expected to maintain control over the local peopleý- He 
felt they should be left undisturbed and the-status quo 
maintained. If the Indians thought-otherwise the whole 
problem of civilians should be-discussed by the Governments of 
the two countries. General Himmo's comment to General Sen was 
thatýthe civilian problem had been present for a long time, and 
that as it was a civil matter and outside the Karachi 
Agreement, UNMOGIP could only attempt, to alleviate the 
situation and minimise incidents by endeavouring to use its 
influence with local commanders from a Good Offices 
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standpointi, 7., 
General Sen took until the end of February 1960 to answer 
this letter. - He then maintained-that he did not share 
Pakistan! s contention. that the CFL had no bearing on the 
properties owned by State subjects, but that indeed the CFL had 
been established specifically with the object of preventing 
clashes between the two sides. It was for the authorities on 
the Pakistan side of the Line to control their civilians. 
They-could not absolve themselves from this responsibility on 
the ground that civilian problems were outside scope of the 
Karachi Agreement. He pointed out that such problems did not 
arise-on the Indian side of the Line, and if the activities of 
the civilians on the other side were controlled, no problem 
would, arise. He further maintained that legal conventions did 
not support the Pakistan claim so far as the question of 
civilian rights to cross the CFL were concerned. He quoted 
Article 51 of the Geneva Convention of 1949, -which stated that 
civilians in occupied territory must not be asked to carry out 
work outside the occupied territorylo - he did not make it 
clear how this affected the civilians who chose to cross the 
Line of their own accord. He also quoted an extract from 
Charles G. Fenwick's "International Law"*: "There appears to 
be no definite rule of customary law-covering, -the relations 
during the armistice between the belligerent, army and-the 
population of occUpied territory or between the population of 
occupied territory and their fellow citizens in territory held 
by the de jure government. Since the legal effects of the 
state of war continue, the presumption should be that the 
rights of the military occupant towards the inhabitants, in 
*Pages 494-5, edition not specified 
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the absence of special agreement, remain unchanged, and that 
the inhabitants are in turn precluded from intercourse with 
their de jure government and the territory under its control. 
The Hague regulations call special attention to the fact that 
'it rests with the Contracting Parties to settle, in the terms 
of, the armistice, what communications may be held in the 
theatre of war with the inhabitants and between the inhabitants 
of one belligerent State and those of the other"'. General 
Sen went on to say that the matter had to be considered in the 
light of, the spirit in which the Ceasefire Agreement was 
con I ceived and accepted by India and Pakistan. He stressed his 
point by reminding Nimmo of a plebiscite held at the time of 
the, demarcation of the CFL in 1949 in the'Tilel, -Valley*, in the 
presence of UN Observers,, to decide whether the villagers who 
found-themselves on theýwrong side of the Line, wished, to, stay 
or cross over. He maintained that this showed that any. who 
elected to, move to the other side of the Line from their 
property would lose their rights in this property. A further 
example he cited was the case of the Indian Army having built 
an almost-duplicate village on the Indian side of the Line to 
accommodate villagers-who decided-to cross into Indian 
territor3,11. 
In his reply to General Sen, General Nimmo, pointed out 
that the last part of the Fenwick extract, by Sen's own 
admission? stated "it rests with the Contracting Parties to 
settle, in the terms of the Armistice... " and the absence of 
any such settlement under the Karachi Agreement had cau5ed 
difficulties for the'Military Observers in the Ceasefire areas 
from time-to time. He-said he assumed that this absence - 
*See page 332. 
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stemmed from the directive under which the Karachi Agreement 
was formulated, which stated that the meetings would be for 
military purposes with political issues not being considered. 
He went on to say that he had therefore endeavoured to avoid 
political, issues and use the Karachi Agreement as the basis for 
UNMO GIP's-role, the most they could do regarding civilians- 
being to use their Good Offices to ease disputes wherever 
possible- with, some success he,, thought. He mentioned some 
achievements in this reSpeCt7O. 
- He-told Cordier that although there was a lot left unsaid 
about civilians on'the Kashmir CFL, he had chosen not to go 
deeply into the matter at this time with General Sen as it 
seemed better to try to keep the problem from escalating-and to 
continue with UN Good Offices as-before, whilst impressing on 
the armed forces-their obligations under the Karachi Agreement. 
He also, again explained, that the pressure of population against 
the CFL was much greater from-the Pakistan side, because much of 
the land on the Indian side in forward areas was empty as the 
Indian Army did, not permit civilians forward of or among their 
advanced positions. Accordingly, civilian encroachment by 
farmers and suchlike was much more of a problem for the Indians 
than the Pakistanis, and'he well understood the Indian point of 
view",. 
A WORSENING SITUATION 
Sabotage 
On 1st August, 1958, Major-General Verma, then Indian CGS, 
wrote to General-Nimmo saying-that sabotage activities over the 
CFL were causing grave concern. - He said that 46 major cases 
had been reported that year, and from time to time incidents 
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had been brought to General Nimmols notice. He reminded 
General Nimmo that the matter had been discussed the previous 
December, when General Nimmo had-promised to give every 
assistance in pinning responsibility should definite evidence 
be produced72. 
In May 1958 General Nimmo assured the Indian side that he 
had-spoken to the Pakistan Chief of Staff about the Indian 
concern that the Pakistan Army was involved in sabotage 
incidents in-Kashmir, but was convinced by the reply that the 
Army Authorities were-not responsible for such activities and 
would not condone them73. ' However, the Indians believed that 
since'the beginning of 1958 Pakistan had been engineering more 
and, more, incidents across the CFL in order to keep the problem 
in the public eye. These included firing, encroachment on 
territory,, --stoppage of water channels flowing across the Line, 
incidents at harvest time, spurious claims to property, 
commando raids by soldiers disguised as civilians, planting of 
booby traps and bombs, cutting off telegraph and telephone 
lines, night attacks on picquets, posts and villages, and 
distribution-ofýliterature inciting people to religious, 
hatred". 
- General Verma said the-exploSives and devices were so 
modern they could only come from-the Pakistan Army via their US 
Military Aid', and that the Indian, Army had evidence to prove 
complicity by the Pakistan authorities, and the employment of 
Pakistan/Azad Kashmiri soldiers in these aCtS73., - Niramo 
pointed out that of the 67 complaints so far received that 
year, only'two might possibly have been amongst the 46 cases of 
sabotage mentioned by Verma, and in these-two raids, the- 
presence of soldiers from Pakistan could not be established. 
Failing receipt of detailed information or definite proof of 
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the Pakistan Army's complicity, "I think you will agree it is a 
little difficult for the UN to make accusations". He 
suggested also that if the situation was as serious as depicted 
it was hard to understand why one did not hear more of it in 
Srinagar, or that Observers in forward positions did not 
receive formal complaints of Pakistan Army activities in this 
connection 76. 
Asked for their opinion in writing on the matter of 
sabotage, in August 1958, whilst some Observers did think such 
acts were on the increase, most thought they had always been 
pretty constant, and difficult to prove therefore not often 
reported. -Since the Observers' tours of duty were normally 
only-of one to two years,, however, most of them wouldnot have 
had a long period of time to make comparisons. One Observer, 
stationed at Punch did say: "... unofficially... there have 
been some half dozen cases-of sabotage this-year, and it would 
appear that the incidence of such cases. -is, on the increase. 
Attempts have been made by civilians to-demolish a medium-sized 
bridge, the invaluable flying fox, and some places-of-Hindu 
worship. These attempts were all unsuccessful. It is- 
understood a civilian was-, caught'red-handed. Indians here say 
that civilians are instructed by Pakistan military personnel 
and are sent to do the Job, but become scared when'laying the 
charges. The fuses seldom ignite"77. 
. In February 1960 General Sen, informed 
General Nimmo he 
could not subscribe to, the latter's view that he, Nimmo, was 
unable to deal with incidents involving civilians and armed 
parties transgressing onto the Indian side of the, Line. He 
drew Nimmo's, attention to Paragraph B-of, Part I of the UNCIP 
Resolution of 13th August, 1948 wherein forces under the - 
control of either High Command were defined as including "all 
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forces, organised and unorganised, fighting or participating in 
hostilities on their respective sides"78 . The irregular 
forces in mind at the time of the Resolution would have been 
for the most part the tribesmen who had initiated the original 
invasion of Kashmir. Whether the armed gangs of civilians 
operating in Kashmir in 1960, even if it could be proved they 
had crossed the Line, could be said to be operating on the side 
of a Government which professed to have suspended hostilities, 
and to know nothing about them, is at least debatable. It is 
possible that some of the authorities on the Pakistan side, 
particularly those of Azad Kashmir, mightýhave been prepared to 
turn a blind eye to-their activities and even offer 
encouragement. But General Nimmo did not believe that senior 
Pakistan Army officers, the only authorities with whom he had 
the power to deal, were doing any such thing79. Indeed they 
would probably have preferred that the incidents did not take 
place. General Sen, however, was not prepared to believe that 
the Pakistan Army authorities were not actively, conniving with 
the armed intruders, who would not otherwise have access to 
such a large stock of arms. He strongly expressed the view 
that the Pakistan High Command should be held fully 
responsible". 
General Nimmo repeated the accusation to the CGS, 
Pakistan, General Yahya Khan, and received the reply that 
India's allegations were false, baseless and malicious. Yahya 
Khan reminded Nimmo that as a result of a similar complaint on 
a previous occasion they had made searches for arms in the 
presence of UN Observers, -and no "large stocks" had been found 
in Azad Kashmir territory. He further suggested that the 
solution to the problem lay in adopting the recommendations 
they had made on that occasion, early in 195901. The Pakistan 
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conclusion at that time was that the miscreants had 
sympathisers on both sides of the Line, and possibly resided on 
the Indian side, and that the main reason for the local 
people's hostility to Indian patrols seemed to be the 
repressive measures which the patrols had taken in disputed 
areas. The Pakistan Army authorities therefore suggested that 
since they themselves could not enter the 500-yard zone where 
most of the armed gangs were hiding, the Indians should 
discontinue their unpopular armed patrols within this zone and 
avoid disturbing the status quo in the disputed areas". 
General Sen, however, maintained there were no "disputed 
areas" since the the CFL was well demarcated and its alignment 
well-known to all concerned". Judging by the number of 
incidents which centred on the exact location of the Line over 
the years, this was not exactly so*, but neither was this what 
the Pakistan authorities had in mind in referring to the 
"disputed areas". However, General Nimmo did not pursue the 
matter further with India on this occasion for fear of 
exacerbating the situation at a time when the CFL had become 
4 
comparatively quietIO4. Yet again he remarked to Andrew 
Cordier that it would never be possible for a small observer 
group to deal with civilian unrest, robbery, smuggling, cattle 
thieving or encroachments to cut grass or scratch for a living 
in empty areas along the CFL, nor was it its function. Police 
and military forces were available to curb such activities, 
which was difficult even for them in the extensive mountainous 
area. UNMOGIP's object would be achieved, he said, if it 
managed to keep the armed forces from conflict and act as a 
deterrent by its presence0s. 
*See pages 328-321. 
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Self-Defence 
Various related matters were in dispute with General Sen, 
one of these being the question of self-defence. General Son 
Dutt, a member of Sen's staff, who actually began the 
communications from the Indian side, requested a review of 
certain cases, including one where UN investigations proved 
that firing emanated from the Pakistan side and was answered by 
the Indian side. Awards of Violation had been given against 
both sides with the comment that "no tangible reason was 
produced for this show of violence and irresponsible firing 
across the CFL by either side". The Indians felt their reason 
for firing was tangible enough, and General Son Dutt wanted to 
know if it was intended to deny them the right of self-defence. 
He quoted General Delvoie as having stated in a letter on 17th 
August, 1949 that it was understood that troops always retained 
the right to fire in self-defence"'-. What he did not quote, 
as General-Nimmo pointed out to Andrew Cordier, when he 
forwarded the correspondence for information and possible 
comment, was that General Delvoie had gone on to say: 
"Howeveý, in order to avoid ill feelings between the armies, a 
soldier, before firing at an intruder, should have used all 
other means to dispel him from his area"07. 
General Nimmo reviewed the cases in question as requested, 
but felt that no revision of his original awards was necessary. 
Furthermore he stated that he felt the question of self-defence 
arose only when one was actually attackedaO. General Sen said 
he had no option but to acquiesce in General Nimmo's decision 
that no revision was necessary, but did so "under protest". 
He also disagreed with General Nimmo on the question of 
self-defence since there could be no self-defence when the 
attacker was accomplishing or had accomplished his mission. 
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He maintained that all legal systems recognised that the right 
of self-defence had to be exercised when the life and/or 
property of an individual/post/picquet was threatened, before 
the attacker accomplished his mission". 
Cordier thought that General Delvoie's comment seemed 
sound, and it would certainly be stretching the meaning of the 
term to use self-defence in a preventive sense, and on-the 
basis of an assumption about the intention of the other side 
which might not be well-founded. However he admitted that the 
dilemma to which General Sen's letter drew attention was quite 
real: if one permitted the attacker to confirm in an overt act 
that his intention was to attack, it might be too late for the 
victim to exercise his right of self-defence. He thought it 
was relevant to note the Secretary-General's point in his 
report of 9th May, 1956 on Armistice Agreements in Palestine, 
that the reservation made by the parties as to their right of 
self defence was "necessarily of an indeterminate nature": the 
principle could not be applied in advance in hypothetical 
cases'O. 
A Period of Tranquillity 
In February 1960, after he had visited Lahore for the 
annual Horse and Cattle Show at the invitation of the Pakistan 
CIC, General Nimmo reported that General Thimmaya, Chief of the 
0 
Indian Army Staff, and the Indian Deputy Defence Minister were 
also there. He said it was the first time he had seen the 
Chief of the Indian Army attending such a function since 
195491* ]BY March 1960, when Nimmo sent copies of his 
*On that occasion Nimmo, had noted it was "undoubtedly one 
of those signs which indicate improved relations"12. In 
fact he also visited Lahore in February 1955 for the 
National Horse Show, when there had been polo matches with 
India, and he remarked then on seeing the CICs of the 
Indian and Pakistan Armies together on the dai S13. 
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correspondence with General Sen to Andrew Cordier, he was able 
to report even before Cordier had a chance to reply, that a 
meeting-of-the two Commanders-in-Chief was to take place in New 
Delhi. General Nimmo thought such meetings between 
Commanders, which he, himself had been advocating, were a good 
augury for the future. He found it difficult to reconcile 
such optimistic signs with the Indian attitude displayed in his 
recent corre5pondence, with General Sen, but-he hoped that the 
CICs would talk over some of the points which had been raised 
therein74. General Musa,. -CIC, Pakistan, -not only visited 
General Thimayya,. but also met Prime Minister Nehru and the 
Defence Minister, Krishna Menon". General Nimmo subsequently 
reported, however, -that so far as he could judge-they "do not 
seem to have spoken about the Ceasefire problem at all"13. 
Nevertheless, to match this sudden improvement, in - 
relations there was-an equally sudden drop in-the number of - 
complaints along the CFL. At the-end of March General Nimmo 
was able to report that the atmosphere along the CFL was "very 
tranquil"'17, although this tranquillity was doomed to be 
short-lived. 
Deterioration in Relations 
By the end of 1960-General Nimmo's reports were showing 
signs of a further deterioration inýrelations, not, only between 
the Armies themselves but also, to a lesser extent, between the 
Mission and the Armies. In September 1960 Nimmo wroteýto the 
two Chiefs of the General Staff urging both sides, to make more 
of an effort to carry outýtheir past undertakings to trace and 
return stolen or strayed animals and thus endeavour to maintain 
peace, in the area7g. At about the-same time there was a 
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complaint that Pakistan civilians cultivating land on the 
Indian side of the Ceasefire Line tried to overpower an Indian 
police patrol after being warned to withdraw. The patrol 
opened fire in self-defence79. Another incident occurred in 
October 1960 when the Indians alleged that about 20 armed 
personnel from the Pakistan side dressed in khaki had crossed 
into Indian territory and fired upon an Indian patrol 
despatched to investigate. In their complaint the Indians 
admitted they had returned the fire in self-defence. 
Observers investigated the incident and found the evidence, 
though conflicting and even inaccurate, suggested that 
civilians in the general area had fired, but that there was no 
proof that Pakistan troops were involved, and there was some 
doubt as to which side had initiated the incident. General 
Nimmo remarked it was possible to argue that neither side was 
blameless and that such episodes should not occur at all under 
conditions of ceasefire, but that each command should examine 
its own procedures with a view to keeping the peace as they had 
contracted to do. No Violation was awarded'OO. 
There was a surge in the number of firing incidents which 
neither party seemed disposed to take any specific action to 
prevent, in spite of the promise of co-operation with UNMOGIP, 
and suggestions by General Nimmo such as replacement of the 
units concerned"'. Observers did their best to investigate 
incidents and to calm the units but, as General Nimmo noted: 
"In the face of direct contradictions and sometimes outright 
lies during investigation, the task of detecting what went on 
is frequently very difficult 11102. 
In January 1961 he reported that in view of indiscriminate 
firing by both sides in one small area he had stressed to both 
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India and Pakistan that hostility among the troops must not be 
allowed to get worse. He also gave his view that there were 
too many small posts in the area, and that common agreement 
alreadyýexisted for re-grouping or re-siting of defences, 
provided the overall potential was not increased and new 
positions were further to the rear. He concluded by 
expressing his feeling that something could be done to restore 
calm in the area if each side concentrated on its own local 
problems and ceased merely to blame the other for all the 
existing troubles'03. A few weeks later, in March 1961, he 
wrote to Cordier saying that the difficulties confronting a 
purely Military Observer Group increased as disturbances along 
the CFL tended-to originate more and more from civilian/police 
activities,, sometimes involving the troops themselves. He 
said that, the Mission's efforts were directed towards 
maintaining a peaceful Ceasefire zone, whilst steering, the 
, "encroachment" problems into Government. hands through Army_- 
channels, -but with no result. -Nor did he expect any, result 
under the circumstances which existed. Indeed, the signs were 
that the situation was, likely to deteriorate further that 
summer, and in, this view; he was not-mistaken'04. 
Chaknot 
In June 19611: the Indians established two armed police 
posts, one each at Balakot and Tarkundi, and initiated the 
first of several serious situations which developed in, advance 
of, the war in 1965*. -- One of the major troublespots, however, 
had more political than military significance, and gave rise to 
the most serious incident inýwhich Pakistan appeared quite - 
*See pages 228-236. 
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deliberately to make trouble for UNMOGIP in furtherance of its 
own policy. However, it could be said that this was for 
pragmatic rather political reasons, in that she may have had 
something to hide from UNMOGIP. The incident foreshadowed the 
way the Pakistan Army was inclined to behave immediately prior 
to the outbreak of war in-1965, when obstacles were put in the 
way of Observers attempting, to carry out their duties*. 
Chaknot-was an isolated and-extremely poor village 
consisting of about 200 inhabitants of Pathan origin located in 
the mountains 75 miles north of Srinagar on the Indian side of 
the Ceasefire Line, but with close blood and economic-ties with 
two villages on-the other side-of the Line and, -surprisingly, 
under the practical control of Azad Kashmir. Its onlyýmeans 
of communication was by pony or-on foot over very hazardous 
tracks for 37 mi'les, on the Indian, side or, more than 100 miles- 
on the Pakistan side. It had beenýa forgotten place until 
early in . 1963 when a deputation of villagers-went to Srinagar 
to request food aid. Subsequently an Indian police patrol 
went into the area, -resulting in complaints from each-side. 
Pakistan submitted a complaint in April 1963 that India was 
ill-treating the villagers, and India complained in May that 
Pakistan troops had'been inciting the villagers to accede to 
Pakistan. Observers'visited the area but their investigations 
did not substantiate the complaints. General Nimmo notified 
their findings to India and Pakistan, and said he considered, 
the authorities of both sides had acted with the best ofý 
intentions. He pointed out that the matter was outside the 
authority of UNMOGIP. Nevertheless he suggested to GHQ 
Pakistan that since the village was on the Indian side of the 
*See pages 403-405. 
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CFL, the civil authorities on the Pakistan side might be 
induced not to press their previous control across the CFL, 
which could only result in a disturbed situation in which the 
local civilians would be the principal sufferers. UNMOGIP, he 
said, would encourage the civil authorities on the Indian side 
to exercie humanity and tolerance in their handling of the 
situation. At the same time he suggested tothe Indian 
authorities that, whilst'it was -their decision, any efforts 
they might make to administer Chaknot themselves would be 
fraught with difficulties. He also mentioned the question of 
a water mill'on the Indian side, which was the-only one in the 
area and had therefore been used for years by civilians from 
both sides of the Line. He said that prohibition of-its use 
by villagers on, the other side of the line would impose 
unnecessary-hardship on-them and would also anger the villagers 
of, Chaknot: he suggested that there would therefore seem to be 
advantages in ignoring the presence and use of the mill at that 
stage'". 
However, tension developed as both sides complained of 
increasing activity by the other, and at the end of October 
1963 India allegedly expelled some civilians from the area. 
Requested to investigate General Nimmo-told-,, Major-General Malik 
Sher Bahadur, the Pakistan CGS, that the matter was completely 
outside the competence of UNMOGIP., 'Pakistan then introduced a 
reinforcement battalion to the rear, ofýthe-area, claiming that 
the Indians were also reinforcing. Although the dispute was 
essentially civil, General Nimmo'felt that this Pakistan'troop 
movement, brought the situation within his responsibility. 
Observers made investigations from which it appeared that seven 
families had moved from homes in-Chaknot and had camped on the 
Pakistan side of the Ceasefire-Line near an army picquet. But 
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Observers maintained Indian troop concentrations had not 
occurred'06. Not a single shot was fired, but the question of 
control of the area developed into a political dispute which 
made headlines in the international Press'", with the result 
that the two parties saw their prestige publicly at stake and 
became entrenched in their positions, making a settlement 
harder to reach. In spite of the very difficult journey, 
General Nimmo sent several Observer teams to visit the area, 
but they could not go in without adequate administrative 
arrangements which provided either side with ample time to hide 
any forces or materials they did not wish to be seen by the 
UN106. General Nimmo noted: "It is quite clear... that a very 
minor situation was exploited beyond all reason by both parties 
for political ends"101. 
Of particular concern to UNMOGIP was an incident' 
concerning an Observer who made two difficult treks to the area 
in November 1963. The Pakistan Local Command claimed he 
behaved in "a very rude manner" in the first instance, and 
appeared to be biased'"., -General^-Nimmo told Ralph Bunche 
that the Observer had reported, that he had had words with a 
Pakistan Sector Commander, a Captain, but had apologised and 
the Sector Commander had stated the matter was forgotten. By 
the time Nimmo received a message to say that the Observer was 
unacceptable, he was already on his way for a follow-up check 
of-the area, on which occasion he was prevented from crossing 
the CFL. Nimmo was certain that matter had been blown up out 
of all proportion, and it was difficult to. understand why, 
unless it was a device temporarily to deny'the area to the 
UNIII. He pointed out to the CGS, Pakistan that as a result 
of the denial of access to this and an accompanying Observer - 
their entry being barred by armed troops and a loaded machine 
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gun in a firing position - an essential UN inpsection of the 
area did not proceed. Further, their return to the awaiting 
Indian escort did nothing to allay the 5USPiCions of happenings 
on the other side. Nimmo told the CGS he was quite satisfled 
that the Observer in question was in no way biased; it was 
true he had used strong language, but under considerable 
provocation and in a tired condition. He went on to say that 
while he did not condone the use of strong language it never 
came-as a surprise to-him in any army he had mixed with, "even 
on-the polo field "112. Nevertheless Nimmo felt obliged to 
cancel the'pre-arranged extension of the Observer's tour of 
duty"'*. 
When the publicity died down at the end of the year the 
tension subsided and Paki. ý; tan withdrew her reinforcements. 
But she contintied'to maintain'that the Observers'had been' 
mistaken in stating there had, been no similar reinforcement on 
the'Indian side". ' General Nimmo admitted to Ralph Bunche 
that there could indeed have been some small'Indian-activity 
which'was hidden from', the Observers in the difficult'terrain. 
Decisions, he emphasized, could only be based on actual 
f indings'". 
Increased Strengthening of Defences 
In January 1962 General Nimmo reported that an increased 
number, of complaints referring to strengthening of defences and 
build up of troops had been investigated promptly but proved 
*In fact the Observer, an Australian, withdrew his 
application for an extension "for family reasons-, which 
was the official reason given by the Secretary-General in 
his letter to the Permanent Representative of 
Australia' 14. Otherwise Nimmo had intended writing to 
the Australian Army authorities as he did not want "a good 
officer and a good Observer... discredited over such a 
trivial incident"115. 
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unfounded, and. he felt they were rather the result of the 
prevailing political tension, and were attempts to use 
Observers to get information about the opposite sidella. From 
the beginning of 1964 the number of such complaints increased 
substantially, -and 
it became apparent that the Indians were 
re-occupying picquets which had not been used for several 
years. As a result Pakistan did indeed start to strengthen 
some defences'&?, and as, the year, progressed the increased 
number of complaints was paralleled by an equal, increase in 
their basis in fact Requests for demolition, tended to be met 
with the excuse that the deteriorating situatign required 
better defensive measures, and, were not always-, complied with. 
General Nimmo was particularly disturbed by reports of the 
laying of anti-personnellmineSI20.. 
In January, 1965 Nimmo, assured Bunche, that his, Observer 
Teams were doing all they were able, and, -he knew of many 
instances in which their intervention had quietened, things down 
and, prevented-escalation. However,, they were. constantly. being 
deceived; on occasion fire had-taken place when, -they were 
known to be in the area; and sometimes they had even been 
firedýupon themselves. Although outward signs of co-operation 
were still frequently observed and duly appreciated,. Nimmo said 
one had the feeling that UNMOGIP was regarded, 'I'as. being rather 
in the way and somewhat of a nuisance",. He admitted,. however, 
that this was the lot of UN military observers anywhere, 
otherwise there would be no need for them'21 -, a point with 
which Bunche agreed, whilst noting that., the,, parties who tended 
to look on them in that way still insisted on, retaining,,, 
theM'21. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE - ATTITUDES OF THE PRESS AND THE, PEOPLE - 
Although the Indian and, even more so, the Kashmir State 
authorities. were not above exploiting fairly innocuous 
incidents to embarrass UNMOGIP for political reasons, most of 
the politically-inspired embarrassment from the Pakistan side 
came from the quasi-official and local people of Azad Kashmir, 
rather than from the Pakistan authorities, and there were 
sometimes anti-UN references in the Press. The maJority of 
the ill-feeling shownýin Azad Kashmir, and expressed more 
generally in the Press of-Pakistan, was directed-against the UN 
for not having solved the Kashmir problem by, 'forcing India to 
hold a plebiscite. It-was not normally. directed against 
UNMOGIP or the-Military Observers, although-in periods of high 
political-tension, civilians sometimes harassed Observers as 
the living, 'embodiment of the UN. - On a few such occasions 
physical abuse-occurred, -but normally civilian grievances were 
aired inýthe, form of demonstrations outside the UNMOGIP HQ 
building or field, stations,, or-the Group was-handed petitions 
requesting the UN to take action. 
More general demonstrations regarding the-situation in 
Kashmir were also prevalent, and hostile Press propaganda was 
an important ingredient of, the, Dispute. Adverse references in 
the Press to the-UN or the Observer, Group rarely causedýmajor 
problems, but hostile Press propaganda put-forth by both sides, 
but perhaps, more so by Pakistan, ýconstantly maintained-the 
tension between the parties and soured-the atmosphere in which 
the Mission had to work,, and was therefore, a greater source, of 
concern. The study below* of a leakage to the Press of 
T 
*Pages 360-371. 
356 
General Nimmo's report of the Nekowal Incident serves as an 
example of how breaches of the Ceasefire could be used for 
propaganda purposes, and shows also how seriously the United 
Nations Secretariat took a breach in the confidentiality of 
UNMOGIP's reports. ' 
THE PRESS 
io 
The Press and UNMOGIP 
Even before sensational reports-'regarding the Delvoie 
Incident had appearedýin the Press, media propaganda had given 
cause for concern. In mid-April 1949 at the time, of the 
presentation of-the Commission's first truce terms, information 
concerning alleged incidents was released to the Press and 
Indian newspapers, -published lists of violations of the 
Ceasefire Agreement allegedly committed by the Pakistan Army. 
The Pakistan Press countered by publishing violations' 
attributed to the Indian Army'. The Indian Press at this time 
was usually more reserved and more informative regarding the 
Kashmir situation-than the Pakistan Press, which, tended to give 
emotional'interpretations and show suspicion of India's 
intentions'. The fact that India chose this time to list 
ACFVs against Pakistan, combined with a spate angry editorials, 
suggests political motivation at the behest of the Government. 
Suchýpublicity, created-a general feeling of uncertainty in 
spite of a communique from, the Commission, on 21st April, 
endeavouring to restore the situation to, its proper 
perspective, by. pointing out that investigations had found, most 
of the complaints to be either'baseless or exaggerated, and 
that only two were considered to be serioUS3. 
Prior to the Joint military meetings in Karachi in July 
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1949* rumours appeared in the Press to the effect that General 
Delvoie was pro-Pakistan and the Commission was at odds within 
itself, being split into pro-Indian and pro-Pakistan factionS4. 
These rumours were again politically motivated, and if they 
were not totally without-foundation, -the differences which 
existed within the Commission were-rather in the delegates' 
manner of approach to the problem than asýa result of any lack 
of impartiality or integrity'amongst . its-members. - Indian 
officials, including Generals Cariappa and-Thimayya, informally 
referred to such rumours in conversations with Erik Colban and 
members of the Commission, but following the meetings General 
Thimayya stated to one member of the Commission's-staff that he 
had been extremely impressed with the-impartiality of the 
proceedings in Karachi, and particularly with the"firm and one 
hundred percent fair dealing of General Delvoie"s. 
The news that the Commission had suggested a joint 
military conference had-been, received with mixed feelings by 
the Press in both India and Pakistan. 'The word "failure" 
occurred frequently and acted like a headline-to many 
commentaries and editorials on-the Commission's activities, 
especially in the Pakistan Press and radio. The Indian 
Express and Free Press Journal of Bombay wrote editorially of 
the "last hope", and warned'of: concessions that might-be made 
by India, and blamed the Commission for not branding Pakistan 
as an aggressoe . However, the Truce'Subcommittee adopted a 
policy of releasing news from the meetings daily and as a 
result the Karachi Conference was ultimately given a respectful 
and accurate coverage, free of speculation. Daily agreements 
in the news on minor points built a foundation for the eventual 
*See page 95. 
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satisfactory climax which was headline news throughout the 
Subcontinent. And as the failure of seven months of 
negotiations was blamed on the Commission, so the 5UCCe55 in 
Karachi was attributed to it. The Times of India even 
compared it with the Ceasefire Agreement of 1st January, 194 97. 
Nevertheless, a strong minority note in India, mainly the left 
of centre and the sensational Press, still complained about 
"Pakistan's gains", and at Pakistan having been treated as an 
equal rather than as an aggressor. Led by the Socialist 
newspaper Nation, this minority comment looked upon the 
Ceasefire Line as a partition line, coupling it with British 
intentions, and as such a defeat for Indiao. Further positive 
comment occurred in the Press when the demarcation on the 
ground of the Ceasefire Line was completed, in spite of its 
coinciding with the ignominious departure from the Subcontinent 
of General Delvoie9*. 
Items disparaging the Observer Group in future years were 
comparatively rare**, so much so that General Nimmo was stung 
to react when on 10th May, 1955 a Pakistan newspaper published 
a leader on the Nekowal Incident*** in which it stated: 
"The UN Observer Team, it appears, could not arrive 
earlier. To avoid repetition of such incidents, it 
should be possible to arrange for the prompt arrival of 
Observers on the scene. "'* 
General Nimmo wrote to-the Pakistan Chief of Staff, 
General Nasir Ali Khan, bringing his attention to the item and 
commenting that it was NOT the UN Observers' function or duty 
*Page 250. 
**See pages 252,258 and 268. 
***See pages 212-213. 
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to ensure peace on the Border. They could only help the local 
authorities to do so and could do nothing without the necessary 
support. He further pointed out that he felt it would do no 
harm if it were generally known that it was entirely due to the 
initiative and prolonged efforts of the Military Observers over 
a period of more than four hours that the, firing at Nekowal 
eventually stopped. Otherwise the disturbance could have 
increased to unlimited proportions, with tragic results, since 
nobody-inýauthority gave them the slightest assistance in 
controlling or stopping the fighting. He went on to say that 
it was not the Observers' duty to go about the area under fire 
ordering individuals and groups to ceasefire, ' or carrying 
written orders in, Urdu to-this effect from a Border Police 
Captain, which they had all undertaken at, much personal risk. 
They would have been quite within their normal sphere of duty 
if they had merely observed and reported the facts as they 
occurred so'that the UN could assess-the cause and apportion 
the-blame". II- 
General Nasir Ali Khan replied, that it was unfortunate 
that the newspaper expressed its views without being in full 
knowledge of the facts or consulting anyone, ' and he was 
therefore issuing a, small statement to, the Press clarifying the 
point. ' Meanwhileýhe wished to express the Pakistan Army's 
appreciation to General Nimmo and his Observers for their 
assistance and the risks they had taken in order to maintain 
good relations across the Border". The Press note he issued 
was duly published in The Civil and Hilitary Gazette. it 
statedýthat physical intervention in such incidents as the one 
at Nekowal-was'neither. practicable nor was it required of UN 
Observers, whose duty was to investigate and enquire into 
incidents brought to their attention. Nevertheless, the UN 
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Observers had always made every effort to help in maintaining 
good relations on the Ceasefire Line and at times, at great 
personal risk, had gone beyond the call of duty in an endeavour 
to restore the peace". General Nimmo was happy to close the 
matter at that point and, in turn, assured General Nasir Ali 
Khan of his gratitude for the co-operation and friendliness the 
Group found everywhere in the Pakistan Army, and for the frank 
and fair way in which the General himself approached all 
problems presented to hiMI4. 
Leakage to the Press of General Nimmo's findings in the Nekowal 
Incident* 
Only two months before the Nekowal Incident occurred in 
May 1955, General Nimmo had remarked to Andrew Cordier on the 
noticeable improvement in Indo Pakistan relations that year. 
Nevertheless, he said, an officer had recently been shot from 
across the Border, and antagonisms were deep-rooted. It was 
fortunate that incidents were seldom reported in the Press, 
otherwise tempers would be maintained at a higher pitch. it 
was fortunate also, he thought, that the higher command in each 
Army was always willing to co-operate with UNMOGIP, since they 
also preferred to see quiet, reigning in the forward areas, ". 
Most incidents, along theýCeasefire Line were minor matters 
and, received very little attention, even, from the local Press, 
because-they had to pass, through the Public Relations branch of 
the Armies. The Nekowal Incident, however, occurred on the 
Border, in an area of unusually high population, and the 
casualties; included, members of a civilian communal farming 
organisation-whose-views could not be contained by military 
*See pages 212-213. 
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discipline. The Incident was of sufficient gravity to have 
excited considerable Press comment from the start, intensified 
no doubt by the fact that it happened on the eve of talks 
between the two Prime Ministers*. Consequently the leakage of 
some information was probably unavoidable". 
The two Armies received General Nimmols report of his 
findings with regard to the Incident on 17th May, 1955. On 
18th May the Indian Express stated: "It is learnt that UN 
Observers hold that the Pakistan police crossed into the Indian 
border and the attack was pre-planned". The Times of India 
reported similarly, but added that no official confirmation was 
available 17. According to General Nimmo this leakage forced 
the hand of the Indian CGS, General Chaudhuri, and later his 
own hand, and caused resentment in Pakistan. General 
Chaudhuri agreed when General Nimmo pointed out that one of the 
good features of their dealings had always been that because 
their communications were personal and secret they promoted 
frankness and trust, but he requested Nimmo's permission to 
publishýa brief factual statement if he found it necessary. 
Nimmo consented after he had received certain assurancesis. 
In order to maintain his position of impartiality; and in an 
attempt to minimise the possible damage engendered by the leak, 
he also sent a cable to General Nasir Ali Khan, saying that in 
view of the wide publicity given to the incident he would agree 
that the CGS Pakistan issue a brief factual statement of the 
findings at his discretion19. General Nimmo's chief 
pre-occupation, as he intimated to both CGS, was the necessity 
of avoiding recriminations and retaliations. He also urged 
this, through his Observers, on local army and police 
*See page 287. 
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authorities along the Border. He went away on leave feeling 
that the "unfortunate and ghastly" episode might in the long 
run do good". 
The brief, factual statement authorised by General Nimmo, 
appeared in similar versions in both the above newspapers on 
21st May. They were described by Acting CMO Colonel MacDonald 
when he forwarded them to UNHQ to be "in accordance with the 
desire, of the CMO in that they tend to avoid any 
recriminations" and showed "a desire to be factual but... 
considerably toned down 1*2L. Nevertheless, however brief and 
factual, they could not avoid confirming the original leak, and 
Pakistan could not fail to be annoyed by the knowledge becoming 
public that Observers believed their nationals had made a 
pre-planned attack on India, inflicting both casualties and 
damage to property, however dispassionately this may have been 
reported. - On 1st June Colonel MacDonald cabled Cordier that 
articles which appeared in two Pakistan newspapers, The Civil 
and Hilitary Gazette and VaNn, had identical wording which 
suggested they were officially sponsored, and that he 
considered some of the quotations were "misleading-and 
tendentiOU5"22. General Chaudhuri-inevitably then complained 
that the newspapers had published extracts from General Nimmols 
original report and findings and presented them in a, fashion 
which tended to discredit the Indians, and which showed 
recrimination. He believed they were in possession of the 
full report and therefore himself requested permission of the 
UN to release the full report and findings toý. the Press. He 
said he was also referring the matter for-consideration by the 
two GovernmentS23. 
I Arthur Lall, India's Permanent Representative to the UN, 
also started to press for permission to release the whole 
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report. He said it might be necessary for India to leak more 
of it "in sheer self-defence", since the Pakistan, elections 
were approaching and some candidates were using Press 
distortions about the Nehowal report, together with other 
charges,, to intensify their attacks on India 24 . On 16th the 
Indian Press retaliated. Colonel MacDonald reported that the 
statements were factual except for a phrase blaming the 
incident on'Pakistan troops, when in fact Pakistan Army 
personnel were, not involved2o. On 18th June he considered 
further-Press-'statements were tendentious and inexact, but 
could have been the result of the Indian Army'-s own 
investigations intoýthe incident26 Ambassador Mir Khan, the 
Pakistan-Permanent Representative to the UN, complained to the 
UN Secretariat that the Indian Press was waging a virulent 
campaign'against Pakistan over the Nekowal Incident, and that 
they too*-were guilty of leaking the contents of the report". 
UN Reaction to the Leakage 
The Secretary-General's office now became closely 
concerned, with the affair, and began to consider the 
implications of a decision to release the report, not only for 
the-future of both the Ceasefire and UNMOGIP, but also for the 
integrity of confidential UN reports in general. - They were 
concerned that a situation might develop where both sides might 
compete to achieve the highest score of, condemnations of-the 
other side, as had happened in Palestine. But what they were 
most concerned about was the fact that Pakistan newspapers had 
used direct quotations, taken out-, of, context, and sometimes 
twisted to mean the very opposite-of what-the report-stated, 
but having all the appearance of being the very words of the 
report, including quotation marks and-direct attribution2s. 
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.., Cordier's assistant, Leo Malania, compiled a memorandum on 
the issue. He blamed Pakistan for the most serious breach of 
General Nimmo's authorisation. He made it clear, however, 
that he believed not only had the report been leaked to the 
Pakistan Press, which in many instances grossly distorted its 
sense, but also that it had been available to the Indian Press 
which, whilst it exploited the incident for propaganda purposes 
against Pakistan, did not leak the report in any technical 
sense of the word. Many of the facts and allegations 
mentioned in the Indian Press could have been obtained from an 
independent investigation made by the Indian Army, and not 
necessarily from the report. Apart from one or two- 
departures, items in the Indian Press regarding-the incident 
were, by and large, in accordance with General Nimmo's 
21 
authorisation . 
Ambassador Mir Khan said that the leakage in the Pakistan 
Press was completely, unauthorised, that an investigation was 
under-way, and that the offenders would-be punished". 
Malania suggested that if Mir Khan would agree to state this in 
a, letter and authorise its use by the Secretary-General to 
demonstrate to the Indian delegation that the Pakistan 
Government'had, in effect, - expressed regrets, the, 
Secretary-General would not have to consider authorising 
release of the full text of the report. ý Instead he could 
request the-two Governments to use their influence to have the 
Press, refrain from making any further use of material from the 
secret report3l . 
An-aide memoire was thus drawn up in consultation with Mir 
Khan. It stated that-in the Secretary-General's view a 
serious breach had taken place in the procedure followed 
hitherto, with the-agreement of Pakistan and--India,. that 
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reports of investigations by UNMOGIP were treated as secret: 
"Some misleading references to the findings of the UN Observers 
were published in the Press of India, and a leakage of the 
report has occurred in the Press of Pakistan. Extracts from 
the Military Observers' report were quoted out of context, 
tending to create a misleading impression regarding the 
contents of the report. The Secretary-General is deeply 
concerned over this development. The function of the United 
Nations Military Observer Group is to assist the military 
authorities of India and Pakistan in maintaining the Cea5efire 
Agreement. The effectiveness of their work, of which the 
latest example has been their assistance in restoring the 
ceasefire in the vicinity of Neko, wal, would be greatly impaired 
unless both sides continue to preserve, as they have in the 
past, the confidential character of the investigations 
conducted by the United Nations Observers and of the 
conclusions communicated confidentially by the Chief Military 
Observer to the Chief Commanding Officers of the Indian and 
Pakistan Armies". He trusted that the Governments concerned 
shared this view and would use their influence to, ensure that 
the-, established procedure was faithfully observed in the 
future. The aide m,! Bmoire also mentioned that the 
Secretary-General had noted with satisfaction the assurances of 
the Permanent Representative of Pakistan that such publication 
in the Pakistan Press was unauthorised, that an investigation 
had been initiated for appropriate action, and that all 
possible steps, had been taken to ensure secrecy of such reports 
in, the futur632. 
On 15th July the aide memoire was accepted by the 
Permanent Representative of Pakistan 33 - not surprisingly since 
it, had been drawn up in consultation with him. What is 
366 
surprising is that the people concerned did not seem to feel it 
necessary to consult also with India, the party they were 
trying to placate. According to a cable from Cordier to 
Secretary-General. Hammarskjold, who was in Geneva: "Lall 
called and in the strongest and most abusive language demanded 
withdrawal of aide memoire and demanded I send a letter 
immediately to both delegations to that effect... Lall regarded 
this as a very high-handed action of the Secretariat, that it 
condemned India moreýthan Pakistan, that it made Pakistan the 
good boy-and that India was singled out for a special attack... 
the letter that follows... is an effort-to put the issue right 
with Lall. J assume we, will not succeed "34.,, 
ý High-handed-the action may have been, ill-considered - 
with the: benefit of hindsight - at least, but to suggest that 
it condemned India more, than Pakistan only demonstrated India's 
sensitivity to the whole issue of the Kashmir Dispute, and the 
extent to which, as a result, India could become blind to all 
reason. By the middle of 1955 the UN Secretariat must have 
been aware, of this sensitivity, which arose initially because 
India felt it was unjust to treat the-two countries equally, 
when she believed Pakistan to be the aggressor. Whatever the 
UN's beliefs about the main issue, or reasons for acting as it 
did, it was unwise, to draw up a-document that was sufficiently 
ambiguous to allow India-to feel once again she was being 
treated less fairlythan Pakistan, particularly when the 
Secretariat did^not, actually, doubt, that the greater wrong this 
time was perpetrated by Pakistan. To have consulted the one 
without the other must-inevitably have added fuel to the fire, 
and Lall's fury was possibly compounded by the fact that he 
could see, the opportunity of publishing the full report, which 
was quite-damningto Pakistan, slipping away from him. 
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Cordier's lengthy letter to Lall expressed the 
Secretary-General's and his own deep regret that a 
misunderstanding had developed over the "draft" transmitted to 
him, and explained that their concern had been with the 
preservation-of the secrecy of UN reports after the leakage in 
the Pakistan Press had been referred to them, first by the 
Acting CMO and then by Mr. Lall himself. He said it was felt 
that an identical aide memoire sent to both India and Pakistan, 
including positive assurances from Pakistan, would meet the 
requirements of the Indian Government, and he should note that 
they had not asked for similar assurances from the Indian 
- which indicated that the occurrences in the Indian Government, 
Press had not been put on a level with the leak in Pakistan3s. 
Arthur Lall also wrote a letter each to Cordier and to 
HammarskJold. The first put in more restrained, terms the 
points he had made on the telephone,. saying why he considered 
the aide memoire laid greater blame on India. He grudgingly 
accepted that it was the impression he felt was given by the 
aide memoire rather than its intentionýthat was at-fault, ' but 
he did find it "a most extraordinary'procedure" that Pakistan 
should have been consulted without India, and he seemed to find 
it difficult to believe that the'reason was because the UN 
thought Pakistan was in the wrong, especially as the final 
document succeeded in giving a different impression "by 
blurring the-facts"'. He enclosed a copy-of this letter with 
the-one to the Secretarv-General, which was quite cordial and 
ended-with the words; "I trust it will be possible to remedy 
what I am afraid is not at all a conciliatory or helpful 
document"'. 
The whole'unfortunate situation then quickly changed'for 
the better as Arthur Lall, either having relieved himself of 
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his annoyance, and being satisfied with Cordier's letter of 
explanation, or else having received instructions from New 
Delhi, -apologized for his initial attitude, and had a lengthy 
conversation with Cordier "covering a number of matters", 
before informing Cordier that his Government had some weeks 
previously dropped the idea of publication of the report. 
Cordier expressed his appreciation for the new position taken 
by the Indian Government, and his regret that they were not 
informed in ample time., Lall suggested the aide memoire 
should be cancelled since his Government was satisfied with the 
assurances given by. Pakistan, and they would regard the 
incident as closed3s. This then happened, and the two sides 
agreed to continue to'apply secrecy to General Nimmols 
reports". 
Cordier feltthat as a result'of the Secretary-General's 
strong reaction the incident had achieved considerable 
importance in showing to both parties that in the event of any 
statement violating the-established practice of keeping secret 
the CMO's report on an incident, the Secretary-General was 
prepared to act strongly. He felt the outcome of the incident 
had been to strengthen respect for existing procedures". 
His optimism may have been slightly misplaced because the 
following May - 1956 - Arthur Lall brought up the subJect 
again, suggesting that if the Prime Ministers of India and 
Pakistan agreed mutually to, the publication of the 
correspondence, they had exchanged on the Nekowal Incident, 
perhaps-the Secretary-General would not raise any obJections 
even though the correspondence contained quotations from the 
Military Observers' Report4l; Numerous questions were being 
raised in the Indian Parliament, and the Indian Government 
claimed that consistent with parliamentary practice it had no 
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alternative but to inform MPs what had happened 42. General 
Nimmo was also approached on the subject by the CGS, Indian 
Army, and replied to the effect that the matter was up to the 
Secretary-General. He privately told Cordier that his 
personal opinion was that the Secretary-General should not 
agree as a matter of principle. He also believed that the 
Indian Government action would serve no useful purpose and 
merely inflame tempers further. Nekowal was only one of many 
incidents since 1950 involving deaths, and mistakes had been 
made by both sideS43. Cordier passed these views on to 
Ambassador Mir Khan, saying that the publication of the secret 
report on'this one incident was likely to lead to requests for 
the publication of similar reports on other incidents. This 
in turn would lead to Press controversies and an increase in 
tension. He pointed out that it had been the consistent . 
policy of UNMOGIP to safeguard the confidential character of 
its investigations and reports on incidents. . 
This had made it 
possible for the Group to render maximum assistanceto the 
authorities concerned in maintaining compliance with the 
Ceasefire Agreement, and in many cases in quietly correcting 
the causes of such incidentS44* . 
Further Deliberations on the Leakage 
The UN Secretariat realised it was impossible to expect 
one side or the other to employ restraint in the face of a 
virulent propaganda campaign without attempting some, kind of 
defence 45. They mistakenly believed that it was a regular 
procedure rather than a single ad hoc measure to authorise the 
Commanding Officers to issue "factual statements" based on the 
*It is likely, but is not known, that Arthur Lall recei I ved 
a similar letter. 
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CMO's reports, and thought this gave a lot of latitude and was 
open to abuse 46. The discretion of military commanders to 
issue statements would tend to be put under very heavy strain, 
and the temptation to leak those parts of the report which were 
favourable become rather difficult to res iSt47. Malania 
suggested that instead of giving blanket authorisation to both 
sides to issue their own version of the contents of the report, 
the CMO should be required to submit with his report an 
authorised Press release to be issued by the two sides, 
summarising the contents of the report4g. 
Colonel MacDonald thought it was reasonable to suppose 
ihat in the case of Nehowal most of-the information presented 
by both sides would have been made known to reporters making 
general enquiries., that any statement issued-by the United 
Nations or the Armies would have been open to criticism by the 
Press, and that therefore it was preferable to have any such 
criticism directed at a factual statement made by the armies on 
each-side rather than at a Press Release issued by the United 
Nations". -Cordier admitted that with so many sources of 
information available'to-both sides, comments in the Press were 
unavoidable. He told General, Nimmo he could recognise a case 
for ensuring respect for the secrecy-of the-reports by putting 
both Commanding Officers on'their honour to issue-factual, 
statements, since UNMOGIP's whole effort was based on 
bi-lateral agreement, but that'the very extensive publicity 
which an incident of-, the -importance--of-Nekowal 
had-received 
brought a new element into the'picture". 
General Nimmo agreed that the publicity in the case 
introduced-a new element into-his considerations, if only 
because it made it evident that it was unwise to rely too much 
on security measures "in certain offices". His initial 
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reaction was to doubt whether a draft Press Release was 
actually preferable to merely issuing to each side with his 
finding of the case "a brief summary of the appropriate 
elements of a report", so that even if they wished to publish 
it, or. the contents leaked out, they could not go beyond a 
minimum of strictly accurate data. Apart from the fact that 
this was the only time he had given authorisation to publish 
his'findings, in view of the seriousness of the case he had, 
most unusually, sent full details of the Observers' reports to 
Pakistan, and himself made a fuller summary than was normal to 
each side5l-. 
-, General Nimmo, having already explained his reasons for 
departing'from. normal procedure*, added that he did so'under 
special circumstances, and after a leakage had occurred. He 
would be more than ever careful in future that the data 
released to either side would be'the barest, minimum. - He 
nevertheless thought it preferable toýmaintain the present 
procedure rather than that the CMO should add the text of a 
Press statement to be released by both sides. - Theoretically 
it might have been better to have issued one in this abnormal 
instance, but he was "interested" to, note that General 
Chaudhuri seemed to have kept his verbal-agreement that the 
Indian releases were limited and factual, - and he felt that the 
leakages on the Pakistan side probably, occurred elsewhere than 
at GHQ, Rawalpindi. It seemed to him doubtful that an 
official Press Release would have satisfied the Press once they 
had access to the report itself52. 
Cordier was now fully satisfied that existing, procedures 
should continue. He recommended only that if a leak occurred 
*See pages 215 and 361. 
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again, and either of the two Armies GHQ felt they should issue 
a statement, they should do it in close consultation with 
General Nimmo and each other, to be released simultaneously by 
both sides if possible. He felt this could help in inducing 
them to stop further leaks from the report, and in putting an 
end to recriminations in the Press". Leakages do not seem to 
have occurred again until immediately prior to the war in 
1965*. 
Hostile Propaganda 
'. 'Fifty percent of the reason for bad Indo-Pakistan 
relations over the Kashmir issue must be sought in mischievous 
irresponsibility of the Press of both Dominions" was the 
comment of one of Pakistan's representatives at the close of 
the successful Karachi Conference in 194954. And in his first 
report as Chief Military Observer in February 1950, Brigadier 
Angle stated that the Indian Commander-in-Chief, General 
Cariappa, had requested that when next he was in Pakistan he 
should suggest that their Press stop publishing threats of war 
which achieved "nothing other than to antagonise our own 
troop5... "". General Gracey, CIC Pakistan Army replied that 
he had no control over the Pakistan Press, and he felt that 
both sides were guilty of alarmist propagandeb. And Angle 
himself soon suggested to Erik Colban that outbursts in 
Pakistani and Indian newspapers were aggravating the situation 
as it was upon these sources that officers and troops in the 
field formed their opinionS17. On 5th May, 1950 more than 60 
editors from the two countries met and arrived at an agreement 
not to carry on any propaganda against either country". 
*See pages 375-376. 
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Colban suggested to the Secretary-General, however, that the 
step might not be extended to Kashmir where the worst of the 
propaganda by the two sides took place". 
In any event, in spite of the agreement, hostile 
propaganda soon resumed. War-fever was at a pitch again by 
the summer of 1951. And indeed Kashmir, within and outside 
the State, continued to remain the major outlet for the two 
sides' verbal aggression against each other, although it was 
apparent that both sides were able to curtail the excesses of 
the Press when it suited them. When they agreed to hold 
bilateral negotiations in 1953, Nehru was suddenly highly 
praised, in the Pakistan Press, and crowds lined the streets to 
cheer his arrival in Karachi6O. By the time the Pakistan 
Prime Minister followed up this visit and went to New Delhi in 
August 1953, Sheik Abdullah had been arrested, and the Pakistan 
Press had become hysterical in their accusations against India 
again, although Nehru was still able to persuade his people to 
offer Mohammed Ali a warm welcome6l. In their talks Nehru 
raised the question ofthe irresponsible Pakistan Press 
campaign of the preceding week, in contrast to the correct 
approach of the Indian Press, and in their statement'at the end 
of this meeting the two Prime Ministers emphasised the need to 
curb, irresponsible language, whether in newspapers, speech or 
by radi o62. The situation did not noticeably improve, 
however, *and the IndianýPress soon became vociferous when 
rumours began to circulate of US military aid to Pakistan",. 
ý, Hopes generated by a new series of talks tapered away in 
August 1955 as an anti-Indian campaign was again mounted in 
Pakistan-when it was rumoured - and finally, in April 1956, 
confirmed - that Nehru had suggested a settlement on the basis 
of the status qUC, 64 . The meeting of SEATO in Karachi from 
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6-8th March, 1956 also increased the number of Press reports on 
the Kashmir problem, but General Nimmo felt that the increased 
publicity would not affect UNMOGIP operationally". However, 
in 1957 Pakistan returned the question to the Security Council. 
This move was followed by the failure both of the Jarring 
Mission in 1957*, and Dr. Graham's final attempt at a 
settlement-in 1958**. Further war fever ensued in the Press, 
and the tension started to have its effect on the Ceasefire 
Line, with an increasing number of complaints being submitted. 
Although the two Prime Ministers intervened and tried to calm 
down the Press in an attempt to improve relations, any 
improvement was again short-lived". After his visit to the 
Mission in October-1958, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan*** noted that 
propaganda-by radio from both sides, and speeches in the United 
Nations. and the two'Parliaments and elsewhere, kept tempers 
7 u 1: 0 
. 
By the end of-1961 political leaders and-the Press alike 
were making statements regarding the build-up of aggressive 
intent, although Observers could find no sign of activity, in 
the'rear areas of the CFL, and the-only incidents being 
reported were in establighed, -trouble spots". - 
From then 
onwards war-fever continued-, almost unabated, in the Press until 
war actually broke out in 1965. 
,ý In October 1963 General Nimmo, told Dr. Bunche that when 
he read the frequent, charges and counter-charges made by both 
parties in the daily Press, and the accounts of speeches in the 
General Assembly, he felt they in no way accorded with the 
Ceasefire Order contained in'Part I of the, UNCIP Resolution of 
1-*See pages 291-292ý 
-**See page 293. 
***See pages 297-298. 
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13th August, 1948, paragraph E (246) which, he said, appeared 
to have been entirely forgotten by both sides. He thought 
that when such a spirit was abroad in high places, one could 
not wonder at frequent evidences of hostility among the rank 
and file on the CFL6". And in early 1964 he told Bunche that 
over the previous few months he had become increasingly 
concerned about the expeditious and slanted accuracy of Press 
reports in India and Pakistan, from the contents of which it 
was quite apparent that the two parties were issuing handouts 
to their Press since in most instances the Press could not 
possiblyýh6ve obtained its information from, any other source. 
In Nimmo's opinion it was all part of a carefully planned 
campaign on the part of both sides to keep the ceasefire 
situation at boiling point. At the same time he felt it was 
pointless to write to either CGS to register a complaint about 
making extracts of his secret and confidential communications 
public since it was quite clear that the military were acting 
on, political direction". 
The immediate cause for concern was a demi-official letter 
on the Chaknot situation* which General Nimmo had sent to both 
CGS, and which India had submitted to the Security Council. 
General Nimmo thought the Chaknot affair was in itself trivial 
and was only elevated to world notoriety to, further the 
political aspirations of both sides. He regarded the Indian 
action as improper and unethical, but realised that India would 
claim-there had been no breach of faith since both sides had 
received the letter. Whilst he would not accept this point, 
Nimmoýreluctantly'conceded that each side had to counter the 
propaganda tactics of the other, but he thought it unfortunate 
*See pages 349-353. 
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- though inevitably that was why this particular letter had 
been used - that the letter in question had referred only to 
two specific incidents, which would create the impression to 
the uninformed that Pakistan was the Chaknot "boogyman". 
Nimmo did not feel this to be entirely the case. In any case 
Nimmo'believed that it was fundamental that the United Nations 
could not permit Governments to support their claims or counter 
claims with any UN document which had not been made available 
to all member nations"'. As Bunche and Nimmo feared, this was 
only the start'of a chain reaction, whereby each side began to 
place certain of General Nimmo's findings before the Security 
Council-in furtherance of their political aiMS72. , 
The Holy Relic 
-In the last week of'December, 1963, a Holy Relic, 
supposedly a Hair of, the Prophet Mohammed, disappeared from the 
Hazratbal Shrine in Srinagar. There was great agitation, with 
strikes and demonstrations against the Jammu and Kashmir 
Government, in which Hindus and Sikhs as well as Muslims 
73 
participated Pakistan newspapers, broadcasts and official 
statements presented it as an even graver crisis than it was. 
General Nimmo'reported that apart from in Srinagar the- 
situation, had been relatively quiet throughout Kashmir and 
Pakistan. However, he thought, there could-have been serious 
trouble in Srinagar had the Indians not-employed so many 
troops. Although neither Observers nor UN vehicles were 
molested in any way, for many days all shops in Srinagar were 
closed, and it was necessary to take food supplies in for the 
Observers stationed there. One point of interest he mentioned 
was that an Observer had spoken to an American Journalist who 
was fluent in Urdu and had had considerable success in 
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interviewing the man in the street. Ordinarily these people 
would not talk, but he was able to take advantage of the 
emotion of the moment. He formed the opinion that they wanted 
Sheik Abdullah as their leader, and that they wanted a 
plebiscite. The relic appeared in his view to be secondary7l. 
- Nehru's Director of Intelligence, B. N. Mullik, rushed to 
the scene and was instrumental, as he claims, in having the 
relic found and returned by 3rd January. On 3rd February, 
after considerable doubts as-to whether it Was the real thing, 
the Relic was verified by important religious leaders, and 
conditions returned to normal73. The Pakistan Press, however, 
continued its virulent propaganda campaign, and it is possible 
that the massive infiltration of Indian-held Kashmir in August 
1965 was a direct result, in that it led the Azad Kashmiris to 
believe that in conditions of such unrest they could, with 
little difficulty,, encourage an internal rebellion against the 
so-called Indian occupation of Kashmir. 
ACTION BY THE KASHMIRIS 
Demonstrations on the Pakistan Side 
On 24th October, 1952 a "Kashmir Day" was observed 
throughout Pakistan; Scores of meetings were held and 
resolutions passed urging action and condemning the "dilatory" 
policy of the UN and asking for Pakistan's withdrawal from the 
UN'16. In September 1955 there was a Pakistan - though not 
77 Government-sponsored - movement for satyagraha* in Kashmir 
following which, on 26th November, the Pakistan All-Parties 
Conference on Kashmir met and denounced Indian intransigence 
*Non-violent resistance, as espoused by Mahatma Gandhi. 
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and expressed disappointment in the Security Council's lack of 
action". On 28th November, 1955 Kashmir Day was observed in 
Karachi with slogans demanding the liberation of Kashmir, a 
break with both India and the UN, and for war against Indiel. 
In January 1957, as the Security Council was meeting again at 
Pakistan's request to discuss the Dispute, another Kashmir Day 
was observed-, with demonstrations throughout Pakistan and Azad 
Kashmir in-protest against the integration of "Indian occupied 
Kashmir", with Indieo. Subsequently there was great 
disappointment in Pakistan with Dr. Graham's report, presented 
in March 1958 as the-ultimate result of this most recent resort 
to the-UN., The AK President, Mr. Khurshid remarked that it 
was a confession of UN helplessness". I 
, 'On 28th June, 1958 Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas*, leader of the 
Kashmir Liberation Movement, called on his followers to make a 
mass demonstration and cross to the Indian side of the 
Ceasefire LineB3. , Despite Pakistan official'attempts to 
prevent them, some'AK civilians did succeed in making the, 
crossing. They were arrested by Indian Army authorities and 
handed over to-the Jammu and Kashmir Government". On 9th 
July, 1958 the Pakistan Mission to the UN issued a Press 
Release saying that the Government of Pakistan was continuing 
to enforce, itsýorder against the crossing of the Ceasefire 
Line, but maintained that the movement had widespread support 
not only in Azad Kashmir, but also in West and even East 
Pakistan. Meetings and processions also went ahead in 
*When the Secretary-General visited the Subcontinent in 
1959, Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas sent him a telegram saying 
that the Kashmiris were never a party to the "ominous" 
ceasefire agreement, and "urgently" and "loudly demand(ed) 
that the UN must without further delay redeem its pledges 
and fulfill its obligations about Kashmir in a bold and 
businesslike manner "82 . 
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defiance, of a Government ban, and the Government was subjected 
to severe criticism by all principal opposition parties for 
curbing the movement. Seven top leaders and 1200 volunteers 
were arrested". Demonstrators outside the Observers' 
bungalow in Sialkot claimed that if after ten years the UN had 
been unable to do anything it was time to take matters into 
their own hands". 
In February 1961 there were further demonstrations against 
an UNFO team, this time within the Pakistan military compound 
in Domel. The demonstrators, approximately 250 young men, 
broke through the guard and into the office, smashing a chair 
and tearing down curtains before being expelled by orderlies 
and other soldiers. Slogans translated as "UN get out" were 
shouted. After their departure the demonstrators met an 
Observer returning to the station in a jeep which was stopped 
and the Observer struck several-times, with sticks. The local 
Army command expressed its regret and took steps to prevent 
further intrusions87. Nevertheless in January 1964 General 
Nimmo - writing on another subject - mentioned that the field 
station-at Domel was being stoned by a demonstrating mob as a 
result of the Holy Relic situation"*, Demonstrations also 
occurred a this time outside Bhimber and Kotli field stations, 
also on the Pakistan side"". And, during May 1965, at a time 
of disturbances in Srinagar as a result of Sheik Abdullah's 
re-arrest, the UN flag at Kotli was torn down, but no other 
damage done, when the field station was the focus for one of 
several demonstrations which took place on the Pakistan side 
against the UN for failing to settle the Kashmir problem. 
The 
demonstration was not, however, thought to be 5pecificallY, 
*See pages 376-377. 
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against UNMOGIPIO. 
Demonstrations on the Indian Side 
Demonstrations concerning the Kashmir dispute also 
occurred on the Indian side, but mainly only in Kashmir itself, 
and perhaps, less frequently than on the Pakistan side as they 
faced the active resistance rather than the passive acceptance 
ofýthe, Government. -They were also less often, perhaps for the 
sameýreason,, directed against the'UN**. Following the release 
of'Sheik Abdullah from prison in April 1964 there were several 
demonstrations, in his favour, and that same month about 300 
demonstrators tried to invade a hotel in Srinagar where Ralph 
Bunche-was, expected to be lunching on theýoccasion of his visit 
to-the-Mission. ' In fact he had already left, and onýbeing, 
toldýthis the demonstrators, members of the Jammu., and Kashmir 
Students and Youth League, handed over for-forward 
transmission, a petition that was "anti-India" in tone 
**Those which occurred the first time Sheik Abdullah was 
r-arrested, at the time of General de Ridder's arrival as 
ACMO are mentioned on pages 268-270. Perhaps the worst 
demonstrations against UNMOGIP occurred in Srinagar at a 
time when the Observers were actually expecting trouble in 
Rawalpindi. This was on the occasion of former President 
Bhutto's hanging in 1979. General Waldenstrom, CMO at 
the time, believed it was either because US money was said 
to have been involved in the hanging, and the people could 
not distinguish-between UN and US, or they blamed the UN 
for not succeeding in saving Bhutto since it was known 
that General Waldenstrom had personally delivered a-, 
message from Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, through 
Mr. Agha Shahi, the Pakistan Foreign Minister, to President 
Zia requesting clemency. Stones and firebombs were 
thrown at-the UNMOGIP HQ, and at first the local police 
and then the military were insufficient to strengthen the 
guard, and Delhi had to be reque5ted, for reinforcements, 
which took some hours. The villa next door was burned, 
and also a Christian church (because the hangman was said 
to be Christian), and the Srinagar Club (built by the 
British). Although only-one member of the Mission was 
injured, some civilians were killed and it was feared 
there might be a movement for revenge, but Sheik Abdullah 
stepped in and eased the situation7l. 
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and in support of Sheik Abdullah, who was at the time himself 
advocating a plebiscite. It called for further intervention 
by the Security Council and the despatch of UN troops "to 
safeguard our lives and pave the way for a free and impartial 
plebiscite"12. 
Inevitably there were more demonstrations after Sheik 
Abdullah's re-arrest early in May 1965, with disturbances 
particularly in Srinagar. Shops were closed and there was 
little, civilian transport, but police and troops kept the 
situation under control. An Observer's vehicle was stoned and 
a headlight smashed, so General Nimmo confined Mission 
personnel to their own areas except for official dutie513. A 
few weeks later, this time on the anniversary of Sheik 
Abdullah's arrest in 1953, the UN transport carrying staff and 
Observers home was attacked and the vehicles damaged by flying 
bricks. It Was nevertheless felt that the action was designed 
to draw attention to the Kashmir, dispute using the UN as a 
medium, since no general hostility to the Group, had been 
f elt". 
Petitions 
Petitions were regularly handed in for onward transmission 
to New York often, but not necessarily, on the occasion of a 
demonstration. - The Observers tried, to communicate the 
fact 
that it was not their function to accept petitions, as this 
could seem to be a partisan move, butýif a nasty situation 
appeared to be developing as a result, they would take theM and 
pass them on, and that would be the end of-the matter". Only 
on rare occasions did the acceptance of a-petition give rise to 
further action. In 1953 during the disturbances caused by 
Sheik Abdullah's arrest, the UN Field Observer Team at Doniel 
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received a petition against what the Azad Kashmiris understood 
to be wholesale genocide of Moslems taking place in Kashmir. 
Fearing "reaction to the distorted Press pictures elsewhere 
along the CFL" General de Ridder, who was Acting CMO in General 
Nimmo'5 absence, sent his Chief Operations Officer to the 
Pakistan Deputy CIC to assure him that the reports had no basis 
in fact, and that the Indian Army had neither been used to 
quell the disturbances, nor had it Increased its forces in 
Kashmir. He also sent messages to the UN Observer Teams on 
the'Pakistan side asking them to reassure local commanders, and 
caution them to be alert against incitement-of front line 
troops by excited civilians". 
, As tension between India and Pakistan increased in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, the number of petitions presented 
likewise increased. In September-1961, General Nimmo told 
Cordier that his Observers on the Pakistan side had twice-been 
handed petitions by local civilians since the trouble in the 
Balakot-Tarkundi* area had started. The headman who handed 
one of these over had said that'the people were too poor to go 
anywhere else but since the Indians had established-the new 
Police Post they did not dare to go out'andýwork in the fields, 
graze their cattle or get water, because the Indians were 
firing at them and causing many casualties; they sincerely 
requested through the UN that the Police Post should be 
withdrawn. Nimmo suggested, to Cordier that an informal 
approach might be made to the two Delegations in New York, for 
the sake of the humanitarian con51deration5 involved, since 
this, was an aspect which was frequently publicised in 
connection with other situations in'the world"'. 
*See pages 228-236. 
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In April 1964 General Chaudhuri, the Indian CGS, wrote to 
complain to General Nimmo that students had taken petitions to 
the UN office in Srinagar in March, that a UN jeep had been 
provided to the student leader to take the resolution to the 
airport for onward despatch, and that several more meetings 
with Military Observers had followed". The Times of India 
also had an item about General Chaudhuri's complaint, and said 
the Prime Minister of Kashmir had spoken to the Indian Ministry 
of External Affairs about the "obJectionable activities of the 
United Nations Observers""'. Once again it would appear that 
the Kashmir State Government was at the root of the trouble for 
UNMOGIP. - General Chaudhuri merely stated that apart from 
impressing upon the Observers the desirability of-not 
transgressing the limits of their jurisdiction, even 
unwittingly, the Government of India did not appear to 
contemplate any action like lodging a formal complaint against 
the team'00. 
Nimmo told Chaudhuri that although the petitions were 
accepted, no jeep was used and the action had had the effect of 
pacifying demonstrators and causing them to disperse 
peacefully. He went on: "Our Observers are neutral as 
regards political issues and have no desire to receive 
petitions, but it was difficult to see what other action could 
be taken and forwarding to the Secretary-General without 
comment seemed safe so that he could decide what to do"101. 
However the matter did not rest thereý Ralph Bunche agreed 
that General Nimmo had taken the correct position'02, but 
comments were made about the incident in the Rajya Sabha* at 
the end of May,, -and it was suggested the Military Observers 
*The Upper House of the Indian Parliament. 
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should be declared persona non grata and be asked to 
withdraw'03. The Indian Government spokesman said they had 
rejected General Nimmo's explanation that the fact of receiving 
the petitions was a simple and safe one from all points of 
view, and that further representations would be made to the UN, 
after which whatever steps were considered appropriate would be 
taken'04. General Nimmo wrote to Dr. Bunche enclosing various 
Press clippings on the matter and said: "The aspersions which 
continue to be publicised against us are not very fair or 
helpful "105. A Secretariat note on his letter suggested that 
the Secretary-General tell the Permanent Representative of 
India that he would be compelled to take a firm stand in supprt 
of-the Military Observers if any representations were made to 
him, and express the hope that no such representation would 
therefore be made'". Presumably this happened as the file 
makes no further mention of the subject. 
Azad Kashmir calls for war 
-WhenýýBrigadier Angle arrived as CMO in February 1950 
senior Army officers on both sides expressed a strong desire 
for peace. In contrast the Azad Kashmir-Deputy Commissioner 
told Angle-that the UN should use "the hydrogen bomb, to force 
India to a settlement"! 107 , In the summer of 1951 Sardar 
Ibrahim, -the Prime Minister of Azad Kashmir, threatened that 
the-Kashmir issue would not be settled by the UN but ! 'on the 
battlefield"100, and such threats continued to be made until 
the-two sides did find themselves on the, battlefield again, in 
1965. In September 195ý Ibrahim criticized the inactivity of 
the UN and accused the Pakistan Government of "dilly-dallying". 
He called for a resumption of "liberation" fighting'O". When 
the Kashmir Constituent Assembly ratified the Accession to 
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India in February, 1954 the AK leader Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas 
declared the people should depend solely on their own efforts 
and not look to the UN for the liberation of Kashmir, and there 
were bellicose speeches in the Pakistan Parliament and promises 
from the tribesmen that they were ready to invade again"O. 
War cries were similarly raised after the failure of the last 
Graham mission in 1958*. The Pakistan Government faced 
constant and serious difficulties in keeping the Azad forces 
quiet amidst fears of revolution in Pakistan. 
In the autumn of 1961 the unofficial government of Azad 
Kashmir went to the electorate for the first time. The 
President, Mr. - K. H. Khurshid, ran his election campaign on the 
advocacy of direct action for settlement of the Kashmir 
question, and criticised the UN for its failure to resolve the 
problem. He described his armed forces not as purely 
defensive, but as "created with a specific objective", and 
"with a missionýto fulfil". He said his government was taking 
"all necessary steps to equip the army for the liberation of 
enemy occupied areas of the State's territory""&. On 17th 
July, 1964 both the Pakistan Times and DaNn reported him as 
saying that no force in the world could prevent the Kashmiris 
from liberating their homeland'". 
Following the disturbances created by the loss of the Holy 
Relic UNMOGIP had, in February of that year, received warnings 
of war from two separate organisations on the Pakistan side for 
transmission to New York. The first, presented by Aafar 
Mahmood, President, and a ten-member deputation of Rostrum** 
stated that "the recent revolt of the people against the ugly 
*See page 293. 
*Details of this organisation not known. 
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role that India is playing in Kashmir... has clearly shown that 
unless solved immediately the Kashmir problem with its volcanic 
eruption is bound to endanger the world peace and security". 
The memorandum complained that the UN was playing in the hands 
of the big powers of the world and had concerned itself only 
with their interests'". Similarly, in the other petition, 
the Joint Secretary of the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim 
Conference, the major political grouping of Azad Kashmir, 
expressed lack of confidence in the UN, a tool of the big 
powers, and warned that there could be armed conflict at any 
time between Kashmir volunteers and the Indian Army, mainly 
because the Kashmiris wanted a plebiscite. The letter 
attributed atrocities to the Indian Army in Ladakh and 
elsewhere, at Nehru's instigation, and maintained that the 
Conference considered the Ceasefire null and void. It went on 
to say that on-2nd February, 1964 a war of liberation had been 
declared, and guerilla warfare was to be practised, 14. This 
was obviously a warning of what had become deliberate policy, 
since incidents between Azad Kashmir civilians and Indian 
Police became steadily worse, with troops also increasingly- 
involved, until war broke out in 1965. It suggests also that 
pressure on Pakistan for the war came from the Azad Kashmiris, 
rather than being inherent in Pakistan itself. 
In March 1964 the United Nations Association of Pakistan 
wrote directly to Secretary-General U Thant, saying there was 
imminent danger of war and that the people of Pakistan were 
fast losing faith in the United Nations and were at a loss to 
understand why the UN could not enforce resolutions passed by 
the Security Council. They urged the UN to make India fulfil 
its promise to give the right of self-determination to the 
people of Kashmir. The letter noted a public meeting had been 
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held under the auspices of the Association in furtherance of 
its drive to popularise the United Nations, and three 
resolutions had been passed: firstly to request U Thant to 
visit Kashmir and study the appalling conditions; secondly to 
request the Pakistan Government to afford facilities to such 
public representatives as understood the Kashmir problem to 
visit all member countries of the UN to acquaint them with the 
seriousness of the situation, so'that they'would direct their 
representatives in the UN to support the cause of Kashmir in 
such'a manner that the UN'would realize the necessity of early 
implementation - of its resolution to hold a plebiscite in 
Kashmir; 'and thirdly that the nation as'a whole should stand 
by the Government of Pakistan in presenting and pleading for 
the cause of Kashmir in the UNIIII. 
By August 1965, during the intense activity prior to the 
outbreak of war, political rallies were being held daily in 
Muzzafarabadt capital of Azad'Kashmir. Villagers were brought 
in by bus from'the surrounding areas to attend, and a 
1OUspeaker-equipped truck exhorted them to "Jehad", Or holy 
war. LocAl Command requested Observers atýDomel'to'refrain- 
from visiting'the city, and expressed concern about their 
safety, but the Observers did noi notice any hostility directed 
towards themselves'14. 
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PART IV - UNMOGIP AND THE HOSTILITIES OF 1965 AND 1971 
CHAPTER THIRTEEN - INFILTRATION AND COUNTERMEASURES 
As reported at the end of Chapter Nine*, the increasing 
activity experienced along the Ceasefire Line during the early 
1960s continued with mounting intensity into 1965. In April 
the atmosphere was further vitiated when the Indians charged 
that Pakistan armed personnel had mounted heavy attacks on two 
Indian police posts in the Rann of Kutch,, a small, desolate and 
sparsely populated border territory of little real value in the 
southern part of the international border between India and 
West Pakistan. Pakistan denied the charge, but a short period 
of, fighting followed before the two Governments signed a 
ceasefire agreement and allowed the matter to be submitted to 
arbitration, **. 
In May the constant incursions by the Pakistan side on the 
western portion of the CFL throughout the early part of the 
year were suddenly counterbalanced by the-Indian occupation of 
Pakistan, positions just over the Ceasefire Line in the Northern 
Areas, near Kargil. This was the first time that either side 
had held ground across, the Ceasefire Line since-the Ceasefire 
in 19493, and was the most telling sign yet of -the, seriousness 
of the'situation'between the-parties. With the evacuation of 
these positions at the beginning of July, and the signing of 
the Rann-of Kutch Agreement, it seemed that the situation had 
calmed down. However, on 5th August, a massive infiltration 
began across the CFL from the Pakistan side into Indian-held 
*See-pages 241-243. 
**The arbitration came to a successful conclusion in 
19682. 
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Kashmir, with attacks taking place on bridges, military 
installations and picquets. 
General Nimmo at first thought that the raids were 
purposely carried out to coincide with the anniversary of Sheik 
Abdullah's arrest, as an additional protest and possibly to 
promote-further local unrest*. The Pakistanis claimed there 
was a spontaneous uprising of the local people*, but General 
Nimmo, was able to testify from his Observers' investigations 
that Azad Kashmiri regular troops and well-trained irregulars 
had crossed the CFL to perpetrate the trouble,. 
On 15th August the Indians counter-attacked, re-occupying 
the recently evacuated posts near Kargil. They also mounted a 
spirited defence in the Punch area where they subsequently 
crossed the CFL and held ground on the Pakistan-side. 
Meanwhile the Observers were finding it increasingly difficult 
to-go about their duties, either because of limitations imposed 
byýLocal, Commanders, or because continuous firing prevented 
their movement, or roads were closed for security reasons. 
Thus they were unable to carry out their primary objective of 
observing the Ceasefire - whichýin any event patently no longer 
existed. Nor could they properly investigate the source of 
the violations: by the time-they were-able to reach the scene 
of a complaint, the evidence was often too confused for 
realistic evaluations to be made. 
WAR THREATENS 
General Nimmo wrote to both sides in April 1965, as he had 
done many times before, without success, to attempt to arrange 
a high level conference concerning civilians in ceasefire 
areas, suggesting once again that a meeting be held at the 
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highest level possible to reach some agreed definition of the 
rights, privileges and responsibilities of civilians in the 
area of the-CFL. On this occasion India agreed but Pakistan 
was "unable to agree under the prevailing conditions". 
In his report for the last fortnight of March, General 
Nimmo had mentioned that all the incident5 involving the 
crossing of-the CFL during that period were the responsibility 
of Pakistana. I On 11th May he wrote to the CGS, Pakistan 
asking whether he was aware of the number and nature of armed 
crossings of the CFL by Pakistan forces, since the total 
violations had already reached double figures that year. Such 
crossings, according to General Nimmo had been done "for the 
purpose of attacking established military posts, or firing at 
them from-close range, or ambushing patrols, water or ration 
parties and the like", -and represented "one of, tbe Most 
flagrant forms of ceasefire violation" as they were 
"premeditated and planned, with the obvious approval of higher 
military authorities"'. 
The phrase, "the most active period in theýhistory of the 
Mission", was again brought into use to-describe the last 
two-week period in May, with a record number of-387 complaints 
being received, four of a serious nature, including the 
occupation by Indian forces of Pakistan occupied positions 
dominating-the Kargil arealo*. On, three occasions during this 
period Observers reported being shot at by Pakistan troOP5 or 
para-military elements, and once they came under fire from an 
Indian post". 
On 21st May Nimmo cabled Bunche that he would not be 
surprised if a serious military clash occurred in May or June 
*See pages 392-397. 
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a before the monsoon broke since both sides were in positions of 
readiness and the atmosphere was tense. Most barracks and 
static quarters were empty, he said, and formation HQ and units 
were disposed in the field; airfields had an empty wartime 
look and both-sides were "increasingly contemptuous of UN and 
their, ceasefire obligations as you are already aware from the 
violations perpetrated daily. There are signs also that 
partial efforts are being made to deter Observers from visiting 
certain areas, but we are insisting upon our right of free 
movement both ground and air. " He thought perhaps a curt 
reminder to both parties about their Ceasefire undertakings 
should be made12. Dr. Bunche queried whether the situation 
was threatening enough to warrant the Secretary-General 
submitting a brief report to the Security CouncilI3. 
Nimmols response was that-it was, -but he preferred that 
the matter "be keptIn the family for the present as one of 
their aims may be toýforce such recognition. Should a clash 
occur involving seizing and holding-positions across the CFL or 
Border,. I shall not then hesitate to recommend such action to 
you"*. Meanwhile-he thought both Representatives should be 
told-quite plainly that the Secretary-General was aware of the 
military situation and its implications and deplored 
specifically the following aspects;. 
1. continued firing-across the CFL; 
2. the fact that the demilitarized zone was no longer 
respected, and that raids and ambushes were all too 
common; 
*In fact Indian troops had already captured some Pakistan 
positions across the Line in the Kargil area (pages 
392-397), and a week later Nimmo told Bunche that if they did not revert to their, former dispositions "in, reasonable time", it would be a matter for the Security CounciJ14. 
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3. that surreptitious reinforcement of forward areas was 
commonplace, as was the laying of mines and booby traps; 
4. that forces of division strength were deployed opposite 
one another on the Jammu-Sialkot Border; 
5. and that tenseness and an air of anticipation was very 
marked everywhere in forward areas". 
Nimmo mentioned also that large forces were deployed on 
both sides in the Punjab, and all service leave had been 
cancelled". A few days later he reported he had flown to 
several focal points and had discussions with most of his 
Observers. He said that although the CFL was very disturbed 
he did not anticipate major offensive operations being 
contemplated although tempers were high and many minor clashes 
and firing incidents were likely to continue. On the Indian 
side defensive preparations were "feverish", with infantry, 
mortars and artillery extensively deployed and dug in. On the 
Pakistan side also, but with less numbers and much less 
material, though many Azad Kashmir armed civilians were in 
evidence. On the Border there were no significant moves. 
The Indians were in defensive posture but well, back from the 
Border itself, and-Pakistan formations were mobile but also 
held back17. Bunche in his turn reported that the 
Secretary-General was to confer with both Permanent 
Representatives about the situation, and particularly about the 
increase of forces in Kashmir". 
Indian Occupation of Pakistan Posts in the Kargil Area 
On the night of 16th May, 1965, an Indian picquet was 
attacked by about 20 men supported, according to the Indian 
complaint, by light machine gun fire in the Kargil area. A 
Violation was subsequently awarded against Pakistan for 
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cr055ing the CFL11. However, as a result of the attack, 
Indian troops crossed the Ceasefire Line in the same area on 
17th May and captured three Pakistan posts. General Nimmo 
several times requested them to evacuate the posts but without 
success, and after a personal talk with the Indian Army Chief, 
General Chaudhuri, he had to report that*he had received no 
encouragement that early evacuation of the captured Positions 
could be expected. He also felt, having visited Rawalpindi, 
that the Pakistanis were anxious to exploit the matter. All 
of which General Nimmo felt was "highly detrimental to UN 
authority and prestige", especially in the present military 
situation on the Subcontinent which was "definitely ominous "20. 
In early June, during the first two weeks of which the 
number of complaints rose to 545, Pakistan troops established 
two new positions in the Kargil area on high ground further to 
the West in an attempt to stabilize the situation. This was 
followed by Indian attacks to dislodge the, Pakistan troops from 
their new positions". By 8th June 80 Indians and 31 
Pakistanis had already been killed in the area, and Observers 
expected the casualty figures to ri SeZ2 . Theýlndians held a 
new front of approximately 15 miles along the CFL, which 
General Nimmo pointed out was in direct violation of the 
Karachi Agreement. The new positions were being consolidated, 
wired and mined and ammunition and stores-were going forward on 
yaks. High ranking Indian officers had visited Kargil 50 were 
fully aware of the significance of their actions. Furthermore 
the Pakistan CGS told Nimmo that the Pakistanis would be forced 
to retaliate in the same manner if the Indian posts were not 
1123 
vacated, and "thus the CFL will cease to exist . Nimmo 
cabled Bunche that the situation had grown serious enough for 
reference by the Secretary-General to the Security Council for 
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an emergency meeting. He recommended that immediate action be 
directed towards ordering India to withdraw all troops who had 
advanced into the area as early as possible, and for Pakistan 
to ensure proper restraint in order to facilitate this movement 
under the supervision of UN ObserverS24. 
Dr. Bunche replied that the Secretary-General was 
disinclined to call an emergency meeting of the Security 
Council except under conditions of extreme urgency, and even if 
he did there was no guarantee that the Security Council would 
take action along the lines indicated by Nimmo. However, the 
Secretary-General would circulate to the Security Council a 
report on the situation which would include a warning 
sufficiently strong to alert them to the possibility of both an 
emergency meeting and an imminent blow-up along the CFL25. 
The SecretarV-General would not make any specific 
recommendations to the Council for action, because this had to 
be left to the Council, -but he was nevertheless interested in 
any ideas that Nimmo might have concerning what might usefully 
21 be done 
Nimmo recommended that both parties be urged strictly to 
observe their obligations-under the Ceasefire Agreement. In 
particular they should withdraw all troops who had established 
themselves by force on or across the CFL, or had taken up 
positions in advance of their original line of forward defended 
localities, and should cease firing across, or having armed 
forces cross the CFL. He also suggested that an experienced 
Observer be attached to UNHQ for military liaison duties, 
possibly for the last three months of his tour. Finally he 
suggested frequent meetings of Indian and Pakistan 
representatives at HQ so that the true Ceasefire situation, 
based on Observers, reports, could be made known to them at the 
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discretion of the Secretary-General. He hoped this would 
gradually tend to promote better understanding of the worsening 
problem27. 
Bunche doubted the utility of having an Observer at HQ 
since approaches there were predominantly at the political 
level and on a political basis; and he felt that Nimmo's 
reports afforded ample information for the basis of talks in 
New York. However, he agreed with Nimmo on the desirability 
of meeting with Indian and Pakistan representatives at HQ which 
"has been and continues to be done"28. 
On 11th June the Permanent Representative of Pakistan sent 
a formal letter of complaint about the Kargil*situation to the 
Secretary-General, 'expressing Pakistan's "deep concern that the 
UN Observers have proved totally ineffective in face of open 
aggression by Indian forces... If the aggression is not 
evacuated (sic) soon, an extremely serious situation is bound 
to develop in which the continued integrity of. the CFL itself 
will become. open to question... "21. 
The Secretary-General replied that General Nimmo and his 
Observers on the spot-had been doing and were continuing to do 
everything possible to get the situation in, the Kargil sector 
restored to normality, and that he himself had been seeking a 
similar result through efforts at, HQ. If these efforts did 
not produce concrete results very shortly it-was his intention 
to, submit a factual report on the matter to the Security 
Council". I 
On 12th June the Secretary-General appealed to the 
Government of India to restore-and observe the original CFL in 
the Kargil area. Circulation of the proposed report was 
deferred pending a response from Indi&'. In the interest of 
"balance and fairness" the Indians drew attention to General 
396 
Nimmo's various attempts at addressing the problem of civilians 
along the CFL, and claimed that whilst they had co-operated, 
Pakistan had not, a fact which they felt was relevant to any 
report". General Nimmo commented that the matter was less 
straightforward than the Indians suggested33. In reply to the 
question at issue, the Indians pointed out that the road from 
Srinagar to Leh was vitally strategic for the defence of Ladakh 
against China, and certain sectors of that road ran parallel to 
the CFL near Kargil. They claimed Pakistan forces had made 
frequent attempts to cut the road, and that on 16th May 
Pakistan armed units supported by artillery* had attacked an 
Indian army picquet several miles from the CFL on the Indian 
side nor. theast. of Kargil. Faced with a continuing threat they 
were obliged to occupy the two high points across the CFL from 
which Pakistan forces had been mounting attacks on the 
Leh-Srinagar road and on the Kargil airfield34. According to 
General Nimmo, the last violation in the area was a minor one 
in 1960. No complaint had ever been received of Pakistan 
mounting attacks on either the road or Kargil airfield prior to 
Indian occupation of the Pakistan positionS33., 
India affirmed her desire, to withdraw from the occupied 
posts, but insisted there should*be no repetition of Pakistan 
attacks from them, and that UNMOGIP should-assure the safety of 
its vital communications to Ladakh by posting'Observers in the 
area"'. Bunche offered to make every effort to get additional 
Observers as replacements if Nimmo could'take them immediately 
from less critical areas in view of the urgency of the 
situati on37 . General NiEmo sent'a signal to the Indian COAS 
informing'him. that Observers had been posted'in Kargil since 
*No artillery was mentioned in the original complaint, see 
page 392. 
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25th May, and that the posting would be permanent". He told 
Bunche that permanent postings there had been avoided in the 
past because of infrequent complaints and paucity of Pakistan 
forces in the aree9. 
Thus, on the basis of an assurance by the 
Secretary-General that if the CFL in Kargil was restored, no 
report to the Security Council would be necessary, the 
Representative of India confirmed that his Government had taken 
40 the decision to withdraw troops from the Pakistan side 
There was subsequently an attempt by the Indians to remain at a 
point known as Black Rocks", an unauthorised position on their 
own side which it appears may previously have been illegally 
occupied by Pakistan 42, and further complications arose when 
anti-personnel mines were discovered", but the evacuation was 
complete by 7th July, 196544. 
INFILTRATION 
. After a general decrease in activity-, noted in JUIY43, a 
massive infiltration across the CFL into Indian-held Kashmir 
began in August. ý -A record number of 1i151 complaints was 
received during, the month, compared with 440 for July. 
Clashes between Indian forces and infiltrators on the one hand, 
and attacks by Indian troops across the CFL on the other 
resulted in heavy casualties, with reports by India of 78 being 
killed (53 soldiers) and 203 wounded (164 soldiers), and by 
Pakistan of 147 killed (124 soldiers) and 28 wounded, (6 
soldiers). General Nimmo suggested the casualty figures-were 
much higher, as both-sides were loath fully to admit their 
casualties4l. On 14th August Nimmo requested Bunche to ask 
Member Governments to restrict entry of dependants of Military 
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Observers into the Mission area until further notice 
47. 
On 2nd July the Kotli Observer Team noted a new Azad 
Kashmir battalion in their area, together with approximately 
one battalion of Razakars*. They also reported seeing several 
groups of civilians with rifles receiving military instruction 
from Army personnel". Another Observer Team reported that a 
convoy of 19 vehicles carrying armed civilians had been seen in 
Rawalakot-Sector on 24th July. No action was taken because at 
that time Pakistan regulars and Azad Kashmir forces were far 
below their permissible strength, whilst Indian forces were 
already up tottheirS49. 
From 5th August India began to complain of attacks, mainly 
on bridges, military convoys and isolated picquets, but also 
increasingly, on local headquarters. Some picquets were 
occupied by-the attackers. In the Bhimber/Jammu Sectors the 
attacks were supported by heavy Pakistan artillery fire"O. UN 
Observers'themselves saw mortar and grenade explosions and 
light machine gun fire directed at two bridges located one and 
a half miles south of, their location and four miles on, the 
Indian side of the CFL on the main Pdnch-Ja=u road3l., 
On 11th August the Permanent Representative of India- 
informed-the Secretary-General that infiltrators were-not only 
staying on the Indian side but were fanned out over-a wide 
area72. Bunche cabled for comment from Nimmo, who'detailed 27 
attacks on the Indian side since 5th August, but declared it 
was impossible to state categorically that'infiltrators were 
fanning over a wide aree3. He had already, on 9th Augusto 
cabled that the situation had seriously deteriorated since the 
night of 5/6th August, and suggested that the Pakistan 
*Armed civilians. 
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Permanent Representative be advised urgently that such actions 
could only result in a serious deterioration of the Ceasefire 
situation, and could even cause retaliation by Indian forces 
"of which they would be amply capable owing to the great 
advantage in numbers and weapons "54. 
Operation Gibraltar* 
In New York, the suggested demarche evoked the response 
from Pakistan that neither Pakistan nor Azad Kashmir troops had 
been involved'in the incidents, but in fact there had been 
"local uprisings of the Kashmiri people" on the Indian side of 
the CFL53. IThe Permanent Representative of India asserted 
that substantial quantities of arms and ammunition which could 
only have been supplied by the Pakistan Government had been 
captured from the raiders, 'and that prisoners taken wore the 
badges of the Azad Kashmir Reserve Force, proving conclusively 
that infiltration was-massive, well-organised. and equipped by 
the Pakistan Government". 
General Nimmo could not confirm the amount ofrweapons and 
ammunition the, Indian Mission claimed had been captured, but 
agreed that the considerable quantity of warlike stores seen by 
Observers provedýwithout doubt that the, incidents must'have 
been co-ordinated, mounted and fully supplied by Pakistan 
force S57,., -, He reported-that evidence picked up by Observers in 
an. -area where a picquet was attacked and a convoy ambushed, 
together with the evidence collected by interrogation, of 
wounded Indians, whose statements corroborated each other's, 
clearly indicated that the attacks took place as alleged. 
Further, he was of the view that the professional manner'of the 
*The name came from the original Muslim thrust into 
Gibraltar as the spearhead of Islam into Spain. 
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attacks established that they were carried out by well-trained 
raiders", and that investigations by Military Observers proved 
irrefutably that Azad Kashmir regular forces and trained 
mujahids from the Pakistan side of the CFL were involved. it 
was possible that some had dribbled across the Line over a 
period of months, since Observers had noted that weapons and 
ammunition abandoned by the attackers were lacking in care and 
maintenance, possibly due to having been hidden for some time, 
or,. to the men living in harsh conditions. In such an event 
those involved must have received at least some assistance from 
local inhabitants. 
Nimmo admitted that attacking or raiding-parties seemed to 
know the country intimitely, as well as the locations of 
bridges; ' headquarters and installations, and the routes used by 
military and police. He felt, however, it was hard to believe 
that such groups could be wholly trained and equipped within 
the State. - He maintained that there was no armed rebellion. 
Villagers had been seen moving away-from troubled areas in 
southern sectors, and active support-by the inhabitants of - 
Indian-held Kashmir was not evident. , Indeed, the-considerable 
strength of Indian forces, both military and police, throughout 
the-State of Jammu and Kashmir, -would render any attempt at 
-uprising futile. Nevertheless, this 
did not necessarily rule 
out natural sympathy for a cause, or active co-operation by 
individuals or small bodies with outsiders, especially in 
outlying areas of the Valley-, and in mountainous districts such 
as Punch5l. 
In fact-there was a good deal of unrest in and around 
Srinagar also, the 9th August being the anniversary of Sheik 
Abdullah's arrest in 1953,10. Numerous firing incidents 
occurred each night, but UNMOGIP only received six complaints 
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connected with the area, and these only after prolonged 
requests for their submission. In most cases it appeared that 
Indian security forces had been firing indiscriminately with 
little provocationý'. On 15th August Nimmo told Bunche that 
an additional military command had been set up in Srinagar, but 
the Indians seemed loath to conduct Observers to troublespots, 
and his impression was that they were worried and unsure about 
what was happening. They seemed more concerned with the 
civilian than the military situation62. 
According to Air Chief Marshal P. C. Lal", who was Vice 
Chief of the Indian Air Force at the time, India wanted to 
localise the trouble, knowing that in spite of Pakistan claims, 
Kashmiris were not burning villages and "creating mayhem", but 
that infiltrators were causing trouble and the local 
authorities were unable to cope. The Indian Army was 
therefore asked to help in a policing rather than a fighting 
role. , The Pakistanis launched their so-called "Operation 
Gibraltar" as a result of the Holy Relic incident*, believing 
that there was sufficient unrest amongst the Kashmiri people 
that with very little encouragement they would rise up and "do 
the job for them, but they didn' t "44 . And indeed two 
foreign 
journalists noted, firstly, that there was virtually no 
evidence of any significant popular support for the 
infiltratorS65 and, secondly, that the local population 
appeared to have been "indifferent to this latest attempt to 
'liberate' them. ' The expected popular uprising did not 
happen. This was'partly because of the speed of India's 
reaction... but, mainly because the average Kashmiri is now 
rather, disenchanted with Pakistan for its governing of Azad 
*See pages 376-377. 
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Kashmir and its open friendship with China, whose record in 
Tibet alarms them" 66. 
Evidence of Prisoners 
- 'UN-Observers believed the statement of a prisoner taken by 
the Indians on the night of 7/8th August. He said he was a 
soldier of the 16 AK Infantry Battalion which had formed the 
bulk of'the raiding party, estimated by him at 300 soldiers led 
by the Battalion second-in-charge and 100 mujahids. He said 
their task was to infiltrate deeply, blow up bridges and attack 
ammunition dumps and formation HeadquarterS67. 
On 17th and 18th August, Observers from the Baramula Team 
interviewed separately three prisoners who had allegedly been 
captured five and a half miles on the Indian side of the CFL. 
The-first two said they, had been recruited about two months 
previously and trained for six'weeks near Muzaffarabad. Their 
company was, comprised, of mujahids and troops from 6AK. , They 
had crossed, -the CFL early in August and, had hidden in the 
forest until 6th August. They had then been surprised by 
Indian troops and had scattered. They later joined up with 
other raiders, but after some clashes with Indian patrols, they 
becameýfrightened and ran away. They-identified a rifle and 
small machine gun, produced by the Indians as evidencei as 
their personal weaponS68. 
The third prisoner said he was a, regular soldier from 9AK 
Regiment, and had been stationed-near Muzaffarabad until about 
six-weeks previously when, together, with others from his unit, 
he had been selected1or some special training. When trained, 
his group was known as B Company and consisted of soldiers from 
9 AKi-mujahids and a section of Special, Service Group soldiers 
from the-Para Baluch Regiments. -B Company crossed the CFL- 
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about 1st August and hid in the forest until 6th August when 
they were fired on by Indian artillery. They got disorganised 
and did not take part in any raids. He said the groups's task 
had been to cut telephone lines, to raid small military posts, 
and to raid police stations. He was carrying a rifle and part 
of a wireless-set. He was not told how long he could expect 
to stay across the CFL, but had started off with 8 days' 
rations". 
Further evidence came when Military Observers interviewed 
two pkisoners-on--29th--August. They were AK sepoys who, after 
having been'given a few weeks training in Rawalpindi and in a 
picquet, were taken to the CFL where they had to change their 
uniform to the dark blue dress they were wearing6 They were 
then obliged to cross the'CFL,. Three'soldiers who refused 
were sent to jail. Their-mission was to destroy roads and 
Government buildings. 20-30 Azad Kashmir civilians were 
obliged to go with, them in order to carry their equipment. 
The-prisoners believed-that-if-they were to go back to Pakistan 
they would go to jail or be killed711 . 
Restrictions on Observers' Movements 
Incidents were not always-immediately reported to 
Observers: sometimes it'was as, mdch as, four days before a 
complaint was submitted. Furthermore, continuous firing-made 
it difficult'for Observers to reach-the 5cenes of the 
incidents,, and with road and tracks closed for security 
reasons, there were problems in despatching, reports of 
investigations to General Nimmo71. ý The Pakistan Army', 
authorities; especially, 'were-at times also less than 
co-operative. ' iOn 12th August an Observer from the Rawalakot 
Team reported, that whilst on one visit he saw three artillery 
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guns in firing position. On making. closer investigation he 
was halted by what he took to be .. a soldier of unknown rank as 
he was not dressed in recognised uniform", who said he couldý 
not go. forward. When the Observer explained who he was, and 
that he wanted to carry out his duties, the soldier pushed him 
"provocatively" backward a couple of times and shouted "go 
back "72 
. The SectorýCommander afterwards apologised 73 , but 
movement of Observers all along the CFL from that time became 
increasingly restricted. 
The Pakistan Local Commander in Bhimber informed the 
Observers that he would permit investigation of a complaint 
only when he was ready to do S074, and in Domel also Observers 
found they could go to investigate serious incidents only at 
the discretion of the-Pakistan Local Commanders, although the 
Indian-Local Commander in the area had already-, guaranteed, the 
Observers' safety73.. General Nimmo complained'about the 
restrictions'to thelPakistan CGS", who said, that it was due 
to misunderstanding, and-, advised: - "Local Commands have been 
informed that., UN Observers are free to move and visit any area 
provided they. keep our,, Local Commands informed-about their 
schedules. Safety of UN Observers-cannot however be 
guaranteed if the other'side decides to lodge military 
operations in the area which theýObservers may be visiting, at 
the time "'17. -The Dhimber. Team reported immediately afterwards 
that the Local Command had "suddenly reversed its attitude and 
declared that, Observers., would be allowed to move freely 11713. 
But this-still, did not generally always prove to be, the case, 
and-a furtherý, cable was sent to-'the Pakistan CGS on 1st 
September protesting that Observers in Gangam, Skardu Sector, 
had not only been stopped from doing their Job by Pakistan 
troops "but-even manhandled in the most object manner including 
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threats with a rifle"7-1. The Local Commander initiated an 
immediate investigation and cabled that he was genuinely pained 
to learn of the complaint as they had always held and would 
continue to hold UNMOGIP in the highest esteem. This incident 
should not be construed as anything more than an isolated 
event, he said. However, he could not help pointing out that 
such an unfortunate thing could not have been unprovoked, and 
he would not pass judgment without hearing the other side of 
the story"'. 
INDIA COUNTERATTACKS 
Punch 
Certain areas were more particularly affected by the 
infiltration than others. On 10th August it was reported that 
Pakistan troops had attacked Indian picquets 14 miles, northeast 
of Punch. Observers could not reach the area because the 
tracks had-been closed by the Local Commander for security 
reasons. The town of Mandi was said to have been, taken and 
retaken during the'next two, days". South of Punch civilians 
reported that'a force of 100ýinfiltrators was seen on 7th 
August 12 miles from and moving towards the town. Before 
arriving the group-split into three parties and, --on the night 
of 12/13th August, attacked Punch and three separate picquets 
located in its rear 02. The attackers were repulsed"'. 
, On 19th August Observers reported that Pakistan field 
artillery had made eight craters in Punch airfield and hit the 
operating rooms of the hospital" . Observers had little doubt 
that the Pakistanis knew it was a hospital as it had been there 
for many years and was well marked". - General Nimmo sent a 
signal to the CGS, Pakistan: "Am sure you will deprecate in 
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strongest terms the shelling of Punch airfield and hospital as 
witnessed by UN Observers"87*. The CGS replied that the 
Indians were using light fighter aircraft with the obvious 
intention of directing medium artillery fire on Pakistan 
positions. This had forced Pakistan to take limited action 
against the-airfield. Engagement of the hospital was purely 
accidental. He said he would instruct Local Commanders to 
stop the artillery fire if the Indians would stop theirs and 
cease-using, theýairfield for military aircraft"13. 
,,, That, evening artillery-fire was resumed on the hospital 
which was badly damaged"', - --Punch Local Command requested that 
UN Good Offices be used to evacuate wounded personnel from 
Punch airfield, the light'aircraft, ', as Nimmo informed the CGS, 
Pakistan, having'been'brought in for the express purpose. The 
following morning, the UN Liaison Officer-at-Rawalpindi and the 
Punch Observer Team made arrangements between both"Local 
Commands for the evacuation by air of the wounded under UN 
supervision'O., 
Punch was again shelled on,, 26th August, -with shells- 
actually hitting the building-occupied by UN Observers". - The 
Indians returned the fire which resulted-in a Pakistan, 
complaint alleging that the Indians had fired 2,000 25-pounder 
shells. The Punch-Observer Team stated the number was nearer 
200". 
-On-28th August, the CGS; Pakistan advised, that'the Indians 
had crossed the CFL in-strengthýand were attachingvAzad-Kashmir 
territory between Uri and Punch from north, south and east, 
supported by artillery". ý According, to'Colonel Gauthier, 
*On 8th September, 1965 the Indians bombed Sialkot 
Hospital, not in reprisal, but with with equal lack of humanitarian consideration". 
407 
UNMOGIP Chief Operations Officer, the terrain was such that it 
was militarily inconceivable that the attack could have 
developed from the eaSt14. That notwithstanding, the Indians 
were certainly attacking, and made no attempt to deny the fact. 
The following morning they admitted to being deployed on a 
front of approximately ten miles in the Haji Pir Pass area, 
five, miles on the Pakistan side". The Indian VCOAS was 
informed that this action was in flagrant violation of the 
Ceasefire Agreement, and immediate steps should be taken for 
the withdrawal of Indian troops. Any excuse which attempted 
to justify the move by suggesting that'it was taken to stop 
infiltration could not be entertained"'. Nevertheless, this 
excuse was inevitably used by the VCOAS in his reply, which 
stated that the Indians had positive proof of'Pakistan 
infiltrators using the Haji Pir area as a base for operations 
in the Valley of Kashmir, and they could not therefore vacate 
, The action, -, in fact, also involved a further breach of the 
Karachi Agreement, 'in that the brigade operating"in the HaJi 
Pir area had been removed from its location east of Srinagar, 
where it had been-acting as reserve for troops facing the' 
Chinese in Ladakh'O*-. 
The Observers believed that the Indians probably intended 
to cut off the Bedori Bulge"', a Pakistan-held enclave which 
protruded into Indian-held territory. On 10th September, the 
Indian Local Command at Punch'confirmed to Observers that"his 
troops had joined up with Indian troops occupying the HaJi Pir 
Pass, so that Indian'troops had successfully cut off'the Bedori 
Bulge and secured''the entire'Uri-Punch road'OO. 
*See pages 180-181. 
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Northern Sector 
It was reported on 15th August that Indian troops had 
reoccupied the three positions which were at issue in the 
Kargil* area of the Northern Sector in May-June 1965. The 
Kargil Observer Team was advised that the Local Commander 
intended to take whatever steps necessary in view of the 
previous Pakistan aggressions in his area'". He stated that 
the safety of Observers on the Pakistan side of the CFL could 
not be guaranteed because Of Possible increased activity in the 
area. However, General Nimmo told the Observers to remain in 
position in the hope of discouraging escalation, but to move 
rearwards if forced to do so by events, 02. 
India's Representative to the UN informed the 
Secretary-General that since 5th August the Pakistanis had made 
four or five determined attacks to cut the Srinagar-Leh road, 
including attempts to blow up two bridges on the road, 
succeeding in damaging one, and had also placed mines on the 
road. He emphasized the strategic importance of the road to 
India and stated that UN Observers had not been able to ensure 
the security of the road, although this was the basis on which 
Indian troops were withdrawn from the Pakistan positions in 
late June and early July'03. 
Nimmo confirmed the two raids on the bridges, but said no 
complaints had been received regarding other attacks, or mines 
on the roads. He said that India had made much play in the 
Press and official correspondence on the concept that Military 
Observers had assured the security of the road, but this was 
both absurd and physically impossible, although three Observers 
had been placed at Kargil as had been promised to the Indian 
, -*See pages 392-397. 
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command. Two more were camped on the opposite side with a 
small Pakistan post at Gangam. He pointed out that the whole 
Kargil sector had been exceptionally peaceful for years until 
the Indians suddenly attacked on 17th May. Now, General Nimmo, 
said, denials by Military Observers that 100 Pakistanis had 
moved up were not believed by India prior to an Indian patrol 
firing rifle shots and parachute flares at this post on the 
night, of the occupation of 15th August. Threats were made to 
mortar the area whether Observers were there or not, although 
this did not happen. -ý General Nimmo sent an urgent protest to 
the corps commander'04 ., 
Domel Sector 
On 14th-August the Observer Team at Baramula was advised 
by the-Local Indian-Commander that the Uri area, seven miles 
from the Ceasefire Line'. was being shelled by artillery from 
the Chakoti area on the Pakistan side, and that, if the shelling 
did not stop he would retaliate in the same area using'similar 
weapons. The Observer-Team at Domel and the Pakistan CGS'were 
informed. The former confirmed that firing was taking place 
as alleged, and reported that the local Pakistan Commander said 
he had no intention Of stopping his gunsýfrom firing., The CGS 
intimated that since Indian artillery had, been shelling the 
Pakistan side all along the Cea5efire Line since early August, 
they intended to carry out retaliatory fire'05. This 
allegation was checked and it was found that only the Kotli 
Team had received complaints relating torartillery, firing, and 
of 21 complaints only one could be substantiated by physical 
evidence"'. However, -later, that day Indian troopA did start 
shelling the Chakoti area 107. Shelling in the area continued 
for-a week and was the subject of many complaints, but 
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investigation was not possible until restrictions on Observers' 
movements were lifted, at which time they found evidence of 
considerable damage consistent with shellfire. They were also 
able to observe during their journey to the area that certain 
Pakistan formations were not in the positions listed on the 
current Order of Battle. One missing battalion was explained 
as being in Abbotabad (in Pakistan, and therefore outside the 
UNMOGIP area of jurisdiction) for training, which the Observers 
considered "to be at least unusual under present circumstances, 
when a trained unit would be expected to be on hand". No guns 
were seen in areas that were the subject of Indian complaints 
some days previously, but they could have been moved. 
Concentrations of vehicles bearing artillery tactical signs 
were noted in four places on the road, and the Azad Kashmir 
artillery major accompanying the Observers stated they were 
vehicles of his organisation, and that his mortars were not 
deployed in action positions. $ He admitted that his battalion 
might have had Pakistan artillery in support about 13th or 14th 
August, but that there were no guns in the area then'08. One 
wonders whether restrictions on the Observers' movements were 
lifted only when the area was clear. 
The Domel Team reported that relations with Local Command 
were cordial but guarded and that most enquiries were met with 
either a blank stare or an "I don't know". They felt it was 
difficult to believe that Local Command could be as unaware of 
unit and area activity as it professed to be. The Local 
Commander did, however, state that he expected escalation 
within a few days. The Observers reported also that, 
overflight complaints we're becoming a daily occurrence, and 
they had noticed that anti-aircraft guns were ready and 
manned"'. 
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On 25th August the Domel Observer Team was advised by 
Pakistan Local Command that Indian troops had launched a 
battalion attack during the night of 24/25 August and captured 
two Pakistan forward positions, a fact confirmed to the 
Baramula Team by the Indian Local Commander, who said that 
Pakistan forces had attacked first. The following day the 
Indians took a further Pakistan position and, having crossed 
the CFL in a-second place, occupied a ridge three miles east of 
the first crossing place"O. 
Colonel Gauthier, Acting CMO whilst General Nimmo was 
visiting New York for consultations, signalled to the Indian 
VCOAS that in capturing these positions India was in 
contravention of the-Karachi Agreement, and that such actions 
rendered the task of rectifying the general situation much more 
difficult"'., He received the usual reply that the posts had 
been established to, stop the heavy infiltration of Pakistan 
personnellIz. - In his official complaint the CGS, Pakistan, 
maintained: "Apparently mild UN reaction after Indian 
aggression in Kargil-sector has boldened Indians-. Request take 
immediate steps to stop this blatant aggression failing which 
we will be forced to take appropriate action including 
offensive action across the CFL"113. ý 
Chamb 
, Another, trouble spot was the Chamb area at the very 
southern end of-the CFL. First reports, received on 14th 
Augu5t,. claimed that about 300, intruders had crossed the CFL-on 
the night of 10/11 August and gained control of three areas on 
the-Indian side. The Indian Brigade Commander asked the Jammu 
Observer Team to initiate action for a Pakistan withdrawal as 
soon as possible in order to avoid unnecessary violence. - He 
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said the Indians might wait for a UN solution, but as the 
intruders occupied important Indian areas and had cut the track 
between Indian picquets, they might be forced to start action 
very soon'". 
, However the Pakistanis increased their forces and began 
massing forward and firing 25-pound artillery and heavy mortar 
over-Indian picquets and all along the CFL in the Jammu/Bhimber 
Sector. The Jammu Team, estimated the situation to be "very 
serious and ought to be regarded as war, in this area", -. 
The CGS-Pakistan ignored General Nimmo's requests for a 
cessation of firing'". On 16th August the Indians advised 
that nine of their picquets had been captured thatýnight'17. 
The-CGS-Pakistan reiterated that-Paki5tan action was in 
retaliation for continuous Indian shelling all along the 
CFL1111. General Nimmo pointed out that retaliation for each 
other's violations was "not only-wrong in principle, but 
definitely unhelpful towards getting any Ceasefire errors 
adjusted. Each individual action'must be the entire 
responsibility of the'ýdoer'... retaliatory fire, cannot be 
justified under conditions of Ceasefire, -especially so when in 
entirely different sector and time-. There is no question of 
self-defence involved""'?. Inevitably the-Indians 'in turn - 
attacked Pakistan positions in the sector. -Although they were 
repulsed'", the Pakistan Local Commander told Observers that 
his forward positions were being shelled continually along the 
whole front of the Bhimber/Jammu-sectors. Further, he had to 
deployýto meet the-Indian-threat since his forward troops were 
reporting, heavy Indian reinforcements in both men and 
materials, including tanks, a fact which Observers--on both 
sides of the Line were able to confirm, although the Bhimber 
Team heard no shelling when they visited the forward battalion 
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HQ. The Commanding Officer was most anxious to have the two 
UN jeeps move along the CFL and view areas subjected to 
reported Indian artillery and inspect the damage. But the 
Team did not do so since no clearance had been obtained from 
the other side, and because they felt that any movement of UN 
jeeps at the time could only result in both sides taking 
advantage and making adjustmentslzl. 
, Pakistan's sudden reversal of attitude in raising its 
earlier restrictions on Observers' movements* appears thus to 
have come at a time when the tide appeared to be turning 
against them, and any evidence that was to be seen was likely 
to suggest that it was the Indians who were the aggressors. 
In spite of their visit, the Bhimber Team was unable to verify 
the Pakistan complaint about Indian attacks on their positions 
as all the evidence had been withdrawn during the delay of 24 
hours imposed on the Observers before permission was granted to 
conduct an investigation,, which they felt in the end had been 
stage-managed by Local Command. They-were also unable to 
verify the Indian complaint concerning the loss of their 
forward picquets, though the Pakistanis attempted to prove, by 
firing at the positions in the presence of Observers, that they 
were not occupying them. -In fact, -although the Bhimber Team 
did not then know it,, the Indians had retaken the picquetSI22. 
By 25th August, according to the Indian Local Command, all 
Indian, picquets had been recaptured; but there was still a 
number of-infiltrators in the area. -Observers were now able 
to move into the Chamb sector, -ýbut realised that proper 
investigation-so long after the event was futile. The rains 
were destroying much of, the evidence, and it was impossible to 
*See page 404. 
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say whether Pakistan or Indian artillery had destroyed the 
picquets and adjacent villages since the Indian forces had used 
artillery to recapture the picquets, many of which had also 
been repaired and rebuilt in the intervening few days. The 
Observers reported that the whole of the civilian population of 
the Chamb sector, probably about 25,000 people, had been 
evacuated during the previous two weeks and were living in 
refugee camps a short distance away123. 
INTERVENTION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 
Request for a full Report 
A few days after the start of the major infiltration on 
5th August, the Indian Press began to suggest that the 
Secretary-General, Ralph Bunche and General Nimmo were not 
taking the violations of the Ceasefire Line seriously enough, 
and were treating them routinely. Such allegations were 
refuted at UNHQ, and protests made to the Indian ,- 
Representative'24 In fact the Secretariat in New'York kept 
in close and constant touch with the situation, but initially 
seemed unable to take any decisive action. In the period from 
when-the infiltration started in earnest on the night of 5/6th 
August until the Ceasefire on 22nd September, 1965, well over 
200 coded cables were sent to UN HQ in New York from UNMOGIP HQ 
in Srinagar, as well as numerous clear cables, ýletters and 
reports, not to mention a visit by General Nimmo. 
On 12th August, Dr. Bunche requested the "fullest possible 
and most accurate report" from General Nimmo in case it was 
decided to submit a report on developments to the Security 
Counci 1121. General Nimmo's report on the most serious 
incidents was sent to New York in parts on 16th, 18th, 20th, 
415 
23rd and 26th August and 1st and 7th September 126* . 
He also 
let the Secretary-General have a separate letter, dated 30th 
August, enclosing an annotated list of incidents on which 
complaints had been submitted asserting violations of the 
Ceasefire between 5th and 30th August, and which Observers had 
been able to investigate 127. These were all covered in the 
main report. 
On. 14th August Bunche cabled Nimmo asking whether he 
thought a "precedent-breaking" report by the Secretary-General 
to the Security Council would be likely to be helpful or 
harmful from the standpoint of UNMOGIP's operation. He also 
asked whether the report Nimmo was preparing would establish 
beyond challenge that many of those who crossed the CFL from 
the Pakistan side were, in fact, military rather than 
civilians, and even offer accurate numbers of infiltratorsi2e. 
Nimmo replied-thathe preferred that UNMOGIP, should remain free 
to be able'to go on, reporting without restraint, but that if 
the matter did go to'the Security Council he hoped it would do 
so in a big way with the aim of achieving some settlement in 
Kashmir for the-sake of the people of the whole State. - 
Regarding proof, he said that no uniforms had been seen, but-it 
was apparent that trained men had been operating. ý Further, 
although, he-could give a reasonable estimate of the numbers of 
armed men, he could not break the-numbers down between military 
and, civilian. He reminded Bunche that for some years armed 
civilians who fired across the CFL had been classed as troops 
for purposes-of the Karachi Agreement, 21., 
Bunche said there had been no request from any quarter, 
*With General Nimmo absent in New York, the parts dated 
26th August and 1st September were signed by ACMO Colonel 
Gauthier. 
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not. even India, that the Secretary-General should submit a 
report to the Security Council, but there was growing 
impatience, on the part of India that something be done beyond 
the Secretary-General's demarches to the Government of 
Pakistan"O. Nimmo suggested that the Secretary-General 
should issue a sharp reproof to Pakistan for not calling a 
Ceasefire, and removing its guns from the Chamb area: Nimmo had 
twice-requested the CGS, Pakistan, to do this, and had also 
sentýa strong-warning against further exacerbation either there 
or-elsewhere along the CFLI". Bunche replied that the 
Secretary-General would indeed act as suggested, and also ask 
India to'withdraw its-troops from the Pakistanipositions they 
had just re-occupied in Kargil'32. 
Public Statement by the Secretary-General 
I On August 17th the Representatives of India and Pakistan 
and also General Nimmo - received the draft of a public 
statement which the, Secretary-General intended to-issue about 
the, situation in-Kashmir. It stated that he. -the 
Secretary-General, had been making renewed efforts to bring an 
end to a, series of violations of the Cease Fire Line in Kashmir 
which had been taking place daily to an unprecedented degree 
since 5th August, mainly from the Pakistan side, costing many 
lives and much hardship and giving rise to great danger and to 
most serious concern. It mentioned that he had asked General 
Nimmo to submit a full report on the violations of the 
Ceasefire Line which would present information confirmed by the 
investigations of the UN Military Observers, and took the 
opportunity to state that UNMOGIP was performing its duties 
very well under circumstances that were often extremely trying 
and difficult, and at times dangerous. He continued: "I will 
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not, of course, reach any firm conclusions ... until I have seen 
General-Nimmo's comprehensive report. It is clear, however, 
from the information received from UNMOGIP to date that trained 
armed-men have been participating in the raids which have taken 
place on the Indian side of the Ceasefire Line and that at 
least many of them have come from the Pakistan side... and have 
been supported-from that side... Since Indian troops on 15 
August-re-occupied three Pakistan positions in the Kargil area, 
I have also appealed, for'the withdrawal of those troops and all 
personnel of either party who are found to be still on the 
wrong side of the Line. Likewise because of heavy and 
prolonged, artillery fire in the Chamb/Bhimber area across the 
Line from--the Pakistan side on 15-16 August, I have appealed to 
the Government of Pakistan about such firing as a violation of 
the CFL. I shall continue my efforts to restore normal 
conditions along the CFL"133. 
- The statement was not released. ý The Indian 
Representative expressed unhappiness about some aspects*, but 
then agreed to its being issued. The Pakistan Representative 
expressed his Government's strong view that the statement 
should not be issued in the above form since it would create 
*The Hindu suggested that if India had not tried to-get 
the paragraph on Kargil deleted from the statement, U 
Thant might have gone ahead with it: the time spent 
, arguing about the matter gave Pakistan time to gather 
support to quash the statement as a whole 134. 
In fact, part of the Statement was subsequently leaked in 
the Indian Press. India's Foreign Secretary, Mr. C. S. 
Jha, wrote to U Thant to apologise after the 
Secretary-General expressed his "surprise and feeling of hurt at the leakage" to the Permanent Representative of 
-India. Mr. Jha claimed that the Government was horrified 
to see the leakage and had asked the Permanent 
Representative to express the Government of India's deep 
regret at the "unauthori5ed and clandestine publication of 
portions of that document". He blamed the leakage on 
enterprising Journali StS133. 
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the impression that theýUN wanted to maintain the status quo. 
Pakistan was also reported to have told U Thant that she would 
not-want to stay in an organisation which made an unfavourable 
statement about her after having failed all these years to 
persuade India to implement the UNCIP resolution5136. 
On 19th August Nimmo cabled Bunche: "Stage is now reached 
when Pakistan has gone beyond all bounds of rational conduct, 
especially in regard to heavy shelling across Ceasefire Line 
with, field and medium artillery on road, bridges, Indian 
military positions, and now on an airfield, and even a 
hospital*. Such actions give further and ample proof that 
regular army is involved, and that policy direction emanates 
0-137 from highest level... Bunche sympathised with the 
"extremely difficult position in which you and your Observers 
find yourselves because of the Pakistan attitude", *and assured 
Nimmo that the Secretary-General was doing everything he could 
to support him, with regrettably negative results thus far. 
He had stressed that continuing violations by Pakistan, 
ignoring both his own and Nimmo's appeals, not only undermined 
the whole Ceasefire Agreement, but put in question the , 
advisability of the continued maintenance of a UN Ceasefire 
operation in the area'39. 
Thus, having lost faith in the UN's ability to resolve the 
Dispute; it seems that Pakistan was now the party which 
appeared determined to jeopardise the whole peacekeeping 
operation by totally disregarding General Nimmo's pleas for an 
end to hostilities, and putting obstacles in the way, of the 
Ob5ervers'efforts to carry out their investigations**. 
*See pages 405-406. 
**See pages 403-405. 
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Furthermore, Pakistan's Foreign Minister Bhutto told a Press 
Conference that he hoped U Thant would realise that UN 
Observers in Kashmir had no locus standi as far as happenings 
in that State were concerned. The main function of the UN was 
to work for the implementation of its own resolutions on 
Kashmir, he said'31. In contrast the Indian newspaper, The 
Hindui, was proclaiming that the responsibility for reporting 
"was obviously that of the UN Observers... (who) have had enough 
experience to send in factual reports of what has happend. By 
all-accounts they did send in such reports-and the 
Secretary-General was to have made a statement based on their 
findings. At the last minute, evidently under pressure, he 
'0140 dropped the idea... The Hipduýalso maintained that U 
Thant had declined to take sides on the plea that his doing so 
would only prejudice his usefulness. Moreover, when General 
Nimmo's report on Ceasefire Line violations was received there 
was no guarantee that the Secretary-General would make it 
public if he took the view that by so doing he would only be 
widening the rift between the two countries'41. 
On 24th'August the Secretaky-General did make a public 
statement expressing great concern over the situationýin 
Kashmir. He said he had been in earnest consultation with the 
two-Permanent Representatives with a view to stopping the 
violations of the Ceasefire Line reported by General Nimmo. 
He had considered-sending Bunche as his Personal Representative 
to meet and,, talk with the two Governments and General Nimmo, 
but the, response of the two Governments, while not negative, 
involved conditions which would make the mission not feasible 
at the time., Therefore he had asked General Nimmo to go to 
New York for consultation5142. It seems likely that the 
conditions were that Pakistan insisted that the discussions 
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included the political background to the current troubles, and 
India insisted that discussions were confined to the problem of 
the infiltrations, without any mention the Kashmir Dispute as a 
whole. 
Nimmo himself felt that it was preferable to have 
preliminary discussions, at least, in. the atmosphere of New 
York rather than Delhi or Rawalpindi. Furthermore the 
situation in Kashmir was much quieter with conditions reaching 
a static stage bordering on temporary stalemate. He was 
confident that his Chief Operations Officer, Colonel Gauthier, 
could effectively take charge of the Mission in his absence 143. 
Indeed, on 22nd August Bunche had cabled Nimmo: "Are we to 
interpret lack of any reports in last couple of days of 
incidents to mean violations have stopped? "344 Nimmo left 
for New York on 25th August'45. 
The Pakistan Mission to the UN put out a statement 
expressing regret that the Bunche mission had been abandoned, 
and declared: "It is our conviction that the turmoil in 
Kashmir needs to be fully and impartially studied, if any viable 
solution is to be evolved. Such a study will be futile if it 
seeks to separate the cause from the effect, if it neglects the 
root of the trouble. The Ceasefire Line cannot be isolated 
from the surrounding land and its people. The-concept of 
restoring quiet along the Ceasefire Line presupposes that of 
making an effort towards a peaceful and honourable'settlement 
of the dispute itself. Certainly it is something quite 
different from restoring or maintaining the status quo ante in 
Kashmir, which is all that India wants so that it could fulfil 
" 146 its designs of completely annexing the State 
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Appeal by the Soviet Union 
At this stage the Soviet Union appealed to India and 
Pakistan to show wisdom and patience in settling the Kashmir 
conflict "from which neither side could benefit". India had 
been attempting to enlist support for its position, but Pravda 
made it clear that the Soviet Union did not intend to apportion 
blame to either side: "We are not going to discuss here which 
version gives a more accurate representation of events. The 
main thing is to find a way toward the immediate ending of 
bloodshed and conf liCt"147. 
General Nimmols Report 
On 29th August The Hindu reported that the Government of 
India had asked the Secretary-General to make available to 
members of the Security Council General Nimmo's report* on 
Pakistan infilitration into Kashmir. On the 30th General 
Nimmo submitted to the Secretary-General an annotated list, 
I 
with covering letter, of 23 serious incidents or series of 
incidents on which complaints had been received and 
investigated by Observers between 5th and 30th August, 1965, 
and which had taken place virtually along the whole length of 
the Ceasefire Line, from Jammu/Bhimber in the south to 
Kargil/Skardu in the north. Of the 23 incidents, 18 were 
attacks on Indian positions, patrols, bridges or transport 
convoys; five were attacks by India against Pakistan-held 
Kashmir; and three were incidents of firing across the 
Ceasefire Line, and the occupation by Indian forces of Pakistan 
picquets in the Kargil and Tithwal areas"' The Indian 
*As contained in his detailed accounts of 16th, 18th, 
20th and 23rd August, 1965"'. 
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assault-on the Bedori Bulge* occurred too late to be included. 
General Nimmo explained that in the same period many more 
complaints had also been received which Observers had not by 
then investigated., He pointed out that investigations, which 
often-had to be carried out in extremely difficult 
circumstances, -and'at, varying lengths of time after the 
particular action had occurred, had in general not been able to 
verify, either, through-observation or direct evidence, the 
identity of-those responsible for the action and participating 
in-it, or whether, and to what extent, there had in fact been a 
crossing-of. the Ceasefire Line"". Thus, in spite of having 
stressedýhis belief all along thatýthe attacks in Indian-held 
Kashmir hadýbeen made by raiders and infiltrators, and despite 
the evidence he mentioned in-his cables and reports; -in this 
letter summarising the, situation, General Nimmo maintained that 
he had little proof to-offer. Abandoned weapons, for example, 
for the most part had their markings scratched off, although 
some were found which were known to have been manufactured in 
Pakistan. Observers in their reports constantly said-they 
presumed the attackers, came from across--, the Ceasefire Line, but 
couldinot determine-their, identity with certainty. Only once 
did General Nimmo-state in this list of 23 major incidents that 
had been investigated that"available evidence indicated that 
some of the raiders must have come from across the Cea5efire 
Line"., Circumstantial evidence offered on other occasions was 
that-one' dead raider wore dress similar-to the uniforms of the 
Pakistan-frontier corps-of-scouts, and'that Observers had seen 
nine bodies whose clothing and general appearance led them to 
believe they were those of: AK-soldiers. Only one occasion 
*See pages 406-407. 
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was mentioned when Observers interviewed a captured raider who 
admitted to being an AK soldierls', though some of the evidence 
mentioned above would not have reached General Nimmo by 30th 
August, when he himself was in New York. It can only be 
assumed that after his talks in New York, in spite of his 
demonstrably strong belief that the attackers were indeed 
infiltrators from Pakistan, Nimmo was persuaded that there was 
insufficient-, Proof to make this fact public. Alternatively 
political pressure might have dictated that the report should 
not be publicised in view of an overriding desire to maintain a 
balance between India and, Pakistan, a view to which even the 
Soviet-Union subscribed. Nevertheless, on 31st August the 
Secretary-General circulated a confidential-memorandum to 
Security Council members, based on all of General, Nimmo's 
reports, which was "understood to be', a stronger indictment of 
Pakistan Ceasefire Line violations than that contained in the 
previous unpublished statement"132. U Thant also made a 
personal appeal to India and Pakistan leaders for immediate 
measures to end the imminent threat of warl". The Hindu 
reported: "Indiaýhas-noted with satisfaction that the 
Secretary-General has not-mixed up the, present trouble with a 
larger question of a settlement of the Kashmir issue'04. 
On 3rd September Bunche cabled Nimmo, newly returned to 
the Mission area, that support for an early - though one might 
question whether at this stage it could be said to-be "early" 
meeting of-the Security Council on Kashmir was growing, 50. 
Laterýthe same day he-cabled that the Secretary-General had 
decided, to make a-report to the Security Council which would be 
circulated on 4th September, and would be essentially that 
contained in the private paper circulated to, individuals on 
31st August, suitably modified and brought up to date'56. 
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General Nimmo's annotated list of incidents was included, 
updated to number 27 incidents, and on. the basis of Nimmols 
detailed reports the Secretary-General now said unequivocably 
that the series of violations of the CFL commencing on 5th 
August were "in the-form of armed armed men, generally not in 
uniform, crossing the Ceasefire Line from the Pakistan side for 
the purpose of armed action on the Indian side". These 
conclusions had been reached "on the basis of investigations by 
the UN Observers, in the,, light of the extensiveness and 
character of the raiding activities and their proximity to the 
Ceasefire Line, even though in most cases the actual identity 
of those engaging, in the armed attacks on the Indian side and 
their, actual crossings of it could not be verified by direct 
observation or evidence. On the basis of General Nimmo's 
findings the Secretary-General pronounced that the Karachi 
Agreement had collapsed, although --he hoped only 
temporarily's'. 
Meeting of the Security Council 
It was the new President of the Security Council, 
Ambassador Goldberg of the United States, who, had, finally 
called for the Security Council to meet, regardless of 
objections by India and the Soviet Union, and with only the 
reluctant acquiescence of Pakistanive. After an initial 
argument with Ambassador Goldberg over the question of the 
powers of the President of the Council to convene a meeting, 
the Soviet delegate joined the other members in voting for the 
Resolution put forward"'. Thus, on the evening of 4th 
September, the Security Council adopted by unanimous vote the 
following Resolution (209-1965), sponsored by Bolivia, Ivory 
Coast, Jordan, Malaysia, Netherlands and Uruguay: "The 
425 
Security Council, noting the report of the Secretary-General 
(S-6651) dated 3rd September, 1965, having heard the statements 
of the Representatives of India and Pakistan, concerned at the 
deteriorating situation along the Cease Fire Line in Kashmir, 
1. calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to 
take forthwith all steps for an immediate cease-fire; 
2. calls upon the two Governments to respect the Cease 
Fire'Line, and have all armed personnel of each party 
withdrawn to its own side of the Line; 
3. calls upon the two Governments to co-operate fully 
with the UNMOGIP in its task of supervising observance of 
the cease-fire; 
4. requests the Secretary-General to report to the 
Council within three days on the implementation of this 
Resolution 
Bunche pointed out to Nimmo that this direct action by the 
Security Council gave UNMOGIP a strengthened mandate-'. 
During the course of the debate Ambassador Goldberg had also 
specifically said that the Resolution meant the Observers 
should have "full freedom of movement and access" in the 
discharge of their functions "to observe and report any 
violations of the ceasefire and ceasefire line and to supervise 
the ceasefire orders '1162. The Resolution was kept simple and 
no judgements were made, the aim being only to effect a quick 
cessation of hostilities. But it did not succeed. 
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN - THE WAR OF 1965 
, --When the1ashmiris 
did not rise as expected, and the 
Indian Army-began to repel the Azad Kashmiri infiltrators, the 
Pakistan Army had to come to their aid and the war, which had 
effectively long begun between armed Azad Kashmiri civilians 
and-the-police of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, became 
inevitable. It was only after an abortive visit to the 
Subcontinent by the Secretary-General once war had broken out, 
and three Resolutions by the Security Council, that the 
exhausted parties finally agreed to a ceasefire, and an 
augmentation of, UNMOGIP to assist in this and in the withdrawal 
of forces. U Thant then decided that a second, but temporary 
Mission should also be introduced to effect the same functions 
on'the international border between India and West Pakistan, 
extending south from Jammu and Kashmir as far as the Arabian 
Sea. 
It was anticipated that the strengthened mandate offered 
to UNMOGIP by the Security Council Resolutions of-September 
1965 would enable the mission effectively to police the new 
ceasefire which formally came into effect on 22nd September. 
However, although the Observers were able to testify to the 
many breaches of the Ceasefire in its first few weeks, and thus 
draw the attention of the Security Council to them, they were 
unable to persuade the reluctant parties to abide by their 
agreement until they were politically disposed to do so as 
result of the goodwill generated by the Tashkent Conference 
in 
January 1966. 
So far as withdrawals were concerned, the position wa5 
even worse since the parties categorically refused to 
contemplate any withdrawal before difficult issues on the - 
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political 'side were resolved, despite the appointment by the 
Secretary-General of a Special Representative to aid them in 
reaching agreement. The withdrawals, supervised by UNMOGIP, 
went ahead without problem once the political motivation was 
there. 
ESCALATION 
Pakistan admits to crossing the CFL 
, On 31st August, -1965 an Observer travelling from 
Rawalpindi to Bhimber reported that he had seen at least three 
squadrons'of Sherman tanks, some tank recovery vehicles, one 
infantry battalion and some medical units on the Gujrat-Bhimber 
road. -Other-Observers, stationed in Dhimber and Sialkot)ý 
reported-that they had seen troop movements. The news was not 
received-, at UNMOGIP HQ until 2nd September as troop movement 
information could not be passed by radio for security-'reasons, 
and-there were problems with road and air communications'. 
Meanwhile, on 1st September, the Jammu Team'received an 
Indian complaint alleging that Pakistan artillery had started 
intensive shelling on five Indian picquets near the Junction of 
the CFL,, and: the Border. A-further complaint stated that the 
artillery fire was continuing, - and that one and a half tank- 
squadrons had crossed the CFL and attacked a picquet located 
two miles on the Indian side. By the afternoon three Indian 
picquets had been occupied by Pakistan troops. The'tank 
attack, supported by artillery, was still in progress., 
Military-Observers in the area said they had seen Pakistan 
artillery firing directed at nine different areas, and had seen 
a village on fire 2. Observers also confirmed Indian 
complaints that Pakistan artillery had fired, on one occasion 
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with 25 pounders, on battalion HQ in both Punch and Naushera 
sectors. On the same day an Indian platoon was alleged to 
have clashed with 200 infiltrators twelve miles southwest of 
Srinagar3, 'and an Indian convoy had been ambushed at Gund, 24 
miles on the Indian side northeast of Srinagar on the Leh road. 
The Indians recovered eight killed infiltrators, one prisoner 
and a quantity of weapons and equipment. Observers 
investigating the incident reported that they had positive 
identification that the equipment and personnel were from 
Pakistan-since some of the ammunition was marked POF*, although 
other-armsýand ammunition shown to Observers had the numbers 
filed off, - Further a prisoner allegedly captured during the 
clashýtold Observers that he was from the Gilgit area, and that 
he, and a number of other Karakoram Scouts had been selected for 
the mission, which was to destroy the bridge at-Gund4. 
General Nimmo was still in New York when Gauthier cabled 
news of the events of 1st September, adding: "Am much 
disturbed and worried about this turn of events". BUnche 
replied: "We share your worry and, have feared all along-that 
this would be the development. The Secretary-General is in 
touch with members of the Security Council and will use every 
means available to him to prevent disaster"'. 
The Pakistan CGS insisted, to Gauthier that not only were 
the Indians the first to crossýthe CFL in strength in Kargil, 
Tithwal and Uri-Punch sectors, - but had repeatedly boasted about 
it, and proclaimed their intention of doing, so in other sectors 
as well. Thus Pakistan had crossed the CFL by Dhimber on 1st 
September as a purely defensive measure. This was the first 
official-admission from the Pakistan authorities that they had 
*Pakistan Ordnance Factory. 
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crossed the CFL since the troubles started in early August7. 
The Air Forces are Introduced 
On 2nd September, the CGS, Pakistan, told Gauthier that 
for the first time since the Ceasefire on 1st January, 1949, 
the-Indian Air Force had intervened in ground battle by taking 
offensive action against Pakistan troops in Bhimber: "All the 
four Indian Vampires which participated in this action were 
shot down by our aircraft., " he said. "The scale and area of 
hostilities have increased at Indian initiative and they must 
bear responsibility for consequence". Indian radio admitted 
thatýtwo Indian aircraft did not return and two were damaged'. 
Air Chief Marshal Lal claimed that until 1st September, 
when the Indian Air Force was indeed first brought in, no plans 
had been made to,, fight a war, although both Nehru and Shastri 
had'said that'an attack on Kashmir would be an attack on India. 
His belief was that when the expected Kashmiri uprising failed 
to materialize, the Pakistan Army* was brought in, and Pakistan 
tanks entered Jammu. Pakistan had the advantage because their 
forces-in that area, which was part of Pakistan rather than the 
State, of, ýJammu and Kashmir, were not restricted in number by 
the Karachi Agreement, whilst in Jammu India was subject to it. 
India thus had only light tanks and a few troops**. When the 
Jammu highway was threatened by tanks General Chaudhuri, the 
Chief of the Indian Army Staff, asked the Air Force for 
assistance, and obtained its support over Jaurianlo. 
*As opposed to Azad Kashmiri troops. 
**Indeed, on 5th September, Observers reported that Indian 
troops were having trouble in performing artillery combat, 
partly because the Pakistan artillery was changing 
positions very often with its self-propelled artillery, 
and partly because of lack of sufficient Indian 
artillery". 
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On 2nd September the Jammu Team heard from the Indian Local 
Commander that Pakistan aircraft had that morning attacked the 
road between Chamb and Jaurian, with rockets and machine guns, 
inflicting many casualties; that Jaurian villade, 14 miles 
east of the CFL, was in flames; and that Pakistan troops had 
crossed the Border* with approximately 90 tanks which were 
moving eastwards of Chamb'3. A Jeep with UN markings, 
although belonging to the Indian Army, had also been 
destroyed14. Observers who visited the area reported that 
there, was good-physical evidence that strafing had taken place, 
and that most of the, civilian population west of Akhnur was 
being-evacuated". 
Pakistan in Control of Part of Jammu 
- That evening India radio broadcast the news that Pakistan 
troops had succeeded-in establishing a salient of approximately 
five miles in the Chamb sector, and 13 Pakistan tanks had been 
destroyed". The Jammu Team, unable to move into the sector 
since, the beginning of the Pakistan, thrust, reported they had 
good reason to believe that Pakistan troops had managed to 
occupy an area of-approximately 30 square miles, extending 
roughly, five miles east of the Ceasefire Line, and six miles 
north of the Border, up to the Chamb area. Pakistan appeared 
to, be. consolidating on this newly occupied territory17. 
,,, On 3rd September the Pakistan Local Command at Sialkot 
told Observers that any Indian violation of the Border between 
*The CGS assured the UNMOGIP Liaison Officer in Rawalpindi 
that Pakistan troops had not, in fact, crossed into Indian-held Kashmir from any area of adjoining Pakistan territory", i. e. across the Border. This was an important point assuming a desire to localise the dispute 
, to Kashmir and avoid the appearance of international war between India and Pakistan. 
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Sialkot and Jammu would result in a general Pakistan 
offensive", whilst the Indians told the Jammu Team that 21 of 
theirpicquets in the Jammu/Bhimber sector of the Ceasefire 
Line had been abandoned, and the remaining seven picquets, in 
the northern part of the sector, were being shelled and 
attacked. The Indian complaint also alleged that two Pakistan 
tank regiments and an infantry brigade were advancing on the 
Indian side of the CFL. Pakistan aircraft had that day also 
strafedthe Akhnur road". 
On 4th September General Nimmo signalled the CGS, Pakistan 
and strongly urged him to issue the order for the withdrawal of 
his troops from the Chamb sector. He said that such a 
deliberate and co-ordinated attack and occupation of an area on 
the Indian side of the Ceasefire Line could only be qualified 
as retaliatory. measures which were bound to delay the peaceful 
settlement of the situation and lead to further serious 
consequences that might endanger the very foundation of the 
Karachi Agreement". The-CGS replied immediately: "We are 
aware of your genuine efforts to make the Indians vacate their 
aggression. But having seen the hopelessness of these-efforts 
we were forced to take action to stop the Indians from annexing 
Azad Kashmir. Our action was taken after repeated'requ6sts to 
you to convey to the Indians that their failure to vacate 
positions on our side of the Ceasefire Line will have serious 
consequences. Indians apparently refused to heed our 
warnings ... Under the circumstances how can you expect us to 
unilaterally halt our purely defensive operations... "21. 
Reports continued to come in from the southern sector of 
artillery firing, overflights and anti-aircraft gunning, 
further attacks by Pakistan on the Jaurian-Akhnur road, and the 
advance of Indian reinforcementS22. On 5th September Jaurian 
was taken, but fighting continued in the area23. 
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Plans for further Infiltration 
Meanwhile, during the night of 3/4th September, Indian 
troops from the Tangdhar Sector crossed the Ceasefire Line in 
the Sunjoi area, three miles north of Tangdhar, and captured 
some hill features with the aim of cutting the supply route of 
Pakistan infiltrators north of Tangdhar, specifically a 
Pakistan company group located 5 miles north of Sunjoi and one 
and a half miles on the Indian side of the Ceasefire Line 24. 
On 7th September Nimmo sent a "highly confidential" coded cable 
for "Bunche only", saying that Observers at Baramula had 
brought him a copy of Pakistani operation instructions, said by 
Indian Command to have been captured by them at Sunjoi. it 
discussed plans for strong infiltrations and guerilla-type 
attacks on Tangdhar garrison from north and south flanks, and 
upon rear areas and the main supply route through the mountain 
range. "D-Day" was said to be first light on 7th September, 
and operations to last for 14 days. General Nimmo thought the 
information appeared to be genuine2s. 
On the night of 5/6th September Indian troops I crossed the 
Ceasefire Line along the Punch-Uri road and captured an 
important hill feature one and a half miles within Azad Kashmir 
territory. The action was the initial phase of further 
military operations to link up with the forces which had 
already captured the Haji Pir Pass in the Bedori Bulge. The 
Observer Teams were ignored and had to seek the information out 
on the strength of their suspicions. General Nimmo informed 
Indian Army HQ that the-crossing was a serious violation26. 
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THE WAR 
War in Earnest 
On 6th September, 1965 General Nimmo cabled Ralph Bunche 
that there were six infantry battalions in Galuthi Sector 
instead of five, and a new Brigade HQ had been established at 
Mendhar to-take over three of the six battalions. Since the 
Indians had always had a preponderance of forces over Pakistan 
in the sector he felt the re-organisation could only be 
regarded with suspicion, and he had informed the Indian 
authorities that it was contrary to the Karachi Agreement27. 
In a second cable that day he said that 41 Mountain Brigade, 
which he believed belonged to the force in Leh which UNMOGIP 
was not permitted to visit*, was now thought to be near Akhnur, 
and was one of three infantry brigades deployed in Kashmir but 
not included in the Order of Battle for theýState. He noted 
that there were not less than 17 Indian infantry brigades in 
Jammu and Kashmir State, whilst in January 1949 there were 12. 
There were also five armed police battalions on the CFL and 
three on the Jammu-Sialkot Border. He thought there must be 
three in Srinagar. Capacity for forward movement into Azad 
Kashmir, he pointed out, must therefore always be borne in 
mind" 
That same day the CGS, Pakistan, reported that Indian 
forces had crossed the Border in the Sialkot-Jammu sector and 
the international border near Lahore", which, meant they were 
attacking West Pakistan proper. Indian air, raids on Dacca and 
Chittagong in East Pakistan, as well as Lahore-and Rawalpindi, 
were reported during the night of 6/7th September. The 
*See Pages 180-181. 
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bombing of Rawalpindi Airfield was confirmed by Observers 
stationed there3l. 
A cable from Bunche to Nimmo, dated 6th September, asked 
if the latter had any information on an Indian allegation of a 
Pakistan attack two or three days previously on Amritsar (in 
India proper) prior to any Indian military action across the 
international frontier3l. Nimmo replied; "Not officially. 
Indian radio reported on 5th September that a Pakistan aircraft 
had strafed and damaged some air force installations in 
Amritsar. Pakistan Radio denied the allegation"32. This 
suggests that conceivably the attack was an over-zealous and 
unauthorised move by an individual Pakistani pilot which the 
Pakistan authorities would have preferred not to have happened. 
Or that India was attemptingýto claim that it was Pakistan who 
had first broadened the scale of hostilities to the 
international front, a move which made it impossible to keep up 
the pretence that the two countries were not at war. In fact 
war was never actually declared, but the hostilities have ever 
after been referred to as the "Indo-Pakistan War of 1965", 
which is generally taken to have started on 6th September. 
On 7th September Jammu Observers reported that the Local 
Indian Commander would not allow them to move south or 
southwest without permission". The reason soon became 
apparent. Observers at Sialkot that, night reported intense 
shelling of the area by Indian artillery, which was eventually 
returned by Pakistarj34. Earlier that day the Observers had 
travelled, for 25 miles along the Border and reported no sign of 
Pakistani-moves., General Nimmo felt therefore that as there 
had been no Provocation the Indians had no excuse for attacking 
Sialkot. It was "another example of arrogant and deceptive 
disregard for not only ceasefire violations, but for the whole 
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of United Nations"35. As some of the shelling was falling 
around their base the Observer Team withdrew westward on the 
Rawalpindi Road. The Jammu Team reported they felt an Indian 
attack was imminent 36 , and 
indeed during the night the 
Pakistanis complained that Indian troops had crossed the Border 
in three different places and were 12 miles inside Pakistar, 37. 
On 8th September the Sialkot Observer Team reported that 
two Indian Jet aircraft had bombed Sialkot military hospital. 
Meanwhile Pakistan was carrying, out air raids on Jammu, and 
continuing its artillery firing from Sialkot3a. That day All 
India Radio broadcast that Indian troops had opened a second 
front in Jammu and a third one approximately 400 miles south of 
Lahore". ý Indian troops attacked Sialkot from north, south 
and east-on the evening of 8th September, and the town was 
shelled, by medium and heavy Indian artillery and bombed by 
Indian aircraft during the night4O. 
-On 11th September Observers posted on the Pakistan side 
reported some movement of armed tribesmen towards the Border 
and CFL.! About 20,000 of them were estimated to have. passed 
through Rawalpindi, of which approximately 5000 were reported 
to be proceeding towards Domel and-approximately 2000 were 
reported by Observers to be present in each of the Dhimber and 
Kotli sectors. General Nimmo pointed, out that the presence in 
such numbers of unruly tribesmen could only mean more trouble 
in, prospecV. '.. 
By this time the Security Council had finally met and 
adopted, -two-R6solutions, on 4th and 6th September respectively, 
calling for a-Ceasefire, which they requested the 
Secretary-General to exert every effort to give effect to42*. 
*See pages 471 and 437. 
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As a result he made a visit to the Subcontinent*, but the war 
continued. Heavy ground battles supported by armour, 
artillery shelling, bombing and strafing of airfields were 
reported either to Observers or on Indian and Pakistan national 
radio stationS43. Although the engagements were becoming 
heavier, now that the war had spread outside the area of 
UNMOGIP's responsibility there was less the Observers could 
accomplish, confined as they were to their respective 
locations. Indeed they were being more or less ignored by 
their Local Commands and left to fare for them5elve S44. 
As a result of heavy Indian artillery shelling near their 
station, and because of increasing difficulties in maintaining 
contact with the Pakistan Local Command, who appeared reluctant 
to keep them in the picture, the Sialkot Team moved to the 
outskirts of Sialkot, out of artillery range, on the evening of 
12th September. Colonel Gauthier**, cabled the CGS regarding 
the Team's difficulties and received the following reply: "The 
function of the UNFO teams was to supervise ceasefire in Jammu 
and Kashmir territory. Your Team at Sialkot was stationed 
there at our specific request. India and Pakistan are now at 
war. UNFO team can no longer perform duties until this war 
ends. Due to Indian attack, Sialkot now lies in an 
operational zone and we can no longer guarantee the safety of 
your team. You are requested to immediately withdraw your 
team from Sialkot "43. The Team thus moved to Bhimber, the 
nearest Field Station to Sialkot, with the intention of 
visiting Sialkot daily in an attempt to obtain information from 
the Local Command. At their first attempt on 14th September, 
*See pages 437-442. 
**General Nimmo, was accompanying the Secretary-General on his visit to the Subcontinent. 
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they were stopped by Pakistan Military Police 13 miles from 
Sialkot and prevented from proceeding further46. 
The Secretary-General Visits the Subcontinent 
The Security Council was due to hold a further meeting on 
8th September, but was overtaken by the events of 6th September 
when Pakistan asked for an immediate meeting to consider the 
situation. That evening, after hearing representations from 
India and Pakistan, each asserting aggression by the other, and 
describing their own activity as necessary defensive measures, 
the Security Council unanimously adopted a further Resolution 
(210-65). , It requested the Secretary-General "to exert every 
possible-effort to give effect to the present Resolution and 
Resolution 209*,, to take all measures possible to strengthen 
UNMOGIP, and to keep the Council promptly and currently 
informed-on the, implementation of theýResolutions and on the 
situation in the area". U Thant decided to visit the 
Subcontinent-himself. Notes on the approach that the 
Secretary-General might make to India and Pakistan during his 
visit, with suggestions by Bunche and Rolz-Bennett, were found 
in the file, and presumably negotiations were started along 
these lines: , that the'Secretary-General I should interpret the 
Security Council's-mood of determination and--urgency 
forcefully, 'and point out that the Security Council would 
persist in'seeking a ceasefire, and'continuance of the fighting 
woUld"mean a loss of international goodwill for both parties; 
that-the UN could-offer 5upervisory machinery, ---if so desired, 
and assist the parties-in the arrangements for withdrawal and 
help to, tide over the probable lapse of time before the 
*See page 425. 
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withdrawal could take place; that the strengthening of UNMOGIP, 
aside from being desirable in itself, might also provide a 
face-saving device for India to withdraw; as to any conditions 
on the ceasefire, the Council neither could, nor ever had, 
adopted a conditional ceasefire resolution because any 
conditions would in fact condone the fighting - the single 
object of the Resolution was to stop the fighting, and all 
parties were thus equated in the Resolution; that the question 
of merit, blame, etc., could be taken up later; neither side 
could really hope for military victory or gain, in the true 
sense of the word, from fighting - for Pakistan the ceasefire 
was an indispensable prerequisite to discussions of other 
issues, but a, means had to be found toýavoid the appearance of 
India being, forced into a discussion of wider issues by-the 
fighting. As to the wider issues, Bunche suggested it should 
be pointed out that it was no longer possible for any member of 
the United Nations to refuse to discuss a problem, particularly 
when it was a highly dangerous one, and therefore there had to 
be a discussion of the broader issues. The Secretary-General 
could offer assistance as a third party to such discussions, or 
in arranging for a third party to assistýin the discussions, or 
possibly reference-to, the World Court,, since it was apparent 
that bilateral negotiations had failed. For-Pakistan the 
cease-fire-presented great difficulties without broader 
discussions, and for India broader discussions presented great 
difficulties, ý butýsince they argued the merits of the Kashmir 
problem, in the Security, Council, it followed that they agreed 
that there--were problems to be discussed. - In any event a 
modus vivendi between, --the two countries on outstanding problems 
had to beýfound, and, it'should be pointed out that the Security 
Council--had not yet taken all the action open to it, and would 
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certainly continue to exert pressure over the Kashmir 
situation". 
U Thant was on the Subcontinent from 9th-15th September. 
Ayub Khan told him that India had embarked on a course of 
aggression across the CFL because it could not suppress the 
"freedom fighters" and that the Pakistanis who crossed could 
not be blamed for going to help. U Thant explained his 
mandate was to achieve an effective ceasefire and he had no 
authority to discuss the overall question of Kashmir. Ayub 
Khan insisted, that the Security Council should concern itself 
with the fundamental problem and he was not receptive to a 
ceasefire without this. His Foreign Minister, Mr. Bhutto, 
also thought the ceasefire would not stick without a settlement 
of the whole Kashmir problem. He asked U Thant to convey his 
regards to Dr. Radhakrishnan,, the President of India, who had 
been his tutor at Oxford. (Dr. Radhakrishnan was deeply 
touched. ) India's position was that the Kashmir Assembly had 
approved accession in 1953 and the Security Council could not 
reverse this's. 
On 11th'September, when it became apparent that 
negotiations were not progressing favourably; the: 
Secretary-General received a cabled suggestion from, Bunche 
that, for the record, he make a strongly-worded appeal to Ayub 
Khan and Shastri that they should meet-at the earliest possible 
date at a mutually agreeable neutral place to discuss their 
differences and seek a peaceful solution; with or without the 
presence-and assistance of a mutually agreed third party4l. 
The-Secretary-General, however, thought it was, too early to 
make, such a suggestion withýany, hope of its being acceptable to 
either party. He felt the initiative might be more timely 
after he had fully reported to the Security Council. He had 
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discreetly broached the subject but reactions were negative: 
India would agree to bilateral talks at any time, but not to 
the'presence of a third party and, according to Shastri, would 
never agree to talks at any level on Kashmir; Pakistan would 
agree to talks with third party presence, but only to discuss 
Kashmir. U Thant said he was "impressed by the resolute, not 
to say obstinate, mood in both capitals"-and felt, record 
notwithstanding, that it would not help'future relations to 
make a formal public approach about Heads of State meeting if 
the cease-fire appeal failed". In a further cable Bunche 
maintained that the'two parties could not expect U Thant to 
give-them any sympathy or protection in the course of the war 
they were pursuing: the interest of peace, the world's and the 
UN's, necessarily-took precedence over any future relations 
with either of them. It seemed clear to Bunche that any hope 
for-a-change in their positions had to'depend on the ability to 
mobilize and apply to them international pressure of-a 
compelling force. Bunche appreciated U Thant's reasoning, but 
argued that a public appeal would put pressure on theýtwo 
parties precisely because, of their well-known and, adamant 
positions and thus no longer protect them, and further have the 
record show thatý"you as Secretary-General acting under an 
urgent Secco* resolution were sparing no effort in view of the 
desperate nature of the: situation. Opportunity for you to 
make such'an approach would be largely lost, at least for some 
time, if it is not made before your return because Secco will 
then be meeting precluding any such initiative by you". U 
Thant's position, he said, would certainly be far stronger if, 
after the two parties had rejected his ceasefire request, as 
*Security Council. 
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seemed likely, and before he left the area, he made a forceful, 
last ditch appeal to them to substitute talk for bullets, 
though public release of such an appeal could be deferred to be 
included in his report to the Security Council. He thought 
the Security Council Meeting would be more likely to produce a 
helpful result if it had before it a record showing that the 
Secretary-General had Just about exhausted every effort he 
could reasonably make, and it was what the Resolution of 
September 6th called upon him to do5l. The following day, 
14th September, U Thant cabled Bunche that he had in mind to 
issue an appeal along the lines suggested by him after receipt 
of replies to his appeal for a ceasefire52. 
The Secretary-General actually made three appeals during 
his visit to the Subcontinent. Firstly he sent identical - 
appeals for unconditional ceasefire on September 14th: India 
accepted but only in respect of armed forces in uniform, whilst 
reserving the right to deal with infiltrators; Pakistan 
accepted, but demanded that the ceasefire provide for an 
overall political settlement. India accepted a second appeal 
for a ceasefire, effective from 6.30 a. m. Indian standard'time 
on 16th September, provided the Secretary-General confirmed in 
time that Pakistan was agreeable to do likewise, but Pakistan 
maintained her previous position. In his third appeal, sent 
on 15th September, U Thant offered to meet the parties and 
discuss offers of conciliation from a number of world, 
leaders". India made no reply; Pakistan pointed out that 
previous such talks had been abortive54. 
Unable to reach agreement between the two parties U Thant 
returned to New York and suggested that the Security Council 
might order the two Governments concerned-to cease hostilities, 
or incur sanctions, under Articles-39-40 of the-Charter of'the 
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United Nations. He recommended also that the Security Council 
request the two parties to meet and try to resolve their 
differences". He suggested the-Council might consider the 
possibility of creating a small committee to assist in these 
talks. India was annoyed that his suggestions represented a 
shift in attitude in Pakistan's favour, both by bracketing the 
two countries, together, and - more especially - by giving in 
over, the, question of the background to the Dispute. The 
Indian representative also took issue with the- 
Secretary-General's comment that both governments had put 
conditions for'a ceasefire unacceptable to the other, citing 
Shastri's offer of an unconditional ceasefire if Pakistan 
agreed 56 
ý The Security Council-took its cue from the 
Secretary-General and accepted that it had, to do more than Just 
stop'the fighting., There followed some intensive behind-the 
scenes diplomacy whilst the war on the Subcontinent was 
reported to be intensifying, and India claimed that Chinese 
troops were massing on its border, before a draft resolution 
acceptable to both India and Pakistan could be introduced". 
On 20th September the Council adopted Resolution 211. Whilst 
not specifically mentioning Articles 39 and 40, the Resolution 
used terminology more appropriate to those articles and 
"demanded" (as opposed to the usual "called for") a Ceasefire 
by-0700, hours on 22nd September, followed by withdrawal of all 
armed personnel. It requested the Secretary-General. "to 
provide the necessary assistance to ensure supervision of the 
Ceasefire and withdrawal of all armed personnel"ýand, again, 
"to exert every possible effort to give effect to-the present 
Resolution". ý It also included a reference to considering what 
steps could, be taken to assist towards a settlement of-the' 
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political problem underlying the conflict5s. This was rather 
less than Pakistan's demand for a self-implementing plan, but a 
reference nevertheless which India would have preferred not to 
have been included". 
The Indian Prime Minister replied immediately in writing 
to'-say that he was willing to order a simple cease-fire and a 
cessation of hostilities on being informed of Pakistan's 
agreement to do likewise, but in order to comply by the 
requisite time he would need to issue the necessary orders to 
field commanders by 1200 hours GMT on 21st-SeptemberbO. The 
Secretary-General, pointed out that to be, fully consistent with 
the Security Council Resolution each party should instruct its 
forces to cease fire by 0700 hours GMT on 22nd September 
without condition, although it would be understandable, if in 
issuing these orders the troops were authorized to fire if 
fired oný'.. However, India's position was accepted, and when 
Pakistan did not signify agreement in time for India's 
deadline, the timing of the Ceasefire was delayed until 2200 
GMT on 22nd September". 
SUPERVISION OF THE CEASEFIRE 
UNMOGIP's Relationship to UNIPOM63 
In anticipation of an eventual ceasefire, the UN 
Secretariat had been working on plans for its supervision even 
before the adoption of the Resolution of 20th September. In 
the State of Jammu and Kashmir the supervi5ion called for by 
the Security, Council was, not unexpectedly, --, to-be exercised by 
UNMOGIP, which was considerably strengthened for'the purpose. 
Less expectedly a second mission, described by the United 
Nations Secretariat as "an administrative adjunct of UNMOGIP", 
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was set up "as a purely temporary measure" to supervise the 
Ceasefire along the India-Pakistan Border outside Jammu and 
Kashmir 64 
. 
On'20th September Bunche cabled Nimmoto say serious 
thought had to be, given to the question of the relationship to 
UNMOGIP of a new operation with a temporary responsibility for 
supervising the ceasefire. He explained that as UNMOGIP's 
responsibility derived from the Karachi Agreement and would 
continue indefinitely until the Kashmir problem was settled, he 
thought itwould be unwise to tie the indefinite UNMOGIP 
operation to the purely temporary broad ceasefire operation 
resulting from that day's Security Council Resolution, though 
the association and the working-relationship between UNMOGIP 
and'any new apparatus would need to-be extremely close6s. The 
Secretary-General did not make known to the4Security Council 
the decision to create a second mission until 23rd September 
when he announced: "In view of-the differences in origin and 
function-between UNMOGIP and the new group of observers, I have 
decided to, organise-the observers whose function it'is to 
supervise'the ceasefire and withdrawals'as an organisaton 
separate from UNMOGIP, entitled thelUnited Nations India 
Pakistan Observation Missioný(UNIPOM). - Obviously the 
operations of UNIPOMýand-UNMOGIP will be closely, co-ordinated 
both administratively and, operationally"66. , 
Bunche admitted to Nimmo that the question of one or two 
operations "was a very-hot political is5ue'with sharp division 
of-view between-India and Pakistan"67. India tried to in5i5t 
on a singleýmission, whilst Pakistan approved the''setting up of 
a second mission, and wanted as little'co-ordination between 
the two missions as possible. It would seem that India felt 
that an extension of UNMOGIP's mandate would accentuate the 
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fact that the aggression was initiated by Pakistan in order to 
solve the Kashmir question to its own advantage. India may 
also have had some. hope that when the current crisis was over 
theýUNMOGIP operation would finally be wound up. Pakistan may 
equally have feared that this would be the case, and the 
Kashmir-Dispute thus become forgotten. By having two 
operations, the one could be wound up when the ceasefire was 
stable and withdrawals completed, whilst UNMOGIP remained in 
place., ''-Furthermore, the existence-of a second operation 
accentuated, the fact that hostilities'had taken place across 
the international border between the'two nations, such 
hostilities-having been initiated'- so Pakistan at least 
claimed - by India. The Secretary-General held his ground and 
by mid-October the arguments-ceased6g. However, theyýdid not 
augur well for the maintenance-of the'Ceasefire. 
For the first few days General Nimmo was in charge of each 
operation, and in order to ensure the closeýworking 
relationship-between the two Missions, Dr. Bunche requested him 
to exercise-an informal overseeing eye on the new operation 
even afterýMajor-General B. F. Macdonald, DSO,, CD,, a, Canadian, 
was appointedýChief Officer of UNIPOM on 24th,. September6l*. 
The Secretary-General also informed Macdonald that in view of 
his long experience and extended service in the area, he had 
asked Lt. Gen. Nimmo to exercise a general-overseeing function 
with regard to both operation570. 
Until his appointment General Macdonald was with the 
Canadian contingent in UNFICYP as second-in-command of the 
Force, and, was therefore considered to-have'good UN 
experience"'. On 28th September, 'the'Secretary-General 
*Not the Australian Colonel A. N. MacDonald who was with UNMOGIP 1952-1955. 
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cabled '72 a welcome to him on his arrival in New Delhi and gave 
him certain basic instructions for his guidance, saying that 
UNIPOM's function was based on the Security Council Resolution 
of 20th September and its scope was the area of the conflict 
between India and Pakistan over Kashmir outside of Kashmir and 
beyond the Kashmir Ceasefire Line. - 
Bunche also cabled Macdonald to explain that it was not 
possible to speak of a complete separation of the two Missions, 
since UNMOGIP and-UNIPOM were separate operations only because 
their origins were different, and UNMOGIP was restricted in its 
activities to Kashmir and the Kashmir CFL. UNIPOM was set up 
to deal with that aspect of the CFL which was outside Kashmir, 
but the, ceasefire and the withdrawals called for by the 
Security Council involved the entire area of the conflict and 
were therefore to be-treated as, a,: whole. Thus UNMOGIP and 
UNIPOMhad to. establish and maintain the closest possible 
cooperation and co-ordination,. administratively and 
operationally73 , -In the words of a UN Working Paper, "the 
functions and operating procedures of-the UN Observers, pursuant 
to Security Council Resolution 211(1965) of 20th September, 
1965 were, determined-by the existence.,.. ofitwo, parallel 
ceasefires in the Subcontinent, one based on the Karachi 
Agreement, - relating, -only toýKashmir, the'other being the overall 
ceasefire applying to the entire-area-of-conflict, ' based on the 
acceptance by India and Pakistan of the ceasefire called for by 
Resolution 211(1965). The-latter-was a-simple ceasefire in 
general terms, with no agreed, ilist-of activities constituting 
breaches of the, ceasefire, and-no agreed definition and 
demarcation outside Kashmir of the actual ceasefire line 
itself "14 
However, the question of where UNIPOM's area of 
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responsibility ended and UNMOGIP's began soon caused confusion 
owing to the fact that UNMOGIP had always been responsible for 
that part of the border between Pakistan and the State of Jammu 
which was neither part of the CFL, nor the international 
border*. Nimmo initially explained to Macdonald that the 
whole of Jammu and Kashmir State was UNMOGIP responsibility, 
and not Just the CFL,, becauseýof the Mission's responsibility 
for checking the Order of-Battle, and as a result of the 
agreement with both army-commands to resolve disputes on the 
Border". He was'therefore surprised to find UNIPOM Observers 
posted in the Jammu sector. Macdonald, referred to the CGS, 
and told, Nimmo--the latter believed the Indian Government might 
wish UNIPOM, "to be responsible north to, the point where the CFL 
intersected with the international border". Macdonald said 
the CGS had-indicated his view was not entirely firm and he, 
the, CGS wished to give the matter further thought. Macdonald 
recognised that-political aspects-were clearly affecting his 
views; and in, a later message he-confirmed that he had received 
indications that India objected to having the area under 
UNMOGIP due tb, political reasonS76. 
Bunche told Nimmoiý who sought his-advice, that the obvious 
rule of thumb was-that the dividing line would be "where-the 
Kashmir CFL intersects the'international border, except where 
there is firm and'6ontinuing agreement between India and 
Pakistan that UNMOGIP should extend its operation beyond that 
area". He felt unable to say whether there was still firm 
agreement between India and Pakistan, on an extended scope for 
UNMOGIP as in the-past,, and certainly did, not think it, -, 
*See pages 186-188. 
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advisable to bring up the question at that stage since it would 
only serve to raise a further controversial issue at a time 
when they had enough. Bunche said that while there were two 
operations, made unavoidable by the inability of the 
Secretary-General himself to extend the scope and competence of 
UNMOGIP, there had to be the closest possible co-operation 
between the two operations, and acceptance of a team approach 
to the ceasefire in the area as a whole. Therefore, while for 
administrative purposes and indeed to protect the future 
existence of UNMOGIP as, against the purely ad hoc and temporary 
existence of UNIPOM, Observers were beingýassigned to the two 
operations, they should not draw any sharp distinctions between 
those-assigned to one operation or the other. Therefore 
Bunche said he would not be disturbed by the presence of UNIPOM 
Observers-in Jammu or UNMOGIP Observers-in Lahore, *provided 
that Nimmo and Macdonald were fully co-ordinated'on the matter. 
He could not overemphasize the importance of Nimmo and' 
Macdonald presenting a united front to the political 
difficulties confronting theW?. In response Nimmo firstly 
pointed out that the question of areas of responsibility had 
become very confused owing to the use of the term 
"international border" (used by both Macdonald supposedly, but 
almost certainly incorrectly, quoting the CGS Pakistan, and 
then Bunche) for that portion of-the boundary--below the - 
southern limit of the CFL, which had never been recogni5ed as 
such byýPakistan*, and for which UNMOGIP hadýalways been 
responsible 79. However, in a further cable he said that he 
fully, understood what Bunche was'saying, and would co-operate 
*Since-Pakistan did not'acceptýthat that part of Jammu 
belonged to India, its border with Pakistan could not, - in the view of Pakistan, be part of the-Indo-Pakistan 
international border". 
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to the full, keeping quiet about areas of responsibility in 
view of the problems. He had a picture of a number of UN 
Observer Teams along the whole front, reporting to respective 
centres for practical operational and administrative reasons"O. 
Provision of Additional Observers 
I 
Each of the countries currently represented in UNMOGIP 
were asked to provide ten additional officers for the Mission. 
Canada, Denmark and Norway agreed immediately, - and Finland and 
Sweden both offered five., Replies from Australia, Italy, New 
Zealand, Chile and Belgium were not received so speedily, but 
Bunche at first felt-the attitude in general, was positive"'. 
However, on 30th September he cabled that he was holding the 
increase to approximately 70 Observers for the time being in 
view of certain difficulties at his end8z*, and in fact only an 
extra 59 Observers were ultimately assigned to UNMOG IP*4. 
Other countries were requested to supply Observers to UNIPOM, 
and in the first instance General Bull of UNTSO sent-, sixteen85. 
As soon as it was agreedthat the Ceasefireýwould begin on 
22nd September, and in order to establish a-token presence in 
UNIPOM's area of, responsibility pending, the arrival of 
additional Observers from outside, General Nimmo sent-Colonel 
Gauthier, as Officer-i'n-Charge, and six further Observers to 
form a Headquarters'atLahore'(in Pakistan) and cover Kasur, 
Wagah, and Narowal. Another-six Observers were sent t 
Amritsar (in India) to cover Ferozepur, Atare and Dhariwal. 
Nimmo reported that the necessary assi5tande and co-operation 
from both Armies appeared to be forthcoming". The Observers 
*Bunche told Macdonald that the political situation at UNHQ was so sensitive, that even the number of Observers 
was a hot political issue, not to mention their 
national iti eS83. 
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from UNMOGIP and UNTSO were gradually returned to their 
missions as Observers specially recruited for UNIFOM, of whom 
90 were ultimately provided, began to arrive 07. 
Unstable Ceasefire 
ý Serious breaches of the ceasefire were, to occur for some 
weeks to come; The simple ceasefire demanded by the Security 
Councilýwas equally unsatisfactory to both India and Pakistan 
since it took into account neither India's strong views towards 
the infiltrators who sparked off the conflict, nor Pakistan's 
fear that it would only restore the status quo which was what 
Pakistan had been trying, to change. This dissatisfaction was 
evident on the battlefront., The two armies began to 
consolidate their gains by digging trenchesfor future action 
and started edging forward to-strategic positions. -In-the 
process-there were clashes of'varying-magnitude in'different 
sectors.,., 
-Colonel Gauthier, -, as Officer-in-Charge'of UNIPOM, for its 
first-few days, was obliged to report, breaches of the-ceasefire 
starting as early as-first light oný23rd': September. 
Complaints were received from Local Headquarters, Lahore, that 
Indian, troops, were edging-forward of the positions they held at 
the time of the CeasefireOll. Efforts were made by Gauthier to 
contact-the Indian Battalion Commander, but he gained the 
impression that the Indian'Commanderhad no wish to discuss the 
situationg"., At 1715 hours on-24th September shelling started 
from the Indian side., -The heavy firing continued for half an 
hour forcing Gauthier and another Observer who had gone to the 
CFL with him to investigate the earlier complaint, to take 
cover. - Gauthier requested Nimmo to pass a, ýstrong protest to 
the Indian VCOAS which was done". -ý Gauthier also ývisited the 
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Local Pakistan Command who assured him no Pakistan artillery 
had fired. His own considered opinion, however, was that the 
Indians had started the firing, but he believed some shots were 
returned. In any case, he said, the situation was explosive 
and he was experiencing great difficulty in preventing the 
Pakistanis from retaliating. He urged Bunche in New York to 
employ all means at his disposal to stop the Indian forces 
taking further offensive actioel, Gauthier's difficulties 
were compounded by the fact that the suddenness of the 
implementation of the UNIPOM operation meant that few 
facilities were available; he had insufficient Observers and 
no coding operator, and the above message had to be carried by 
hand from Lahore to Rawalpindi to make use of UNMOGIP's 
facilities". II 
In New York, the Permanent Representative of Pakistan 
complained to the Secretary-General about India's breaches of 
the Ceasefire? 3.., General Nimmo agreed, that many alleged 
ceasefire violations had been submitted by both sides, and 
Observers-were endeavouring to investigate. One Observer had 
actually seen Pakistan troops firing with rifles and light 
machine guns towards the Uri-Punch road from dominating 
positions west of the road94 .It 
On 26th September-Observers atýDomel received a Pakistan 
complaint alleging that a company strength of-Indian troops had 
that night overrun a Pakistan standing patrol two, and a half 
miles on the-Pakistan-side, of the CFLi and had fired with - 
artillery and medium machine guns into Shahkot village on the 
Pakistan'side, and were attacking south of the village. A 
ceasefire proposed by Observers was not accepted by the 
Pakistan Local Commander-who said that-unless the UN guaranteed 
total Indian withdrawal from the area he would commence full,, 
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offensive operations. He stated that he had the approval of 
his higherýheadquarters for these operations as the Kishenganga 
bridges were considered vital. GHQ Pakistan later reported 
that they had directed their Local Command to exercise 
restraint, but that they could not allow Indians to occupy 
territory under their control and requested that the Indians 
vacated the positions as soon as possible". 
The Indian LocalýCommand confirmed there had been an 
exchange of fire, but said the Pakistanis had started it and 
the Indian troops had been in possession of the whole area 
between the, CFL and the Kishenganga Rivee6. The Indian 
occupation-of that area had never, however, been reported to 
Observers so UNMOGIP concluded the Pakistan claim was the more 
likely, to be correCt? 7 , On the same day, -Nimmo cabledýBunche 
that information'Just received from Lahoret'indicated that the 
situation had deteriorated further, in the whole1ahore sector, 
and the next day Observers, reporte&a build-up on both sides 
about 10 miles, southeast of Lahorele. 
The Secretary-General reported on the situation to the 
Security Council, and a further Security Council Resolution on 
27th September demanded that both sides honour their 
commitments to ceasefire and withdrawal. 'It was adopted 
unanimously". However, tension remained at a high pitch into 
October with many serious incidents,, including, artillery - 
shelling-and-forward-movement"'O, Fighting in the Chamb area 
was so fierce that Observers had to make'several attempts over 
a period -of days at arranging a local ceasefireý01,. , Other 
Observers were reaching areas, previously not-open to them 
which, General Nimmo, said. -would enable rival claims, to be 
assessed, -but, would not, stop, the incidents-occurring. He felt 
that with the bitterness that existed there was little prospect 
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of real improvement unless a disengagement of forces could be 
brought about, which would require, great pressure'02. 
On 7th October, Military Observers themselves had to 
withdraw when bridges were shelled and attacked by Indian 
troops'01. That day also Nimmo sent Bunche two signals he had 
received from the-CGS, Pakistan reporting messages they claimed 
to have intercepted of the Indians giving orders to destroy 
civilians and villages. General Nimmo felt they indicated the 
feeling that existed between the two sides and emphasised the 
belief in Pakistani minds regarding genocide of Muslims, a 
subject to which they often-referred. He pointed out that 
such matters were difficult to handle since they were not 
strictly to do with the ceasefire, and to promulgate any 
adverse findings would only make things worse. Observers had 
found burning houses, in one, of the areas mentioned, -but had 
also seen the'results of-alleged infiltrators' work'in the form 
of cut telephone wires, andzabotaged roads and trucks. 
Despite everything, civilian life seemed more or less 
normal"". 
Primary Responsibility for Breaches laid on India 
On 8th October Bunche cabled Nimmo and Macdonald asking 
for urgent comments on--a statement made by the Permanent 
Representative of India in, a letter to the Secretary-General to 
the effect that Indian forces had not gone into any new areas 
after the ceasefire, and', whatever areas they, were holding were 
held by them at the time of the ceasefire., Bunche was already 
aware that contrary suggestions had been made by-the, UN- 
Observer teams, but he asked, -for-precise, detaill". - He- 
received a long cabled response from General Nimmo detailing 
Indian forward troop, movements in three sectors"'., - 
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On 15th October Bunche cabled that they were preparing a 
further report for the Secretary-General on the observance of 
the ceasefire, and had noted in presenting the incidents which 
had been investigated and reported on by UNMOGIP and UNIPOM 
that the total picture was somewhat one-sided and showed India 
to have the main reponsibility - by far - for breaches of the 
ceasefire. He wanted to check that this was an accurate 
reflection of the situation before publishing the report, 07. 
Nimmo replied that as their-reports were based upon 
confirmations received-from UN Observers; either as-they 
themselvesýwitnessed or as a result of prompt investigations, 
he saw no alternative but to accept them as an overall picture 
of the situation'00. On 17th October the Secretary-General, 
in his report to the Security Council, noted further complaints 
and commented that there was "no reason to doubt, the 
earnestness of either party in desiring-to honour this 
agreement. But this attitude is not always reflected 
accurately at the front'""-. 
A Slow Improvement 
On 20th October General Nimmo reported that the-Chamb 
area, which had been the most troublesome immediatelyzfter the 
Ceasefire, had now stabilised, but, the Kishenganga River in 
Tangdhar-Domel sector had been the scene of many-complaints by 
both-sides during the previous week and there was no-doubt that 
the Indians, with increased forces, were. ýpressing westward from 
the CFL towards the River. Incidents were also still taking 
place daily in the Mendharýarea, and Kotli-Nausheraýsector'10. 
But at the beginning of November Nimmo was able to report that 
the'situation was quiet in nine of-his eleven sectors"', and 
the general situation thereafter continued to improve. , 
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However, minor firing incidents and complaints of strengthening 
of-defences were still being reported daily, particularly in 
Kotli-Naushera sector and along the Kishenganga River, and were 
generally confirmed by Observers, who often found themselves in 
areas which were thetarget of shelling'12. Although the 
number, of incidents lessened at the beginning of December, 
Pakistan complaints of Indian shelling in the Kotli area 
continued to be confirmed on into that month. Observers 
believed the problems were caused mainly by the number of 
salients on the wrong side of the Ceasefire Line, and the 
intensive patrolling by both sides'". 
Overflights 
Often Observers heard firing from both sides, but only 
received a complaintý"from Pakistan. It appeared-to them that 
it was usually India who started-the, firing. Occasionally it 
was Pakistan, or Pakistan sometimes-returned the fire, in-which 
event India also complained, 14. Oh-the other hand, ' on -14th 
October GeneraLChaudhuri, Chief of, the Indian Army Staff had 
sent messages to Generals Nimmo and Macdonald--saying the 
Indians were seriously concerned-with gross violations by 
Pakistan aircraft, which had-been increasing and had culminated 
in an attack on a village in Rajasthan. He warned that 
continuance of such "provocative" actions might well ', 
irretrievably-, rupture, the precarious ceasefire. General 
Macdonald, he said,. had suggested 5ome'mutually acceptable 
rules to be-observed, by the Air-Force, and General Chaudhuri 
himself put forward'-some recommendations in this respect"S. 
Howevers it was not until 14th December, at a Joint meeting of 
both parties iný, New-Delhiýin the presence of Generals'Nimmo and 
Macdonald, that agreement was reached "for restriction of 
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flights in the vicinity of the respective lines of control 
throughout the area of conflict". It was also agreed by India 
and Pakistan that their light aircraft would not fly within 
1600 metres, nor their high performance aircraft within 10,000 
metres of their respective lines of control, and the agreement 
would, be supervised by Military Observers'". 
The Ceasefire Holds 
, The following day in Delhi General Chaudhuri, Chief of. the 
Indian-Army Staffj informed Generals Nimmo, and Macdonald of his 
intention to issue a unilateral order to his troops not to open 
fire unless-physically attacked by Pakistan troops, the truce 
to take effect from 1700 hours on 26th December for an initial 
period of 24 hours"". This decision was conveyed on 22nd 
December by General Macdonald and Colonel Gauthier to the CGS, 
Pakistan Army. The lAtter, afterwards confirmed in writing 
what he had expressed verbally" that the Pakistanis had no 
intention of disturbing the Ce'asefire except in self-defence; 
and that in view of General Chaudhuri's undertaking he would 
issue fresh orders toýhis troops in-order to re-emphasise-the 
Pakistan stand, and reiterate the instructions with which they 
had been strictly complyingllg. -. 
-Nevertheless,, on'28thý'December, Indian troops--were seen by 
Observers to beýshelling Paki'stan positions from the Kotli 
area.,, 'The Pakistanis did-not return the fire. Colonel 
Gauthier cabled General Chaudhuri, noting "with regret that 
Indian troops saw fit to contravene" his order, and saying he 
assumed that this isolated violation took place because General 
Chaudhuri's order was not disseminated properly"'. In the 
days that followed shelling decreased but did not stop 
altogether in the troublesome Kotli-Galuthi-Naushera and 
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Domel-Tangdhar areas'20. The Indian Local Commander remained 
very much concerned about Pakistan troops occupying positions 
on the Indian side of the CFL south-west of Mendhar and 
Galuthi, and Observers'feared the situation could yet lead to 
some action on the part of the Indians to clear the Pakistan 
salients although there was no positive indication that such 
action was being mounted121. In the Sialkot-Jammu Border area 
also Observers gained the impression from the general activity 
in the area that troops and civilians on the-Pakistan side were 
being mentally conditioned for Possible further fighting, and 
on the'Indian side civilians weke observed receiving small arms 
training from the military'22. 
, However, on 2nd January, 1966 the Prime Minister of India 
and the President of'Pakistan, met in Tashkent at the-invitation 
of-the Soviet Union, and on'10th January it was announced that 
they, had agreedýthat the withdrawal of all armed personnel to 
the positions they'held,, prior to 5th August,, 1965 should be 
completed by 25th February, -1966, and that both sides should 
observe the ceasefire, terms on the Ceasefire Line'23. There 
were indeed thereafter, only minor breaches of. the Ceasefire. 
Meanwhilei on-the night of 3/4 January, 1966, athis- 
headquarters in-Rawalpindi, General Nimmo died in his sleep124. 
Colonel Gauthier* took over as Acting Chief Military Observer 
of UNMOGIP until a-new'00i'General Tassara of Chile, 'arrived 
at the Mission in July-1966**. 
:-- -1 4, 
*See Pages 107-112 for a profile of General Nimmo. 
**Described by General Nimmo in August 1965 as "of much 
experience in. Canadian Army and recently on-staff of NATO. He has absorbed problems of this Mission very quickly and is interested in, and suitable for, this kind of work 11125. 
. ***See Page 472. 
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WITHDRAWAL TO POSITIONS HELD BEFORE 5th AUGUST, 1965 
Initial Efforts to Obtain Withdrawals 
The problem of defining unequivocally the extent of 
occupation on the wrong side of the CFL and Border at the time 
of the Ceasefire was one of the most difficult to solve, and 
was the subject of controversy between local commanders. 
While the war was in progress Observers were denied the 
possibility of free movement in the battle areas and their only 
source of information at the time was limited to daily reports 
emanating from local commanders. From these an estimate of 
the extent, of occupation-on the wrong side of the CFL and 
Border was made 126 . On 24th September General-Nimmo submitted 
a preliminary list of positions held byý, eachzide'from which 
they would be required to withdraw. Within Kashmir Indian 
troops had"occupied Pakistan positions-in the Kargil-Skardu; 
Domel-Tangdhar, and Rawalakot-Uri-Punch-sectors; Pakistan 
forces had occupied Indian positions in theýBhimber-Akhnur, 
sector. - Indian troops were also on the Pakistan, side of the 
Border between Jammu and Sialkot'27, Modificationsvere made 
in various cables as additional information-was released by 
local commanders, and the collated'informatioh, was finally 
reported to Dr. 'Bunche on 27th October 126.., However,, -General 
Nimmo emphasised that the information remained an-estimate 
which in many places could not be verified because of-fighting 
which continued several days after the Ceasefire. -ý- Moreover, 
as a result of the continued fighting, Indian troops had 
managed to nibble at the Pakistan salients in the Chamb-area in 
the first instance, and later in the Mendhar area, -and had 
extended their, zone of occupation-in the Kishenganga and'Bedori 
Bulge sectors. Therefore the question-of establishing beyond 
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doubt the positions held at the time of the Ceasefire was a 
practical impossibility and, in General Nimmo's opinion, if 
published could provoke violent reaction from either side if it 
did not coincide with the respective contentions on such a 
sensitive probleM12?. 
Initially, in his cable of 24th September, General Nimmo 
said that in view of the difficulty in defining exactly the 
positions held on the wrong side of the CFL and Border, he 
would prefer that troops of both parties withdraw to their 
respective sides, whichýwere well-known to them, instead of 
defining the positions from where they had to withdraW130. 
India insisted that any schedule or plan of withdrawal had to 
be co-ordinated and synchronized with, the withdrawal not only 
of Pakistan regular forces, but also armed men not in- ý 
unif ormý31. The Pakistan Representative complained to the 
Secretary-General that the latter appeared "to be concentrating 
almost exclusively on making arrangements for withdrawal of 
troops... In our judgement military withdrawal should proceed 
concurrently with an honourable political settlement"". 
On 26th and 27th September General Nimmo commented on the 
two sides' positions, as indicated to him when he, had attempted 
to effect the necessary withdrawals. -The CGS, Pakistan,. 
stated: "Our government has not yet accepted withdrawal of 
troops to own side of border. Agreement thus far, is only on 
ceasefire. ýIn view this you are-requested to. concentrate on 
implementation of ceasefire. We will accept your instructions 
regarding withdrawal of troops after an agreement on the 
subject is reached. Please intimate reaction of Indian VCOAS 
to your request"133. In fact no reply at all was received to 
a request to the Indian VCOAS to withdraw Indian troops from 
their occupation of a hill feature on the Pakistan side in 
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Domel sector'34. The relevant Local Commander, however, said: 
"Indian troops captured area... on night of 22nd September at 
0300 hours before ceasefire announced therefore question of 
withdrawal does not arise"135. A general request to the 
Commander-in-Chief, Western Command, Indian Army, for the 
withdrawal of all troops from the Pakistan side of the 
international border also elicited no response'36. 
Furthermore General Nimmo reported that it was apparent 
that some occupations of new positions or territory were made 
by groups of local commanders, sometimes in a rather hot-headed 
manner, or even by units somewhat out of control, especially in 
the case of irregulars or para-military, and it would take time 
for tempers to recede. There was therefore much work ahead to 
persuade Governments to order withdrawals, and-for UNMOGIP to 
arrange and supervise them on a reciprocal basis and over a 
timed programme 137. A further resolution"" by the Security 
Council on 27th September calling for a prompt withdrawal of 
all armed personnel was therefore doomed to failure. ' ý 
In his welcoming cable to General MacDonald on 28th 
September, the Secretary-General was forced to admit that it 
had become increasingly apparent that the main burden of the 
efforts to achieve withdrawals would have to be carried at UN 
HQ by the Security Council and the Secretary-General. it 
seemed unlikely in the light of experience thus-far that the 
Observers in the field would be able to make much progress on 
withdrawals through their own efforts, though at a later stage 
that might change'31. It was clear then, that a separate 
agreement on withdrawals was necessary. 
Appointment of General Marambio 
On 13th October the Secretary-General suggested two 
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possible options: either each party should formulate its own 
plan, to be put into effect with the aid of Military Observers; 
or military representatives of each side should come together 
with an acceptable representative to be designated byýthe 
Secretary-General in order to formulate a plan'411. The two 
sides preferred the latter alternative, and India proposed 
General Nimmo as the representative in view of his unequalled 
experience in the area. -U Thant felt General-Nimmo's current 
responsibilities too great for him to take on the extra task, 
and in any event he was not acceptable to Pakistan 141. 
Instead U Thant chose Major-General Sysno Sarmento of Brazil, 
who was Commander of UNEF at the time 142 , but whom India was 
reluctant to accept. 
On 5th November, the Security Council passed a new 
Resolution 143, regretting the delay in the full achievement of 
a complete and effective ceasefire and prompt withdrawal, -and 
calling upon the parties, to instruct-their armed personnel to 
co-operate with the United Nations and cease all military 
activity. It insisted on-an end to, violations, of the - 
ceasefire-and demanded "the prompt and unconditional--execution 
of the proposal'already agreed-to in principle, by, the 
Governments of India and'Pakistan that, their representatives 
meet with a suitable representative of the Secretary-General, 
to be'appointed without delay after consultationwith both 
parties, for the purpose'of formulating an agreed plan and 
schedule for the withdrawals by both parties... "144. - , 
ý The Secretary-General decided - possibly in view of 
India's reluctance to accept him - that General Sarmento could 
not so easily beýimmediately spared from UNEF. - Instead on 
25th-November--- after the said consultation with India and 
Pakistan - he appointed Brigadier-General Tulio Marambio of 
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Chile as his Special Representative to assist the parties with 
their. withdrawal plans'45. General Nimmo was assured that 
General Marambio'. s mission was to be of only short duration, 
and that'any withdrawal plan so reached would be supervised by 
146 himself and General Macdonald and their Military Observers 
The Tashkent Agreement 
.,, 
General Marambio arrived on the Subcontinent on 6th 
December,,, and began a, series of, separate and informal 
consultation with, each side and with Generals, Nimmo and 
Macdonald'47,.. On, December, 8th it was announced that the 
leaders of, India and Pakistan would meetAn Tashkent early in 
January under the. auspices, of the Soviet Premier,. Mr. Kosygin. 
With, this, news,, the outlook for General Marambio's mission-, 
looked more hopeful than at, the time of his appointment. 
However,. on; 15th, December, Colonel Gauthier, noted that the 
Indian-local command in Kotli-Naushera sector continued to 
regard Pakistan occupation of,. the,, India, n side of, the CFL as an 
intrusion, and,, was apparentlyquite, willing to, accept Pakistan 
retaliatory fire, as. a result, -of 
its engaging Pakistan positions 
141 or troops movingin that zone . _Some, days later Gauthier 
again, reported that-the, Indians, -. reserved 
the right-to engage 
Pakistan targets, on-their., side of the, CFL, while Pakistan, 
artillery retaliated on every occasionl4l. : ýurthermore he 
reported that in Kargil Sector, although the situation was 
quiet, the Local Commander had. intimated to an Observer that he 
personally, considered, the withdrawal of troop5to positions 
occupied prior to 5th August, 1965 applied only to the 
India-Pakistan international border area, and not to the., 
Kashmir Ceasefire-Line. He indicated that Positions then' 
occupied by his troops would remain as they were. He 
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explained his attitude by adding that the area occupied by the 
Pakistanis belonged to India anyway, so any area occupied by 
the Indians belonged to them"O. Gauthier pointed out that 
the statement did not necessarily reflect the opinion of the 
higher Indian military authorities, but was nevertheless an 
Indication of the prevailing state of mind'51*. 
After painstaking negotiations during the latter half of 
December, India agreed to send a military rep'resentative to a 
joint meeting on withdrawal under the auspices of General 
Marambio. Pakistan likewise agreed under, it would appear, 
pressure from President Johnson of the United States, whom 
President Ayub Khan visited on 21st December'53. The first 
meeting took place in Lahore, Pakistan, on 3rd January, 1966, 
with successive meetings on 6th, 15th, 25th'and 29th January 
alternating between Lahore and Amritsar-- a short distance over 
the border in India, 54. UNMOGIP was not represented at the 
meetings'55. 
Meanwhile, the leaders of India and'Pakistan were also 
meeting. This resulted, on 10th January, in the important 
Tashkent Declaration, a significant watershed in the relations 
of the signatories. It was avowed, inter alia, that the two 
states would settle their differences by peaceful means, and 
discourage hostile propaganda. It was also agreed that the 
withdrawal of both sides' troops to positions held prior to 5th 
*However, on 27th January at the first meeting of the two 
Local Commanders in the Skardu/Kargil sector for the 
implementation of the ultimate withdrawal agreement, the 
Indian Local Commander did, in the presence of a UN 
Observer, sign an agreement with his Pakistan opposite 
number to withdraw from Black Rocks, and from Kuru and 
Leila picquets, and this was indeed effected'52. 
However, other unauthorised picquets remained occupied. 
As a result, and much to the displeasure of-India, the 
Pakistanis then proceeded to re-occupy the Black Rocks 
themselves, see page 467. 
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August 1965 would be implemented by 25th February, 1966-6*. 
Thus the parties were now committed to a speedy withdrawal in 
fulfilment of the various recent Security Council Re50lUtions 
on the subJect, and the meetings under the chairmanship of 
General Marambio proceeded apace. 
Agreement on Withdrawal 
At their meeting on 15th January the parties agreed on the 
following principles, of a plan and schedule for withdrawal, and 
discussed the role to be assumed by UN Military Observers in 
the withdrawal. 
(a) First stage seven days for reducing tensions and 
bringing about amity and peace; 
(b) Second stage -a five-day-period for disengagement: 
in the plains, -, and also in mountainous, areas where they 
were too close, they would withdraw, 1,000 yards on each 
side; 
(c) Third--stage'- a 21-day period for lifting of mines, 
and dismantling'of defensive and field works by unarmed 
personnel in uniform; --i- 
(d) Fourth and final stage - seven days or-ýbalance ofýdays 
before-25th February for pulling'troops back to-their 
respective territories'36. 
The plan was submitted to the COASj India. and CIC, -, 
Pakistan, and was-approved by them at a meeting-on 22nd 
January'59. I-. 11 -1 .1. II 
At their Joint meeting on 25th January the-parties agreed 
*As a result of a request by UNMOGIP/UNIPOM for an interpretation of the phrase "positions held before 5th 
August, 1965", senior army representatives agreed to 
accept it as meaning "positions authorised by the Karachi 
Agreement" 1117. 
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upon the ground rules for the implementation of the 
disengagement plan, which they divided into two parts. They 
agreed that-Part 1, Phas6 I of the plan, (a) and (b) above, 
should begin at once. In Phase II, -to commence immediately 
after completion of Phase I, both sides were to remove and 
nullify all defences within 21 days. ', -The Good Offices of 
UNMOGIP-and'UNIPOM were to be, requested, to ensure that the 
action agreed to, in Part 1 was fully implemented. In the 
event of-disagreement between the-parties, the-ýdecision of 
UNMOGIP/UNIPOM would be binding. The parties also agreed to 
maintainýthe existing'agreement regarding restriction of 
flightsýof aircraft*1110 . 
Part 2-provided for the withdrawal of all, troops, 
Para-military:,, forces and armed, police who were, on the other 
side-of-the, Border and CFL,, again,, with the assistance of the 
Observers' Good, Offices. -This was', to take effectiby, 25th - 
February regardless of the success-of Part`l; ý'-Phase, II. rAny 
disagreement-that could not be-settled by the parties would be 
resolved by General Marambio-whoseýdecisionvould be final and 
binding, and whose mission would cease on 28th7ebruary., -On. 
29th January, these; arrangements-havingýbeen approved, by'the 
two Governments, the Agreement, on--Withdrawal was signed by both 
parties"'. -The"Agreement stipulated that apart from the 
schedule&daily or-other discussion meetihgsýbetweencommanders 
regarding-,, the"dismantling-Of'defences; there was to beýno 
fraternization between opposing forces, and the'level of 
liaison for'discussing--daily work'plans-would not be, below 
battalion, commander level-,, -accompanied, by UN, 
representativesý`2. -' ýI:,,,, -ýA ,ý-- 
*See-page 456., 
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It was, also informally agreed that military 
representatives of India, and Pakistan, would have joint meetings 
with-theýACMO*, UNMOGIP and Chief Officer-of UNIPOM every 
Saturday to discuss any problems over the withdrawals'63. In 
fact, in the atmosphere of intense goodwill which followed the 
Tashkent Agreement and the subsequent Withdrawal Agreement, 
problems were few, although Observers reported odd cases of 
looting-andýdestruction of'civilian property in occupied areas 
by' bothýsides. - -. Theseý-were brought to the attention of local 
commanders who, promised corrective action'64. ý 
'- 'On, 31st January, UNMOGIP/UNIPOM reported-that Part 1, Phase 
I hadýbeen completed without'incident or difficulty in all 
sectors concerned, 65. - ' However, removal of defences under 
Phase II was hampered, byýbad-weather 164. , As, a. result Phase II 
was ended by agreement on 20th February, and sketches of, 
unrecovered mines and unexploded, bombs, and shells were included 
with, the-certificates of mine clearance and, the dismantling of 
defence works, 'which-, were,, exchanged--at sector, and sub-5ector 
levels. Observers carried outý. aerial and ground, 
reconnaissance in order to confirm, the conditions stated in the 
certificates;,.. -Whenever discrepancies were, discovered, they 
were reported'to the partiesconcernedlly. 1- -ý, 
, -Part 2- withdrawal to. -positions held-, before, 5th August, 
1965 - was completed on schedule by 25th, February, -1966160. 
Soýfew, were the problems that there--is no evidence that General 
Marambio's Good, Offices were sought-to settle any disagreements 
in this final, stagep`andýhis mission, ended, as, anticipated, on 
28th, February'61. ýUNIPOM's operation was also wound up during 
the course of the following, two weeks'". , UNMOGIP was 
*General Nimmo having died early in January, see page 457. 
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gradually reduced, as soon as existing contractual arrangments 
permitted,, to its strength in September 1965171, maintaining 
its mandate to supervise the Karachi Agreement. 
EPILOGUE- 
The Aftermath of the 1966 Withdrawal 
Despite the withdrawal of troops-to-their own side of the 
CFL on schedule. by 25th'February-1966, a, few problems remained 
unsettled, -some, -of which were discussed at a meeting in 
Amritsar of Senior Army, Representatives ofýIndia and-Pakistan 
on-23rd February, 1966, -, which was also"attended-by Colonel 
Gauthier, tGeneral-Macdonald, andýGeneral-Marambio'72. Firstly, 
the question-of withdrawal1rom unauthorised positions on the 
respective-parties'-own, ýside-of the'Line in Kargil was'still at 
issue., 'Sector commandersýon-both sides, were, in complete'-, 
agreement-to their troops'-, withdrawal, from-the wrong, side of 
the CeasefireýLines but made various claims'. and conditions 
regarding these unauthorised positions' ,, withdrawal-from which, 
it-was, agreedi-was linked, rather,, to the reduction, of,, the- 
quantum of forces in the State"than'to-the withdrawal, to 
positions hel&prior to 5th August, 1966173; Suspicion 
between the two, sides continued, with one si. deý_occupyingan, 
unauthorised position to be counterbalanced by-an equallyý 
unauthorised-position on, the other side'74. - -Oný13th, May, 
further to recent recommendations made by Gauthier, -, the Indians 
agreed to, vacate their major unauthorised positions,, and 
Gauthier-requeste&Pakistanýýto do the-same by', the,, same date175. 
However, -ý-some small-unauthorised positions,, -often on-, 
snow-covered heights of over 13,000 feet, continued to be 
occupied by both sides in the area, where the exact position of 
468 
the Ceasefire Line was also in dispute, 76. 
A further bone of contention was the civil administration 
of villages on the Indian side of the Ceasefire Line which had 
previously been under the practical control of Azad Kashmir*, 
the village of, Fandiot in Kotli-Galuthi Sector'being the chief 
concern. TheýIndian, Representative at the meeting on 23rd 
February state&that the Withdrawal Agreement stipulated quite 
clearly that all'forces, including para-military-and police, 
should be withdrawn, 'and that therefore-the, UL should be the 
bas15-for the"withdrawal of all personnel including civil 
administration-. ý Colonel Gauthier, suggested, that India should 
take no action on the'subJect as in UNMOGIP's opinion there was 
no-, civil administration-in the-area. , TheýPakistan 
Representative believed, Ahat the question of civil- 
administration was not'within his terms of-reference, therefore 
the matter should-be-discussed at a higher levell". At the 
end of March Pakistan referred the question of Fandiot to--the 
Secretary-Generall7g. -By, this time both sides, had taken up 
unauthorised positions-in the'area, Pakistan because India had 
done so, ý and'India because she-believed, para-military forces 
had been left, in-the village after-Pakistan's somewhat 
reluctant withdrawal-.,, ", -India-wanted a joint inspection of the 
villageýwith Pakistan in, order, to make clear-to the villagers 
(who were hostile to-lndia)ýthat Pakistan had withdrawn and 
they were now under Indian Control. Pakistan was unwilling 
for such an inspection 179 On 4th April the first firing 
incident', since the withdrawals,, took place-in,, this-area. ' 
Observers were unable to'confirm which side was responsibleloo. 
Both sides did, however, subsequently withdraw from their 
*Areas such as Chaknot, see page 350. 
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unauthorised positions-In the arealel. 
Quantum of Forces 
On 9th'and 10th'February, 1966 the COAS, India and CIC, 
Pakistan-held'meetings at which it was agreed that the quantum 
of regular troops, para-military forces and armed civilians who 
might be considered to constitute a military potential to be 
located in the State of Jammu and Kashmir would not be more 
than as accepted by UNMOGIP in the context of the Karachi 
Agreement. The reduction of armed personnel to these numbers 
would be'completed'by-lst April, 1966, and certified as having 
been done by UNMOGIP182* ., In-, fact-, it was'not, until June that 
the two Armies were able to'supply the, Mission with a detailed 
order of battle- ' location-statement and list of, occupied 
picquets. The'task of verification"then began', -withýthe aim 
of checking-the strength-and dispositions-of ground, forces 
deployed in the-State by'31st August; --1966. -- Observers were- 
instructed-to rely chiefly bn, their own-experienceýand 
observations for information and, to cause the, -, minimum-of 
disturbance to units,, investigated. Muster paradesý-orýsimilar 
detailed checks, were-only, to be, requested'when-a particular 
difficulty existed andýafter'referenceýin each'case to- 
Headquarters.  A physical-count-of, all, large calibre weapons 
was, however, -toýbe conducted'03. I 
Continuation of UN Good Offices 
,, Additional agreements also reached at meetings in-Tebruary 
1966 concerned the return of the few'-remaining 
*It was decided that the question of the training and 
arming of irregulars-, -was to-be referred to the respective- Governments for their consideration. 
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prisoners-of-war-, and a decision that Sector Commanders 
nominated along each Sector of the Ceasefire Line and Border 
were to meet from-time to time to settle any points. that might 
arise. Colonel-Gauthier stated that the UN Good Offices would 
be made available-at-any time to arrange such meetings. it 
was agreed'that the Sialkot-UNFO Team would continue, to 
function after the, withdrawal-t-and revert to the procedure in 
forceýfor the Border area-prior to 5th August, 1965184. 
Civýlians 
-, ý, In May 1966 the usual springtime complaints of civilians 
crossing the Ceasefire Line for, agricultural-purposes were 
received from India. - Gauthier-pointed out, these could not be 
considered"ceasefire violations;, He did, however, call the 
attention of Pakistan GHQ to theýdangers inherent in such 
incidents, both for, the civilians themselves, -andAhrough the 
increase in tension-which they inevitably aroused"'. , He also 
made the-same point to Dr. Bunche, reporting that unofficial 
representations-to the Pakistan military authoritiesýhad had no 
useful result, and the policies-of the two Armies remained 
diametrically, opposed. He reminded Bunche-that-itzwas Mission 
practice to-assume that the Karachi Agreement-did, not apply to 
civilians, and that-therefore complaints aboutýcivilian 
movement in forward areas were, not being accepted or-,,,, - 
investigated-. ý-Actionýwas,, neverthelessýfrequently taken,, as-a 
response-to requests for--UN Good-Offices-, normally in,, 
connection withýthe search,, for straye&cattle,, or the return, of 
detained, civilians. -, The-position"whereby"on the-Indian side 
civilians were generally evacuated at least from the 500-yard 
zone and sometimes moved much further back, and on the Pakistan 
side they were permitted absolute freedom of movement up to and 
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across the Ceasefire Line, and apparently were encouraged to 
cultivate their farms and make their homes in the forward 
areas, was bound to be a continuing source of trouble, he told 
Bunche. '- A senior Pakistan Army officer had expressed the 
opinion to Gauthier that it was quite legitimate for civilians 
crossing the Line to carry weapons and ammunition for their 
protection. ', Gauthier explained further that the Indian 
evacuation of, civilians from the forward areas created an 
arable-no-man's, land-to which-the farmers from'the opposite 
side, ýof, the Line-were-naturally attracted. The Indian 
commanders in-the forward area were'suspicious, that their 
movements were'a-cloak-for spying'or infiltration, -and 
frequently, arrested theoffenders. ' *--In"such,, circumstances an 
exchange oftfire could easily startýý- 'Gauthier'realised the 
problem couldýonly be solved by agreement between, the-two 
Governments and, that no useful-purpose-would be-served-by 
further discussion, with the military authorities, but wished to 
referýthe, matter to Bunchel".. 
Essentially then, -the major`causeýof the-escalating. - 
tension. which-led to; war the previous, year-still remained. 
Bunche thanked Gauthier for his succinct and pbnetrating' 
analysis, ý but could only say theýmatter'had-been,, gone into very 
thoroughly-before and, taken upýwith therespectiveýMissions in 
New York without-noticeable result. - However, -the same-would 
be done again after the new CMOi General Tassara,; had'discussed 
the situation oný the spot with Gauthier'01'. ý' On, 1'st June, 1966 
Colonel, Gauthier-had been notified-of the-offer 'of appointment- 
on 31st May to Major-General Luis Tassara Gonzalez of Chile"O. 
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CHAPTER FIFTEEN - THE IMPACT ON UNMOGIP OF THE 
INDO-PAKISTAN WAR OF 1971 
PROLOGUE 
General Tassara becomes CMO 
Tassara arrived at the Mission to begin his 
term as CMO, on-2nd July, 1966, having recently retired from the 
Chilean Army, and having proved acceptable to both India and 
Pakistan as a successor to General Nimmo2. He had already 
served, two separate tours of, duty as a Military Observer with 
UNMOGIP, ý in 1951-52 and 1956-57, the second time at his, own 
request and on, General Nimmo's recommendation3. 
No major incident occurred along the Ceasefire1ine during 
General,, Tassara's first year, but in June 1967 demonstrations 
occurred outsideýUNMOGIP_HQ over alleged, bombing of. holy 
places4, and in August of that year General Tassaia, 'advised 
that-the two sides had recently become particularly-sensitive 
to, the activities oft, the other'side, and events, that-would 
normally be considered unimportant, were causingýtension to 
rise. -He pointed'out that, it was in August, that the 1965 
activities-'had commenced, and that in, 1966 during, August and 
September similar indications wereýnoted,, until, heavyýrains 
flooded-a considerable area'of Kashmir State, and it became 
apparent that military manoeuvres would be impracticable. --He 
admittedýthat-there was, no sign"of a military, buildýup, at this 
time-, - despite the sensitivity, being displayed3, " 1but his concern 
was-to-some extent, justified when Hindu and Moslem factions 
clashed-in Srinagar at the end of the month,, 'with references 
*He was promoted to Lieutenant-General at the beginning of 
-19681. 
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being-made to the Kashmir issue. A curfew was imposed 
intermittently on the central area of the town for a while, but 
the Mission's activities were unaffected6. 
Normalisation of Relations 
-In October-1967 there was an exchange of fire between 
Indian-and-Pakistan troops when an Indian patrol entered the 
500-yardýzone and-carried oUt-surveillance of unauthorised 
Pakistan positions within the 500-yard zone on the Pakistan 
side. These positions, had already been'the subject of a 
Violation apd, a request for-their withdrawal,. General Tassara 
considered the, incident to-be purely local-as firing soon 
stopped-and, the patrol was-withdrawn7. Unusually; ýhowever, 
the Director of the UN, Information Service-'in New Delhi took-it 
upon himself to, write to U--Thant, regarding the incident, '"which 
he, thought was-the most serious, one, since the conflict in 1965. 
He-sAid the Indians wereýplaying it, -, downi and whilst officially 
accusing the Pakistanisrfor the-incident; unofficially had 
themselves stated that the incident should be taken as a purely 
local matter,, and'responsibility put on the shoulder of the 
local military peoples. No public excitement was expressed in 
Indian political circlos and the press showed restraint', 
suggesting that-a high priority was-being-put on improving- 
relations with Pakistan,. , At,, the'time a top level, Indian 
goodwill mission was-visiting Pakistan to proposeýarrangements 
for the exchange of cultural'delegations,, -student'groups and 
sport5ýteamsl and-on-11th October'-ý- two, days afterýthe incident 
- India and Pakistan reached agreement to-re-establish the- 
telecommunication links between the--ýtwo, countries which had 
been-brokenýoff during, the 1965 conflict". The Indian Chief 
of the Army Staff-was--to visit Pakistan that month to, return an 
474 
earlier visit, by Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff to India, and 
the incident did not cause a postponement of the visit". 
I On 24th and 25th October, 1967, the COAS, India, and the 
CIC, lPakistan, held meetings which indicated that both sides 
wished to settle differences by discussions and eliminate all 
tension areas on the CFL. They agreed that picquets already 
declared by-UNMOGIP to be on the wrong, side of the Line should 
be, vacated as soon as possible exceptýin one disputed area, 
where a joint survey was--to be carried-out under the auspices 
of UNMOGIP, and with the: Mission's assistance andýsupervision. 
They also agreed that information on exercises to include level 
should-be exchanged-three'clear days in advance, that meetings 
of, Local Commanders to settle disputes or disagreements should 
be; resumed,, and. that service light aircraft could fly up to a 
limit-of 1000 metres on-, their own side of-, the-Border or CFL12. 
A period of"tranquillity, followed with-ACFV's, ýwhich had - 
reached a-1967 peak in-July'of 101 complaints, down to 30 in 
November, 15 inýDecember and, only 10 in January 196813. 
THE BUILDUP TO THE WAR OF 197 114 
Dissension in East Pakistan 
- In the-years following independence in 1947-the people of 
East Pakistan began increasingly to feel-that their British 
colonial rulers had been replaced by a much more exploitative 
rule from West Pakistan. The two wings of Pakistan, 1000 
miles apart, from each other and climatically di551Milari-had 
populations which, --though espousing the same religion, were 
physically"and culturally'very-different, "and which spoke" 
different languages withýdifferent scripts., In' the economic, 
sphere the two wings were not similarly, developed in either 
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degree or-kind. The dominance of the West over the East was 
made both more surprising and more galling by virtue of the 
fact that a majority (55%) of the population of Pakistan lived 
in the East Wing". Recruitment to the Pakistan Army and the 
Civi, lýService was, however, confined largely to the West", and 
there was enormous economic discrimination, perhaps the most 
outrageous, being the'distribution largely in the West of the 
export revenues from, jute, grown in"the East"., 
In, lDecember 1970, General Yahya Khan, who had succeeded 
General Ayub Khan-after, the latter's fall from favour the 
previous, year,,, held the, first general-elections since Martial 
Law had been declared in-Pakistan in 1958., Sheik Mujibur 
Rahman's Awami League; the main political party. ofýEastý. 
Pakistan, won, an overall majority of, - appropriately'-- 55Y. of 
the--seats, but'Yahya, Khan and-the ruling Punjabi elite of West 
Pakistan refused to accept theý-, democratic-verdict of the people 
an&, Martial Law, was'retained'O. -- In March, 1971, the Awami' 
League was outlawed and SheikýMujibur Rahman andzother leaders 
arrested". " The population of East'Pakistan rose in revolt 
and on-26th March declared the independence of Bangladeshzo, 
and called'on-the United Nations for assistance". A guerilla 
struggle, -, discreetly helped by Indiap-quickly started against 
the Pakistan Army, which'engaged-in a, policy of virtual 
genocide against-the people of East-Bengalzz". 
Refugees 
ýIndia'was-then-struck by a suddenýinflux of refugees which 
imposed,, an intolerable strain on the country, and put its 
economic-and social-security at risk., Most of the refugees 
crossed over from East Pakistan during May and June 197123 , but 
by the autumn the number had risen to nearly ten million 24. 
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Pakistan maintained that India had exaggerated the figure, but 
never denied that large numbers of refugees were involved213. 
In reply to repeated demands within the country that India 
should refer the matter to the UN, the Indian Foreign MInister, 
Swaran Singh, made the point in the Lok Sabh* at the end of 
JuneAhat the UN"could do nothing thatýwas not initiated by 
member States' home Governments. - He also said: "We cannot 
forget, that on'-earlier occasions it has not been our long 
speeches that have saved the situation but a, veto of a friendly 
country, that has saved us on some very crucial occasions. So, 
I-would not like to, give'a-false sense that the United Nations 
can, -pull U5 Out Of our troubles-and difficulties"26. 
For a few weeks India had, in fact, quietly attempted to 
have the-UN intercede, in East Pakistan in the hope ofýimproving 
conditions., She'wanted credible guarantees to be given for 
the,, safety and, well-being of the people-who-were fleeing in 
order'to''cease theýflow and to persuade as many as possible to 
return'homel". -ýAt a, meeting of theýUN Economic and Social 
Council'-(ECOSOC)-in May'1971, ý-she called publicly for UN action 
but Pakistan voiced opposition-to the discussion of her 
interna1affairS211,., - -Mrs! Gandhi-thenýsoon began, to claim that 
what had started as an internal problem forTakistan had become 
an-internal problem for India too", and sent delegations all 
over the worlds firstlyý-to, explain the problem and, secondly to 
request assistancd in the form of pressure on, Pakistan and 
material aid for the refugees3o. " A better understanding of 
India's position was achieved, 'but little assistance received 
in either direction. Of, about $700 millionispent on the- 
relief operation for the refugees, -only about 10% was received 
*Lower House of the Indian Parliament. 
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in aid from abroad, in spite of many pledges". 
Suggestion for the Posting of UN Observers on the Border 
By the end of June India's suspicions of the political 
implications of a UN role in the crisis were aroused as plans 
for'relief operations developed between the UN agencies and the 
Pakistan authorities.  The efforts of the UN High Commission 
for Refugees (UNHCR) to achieve the'repatriation of the 
refugees were regarded with increasing distruSt32 . In order 
to'channel aid to, the stricken area the UN relief effort had to 
restore the damage caused by the Bangladesh liberation 
movement, 'and thus effectively gave support-to the Pakistan 
Government at the'expense of-the, movement33. -, Pakistan then 
became-increasingly, willing to accept: the assistance of- 
outsiders whilst -India becameýequally'anxious to prevent-any 
external,, intervention34. At the next, meeting of ECOSOC, in 
July 1971-P India-rejected aýsuggestion-, -said to-be the idea of 
the UN High-Commissioner for Refugees, and supported, by the 
United States, to-post UN Observers on either-sideýofýEast 
Pakistan's border,, with-India in-order to: ýassist-in, the, ý, 
voluntary repatriation'of the-refugees'. On American advice 
Pakistan accepted theýidea and thereafter-pressed-for its 
implementation35., I 
On, - 19th July U'Thant-suggested to India and Pakistan, that 
representatives' of the UNCHR be stationed along both sides of 
the border, which -would be a- less formal, step than an observer 
missions- and On 20th, July, Put' his suggestion before' the 
Security Council. The suggestion-was welcomed by Pakistan and 
also by-Britain aLrid the United States, but the Bangladesh , 
liberation movement made'threats, against the safety of the UN 
representatives',, and after a respectable period-of 
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consideration the Indian Government rejected the proposal, 
saying that it would simply create a cover for the continuation 
of atrocities rather than creating the necessary feeling of 
confidence among the refugees". 
India and the leaders of the freedom movement believed 
that it was intended to use the Observers primarily to inhibit 
India from rendering assistance to the liberation movement37. 
India declared that she would consider support of the 
suggestion by anyone an unfriendly act. She insisted it would 
not be-possible for, a small group of Observers to stem the flow 
of-refugees all along the border, nor would it be possible to 
persuade the refugees already in India to return to the 
atrocities from which they had recently escaped, therefore 
Observers-would only be acceptable after peace and normal 
conditions had been established in East Pakistan, with an 
administration acceptable to the majority of the peoples. 
--India also felt that to have Observers placed on both 
sides of the border would be once again to equate India with 
Pakistan as a perpetrator of wrong, as-had happened in Kashmir, 
and to make it seem that the Bangladesh issue was essentially a 
continuationýof the Indo-Pakistan conflict, which it was not". 
Since-India was bearing-the cost of looking after the refugees, 
and would be only too glad to have them return home if 
conditions permitted, there was no reason to station Observers 
on -ýhe Indian side". 
-, To India's annoyance - but, quite justifiablyýin the light 
of, the war which eventuated-some-months later -U Thant had 
made the point in the Security Council that the crisis was 
unfolding in the context of the long-standing, and unresolved 
differences between India andýPakistan,, which had given rise to 
open warfare only six years previoUSly4l., India felt that U 
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Thant had unnecessarily brought in India, who had nothing to do 
with the conflict in East Pakistan, and that he was 
concentrating too much on the issue, of the refugees and 
ignoring the causes of theýconflict. Nor did he redeem 
himself-by making useful recommendations, but left any further 
move to the'Security-Council, --which also did-nothing". 
In the wake-of Indias dissent,, the Soviet Union made it 
clear that it would veto--any suggestion on, the matter by the 
Security Council, which would have to be the organ of the UN to 
propose formally the stationing'of-Observers if it were to come 
about. France and Britain and-were also opposed to the idea 
of, isolating. the'question-of refugees from the basic political 
probleW3. 
Public opinion in India', was firmly on the side-of 
Bangladesh, -and believed that-to submit to UN, pressure would'be 
to'leave the area inla*state of continuing bloodshed-and 
instability, which would-, lead'to arloss, confidence-in Mrs. ' 
Gandhi's Government'as-'a result of'India's own humiliation 44. 
However, in choosing to'continue to support Bangladesh-India 
had, to commit herself, -to, war withýPakistan in'an attempt to 
resolve matters quickly, in, order-to-ease the burden, of the 
refugees, and, ultimately to-reduce-the tension in'the'areWO. 
The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation 
Up to this time the Soviet Unionýhad attempted to maintain, the 
balanced policy, towards, Indief and Pakistan that she had adopted 
since Tashkent, and had urged'restrainton both'sides. ' Most 
western-cOuntries had by now suspended economi'c aid-to Pakistan 
but the Soviet Union continued to supply it, "ýalthough armsýwere 
46 no longer included However, the balance of power in South 
Asia'was suddenly significantly changed-when the, knowledge,, 
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became public, on 15th July, 1971, that official contact was 
being made for the first time between the United-States of 
America and the Peoples' Republic of China. With Pakistan as 
the focal point of the contact, India's position was inevitably 
weakened, whilst the Soviet Union did not relish the prospect 
of a strengthened China. The result was the signing in Delhi 
on 9th August, and ratifification in Moscow the following day, 
of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and 
Co-operation47 which, in spite of its name, had a distinct 
defence orientation in its'implicit warning to the'United 
States and China not, to, intervene in the event'of a conflict 
between India and Pakistan. 
The Russians now backed India in the: United Nations by 
opposing-behind the scenes'every proposal, forýany kind of UN 
intervention which might allow Pakistan to-secure'a-political 
settlement unacceptable to India. On 11th'August, -for- 
example, Mr. Agha Shahi of, Pakistan wrote to the, President, of 
the Security Council proposing that a Good Offices-team of the 
Council should visit the border,, but the Soviet Representative 
. said 
his-country was opposed to the holding of a Security 
Council meeting to discuss the probleWe. On 18th Kugust 
India again rejected the idea of having UN Observers on the 
border" . 
- Nevertheless the Soviets continued their economic aid to' 
Pakistan and, together with the United States (both, of whom- 
realised that war between India and, Pakistan-could only damage 
their own relations), stressed the -importance of a political 
solution in East Pakistan". At, one point India weakened to 
the extent of saying she would accept any settlement so longas 
the imprisoned Awami League leaderý, Sheik Mujibur Rahman, was a 
party to the talks, since he was the elected representative of 
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Bangladesh. Yahya Khan, however, was not prepared to 
negotiate with the Sheik". Meanwhile the Bangladesh 
Liberation Movement was intensifying its activitiesuz. 
Escalation along the Kashmir Ceasefire, Line 
During October and November 1971 there was an increasing ' 
number of complaints by both sides alleging shelling across the 
border, violations of air space, and the strengthening of 
defences along the CFL in Kashmir. The number of ACFVs lodged 
by India for October was 253, of which 36 alleged firing within 
5 miles of the CFL without notification. Four alleged firing 
across the CFL, but only one of these was substantiated53. 
In a speech on 12th October Yahya Khan suggested that 
forces on both sides be withdrawn and again brought up the idea 
of posting UN Observers on the border between East, Pakistan and 
India. Immediately after his speech he moved troops towards 
the borders ofýboth East and'West Pakistan54. 'On'15th October 
General Tassara reported from Srinagar that tension, on-both 
sides of the CFL and border was very high, and escalation, was 
reflected in the forward movement, of-troops and, equipment on 
both sides, and exercises being conducted close to, forward 
areas. Indian troops had replaced-theýBorder, Security Forces 
who were normally at the Border or CFL in Jammu Sector. 
Furthermore, civilians in a column 30 km'long in, every type of 
vehicle were on'the move with all belongings, and a village 
near the CFL'had been completely evacuated of its 500 
inhabitants. ' Civilians from the Pakistan-side around 
Sialkot/Bhimber were also being evacuated with all possessions. 
General Tassara blamed the escalation on agitationfand warlike 
speeches on the radio by both Yahya Khan, and Indira Gandhi. 
He said he had visited local authoritiesýin many areas to'-. 
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dissuade-them'from-any acts of provocation, and that he would 
endeavour to'bring down-tension and have troops withdrawn to 
normal positions. Although he seemed fairly-confident of his 
ability to do this, herecognised that matters outside his 
control in East and West-Bengal might, have serious 
repercussions, in Kashmir: he had reliable information that the 
Indians-were prepared to take offensive action over the 
Bangladesh issue, ýand had made, the-necessary preparations. 
Pakistan was well-prepared for a counterýoffensive in 
Sialkot/Bhimber,, areas, aimed at Pathankot, Jammu and Dhampur. 
Heýd. ecided toýsend his Chief Operations Officer to Rawalpindi 
so that-the two-senior members of, theýMission were one on each 
side of the Line in case an emergency arose. - He also sent 
other, personnel, especially dependants, -from Srinagar to 
Rawalpindi, which would be furtherý--away, from any fighting that 
might occur5s. It was unfortunate that'at this time, when 
mobility was important, the Mission-waswithout its aircraft". 
Tassara contacted the COAS, India- General Manekshaw - 
and conveyed his-concern at the considerable tension which was 
apparent on both sides as a result of the intense activity, and 
movement of troops to forward positions-1or what was stated as 
exercises. The COAS admitted-his movements were not for 
exercise purposes, but were defensive measures being taken in 
the face of the threat posed by Pakistan 57. General Ta5sara 
pointed-out that the CGS Pakistan stated that his movements 
were to counter the threat from-India., -Tassara asked 
Manekshaw if he was prepared to use UNMOGIP's Good Offices to 
ease tension by withdrawing his-, troops as-he,, Tassara, already 
had the promise of the CGS Pakistan that the latter would 
withdraw his troops if India did the, same 58. 
The COAS replied he would answer later in the day which 
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suggested to Tassara that he was consulting his Government on 
the political aspects of such actions'. When he finally 
telephoned his answer he said that India was most concerned 
both about the propaganda from the President Ayub Khan that 
Pakistan was prepared for war, andýthe fact that Pakistan had 
been, moving armour and artillery,, not only-in Kashmir but on 
all India's borders-during the previous two weeks., Heý 
realized that General Tassara was doing, his best, -but he 
irecalled the situation was similar to-1965 when, Pakistan 
"suddenly started", and the United-Nations was unable to do 
anything*. He could not let his guard down until fully 
convinced that their movements had stopped and their troops 
been withdrawn from all border areas, but-Tassara-should tell 
them that-he was well disposed to-withdrawýto. India'sýnormal--;, 
positions if he saw Pakistan taking concrete action, to withdraw 
troops from Borderýand, CFLII. -, General-Tassara recognised'Ahat 
there, were political implications in the background, and he had 
no doubt that the COAS had consulted the-Trime Minister and the 
President, so his was a full statement based on political and 
strategic consideration S62. 
Since General Yahya-Khan wasýalsorat this time saying in 
speeches that he was inclined towards, mutual withdrawal of' 
Indian and Pakistan troops fromýthe, border, General, Tassara 
felt both sides were genuine in stating they, would not,,, -, - 
deliberately provoke hostilities,, andýthat-he might, be-'able-to' 
make moves to conciliate them, but he was afraida small 
*The UN Secretariat thought General Manek5haw was somewhat 
ungracious about the events of 1965 since, they remarked, 
the UN at that time secured a ceasefire, supervised its 
observance and-subsequently-organised troop withdrawals, to 
the satisfaction of all sides". Perhaps General 
Manekshaw would have been more gracious if the UN,, had-, 
succeeded in preventing that war in the first place. 
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incident could cause the situation to get out of hand". 
U Thant Offers his Good Offices 
On, 20th October, -U Thant took up Yahya Khan's suggestion 
of a mutual withdrawal of forces and in identical memoranda 
addressed both to, Yahya Khan and Mrs. Gandhi, and to the Indian 
and Pakistan Representatives at the UN,, placed the UN and its 
facilities at, their disposal. He'remarked that along the 
international frontier between the two countries there was no 
equivalent to the safeguard mechanism provided by the UN 
Military'Observers in, Kashmi, r, and'stated: "The CMO UNMOGIP, 
with my full backing, is doing all that he can on the CFL in 
Jammu and Kashmir to avert misunderstandings, to prevent 
military escalation and, to avoid confrontation thatýmight, lead 
to open hostilities... Naturally he'will continue'to do-his-, - 
utmost toýassist in maintaining the-peace in. the area., of his- 
responsibility"64. 
Yahya Khan welcomed the noteýand again called for UN-- 
Observers". Mrs. Gandhi--left for-a three-week tour, of- 
Western capitals without replying, 'but indicated, -whilst-she-.. was 
away thatýshe would not agree-to the'-stationing*of, UN Observers 
on Indian soil, and pointedýout-that-there were a number, of 
UNHCR representatives in India-whose presence had-, not brought 
about any disposition among the-,, refugees-to-return to, East -- 
Bengal. She again argued that-U Thant-wasequating India with 
Pakistan although the situation. was entirelyýaýPakistan 
creation". 
In her belated formal reply to, on 16th November_Mrs. ý 
Gandhi-said that U Thant, should'rather offer his'good offices 
to Yahya Khan and the Awami League: the root of'the7problem' 
was in the fate ofý75 million people in, Bengal, ýandtheýproblem 
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could'only be solved through peaceful negotiations between the 
militaryýrulers of West Pakistan and the elected and accepted 
leaders of East Bengal. Thus the first step was the release 
of Sheik Mujibur Rahman. She graciously added in her reply 
that it was always a pleasure toýmeet U Thant and-exchange 
views". In other words, true to India's oft declared' 
tradition of hospitality; as shown to various UN - 
Representatives who tried to mediate over the Kashmir Dispute, 
she would not refuse to see anyone, but would not accept the 
official basis, of,, the visit. ý U-Thant did not, however, take 
up such a limited acceptance of his offer. 
General Tassara's Attempts to Ease Tensions 
ý- After discussions with the-Chiefs of, Staff of, both Armies, 
General Tassara: reported on 26th October that he hadý"reached, a 
tacit-agreement withýboth"'thatý'theyý-would-issue'instructions 
to all concerned-to avoid incidents which-would, create further 
tensioný13. -At his request Pakistan had alsoz, withdrawn'-from an 
occupied position on the-wrong side of, the CFL. -- The Pakistan 
Chief of Staff said that if the Indian COAS assured-withdrawal 
in all areas, both East and, West, Pakistan woul&'do the same". 
The Indian-COAS remarked that mere words, of assurance from 
Pahistan, were not enough to lower his guard, since, in the past 
Pakistan had attacked twice, in spite of many solemn assurances. 
He-deduced, from the reluctance of-the, Pakistan COS-to have his 
forces return to their cantonments that the-Pakistan 
authorities had no desire to defuse, the escalation which they 
had started, but, were merely playing-for time. India-may-have 
breached-the Karachi Agreement-_ýby bringing, additional troops 
into. Kashmir, but the situation-created byýPakistan warranted 
India's taking-steps that in-the circumstances superceded the 
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Karachi Agreement. 'He was only prepared, to withdraw when he 
saw Pakistan taking steps "to get the hell away from the 
border/CFL 1170. 
ý1 Tassara'-thought at this time that the situation was still 
under UNMOGIP's"control; that the apex of escalation in 
psychological'''tension had been reached; and that negotiations, 
if carried out,, would help'to-avoid hostilities. He had the 
feeling from reliable political-information'that-both parties 
were waiting for'someone to bring them to the peace table7l. 
However, rin, November he was forced to realise that India was 
prepared'to launch an attack-on East Pakistan to-support her 
political aims-for Bangladesh, whilst being fully aware that 
Pakistan, would'automatically react by'launching an attack 
across the western border/CFL, so India was, al-So taking the 
necessary precautions to meet, that threat". On"14th'November 
Tassara reported that the GOC,, Western-Command, India, - had, 
admitted that theýnumber of additional forces being'inducted 
into the State had continued to increase by, a considerable 
amount. The-decision to do so had-been taken by, the - 
Government following a move by Pakistan forces,, bothinto the 
State and to the Indian border. -The, security of-the country 
was more important than observing the terms, of-the Karachi 
Agreement, and Indian forces would not be withdrawn, until the- 
situation permitted. Tassara, pointed out that until the 
Karachi Agreement was officially abrogated, he, had'to-continue 
to supervise-its terms. The GOC had-replied that-since India 
admitted exceeding the quantum-of forces'allowed in Jammu and 
Kashmir, there was no requirement for Observers to continue to 
check, this aspect as new forces deployed*in battle positions 
and new defences, including minefields, could Jeopardise the 
security of Observers. In view of this, securitylfactor_ý 
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Tassara agreed that whilst UNMOGIP would continue to check on 
the official'order of battle they would not check on the new 
forces introduced into the State, but insisted that until the 
Karachi, Agreement-was abrogated he would continue to supervise 
other'aspects of-UNMOGIP's functions under the Karachi 
Agreement. - The GOC agreed to this" . 
- Tassara mentioned that he had not actually received any 
complaint from Pakistan regarding the induction of additional 
Indian, forces into the, State, but had nevertheless awarded a 
Violation against India as he considered that although he could 
not "influence, their withdrawal which is--now-under political 
decision, it is important that the UN accomplish its duties as 
supervisor of the agreement "74 . Pakistan also inducted 
additional forces into the State, but not to the extent of 
raising their numbers above the permissible level. The 
Pakistan authorities stated they weretaking defensive measures 
only as a reaction to the threat from India and would'continue 
to do so as necessary, irrespective of the, provisions Of the 
Karachi Agreement". Both sides were'now, openly breaching the 
Karachi Agreement by constructing additional defences in 
authorised positions, constructing new un authorised positions, 
laying minefields and reinforcing existing forward defended 
localities with men and warlike stores, and violations had been 
awarded against both parties accordingly76. ' 1-- 
On 21st November India crossed the border-into, East 
Pakistan to help repel a Pakistan attack on, some territory 
under the control of the Bangladesh liberationýforces. 
Pakistan subsequently claimed that this was the dateýon which 
the war had started, although this is not the date generally 
accepted". Tassara summarized the position'on'-25th November, 
saying that the forces of both sides were deployed in battle 
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positions, ýallegedly to meet the threat from the opposite side, 
and all formation HQ'had, occupied tactical positions in the 
field. He nevertheless felt that his Mission was still 
carrying out a useful function in the exercise of its duties. 
Both India and Pakistan were still using the machinery of 
UNMOGIP for lodging complaints of alleged ceasefire violations, 
and continued to afford facilities and permit movement of 
Observers to carry out investigations. Apart from complaints 
alleging the strengthening of defences, in the past five weeks 
there had been 40 complaints from India and 28 from Pakistan of 
firing by the other side, five from India and six from Pakistan 
of entering the 500-yard zone, and ten from India and two from 
Pakistan of crossing the CFL. Violations had been awarded 
where appropriate. Whilst both parties admitted to breaches 
of the Karachi Agreement for reasons outside their military 
control - because political circumstances had superseded 
military agreements - both were still anxious to use the 
machinery of UNMOGIP to prevent either an escalation Of the 
tense situati on existing on the CFL or direct open 
confrontation between the two armies, at least until the 
political situation demanded otherwise. InevitablY the 
situation in East Pakistan was influencing the climate along 
the CFL and had caused tension to run high, resulting izI both 
sides more readily engaging each other by fire at the slightest 
provocation. However, such fire had in the main been confined 
to small patrol clashes or firing from a post at a patrol 
moving into the 500-yard zone, and to small arms and some two 
inch mortars - apart f rom one instance, on 12th Novernbex-, where 
81mm mortars were used". 
On 29th November Yahya Khan wrote to U Thant sugge-ýIting 
Observers be stationed on the Pakistan side of the bordejr 
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only7l, 'to report on border-violations, but war broke out 
before, the, -matter was decided. 
THE WAR,, 
War finally broke out on 3rd December, when Pakistan 
mounted a large air offensive against major Indian cities in 
the West. On 6th December India recognised the Provisional 
Government of Bangladesh, thus further committing herself to 
the state's independence. Pakistan broke off diplomatic 
relations with IndieO. 
Pakistan tried to follow three different, and to some 
extent incompatible courses, making it impossible to realize 
any of them. Firstly she had already sent forces to the East 
- to fight the insurgents rather than the Indians. Then she 
launched an attack in the West, because Pakistan strategic 
thinking had only ever allowed for the possibility of an attack 
in the West, or at least that the East could only be defended 
from the West, since territorial losses in the East could be 
exchanged for territorial gains in the West. By the end of 
1971 it might even have been felt that the loss of the East 
might be acceptable if there was such a compensating gain in 
the West. Thirdly, on the diplomatic front, despite the fact 
that Kashmir would have been the preferable prize in the West, 
it was planned to fight on the international border with India 
in order to play on the fears of war in the United Nations so 
that the Organisation would put an end to the threat of 
full-scale international war on the Subcontinent". However, 
in view of the UN's record in preventing war in 1965, and the 
speed with which the Organisation - if it can be credited with 
doing so at all - put an end to the hostilities in 1947-48 and 
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1965,, Pakistan must have had a considerable amount of 
unwarranted optimism to launch an attack in the belief that the 
UN would prevent the war. 
-, The Indian Army had been greatly strengthened since the 
wars with China in 1962, and Pakistan'in 1965, --and was much 
stronger than that of Pakistan, reflecting the'fact that India 
had to be prepared to'fight on-both the Chinese and Pakistan 
fronts"at, the same-time. , Pakistan, - on the other, hand, was 
weakened'by its'forces having to, fight on two'fronts instead of 
the one they had been trained for'Y andýbyýdefections of Bengali 
soldiers. Furthermore with-,, the Soviet veto, -which was used 
twiceýduring the first week of the war, aiding Jndia, the UN - 
or effectively, the United, States -was unable to, haltýthe war 
in the, way that'Pakistan had, anticipated82. 
-Protected by the, Soviet veto in-the-UN, Indias strategy 
was to act, as swiftly'and decisively as possible to render 
Pakistan', s. position untenable in, the East, whilst simply 
defending-herself as-far as-possible in the: We5t63. -- Her 
forces quickly achieved victory in the-East, and-although the 
situation in the West was-less clear cut, Indian gains were 
still greater than those of Pakistan64. ''' ý On 14th December the 
Commander of the Pakistan'forcesýin'East Bengal offered-tO 
surrender". The actual surrender was'on 16th, Decemberl". 
India then ordered a unilateral ceasefire'in the West from 
20.00 hours-on 17th December, in Mrs. Gandhi's-words"to 5tOP 
f urther bloodshed and unnecessary loss of , lif e"'11'., -ý Pakistan 
reciprocated". 
The War in Kashmir 
As in 1965, once war had broken out there was little 
Ia UNMOGIP could even attempt to achieve, with the Karachi 
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Agreement effectively-suspended and limitations placed on the 
Observers' movements, 'both, for strategic reasons and, for their 
own-safety. Initially, theýonly indication-the--Group had that 
war had commenced on 3rd-December was-the reported movement of 
tanks and infantry in the Bhimber sector of the CFL, near the 
Border". ., General Tassara-, had Just returned to Rawalpindi 
from, a two-day, tour of Srinagar and the northern areas during 
which'he receivedino indication from either side of impending 
hostilities., ýTheýfirst he heard was when Pakistan television 
news service-announced at, 1900. WPT* that Indiaýhad-attacked 
Pakistan along-the_whole western front and that Pakistan 
aircraft-had bombed Srinagar, Amritsar and, Pathankot 
airfields'lo. rThat-evening UN Observers confirmed that, - 
Srinagar airfield had been, bombed, and reported-that Pakistan 
troops-hadýcrossed"theýCFL in Punch sector and that, Indian 
shelling toward Pakistant-in-the area had commenced. Later in 
the evening they'reported that. -the Punch area was under'fire 
from Pakistan artillery. Me Kotli Team also reported 
continuing small arms fire from Pakistan picquets towards 
Indian picquets. , The-Jammu-Team reportedýýheavy artillery fire 
from'both sides had commenced late in, the-, evening: and'the 
Sialkot Team reported that roundsof artillery fire were 
landing in the vicinity. -Finally that, day the Rajauri'Team 
reported, that they had beenLinformed-by the local authority 
that-fighting was taking, place along the CFL from Punch to 
Naushera. General, Tassara instructed his-Observers to remain 
on station and not to move to the field". 
-- The next day General Tassara received atreport, from the 
Indian Chief of the Army Staff that Pakistan "without. any 
*West Pakistan Time. 
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provocation" had spent all night attacking the, airfields of 
Srinagar,, Pathankot, Amritsar, Ambala, Agra, Faridkot, Jodhpur, 
Alwar and, others, -and Pakistan troops had crossed the CFL and 
international-border in-the West in many--places, and were still 
in,, India., -- The Indians had not yet crossed the CFL or border 
but-had madeýair-attacks on Pakistan. -An Emergency had been 
declared in India12. 
Tassara reported that ground activity-, along-the CFL was 
relatively quiet that day and no major incidents were reported, 
although there-was considerableýisolated'air activityl, 3. 
During the''next few-days the CFL became-more active with 
continuous artillery shelling and-small arms fireýin several 
places. Punch was, -bombed, by Pakistantaircraft, and certain 
other limited air raids-were, made by both'sidesý, but no major 
moves occurred. The Pakistan CGS-in answer to a query-from 
Tassara said that Pakistan wasýnot in-aý, formal state, of-war 
with-India, and-, that from Pakistan's point of view, the Karachi 
Agreement was still in force". 
On 8th December the Secretary-General cabled his 
appreciation for the courageous and'outstanding, work that, 
UNMOGIP, was doing and said it was'important-, thatthe, Mission 
should continue its work as long as circumstances, including 
reasonable safety of its personnel,, -allowed. 'l: He'said-, he, was 
increasingly concerned; about the safety of Observers in areas 
where hostilities were taking place, -but.,, had full'confidence in 
General Tassara's judgment in making theýnecessary decisions in 
the'1ight of local developments'P". That, day General Tassara 
reported that the major action in his-'area, of responsibility 
was-centered on Jammu, Sialkot and Bhimber. -,;, Apart from the 
capture, of Chamb by Pakistan both sides, appeare&to-, be holding 
firm. Fighting was reportedfrom-Bhimber and intenseýtank, -, 
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artillery and-machine-gun fire along the Border, particularly 
theýarea north'ofýthe Jammu/Sialkot, road. Sialkot had been 
raide&three--times that day by Indian aircraft. The rest of 
the CFL was relatively, quietl6. The heavy fighting on the 
southern partýof, the, CFL and immediate Border area, which 
intensified during the following days, suggested to Tassara 
that both, sides were attempting a breakthrough with, limited 
obJectives". -On the-9th for the first time there were 
reports inýPakistan newspapers of fighting in, -the Northern 
Sector near Kargil, otherwise the only apparent-change in the 
situation was a decrease in air activityle. 
By 10th December General Tassara felt more-confident in 
suggesting there had been a significant'reduction in the 
intensity of the fighting during the previous--, two days. - 
Government statements printed in the Pakistan Times-maintained 
that Pakistan troops were content to consolidate their gains in 
the Sialkot/Jammu area, and made no claims of territorial-gains 
elsewhere along the CFL11. On the 12th Tas5ara reported only' 
small actions along the CFL. But he said thatheavy fighting 
continued in the Border area of Jammu/Sialkot, where-he had 
hoped to arrange a ceasefire. This, it would appear, wasý 
mainly to try and alleviate some of the administrative problems 
caused to Observers, particularly in connection, with their mail 
and supplies, because all the crossings along the CFL and 
Border were closed to them. However, he was unable to obtain 
Indian concurrence. The Indian COAS, General-Manekshaw 
signalled: "I fully appreciate the"problems your Observers are 
facing and I sympathise with them. However, the, existing 
situation is neither of my making nor choosing. , I... cannot 
risk the security of my people and, my territory by giving an 
assurance which I know Pakistan will not honouri-and cani, in, fact 
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take advantage of. I am sure you will understand. With warm 
personal regards and many thanks for awarding such a big CFV 
against Pakistan"100. I 
General Tassara-considered that the moderate level of 
fighting within,, his area of responsibility would continue until 
a decision was-reached in the East. , He thought that if-the- 
Indians gained control of Dacca they would want to regain 
ground they lost in the Chamb area, and the level of 
hostilities in southern Kashmir would increase accordingly. 
Observers were given instructions, to withdraw from their field 
stations if they considered they were in danger'01. 
On the 14th there was an increase in air activity and the 
Pakistanis intensified their firing-on Punch, which resulted in 
the evacuation of the UN Field Station, to Rajauri. -News - 
releases suggested that the Indians had'stepped up their 
pressure on Pakistan in the Kargil area, a fact later- 
confirmed, but generally the situation on the CFL remained 
unchanged with artillery harassing fire by both sides'02. And 
the situation remained much the same untilýa ceasefire was 
negotiated in Bangladesh on 16th December, 'after which India 
unilaterally declared a ceasefire'-in-the West. - The situation 
thereafter remained mainly quiet apart%from, some-sporadic 
firing for a few days in the, Rawalakot and Punch, -Sectors 103. 
Deliberations in the UN 
In the whole period from the Bangladesh, declaration of 
independence on 26th March, 1971 until the outbreak of war on 
3rd December of that year, neither India-nor'Pakistan-norýthe 
major powers called for a meeting of the Security Council to 
give it a chance to attempt to maintain peace on the--, ý- 
Subcontinent. Nor can it be said that the'UN--had,, anything to 
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do with the-, bringing about of the ceasefire once hostilities 
had-begun. 
- , -'As, a-consequence of Pakistan's air attack India was able 
toýmake-the, first, move in the UN, and lodged a complaint with 
the Secretary-General on the evening of 3rd December. At the 
same time it-was stated in Delhi that India did not propose to 
take the matter to the Security Council because of her past 
unhappy experience with UN intervention in the case of previous 
Pakistan aggressionS104. Pakistan also reported the outbreak 
of fighting to the UN, but did not call for a meeting of the 
Security Council, and it was Argentina, at the behest of the US 
which did so'05. 
, The Council met on 4th December. - The Soviet Union 
proposed that representatives of Bangladesh should, be'invited 
to address the Council, but, did not press the-pointllll. ý 
Pakistan representatives argued that their country was being 
forcibly dismembered by a, fellow Member"of theUN, whilst India 
maintained that the military repression carried, on since the 
end of March inside East Pakistan had-destroyed the possibility 
of that country remaining voluntarily within Pakistan, and that 
Yahya Khan's*refusal to release Sheik Mujib was conclusive 
evidence of the unreality of his proposed political 
solution'07 . The US submitted a draft resolution calling for 
a cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of armed'personnel to 
their own sides of the India-Pakistan-border'and authorised the 
Secretary-General "at the request of the Government of India or 
Pakistan, to place Observers along the, India-Pakistan borders 
to report on the implementation of the ceasefire and troop 
withdrawals, drawing as necessary on UNMOGIP personnel"100. 
The resolution also called on India and Pakistan t6 exert their 
best efforts toward the creation of a climate conducive to, the 
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voluntary return of refugees to East Pakistan and to accept the 
Secretary-General's Good Off-ices to secure and maintain peace 
in the Subcontinent, 09. In introducing the resolution George 
Bush, of the United States, made an indirect charge that could 
not but make any further effort on his part unacceptable to 
India when he said: "This body cannot accept recourse'to force 
to solve this problem... the very purpose which draws us 
together here - building a peaceful world - will be thwarted if 
a situation is accepted in which a government intervenes across 
its borders in the affairs of another with military force in 
violation of the UN Charter""*. The US was more concerned 
with keeping the Soviet Union from gaining-influence in the 
Subcontinent than offering a solution to the problem-created by 
Pakistan's refusal to accept the democratic verdict of, its own 
people, but it seems odd that the United States, by its blatant 
support of Pakistan against India, did not seem to realise it 
was positively encouraging India to invite such influence. 
Eleven nations voted in favour, Britain and France abstained 
and the Soviet Union vetoed the Resolution. Poland also voted 
against it"'. 
Two further resolutions, introduced by the Soviet Union 
and by the non-Permanent Members on 5th December, failed-to 
find favour, and another two draft resolutions did not-even get 
as far as a vote'". The Security Council, remained ,ý 
deadlocked. Members could only agree to refer the matter, 
under the Uniting for Peace procedure to the General Assembly. 
France, Poland, the Soviet Union and the Unite&, Kingdom -, 
abstained, mainly on the grounds that the stalemate encountered 
in the Security Council could not be altered'in-the_ ,, 
Assembly'". Both the United- States and the Soviet Union - 
introduced resolutions, but after the former's was discussed 
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and adopted by 104 votes to 11, with 10 absentions, including 
those of France and the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union's 
resolution was not put to the vote' 14. The Resolution'" 
which was adopted called for an immediate ceasefire and 
withdrawal of troops and urged an intensification of efforts to 
bring about conditions favourable to the voluntary repatriation 
of the refugees. Pakistan quickly accepted the Resolution and 
called for the stationing of UN Observers on both sides of the 
border to supervise the ceasefire and oversee the 
withdrawall". India implicitly rejected the resolution, 
pointing out that it was unrealistic to ask-India to-ceasefire 
without giving a hearing to the representatives of Bangladesh 
whose armed forces were, engaged against Pakistan, and who would 
continue their struggle even in the event of a ceasefirerby 
, 
India. India therefore once again asked the UN tolrecognise 
and eliminate the basic causes of the conflictlly. 
The Security Council was reconvened on, 12th December, 'Just 
as Pakistan troops in the East were starting to'surrenderile., 
Mr. Swaran Singh and Mr. Bhutto, Foreign Ministers of, India and 
Pakistan respectively, attended the meeting,, which was now 
concerned to save West rather than East Pakistan'", ýý India 
insisted a ceasefire was impossible until a representative, of 
Bangladesh had been heard in the Council. The Council still 
refused to allow thi 3120. The American representative called 
for a clear and unequivocal assurance that India did, not'intend 
to annex Pakistan territory, and change the status, quo in 
Kashmir. Mr. Swaran Singh assured the Security Council that 
India had no territorial ambitions in Bangladesh or, West 
Pakistan, and was willing to discuss a ceasefirelthatýwould , 
ensure the freedom of Bangladesh and the vacation of Pakistan 
troops from India territory'21. Kashmir was not mentioned, 
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and although India declared a ceasefire in the West, including 
Kashmir, as soon as Pakistan surrendered in the East, the 
situation in Kashmir did not revert entirely to the statusýquo 
ante bellum. 
INDIA'S WITHDRAWAL OF CO-OPERATION 
Resolution 307 
There were already several draft resolutions before the 
Security Council when the Ceasefire came into effect on 17th 
December, 1971, but the new situation made these largely 
irrelevant, and there was a further round of intensive 
negotiation before a new draft was formulated'22. On 21st 
December the Security Council adopted its only Resolution-(307) 
concerning the war, apart fromthe procedural one passing the 
matter to the General Assembly*.. The Soviet Union and Poland 
abstained. The Resolution demanded "that a durable ceasefire 
and cessation of all hostilities in all areas of, conflict be 
strictly observed and remain in effect until. withdrawals take 
place, as soon as practicable, of all armed forces to, their 
, 
respective territories and to positions which fully respect the 
Ceasefire Line in Jammu and Kashmir supervised by the, United 
Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan "123. 
The Resolution also requested the Secretary-General to "keep 
the Council informed without delay onýdevelopments, relating to 
the implementation of this resolution"121. The Resolution, in 
order to be acceptable, was both vague and. ambiguous.. In 
their anxietv to be seen to be doing, something. Security Council 
members adopted the Resolution in spite of knowing that India 
*See page 496. 
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and Pakistan had different, even conflicting interpretations in 
mind'. -In order-to-ensure its adoption they-agreed to make 
interpretative statements after, rather than before, the vote. 
Thus the Resolution did not call for-a withdrawal 
"immediately", but'"as soon as practicable", leaving the whole 
matter open, and it soon transpired that Pakistan wanted 
negotiations to follow withdrawal and India wanted withdrawal 
to follow negotiations. The thorny problem of the 
recognition, or otherwise, of Bangladesh/East Pakistan was 
overcome by the use of the term "respective territories". 
However, the main ambiguity was in the phrase "the Ceasefire 
Line in Jammu and Kashmir". For the most-part, the Line, 
coincided with the Karachi Agreement Ceasefire'Line, but in 
certain areas there were incursions by one side or the other. 
In the Security Council Agha Shahi said that Pakistan 
recognized only-the Ceasefire Line in Jammu and Kashmir which 
had been established in 1949. Swaran Singh for, India said 
that though the Ceasefire Line of 1949 was. acceptable for 
preservingýpeace there was "need-to-avoid the repetition of 
such incidents by making some adJustments in theýCeasefire Line 
in order to make it more stable, rational and viable"'226; 
UNMOGIP was bound by the UN Secretariat's, interpretation 
of the Resolution which envisaged two phases. The first was 
that the ceasefire would freeze positions as of 1930 hours on 
17th December, 1971. On the basis of the 1965 precedent this 
was understood to be a simple ceasefire, requiring bothýparties 
to refrain from firing and from forward movement along the 
lines where the two armies were in actual control when the 
ceasefire came into effect, as indicated by the forward 
defended localities of the parties. These lines would be 
purely temporary as a first step towards the withdrawals called 
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for in the, Security Council Resolution. The second phase, 
which was to commence "as soon as'practicable" and be 
supervised-by-UNMOGIP, - was the'withdrawal of the armed forces 
of both parties to the CFL, which was presumed to be the 
Karachi Agreement CFL, but with the-reservation that the 
Representative of Somalia had said on behalf of the sponsors of 
the Resolution-immediately after its adoption that the parties 
"may make any mutually acceptable arrangement or 
adJustment"126 .A UN Working Paper subsequently, noted - after 
difficulties with India had-been experienced -that it was 
"significant that the Resolution does not referto, any 
particular ceasefire line or ceasefire agreement, (such-as, the 
Karachi Agrement), but to the ceasefire in Kashmir-in- 
general "127.1 i-ý 11 -` 
I. General Tassara-soon gained the, impression the Indians 
would not be likely to give up any of the'territory they had 
gained in Jammu and Kashmir as they did after'the 1965 war. 
On the other hand, he felt they appeared willing to use gains- 
in-the south of the western border area as bargaining points 
for areas they had lost, such as Chamb. 'He suggested that not 
only did the Indians want an adjustment on, the CFL before 
negotiating for withdrawal, they might-well insist that, the CFL 
be transformed into a border line. -, He thought that as both 
sides seemed to want an overall agreement simultaneously, -, the 
political dialogue would be carried on withýgreat caution, to 
settle problems once and for all, and therefore he did not 
expect that any formal withdrawal, could be expected before May 
or June 1972 128. 
Observers' Freedom of Movement 
Early in January 1972 UNHQ asked Ta55ara for detailed 
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information as to how much the current'line of control differed 
from the old Ceasefire Line"'. ýTassara pointed out that his 
Observers were restricted in'their movements and could not see 
for, them5elves', and, a5 the information was of a tacticalýnature 
he doubted if he would be provided with it until UNMOGIP was 
authorised to, resume its normal functions, 30. ' Guyer and 
Urquhart* in New York expressed surprise that-the Observers had 
continued to be restricted in their movements after the 
ceasefire, and remarked on the serious-. implications of such 
restrictions in terms of the discharge by the Secretary-General 
of-his responsibilities under Security Council Resolution 307. 
They considered it essential to secure complete freedom of 
movement as a matter of priority so as, to'enable, General 
Tassara to report on the strict observance of the, 17th December 
ceasefire along the existing lines of control. However, as a 
practical matter, the full reactivation of-UNMOGIP machinery 
for lodging ACFV's under the Karachi'Agreement, -could only-be 
envisaged in phase two when withdrawal5'had taken place to the 
Karachi Agreement CFL, or to an adju5ted-CFL, 32 
General Tassara wrote to the Indian COAS,, General 
Manekshaw, on 10th January and requested him to-removeý 
restrictions on the movement of Ob5erver5. ý. In-M5 reply 
Manekshaw made no mention of the request, which'Tassara - 
therefore repeated, and after being pressed twice for a reply 
by Tassara'5 Liaison Officer in Delhi, ýManekshaw said that- 
*The dual signature was explained thus by Brian Urquhart: 
"At the end of 1971 Ralph Bunche died, -but no suitable 
successor could be found. I, as the senior member of Bunche's office continued to do (his) work..,. Guyer, 
however, was senior in rank, and we agreed that we would 
co-sign all the operational-cables to the fieldi although I was at that time not an Under Secretary-General. This 
arrangement continued after I was made an'Under Secretary-General to fill Ralph Bunche's post in 1974 
until Guyer finally left the United Nations in 1979 11131,. 
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General Tassarals suggestion was a very important matter and it 
would take, some time for. -him to-receive an answer. General 
Tassara was annoyed and, reported to Guyer and Urquhart that he 
felt very-strongly that India, was-reluctant to accept any 
interference, as, they, -called it, - of the UN in any-subject 
relating toýthe ceasefire, and withdrawal. His opinion was 
that even whileýthe Indians appeared,, at least-from Press 
reports, to favour bilateral talkst they were maintaining a 
ceasefire which, according to them, was brought about-by their 
own initiative, but were always, in, a posture--, in Jammu and 
Kashmir to re-open hostilities, -which from their point of view 
seemed not to have ceased133. General Tassara went on leave 
in February, but during his absence freedom of movement 
continued to be denied to'the Observers despite approaches made 
to the Indian Representative in New YorkI34. ' 
ý At the end of June the Pakistan Permanent Representative- 
to the UN was critical of the fact, that Observers-had been 
instructed-to receive complaints of violations only'of'the 
present Line of Control and not of the Karachi Agreement 
CFL1311. Tassara reminded GuYer and Urquhart of their own 
interpretation of UNMOGIP's position in order to explain the 
situation. Such complaints, Tassara said, ffýwere received only 
from Pakistan, and concerned areas of the, old Karachi Agreement 
Ceasefire Line as well as, the new Ceasefire Line of: Control - 
the latter differing onlyýto a small extent fromýthe formerý36. 
Tassara pointed out, that since November 1971, when, both 
Armies had openly breached the Karachi Agreement, for: which he 
had awarded an overall Violation to both, countries--for laying 
of minefields, reinforcements, strengthening of defences and 
forward movement from outside the State of Jammu and, Kashmir, 
neither side had reverted toýthe conditions required, by, the 
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Karachi Agreement. In fact, since December, Pakistan had been 
continually increasing her, forces in Jammu and Kashmir, 
especially in the Northern'Areas and in Domel Sector. 
Furthermore, in spiteýof assurances that-there-was no 
restriction of movement of Observers on the Pakistan side, as 
on the Indian side, in-the Domel area it had-been most 
dif f icult, to check on -forces in one area -due to restrictions 
and. difficulties placed on movement by the Pakistan 
authoritieS137. , Observers were eventually able to visit there 
and confirm the build up, said to-be to counter-a similar 
Indian-buildup on, the other'side, 38. 
The Position of UNMOGIP 
On 18th December, 1971, General Tassara attempted-, to 
arrange a meeting with the Pakistan-Chiefýof Staff to discuss 
the general situation along the CFL, particularly as it applied 
to the resumption of the Karachi Agreement, and was-told that 
any discussion on the-subject would be more fruitful if he 
waited until the situation became-clarified'31, -On 23rd ' 
December he met the Acting Commander-in-Chief of the, Pakistan 
Army who said he did not wish the UNýto be active on the CFL as 
it'-would give the, impression to the Army and the population - 
that Pakistan had accepted withdrawal only inýthe CFL area'and 
not the Border areallso., The Pakistan Times had"Just published 
a statement by the GOC, Western Command, -, Indian Army, saying 
thatýhis forces would remain deployed on the Border until a 
political settlement was reached. - Tassara agreed that 
Observers should remain away from the forward areas until such 
an, agreement was reached'41. 
By this time Tassara had-already cabled New York that he 
would appreciate some soundings around UNHQ as to whether the 
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Karachi Agreement would be, reinstated in its original form, or 
whether a new agreement, in which UNMOGIP might still be used, 
was-likely-to emergel42. - UNHQ replied that'he should proceed 
on the'assumption-that-the Karachi-Agreement remained'in effect 
despite-the'recent large-Scale violations, and that UNMOGIP 
should continue its workr which in fact-was never interrupted. 
Any initiative, or'suggestion to the contrary would have to 
originate with the partieS143. - The UN was thus'fully prepared 
for a change in the role-of UNMOGIP'as a result of the 1971 
war. The, problem,, inevitably,, was that India'and Pakistan 
could: not agree-on'whether UNMOGIP had a role to Play in the 
future. -On 7'January-the Pakistan authorities'asked, for 
UNMOGIP-toýresume its normal functions within-the, framework of 
the Karachi Agreementl4l , 
but UNHQ now expressed-res6ivations, 
reiterating that UNMOGIP could as yet only act on the basis of 
Resolution'307143 . -. - 11 1-IIII 
-ýOn 28th December Tassara had a meeting with the COAS, 
India, who said it was'unrealistid-, to discuss the"Karachi-ý 
Agreement, or withdrawals;, in the present-circumstances. -, As far 
as the Karachi Agreement was"concerned, he-said,, -there was-a-- 
new ceasefire line andýthere would have to be'a new agreement 
based on the situation as it, then-was. : -His orders to the Army 
were to observe the Ceasefire meticulously, but if attacked-by 
the Pakistanis, to retaliate in-force. Tassara pointe&out 
that it, was pertinent to discuss therKarachi Agreement since 
although the Indian Army had ignored the Agreement; it'had 
never been abrogated. The COAS agreed,, but said;:: thatýfrom his 
point of view the Karachi Agreement, was*dormant'and, was not 
functioning at thatýtime"-' 
Tassara decided that in theýmeantime UNMOGIP'hadýto 
continue to keep in cl'ose touch--with"the situation, -through the 
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local authorities out in-the field. He therefore, informed the 
COAS that UNMOGIP would remain, in position at field stations 
with the same distribution of teams-as before, and would resume 
its. normal role as soon as the, situation permitted, and that in 
any, event UNMOGIP'S work had never stopped, but had carried on 
to the-best of its ability, under-the prevailing-circumstances; 
consequently the, Mission-would, expect to receive the same 
support, that the Indian-Army, had provided in the past. The 
COAS-, said he would co-operateýfully'47. 
,, -On 28th March in a conversation at UNHQ in, -, NewtYork, the 
Permanent Representative of India stated that in his -- i, 
Government's view UNMOGIP machinery had no'function to perform 
in. the present situation, and, that problems relatingý-toýthe 
ceasefire, including ACFV's were being dealt with bilaterally 
through flag meetings. However the Indian Government, he 
said, would prefer not to bring the issue to a head at that 
timelý6.11 1ýI--, 
On, 11th April, Colonel Halliday, Acting Chief Military 
Observer whilst Tassara was on leave, was calledýto, a meeting 
with the Pakistan Director of Military Operations,, -apparently 
at the behest of the Department of Foreign-Affairs who, wanted 
to determine India's attitude towards the-functioning of 
UNMOGIP. The DMO said that while Pakistan had welcomedýthe - 
activities of UNMOGIP and had made all facilities,, available for 
investigations on the CFL he had gained the-impression that 
this was not the case on the Indian side. - Halliday'explained 
that after the Ceasefire the Indian Authoritieshad,, requested 
UNMOGIP not to move to forward areas until a, settlement had- 
been reached, and that the CMO had agreed, and, this wasthe - 
reason why Observers had not been permitted to visit, the CFL on 
the Pakistan side. Halliday pointed out in his report to New 
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York-that the DMO was already fully aware of the situation, and 
Halliday considered, that he, was attempting to ascertain the 
official Indian attitude towards UNMOGIP since there had been 
so much, comment'on it in the Indian Press and Radio. Halliday, 
assured him that while Observers were restricted in their 
movements in the forward areas the Indian Authorities were most 
co-operative in, all. other respectS1411. 
ý, The Secretariat discussed the situation with General 
.. who, visited 
HQ at the end of-April before returning to Tassaraý 
the, Mission after-his leave. On his return Tassara'reported 
that the COAS Pakistan had confirmed that Indiathadýmade 
several attempts by telephone between the Directors of Military 
Op'erations of each side'to conduct bilateral flag'meetings, but 
this had been strongly resisted by Pakistan; -' -, The COAS', -then 
"spontaneously offered full co-operation to UNMOGIP and stated 
that so far as the Pakistan Army was concerned'meetings on the 
CFLýwill be under the auspices of UNMOGIP organisation"1110. 
Tassara also reported that duringýa conversationwith the 
COAS Indian Army on the 18th May it was made clear"that'the, 
Indian Government's stand was that UNMOGIP had"no role' to play 
in the-ceasefire. Tassara had explained'that the'machinery of 
UNMOGIP was available for reporting on the ceasefire in 
accordance with Security Council Resolution-307,0ý-and emphasized 
that this role was not to be confused with'its previous role- 
under the terms of the Karachi Agreement', --as this was' 
misleading and only caused confusion. Tassara found the COAS 
approachable and very understanding of his efforts to keep the 
image of UNMOGIP unimpaired, but adamant that there was no role 
for UNMOGIP131. ' An approach by the Secretariat to the'Indian 
Mission on 23rd May had yielded the indicatiOn"that while their 
position remained unchanged, they did not wish`to say, "anything 
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officially which would tend to harden positions, or close 
doors'52, and Tassara felt they should therefore, also adopt 
that attitude and not push India into doing anything that would 
have that ef f ect'". 
He said the COAS PakistanýArmy was fully aware of the 
Indian Government's stand on UNMOGIP, which had been conveyed 
to them in direct telephone conversations between the two Army 
Headquarters as well as by Tassara himself. The latter had 
also explained, that despite this attitude UNMOGIP's physical 
presence on the Indian-side indicated a-respect for,, the UN, and 
an awareness that-the machinery of UNMOGIP: was. --readily 
available for any role which might be assigned-to-,, them-after 
the summitýconference which was due to be held,, between-Prime 
MinisterýGandhi of India and President-Bhutto, of, Pakistan only 
a few weeks later'" .II1 -1 
However, India's position had already been set out by 
Foreign Minister, Swaran Singh, in the1ok, Sabha on 17th-May, 
1972, and was communicated in a Note Verbale, addre5sed to the 
Secretary-General by the India's Permanent Representative on 
2nd June. This was that the, Karachi-Agreement ceasefire line 
no longer existed. A new line had come-into existence, on 17th 
December, 1971. Since under itsýterms-otreference UNMOGIP's 
functions applied only to the 1949 Ceasefire Line, not to the 
new line, UNMOGIP no longer had any function to perform. ---,, -Any 
problems relating to the observance of the ceasefire-ishould be 
considered bilaterally at flag meetings, between, local 
commanders, and without the involvement of UNMOGIP 
Observers'". 
The Position of the UN, which was often hereafter stated, 
was that UNMOGIP was deployed, in Kashmir on the basis of 
Security Council resolutions. If either, party wished-the 
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mission to be withdrawn, it should so notify the 
Secretary-General, who would promptly inform the Security 
Council which alone had authority to take a decision on the 
matter. On 21 December, 1971, however, the Council had 
specifically called for withdrawals to the #I ceasefire line 
supervised by UNMOGIP"154. 
Withdrawals 
, On 22nd December, 1971 a senior staff officer from GHQ 
Pakistan visited General Tassara to ascertain whether UNMOGIP 
would-supervise withdrawal from all areas in accordance with 
Resolution 307. Tassara told him that this was a-political 
matter between the two Governments but once agreement on 
withdrawal was reached, and unless otherwise instructed, 
UNMOGIP would participate in its supervision, but only as it 
applied to the CFL and the Border area of-Jammu and Sialkot, 57 
Guyer and Urquhart confirmed that UNMOGIP was fully entitled 
under its mandate to supervise withdrawals in its area'of 
operations provided both parties requested it to'do'so, -but if 
both parties were to request similar assistance', concerning - 
withdrawals along the international border outside UNMOGIP's 
area of operations, Tassara should refer the matter immediately 
for instructions to UNHQ'511. 
The following day the Acting Commander-in-Chief'of the 
Pakistan Army told Tassara that Pakistan wanted withdrawal on 
the western front to take place simultaneously at-the Border 
and CFL and not piecemeal, and the UN had been so advised. 
The Acting CIC was prepared to have UNMOGIP reinforced as 
necessary to supervise the withdrawal from-all areas. He, -., - 
reaffirmed that the Karachi Agreement was still valid, -and said 
he considered that the time between the ceasefireýand the 
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withdrawal taking place would be far less than in 1965 as this 
time it was based on a UN Resolution and it was not necessary 
"to have a Tashkent" to reach a withdrawal agreement"'. 
However, at his meeting with the COAS India on 28th 
December, -Tassara realised that the Indians intended to adopt a 
hard line, over withdrawal discussions'. which they were in no 
rush to get started. The COAS was not prepared to talk to the 
Pakistan Army until authorised to do so by the Indian 
Government. - In the meantime his troops would stay where they 
were. Without committing himself he said-that since there was 
an overall problemýto solve, he would be-favourably disposed 
towards simultaneous-discussions on the western border and the 
CFL, but-, insisted that when it came-to withdrawal his advice to 
the Government would be not to do so until the climate was 
right, 40., _' 
, DiSCU55ions between the two sides-eventually--took place 
between August and December 1972, after which troop withdrawals 
along'the-international border quicklyf, took place, -being 
completed by 21st December, 1972. -Withdrawal of troops, in 
Jammu and-Kashmir had already occurred in Septemberý UNMOGIP 
was not involved"". 
ACFVs 
As in 1965, there were conflictingclaimsýabout the, - 
locations of the actual lines-of control, and-this resulted in 
a number of firing incidents, though to, a lesser-extent than in 
1965, as both sides sought to assert control over certain 
areas. - Since the Observerslýfreedom of movement remained 
restricted even after the Ceasefire, they were-unable to verify 
the locations of the lines, as., reported to-General-Tassara by 
the two High Commands, or investigate these incidents. 
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Neither India nor Pakistan had been lodging ACFV's since the 
outbreak of war, but on the basis of general telephonic reports 
from the local authorities and on what the Observers heard at 
the field stations, it appeared that the situation along the 
CFL was sufficiently stable for Tassara to discontinue his 
daily situation reports to New York on 4th January. Then on 
7th January Pakistan did lodge a number of ACFV's against 
Indiat, saying- "The Government of Pakistan requests that 
UNMOGIP should resume their normal functions within the 
framework of the Karachi Agreement. You are therefore 
requested to inform your Field Stations accordingly"162. This 
move seemed to be a reaction to India's having by-passed 
UNMOGIF and submitted complaints directly, to the-Security 
Council, although Pakistan also subsequently brought, to the 
notice of the President of the Security'Council'and the 
Secretary-General alleged violations of the Ceasefire by 
IndiW11. 
Guyer and Urquhart agreed with Tassara that he should' 
approach the COAS India about Pakistan's request for UNMOGIP to 
resume its role, but they emphasised that, Pakistan's view did 
not necessarily coincide with that of the, UN, which was that at 
that time UNMOGIP's 'primary function, which derivedýfrom 
Resolution 307, Paragraphs 1 and 6 and NOT, from the Karachi 
Agreement, was to observe and report to the Secretary-General 
on the observance of the Ceasefire along the current lines of 
control in Jammu and Kashmir. They repeated that resumption 
of the Mission's full functioning could, only be envisaged after 
withdrawaII64. As a result Tassara also wrote to, the COAS 
Pakistan explaining this position and saying that-he-was , 
willing to offer UN Good Offices on any breaches of the present 
ceasefixe, and would accept complaints which specifically 
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violated that ceasefire, in other words firing, overflights or 
forward movement of troops across the Line of Control'613. 
In a lengthy-reply to Tassara's approach, the COAS India 
suggested that it appeared that the Pakistan Army, being in a 
state of disarray, wished to use UNMOGIP to, re-establish the 
Karachi Agreement which by "their flagrant acts of aggression" 
they had, already twice denounced. He thought that General 
Tassara would agree that if the Indiansýwere to accept the CIC 
Pakistan's proposal they would be indulging in self-deception 
since they had no guarantee that Pakistan would not once again 
regroup and reassemble its force for a further adventure along 
the lines of 1965 and 197111,6. 
During Tassara's absence on leave between February and 
April 1972 India again submitted complaints to-the-Security 
Council, and the areas mentioned, Tithwal and Punch in 
particular, coincided with the areas of main activity reported 
in the Pakistan complaints to UNMOGIP since, the Ceasefire. 
Observers felt it would not be unreasonable-to assume, although 
the Indians had not told them so, that the-, alleged violations 
reported by the Pakistanis had not been, ýentirely one-sideds-b7. 
In early May there were Press reports that India and - 
Pakistan were accusing each other of major-,. violations In the 
Tithwal area and fighting was said to'be in progress'611. On 
6th May the Pakistan COAS told Tassara that-the, two--main areas 
where violations were being committed concerned stretches of 
land which were on the Pakistan side of the-Karachi Agreement 
CFL, but which India claimed to have'taken during the 1971 war. 
Pakistan denied that claim and submitted ACFV's regarding 
Indian encroachment to TaS5ara'61. Tassara-commented to New 
York that the discrepancies between claims by-'India-and-- a 
Pakistan of the location of the Line of Controlýas established 
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on 17th December, 1971 would continue to occur as a result of 
India not permitting any control on the location and movement 
of her troops, especially on the Line of Control itself. 
Tassara felt he was not in a position to appreciate fully the 
situation, but was in no doubt that Pakistan was not taking any 
large scale retaliation against India's actions"O. The 
Indian Press then reported a local ceasefire in the Tithwal 
Sector had been ordered on 6th May after direct contact between 
the two Army Headquartersl7l. Pakistan GHQ told Tassara that 
India had requested a flag meeting for such purposes, but'this 
had been refused by Pakistan unless UN Observers were present. 
But, they confirmed firing had ceased in the, area; although 
firing was still taking place in the Northern Sectorý, - where 
Indian troops were still across the Line of ControJ172. 
Good Offices 
On 17th June Tassara held discussions with the Indian 
COAS. He subsequently received a letter, from the Pakistan 
COAS saying that the DMO India had indicated that, as a result 
of Tasssara's efforts, the COAS Indian Army hadýagreed to- 
reduce tension along the Line of Control. ý Further, the-two 
Army Chiefs had agreed to enforce the ceasefire strictly with 
effect from 1500 hours oný27th June, 1972. They had also 
agreed neither to strengthen existing'defences along-the Line 
of Control nor to try to edge forward from present positions. 
Tassara was requested to enforce their agreement so, far as the 
State of Jammu and Kashmir was concerned. The COAS India 
confirmed the substance of the agreement'77. Tassara' - 
therefore stated that as from 27th June he would'only accept 
complaints which concerned alleged breaches of their agreement 
- firing, movement forward of their present positions and 
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strengthening of existing defences along the Line of 
Control'74. 
. New York thought this might be too restrictive and could 
even, conflict with the Secretary-General's obligation under 
Resolution 307175. Tassara explained that the acceptance of 
UN, Good Offices to assist Pakistan in its agreement with India 
did not represent changes in UNMOGIP's operation, but clarified 
a situation which had been in effect since January. Rather 
than its being restrictive UNMOGIP was now increasing its 
activities on the Pakistan side. Previously, when the Karachi 
Agreement, was made dormant by the activities of both sides, 
they could only accept UN Good Offices on matters pertaining to 
breaches of-the, 1971 Ceasefire. Following this new agreement 
theyýcould accept complaintsýfrom Pakistan alleging any 
movement forward of present positions, not necessarily across 
the Line of Control, and also strengthening of defences, and 
pass-them on-under UN Good Offices"'. , In other words; in 
addition to-reporting to the Secretary-General on strict 
observance of the 17th December, Ceasefire along existing lines 
of control, in accordance with Resolution, 307, -they, were also 
passing complaints lodged by Pakistan Army as, Goodýoffices to 
the Indian Army, even though the Indians would no't'allow 
UNMOGIP, to. function on their side. 
At this timeýthe communications, Tassara forwarded on a 
Good Offices basis for consideration by the Indian-COAS were 
acknowledged, but no indication, of probable action given'77 . 
Afterthe Simla Agreement was-signed the'following month*, the 
Indian COAS-requested General Tassara to discontinue the ' 
practice"O. In fact Tassara continued to forward Pakistarl's 
*See below. 
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complaints to him, whilst pointing out to the COAS Pakistan 
that Good Offices could "only be exercised with the concurrence 
of both parties. Any request for the United Nations Good 
Offices by one party is immediately transmitted by the CMO to 
the other party. The CMO is not in a position to advise as to 
the possible outcome of such a request in any particular 
case 
11179 
The Simla Conference 
After preliminary meetings of'Special Emissaries in 
Pakistan at the end of April 1972, President Bhutto* and Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi met atýSimla where, on July 2nd, they 
signed an Agreement**, Article II of which stated that the two 
countries were "resolved to settle their differences by 
peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other 
peaceful means mutually agreed upon by them"100 -the UN 
Secretariat subsequently, pointed out to General Tassara, -that 
the text'clearly did not rule out resort, to third party 
methods"'. Article IV, paragraph 41of the Agreement called 
for troop withdrawals to either side-'of the international 
border, and provided that: "In Jammu and Kashmir the Line of 
Control resulting from the'ceasefire of'December 17,1971 shall 
be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised 
position of either side". 'Another passage stated that 
representatives of the two-sides would-meetto-discuss 
arrangements for a durable-peace '. 'includingý--the, question of 
repatriation of prisoners of-war and-civilian'internees, ý 'a 
final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir and the resumption of 
*President Yahya Khan resigned in December 1971. 
**The Simla Agreement entered into force ' on 
4th August, 
1972 after being ratified by the"two Governments. 
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diplomatic relations"202. 
On 5th July, 1972, the Secretary-General issued the 
following statement: "I welcomed the Joint statement of the 
PrimeýMinister of India and the President of Pakistan, which I 
have read with great interest and close attention. The 
agreement reached in Simla represents in my opinion an 
essential, first step on the long and necessarily arduous road 
to'peace. on the Subcontinent. ýThe Joint statement encourages 
me to believe that the solution of these yet unresolved 
problems will be facilitated by this important step"103. 
Following the conclusion of the Simla Agreement the 
positions of the parties concerning UNMOGIP remained ý 
essentially", unchanged. The Indian Foreign Minister, Swaran 
Singh, met the Secretary-General, in Warsaw on 7th July, 1972 
and repeated his Government's view that the Ceasefire Line no 
longer existed, therefore UNMOGIP had-no longer'had any , 
function to perform. 'He said that India would appreciate it 
if UNMOGIP "would fade out". - However, he did not officially 
request-the termination of the Mission, ý and-the Indian- 
Government soon indicated-that it had, -no-, intention of doing so 
for, the time being'04 .I 
On 20th July General Manekshaw, -COAS, - India, -, also, 
reiterated to General Tassara his Government's position that 
UNMOGIP had become redundant,, and that1ndia'considered that 
the Simla Accord required all matters in, dispute' to be settled 
bilaterally, without the intervention of'any other party 
(despite the reference in the text to-"any other means mutually 
agreed upon between them"). -However, he said that India had 
no objection toýUNMOGIP's continuing to function on the 
Pakistan side of the line of control. fHe intimated that his 
Government looked forward to-an-agreementýwith Pakistan which 
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would-transform the line of control into an international 
frontier, meaning in effect that Pakistan would abandon its 
claim, to the-portion of Kashmir beyond the Line"13. 
-, Pakistan, on the other hand, pointed out that the 
Agreement did not prejudice its position concerning the status 
of Kashmir and of the Ceasefire Line, and the Pakistan COAS 
assured General Tassara that Observers continued to be welcome 
and would be given-complete freedom of movement on Pakistan's 
side of the Line'04 . 
After Simla 
On 29th July General Tassara reported, to Guyer and 
Urquhart "ONLY", a reorganization of Indian forces in Jammu and 
Kashmir with a new, formation headquarters, HQ Northern Command, 
being formed and located at Udhampur, and a further formation 
HQ formed and located in Jammu. He stated that, India had 
definitely built up her forces in the State'above the quantum 
allowable under the Karachi Agreement, and had-created the 
machinery for command and control to meet any--eventualityII17. 
On 31st July the Norwegian Embassy informed the 
Secretary-General that the Indian Embassy in Oslo had denied a 
prospective Norwegian Observer a visa on account of the 
uncertainty of UNMOGIP's future: The Embassy said it had 
instructions from Delhi to refuse all visas for UNMOGIP 
Observers henceforward., The Acting Permanent Representative 
for India was asked for, urgent clarification of his 
Government's Position and was informed the Secretary-General 
could not accept such an approach, which would, if persistently 
applied, cause UNMOGIP to be phased out by attrition, and would 
also create great difficulities for governments supplying 
Observers-. If the-Indian Government wished UNMOGIP to beý 
517 
withdrawn, the right course would be to notify the 
Secretary-General who would, in turn, report to the Security 
Council which would have to take a decision. An important 
aspect of the situation, he was told, would be that Pakistan 
wished UNMOGIP to continue'80. The Acting Permanent 
Representative, knowing nothing of the matter, promised to 
contact Delhi immediately"'. He later reported that the visa 
had been granted, and that the delay was due to a 
misunderstanding"O. 
General Tassara's opinion on hearing of the problem, but 
before its resolution, was that India did not want UNMOGIP, and 
would not continue to accept the Mission for much longer. He 
was convinced that all devious methods to create, difficulties 
for the continued presence of the Group were being used. Not 
only were the Observers denied movement in forward areas, but 
the Indian local authorities now refused to accept any 
communications from the field teams. - In addition. Observers on 
the Indian side had all experienced an-atmosphere of being 
unwelcome to the Indian Officers with-, whom they, came into 
contact"' 
Tassara had already recommended-that,, Observers on the 
Indian side be located only in New Delhi, Srinagar; Jammu and 
Baramula; rather than at the out-lying field stations, in order 
to maintain Just a basic-framework on-the Indian"side. He now 
Urged his proposal be implemented so--that if'it was later - 
decided-to withdraw completely from the Indian side they could 
take advantage ofý, the normal'move of Headquarters from Srinagar 
to Rawalpindi in October*, which would show that, they were 
taking action on their own initiative, and not-placing too much 
importance on India's'deliberations on the subject. He ý 
believed that was the-way to keep-the posture, of-the United 
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Nations unimpaired. He also thought the possibility of some 
threat or danger to UNMOGIP personnel and dependants should not 
be overlooked since this had happened in the past when 
situations developed which were not to the liking of the 
parties involved. He was concerned that the Indians might 
restrict the Group's movement across the CFL and border by land 
or air, as they had done during the war in December 1971. He 
even considered that plans for evacuation from the Indian side 
should be secretly made so thatthey could suddenly be executed 
if necessary"2. 
The UN's Position on UNMOGIP 
The Secretary-General sympathized with the difficulties 
UNMOGIP was facing, and especially--*with the, problem. of morale 
among Observers"s. Indeed, he requested the Deputy Permanent 
Representative of India to ask his Government to ensure, -that 
until the Mission's future wasýsettled one-way or another, 
Indian authorities at all levels should avoid any action which 
might embarrass UNMOGIP Observers,, either, singly or , 
collectively"". Tassara was instructed to report any case of 
harassment to him, when he would take-prompt action, and any 
serious risk for Observers - such, -as, movement'in areas not 
cleared of mines - was to be avoided'15. 
However the Secretary-General, explained to Tassara and- 
he had taken the advice of LegalýCounsel-on-, the'subject that 
he was faced with an issue of principle, since, under-, Security 
Council Resolutions, 'particularlv Resolutioný307, as well as 
the Karachi Agreement, the Secretary-General was-obliged to 
maintain UNMOGIP until both parties'agreed to request, a. change, 
and the Security Council formally decided. to accept such a 
request. The Secretary-General Could not-take action"on his 
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own initiative which would derogate from the responsibility 
vested in him by the parties and by Council resolutions; 
indeed, he was obliged to continue implementing those 
resolutions to the fullest extent possible. He went-on to say 
that to shut down a substantial number of field stations on one 
side of the CFL, and reduce the number of Observers on that 
side to a skeleton staff, would amount to accommodating the 
position of one of the parties without regard for the position 
of the other, or for the Secretary-General's overall 
responsibility under Council resolutions. --It would, in 
effect, also result in a change of the political-juridical 
situation. He could not therefore agree-to closing any field 
stations or a substantial reduction in the number of Observers, 
though this did not, of course, preclude minor routine 
readjustments. He said he intendedto take up the matter with 
both parties, and asked for Tassara's views as to whether there 
would be any advantage in exploring the possibility of more 
active functioning of UNMOGIP on the Pakistan side-of the CFL, 
since Tassara had indicated that India would, not'mind if 
UNMOGIP continued operating on the Pakistan side"'. 
Tassara did not consider it would serve any useful purpose 
to attempt more active functioning on the Pakistan side since 
they were already exercising the utmostýactivity on that side 
commensurate with the fact that they did notreceive complaints 
from India for investigation on the Pakistan side, and could 
not investigate Pakistan's complaints on the Indian side. 
They would thus in effect only become a means of confirming 
Indian activities against Pakistan, but not Pakistan's 
activities against India. Although this might have some 
significance, it would be against the principle for which the 
Group was formed. All they could now do, was to convey 
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complaints by Pakistan direct to the COAS India under UN Good 
Offices. In fact, the COAS India had asked Tassara to 
discontinue sending these requests,, and said he was only 
prevented from returning them out, -of deference to Tassara. 
Tassara continued to forward them,. however, as the only means 
of communication open to the Group, since Local Authorities on 
the-Indian side refused to receive-any communication from the 
UN Team in their area of control"7,. 
- Tassara told the Secretary-General, that he thought that at 
the-next round of talks-Pakistan-would'-have-to submit to the 
pressures from India to settle matters-relating to the CFL or 
Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir bilaterally, - without the 
presence, of the UN. -He was even suspicious that there was 
already a secret agreement between the-two parties to this 
effect. ý -There was no doubt,,, he said, that India-would exclude 
UNMOGIP from all discussions concerning, the, Karachi Agreement 
orýLine of Control, Agreement, -and would not permit, the, 
resumption of UN functioning on the". Indian! side,. ýof-the, Line. 
Even-the Pakistan COAS had said that India, and,, Pakistan. would 
be conducting bilateral talks without the-presence of UNMOGIP, 
and that the UN-should welcome such talks'asýthey were being 
held inýaccordance; with the Simla Accord which-the 
Secretary-General had stated he-welcomed. ý TassaraTrather 
cynically suggested that when Pakistan considered UNMOGIP's 
presence was no longer necessary for its purposes it would do 
as India had done and also say "that we are ineffective and not 
performing any useful purpose thus discrediting us'in the 
end"196. ,II, - ý1ý II 
Guyer and Urquhart also told, Tassara that they fully 
appreciated-his difficulties. They said that if'1n their 
forthcoming talks-India and Pakistan reached agreement on-the 
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future of UNMOGIP in one way or another, 'there was little doubt 
that the Security Council would go along with their wishes. 
As-,, long as UNMOGIP remained in existence, they would, in 
principle, wish it to operate on both sides of the Line. 
However, it was clear that the Secretary-General's reporting 
obligations, - as well as the supervisory function of UNMOGIP, 
could only be implemented, to the extent allowed by the parties. 
Conversely, as long as'-the-Secretary-Generalls and UNMOGIP's 
mandate wasýnot modified-by the Security-Council it was their 
duty'to implement-that mandate to the full extent possible. 
Restrictions imposed by one side on-UNMOGIP's functioning did 
not relieve,, the Secretary-General of his responsibilities. 
Therefore, until its mandateýwas, changed or terminated, UNMOGIP 
had--to, operate as best it. -could. Itshould in anr--case- , 
observe and-report to the-Secretary-General on the'observance 
of the, Ceasefire, of December 1971, a, task which,, shoUld be-more 
readily'accomplished since-the'Indian COAS had stated that his 
Government had no objection'to UNMOGIP operating'on, -the 
Pakistan side-of the Linej- and as Observers-could now, ýapproach 
the Line from the Pakistan side"'- a move which'ýhad only-been 
possible since 17th July, 1972 whený, _, onýthe'strength of- 
assurances, from the Pakistan Army Command, General Tassara had 
lifted the-restrictions-, on-, the, movement of Observers on the 
Pakistan side of the Line"'I. - -ý -ý ' 11 ., 1-ý -Iýf, - 
Troop Withdrawals and Delineation of the Line of Control 
, On the basis of the Simla, Agreement of July-1972 troop 
withdrawals"along the internationalýfrontier should have been 
completed by 4, September"',. - ý However,, as soon', as -the - 
Agreement, was-ratified early, in August"India-raised the 
question of delineation of'the Line'of, Control iwKashmir, and 
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insisted that withdrawals along the international frontier 
would not take place until delineation of the Line had been 
completed202. 
On-10th August, in spite of, Pakistan's objections to 
India's'stand that the Line of Control should cover the entire 
CFL,, the Commanders of the two Armies, commenced discussions 
which Pakistan insisted were to "determine the actual Line of 
Control in, Jammu and Kashmir on limited areas where the old 
Ceasefire Line was disturbed by the December 1971 war"203. 
The-Pakistan spokesman maintained that any impression that the 
demarcationýof-the "entire Ceasefire Line was going to be 
discussed was, wholly wrong" - 95%-of the old Ceasefire Line 
still-existed,, and the UN Observers still had a-definite role 
to play"'. The' meeting was held on the Indian side at-the 
crossing place on the Border-between Jammu and Sialkot, and 
India, prevented all movement of Observers-through the area 
during the period of the talks"'. -- - 
General Tassara requested-an official-report on the 
meeting from Indian'Army, HQ and was told. that, as the-meeting 
was bilateral theýChief of the Army--Staff considered it would 
be inappropriate to give a copy.,. of, -, the minutes-, to a-third, - 
party. 'However Tassara did receive a-briefing, -, on the-. meeting 
at GHQ Pakistan. Whilst a definition of'the Line, of Control 
was, notýagreed,, upon,,, -with India stillstating the entire CFL 
was the Line, of-Control and Pakistan only the portions which 
had changed, thirty-five areas-of disturbance were agreed, as 
were procedures for delineation of the Line in these areas. 
As'far as UNMOGIP was concerned, India did not want UN 
Observers to be allowed any participation in delineation or any 
future actions; Pakistan wanted UNMOGIP to stay and 
investigate disturbances along, the, CFL, and said the Simla 
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Agreement did not overrule the Security Council action, nor 
could India unilaterally abolish Security Council action. No 
agreement was reached-16. 
Further meetings were arranged,, and on 22nd August 
UNMOGIPIs Chief Operations Officer was informed that India and 
Pakistan-had reached an agreement to withdraw troops in Kashmir 
around, 3rd-4th September207. For the'most part the 
discussions were completed on 18th October, the Line of Control 
having been Jointly'delineated on the ground and on maps. 
However, formal agreement was held up-for seven weeks over a 
small'areaýon the Jammu/Pakistan Border where Pakistan felt if 
she-withdrew her troops it would be tantamount to admitting 
that the Border was an internationalýfrontier, hence an 
abandonment of Pakistan's claim to Kashmir. ýA solution-, 
involving some minor exchanges of, territory was'eventually 
reached,. on 7th December and the delineation of. the-whole Line 
of Control completed on 11th December. Maps showing the Line 
were, given to the CMO for forwarding-to the, Secretary-General 
by Pakistan, but not by India. - Withdrawals along theý 
international border then took place promptly206. 
--Pakistan's position remains that the delineation of-the 
Line of Contro; did not affect the real issues surrounding the 
Kashmir Dispute, but the fact that since 1972 the Ceasefire 
Line has generally been referred to asýthe Line of Control 
gives-considerable weight' to the Indian view-that the situation 
was materially changed by-the war of 1971. ý 
UNMOGIP AFTER 1972 
An Unsung Compromise 
On 30th August, 1972 Guyer cabled Tassara that the 
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Secretariat's consideration of the role and functioning of 
UNMOGIP was necessarily affected by the bilateral talks in New 
Delhi. ' According to, Press reports the question of UNMOGIP was 
still unresolved, but India was said to have no objection to 
Observersý_continuing to, function on the Pakistan side of the 
CeasefireýLine-and Line of Control. It seemed wise therefore 
to defer any further changes in UNMOGIP's modus operandi until 
the'situation-had been clarified201. 
', In February 1973 the-Secretary-General visited UNMOGIP 
during--the, course of-a trip'to the Subcontinent. He alsoýmet 
Mrs: -Gandhi who recalled that, although the decision had not 
been popular in India, she, had, ordered a unilateral ceasefire 
on the-West Pakistan frontýin December, 1971. -She was 
convinced, -that only, friendship, and cooperation between-Ahe 
countries on the, Subcontinent could facilitate progress and 
development., - In this spirit she-had invited President Bhutto 
to Simla. - He had more or less agreed with her thinking. 
However, on, his-return to-Pakistaniý'ýstatements were,, made-, by him 
and'others'which'wereýdifferent in their-, tenor' , and although it 
had been-, agreed that neither side would, conduct a propaganda- 
campaign-'against the-other, 'anti-India,, propaganda, ýwas, resumed 
f 
in, -Pakistan 
210 
.-ýI, III-FiI ý' ''I I- 
I Bef6ie he left-forthe Subcontinent the Secretary-Generalý 
was, briefed-that-there were three alternatives', 'as"far-as the 
unsettled status of UNMOGIPýwas concerned, bearing in mind 
there was-no-question of, withdrawing the Mission without the 
authorisation-, of-the Security Council,, which was unlikely to 
take action unless requested to, do-so by both-parties. The 
first was that India and Pakistan might reach an agreement over 
its continued-functioning, which was unlikely'as India-took the 
view that the Karachi Agreement had collapsed, thus the Karachi 
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CFL had disappeared, and UNMOGIP therefore had no function to 
perform. Pakistan's totally opposite view-was tied to its 
basic stand concerning the, status of Kashmir. Secondly they 
might both agree to-discontinue UNMOGIP, in which'case the 
Security--Council would be likely to comply. - Such a 
development, though highly improbable, might occur-as-part of a 
"package-, deal"-including other-issues. Pakistan could of 
course reserve, its position over the, future, of, Kashmir. 
Thirdly India and Pakistan might continue to disagree about 
UNMOGIP, ' in which case-UNMOGIP would, presumably-, continue its' 
present limited functions on the,. Pakistan side of the Line of 
Control, and observe and, -'report"on the-ceasefir'e. ' It-would 
continue to be unable to operate on'the Indian side, or' might 
even be asked to depart from-tha-L'area. ý In'the-latter case 
the, Secretary-General, would, have to, refer'-the matter-to-the 
Security Council211*. Essentially it was thethird, 
alternative, which eventuated. 
-There-was a major-discussion at UNHQ,, and it was agreed 
that, UNMOGIP could stay on the1ndian side., -However', -no ACFV 
complaints, were thereafter received, from, India. 1, The'Indians 
continued to maintain'that the Simla Agreement had, -supers'eded 
the-Karachi Agreement, and there,, should no longer be'any need 
for-UNMOGIP as India and Pakistan would sort out their problems 
on a bi--4ateral basis. The last report on UNMOGIP to the , 
Security'Council was in 1972, and the Security Council"was not 
again informed'of the continued, restrictions imposed on'the' 
movement, of Observers on'the Indian side,, although'it was a 
generally known fact to anyone with any interest in the matter. 
*Presumablylthe Secretary-General discussed UNMOGIP along 
these lines during his visit, but there was no mention of UNMOGIP in the extract available of the minutes of his 
meeting with Mrs. Gandhi2t2. 
526 
The support received from India in such matters as transport 
and accommodation was as good as it ever had been, and access 
to field stations and HQ in Srinagar was not hampered. 
Observers were not allowed to undertake field tasks, such as 
Investigations of Pakistan complaints or checking on the Order 
of Battle on the Indian side, but inevitably they were able to 
make certain observations as they travelled-to and fro, and 
report their, observations. Social relations were good at 
senior level, but sometimes less good than on-the Pakistan side 
at local level, where they varied con51derably-according to the 
individual Indian officer concerned2lý. 
In 1975 the Indian High Commission, in London4-stated it was 
.. up to the'UN to decide whether they should be recalled"214 . 
However, at the time of General Tassara's retirement iný1978 
there were-Press reports that "according, to offical sources in 
Srinagar" India had decided to seek the, withdrawal of UNMOGIP 
because "they are irrelevant in-view of-the-growing 
Indo-Pakistan understanding to solve:, their problems 
bilaterally 11215 . Secretary-General Waldheim, was reported to 
have toldthe Indian Minister of'External Affairs-that as the 
matter involved both India and Pakistan, the future of the UN 
Observers would have to be decided upon-in'consultation with 
Islamabad 211 
Brigadier-General Stig, Waldenstrom, a Swede, succeeded 
General Tassara as CMO of UNMOGIP in 1978,, and. remained with. 
the Mission until 1982*. Previously--he, had been in Korea with 
the Neutral-, Nations Supervisory Commission,, and was, with UNEF 
*In 1982 Brigadier-General T. A. Johnsen, -who had been 
with Norway's delegation to the UN for three and a half 
years, --succeeded General Waldenstroe". General, Johnsen 
was succeeded by Brigadier-General Alf Hammer, another 
Norwegian-, in August 1986218. 
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in 1962., -- He also spent four years at the United Nations in 
New York as Military Adviser to the Swedish Delegation 211. 
UNMOGIP under General Waldenstrom. 
When General Waldenstrom became CMO the possibility of 
changes in the Mission was discussed, and various alternatives 
considered, but it was decided that it was best left as it was. 
In particular the suggestion was raised not to have field 
stations on the Indian side, --but to keep'the Observers in 
Srinagar and send-them out as the occasion arose. -- However, it 
was decided that India would-never'in such'an event allow them 
out, and Pakistan would be furious if any Indian field station 
was closed"o. I 
-despite the'withdrawal of New Zealand'in 1976, -ý- In 1978, 
there was-still-an establishment of(44 Observers. In 1978-9 
Canada withdrew, having'already been saying-at"the UN that if a 
problem had not-been solved after, mahy years of a-peacekeeping 
mission's presence, that missionýshould, be,, withdrawn. - This 
initially brought the number down to one of the lowest ever at 
32. In March 1982 there were 37 Observers, l, including a- ý 
medical officer, ý a post which had only been initiated in-1980, 
and two more officers were shortly expected-to-arrive. - ý-A 
minimum requirement, of, 39 was considered necessary when the 
summer field stationsý'opened 221 
After-a marked decrease from'the mid-1970s, -in the number 
of alleged-ceasefireecomplaints - made, of, -course" "only by 
Pakistan --the number started to, increase . again-at, the end of 
1 .111. A 
*In December 1985 Australia withdrew her Military 
Observers. Uruguay and Italy then provided additional 
Observers-to,, maintain the number atý37. Other countries 
still participating were Belgium, Chile, Denmark, Finland, 
Norway and Sweden 222 
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the decade; 
Number of ACFV'S made by Pakistan 1972-1982223* 
, 1972 1344 
1973 510 
, 1974 335 
1975 67 
1976 12 
1977 14 
1978 51 
1979 93 
1980- 60 
1981 152 
1982 90 
Out, of 152 complaints made by-Pakistan, in, 1981,131 
alleged firing, 13 alleged-strengthening of defences and 8 
alleged overflights. Ofthese 152 complaints, 107 were in 
Kotli sector, including 94"firing complaints and-12 of 
strengthening-of defences. - There wereýinsufficient, Observers 
to investigate this number of complaints, - especially with-such 
a, disproportionate amount--in one area. -Theyýattempted to 
investigate as many as possible, but gave first, priority to the 
serious ones; that is-if an Observer's'life, had been- ý 
endangered, a, civilian-ýor-soldier killed,. orý, injured,. or weapons 
heavier than a machine gun, -used223 
ý, Reporting-of-overflights had to be taken ontrust as the 
Mission had no'radar. -. - Observers-felt that some overflights 
were accidental butýothers were obviously on reconnaissance. 
Crossing the Line, -aýform of violation which did not, happen in 
1981, - normally occurred, when a patrol got lost, and was not , 
then considered to be serious., -It could easily occur as both 
sides patrolled aggressively-right up to the Line 224. 
The"Indians, in accordance with their insistence that the 
Simla Agreement superseded the Karachi'Agreement, claimed it 
*The number of complaints made by Pakistan for the years 
1983-1986 were 86,124,149 and 249 respectively. , And there were 91 complaints between 1st January and 29th 
July, -1987224 . 
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was now permissible to-construct and improve on defences right 
up to the Line of Control., The Simla Agreement in fact 
neitherýcondoned nor, 'forbade it. The Pakistanis claimed to 
stand by the Karachi Agreement, which-did forbid it and which, 
they maintained, was still'in force. Therefore any 
construction was a violation. After extensive informal 
negotiation at UNHQ in-1979, -it was decided that UNMOGIP should 
record any strengthening of defences,, but not condemn-it as a 
violation. ' Observers tended to feel that this effectively 
gave support toýIndia's-standpoint; and'somewhat weakened, 
UNMOGIP's position of-, impartial ity227'. -I, I 
, In 1981 in Rawalakot-Sector two bunkers on the, Indian side 
and one one on the Pakistan side were vacated by agreement. 
On the night of 6th July the Indians reoccupied their bunkers 
and attracted Pakistan-firing. -An. Indian captain-was killed. 
News, of the, death reached-UNMOGIPlý-onlyý-throughýthe media, but 
the Indians told. General Waldenstrom: when he mentioned itAo, 
them that they had taken a very seriousýview of, the matter. 
The-Pakistan DMO admitted to UNMOGIP's Chief-Operations - 
Officer, Colonel CloUghley, that he had given orders, to shoot. 
Colonel Cloughley requested a meeting at the time with'the 
Indian'DMO who agreed to see him, but said'he would not-talk 
about the Line of Control. Colonel Cloughley decided ,- 
therefore'that a visit to Delhiýwould be-a waste of time, and 
instead saw the Indian Defence Attache in Pakistan, and, assured 
him that there was no military build up on the Pakistan side of 
220 the Line 
Strictly speaking no such-initiatives were taken by the 
Mission, but if any area became very tense the CMO might ask to 
see the Army chiefs of both sides to tell them how it looked 
from the other side. They always agreed to see him if he so 
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requested, and he believed that even if they tended not to see 
each other's point of view when it was explained to them, at 
least they recognized the seriousness of a rise in tension when 
it was pointed out. The two Commanders also had hot lines to 
each other, and flag meetings were sometimes arranged22?. 
In addition to sendi ng a monthly summary of complaints to 
New York, General Waldenstrom continued General Tassara's 
practice of notifying the Indians of all Pakistan complaints 
that he accepted. The only time the Indians acknowledged his 
notification was when they were informed of a shooting incident 
which nearly killed an Observer in August 1981. The Indians 
denied any shooting, but said they had reiterated orders not to 
shoot. The Observers, whose flag was pierced through the 
middle, continued to believe the shot was meant to kiJJ230*. 
Most firing incidents, however, were caused by armed 
civilian farmers going too close to, or even crossing the Line 
of Control in pursuit of their animals. Farming close to the 
Line, was still forbiddden on the Indian side, and India still 
stated that the Pakistanis should also keep the farmers away so 
they would not get shot. Equally the Pakistan military 
officials continued to maintain that they had no authority to 
prevent farmers approaching the Line. Ultimately the argument 
was a political one: part of India's strategy to have the Line 
made an international border, and Pakistan's to prevent this 
from happening231. To this extent the situation remained much 
as it had been since the early 1950s. 
*As reported to, the writer by a Military'Observer in March 
1982. In January 1983 Professor Alan James was told by 
another Observer, who was not with UNMOGIP at'the'time, of the incident - assuming that it was indeed the same 
incident - that it was not established from which side the 
shot came. 
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Indian Policy, 
In mo re general terms, Indian policy appears to be to keep 
a low profile on the subject of UNMOGIP so that people will 
simply forget about the Mission's existence. Most people in 
India indeed have never heard of UNMOGIP, and it seems that 
many of those who have do not realise it is still in 
position 232, although it was somewhat inexplicably brought to 
the public attention on 13th September, 1981. On that day the 
newspaper National Herald, the voice of the governing Congress 
Party, led with a story accusing UN Observers of spying and 
having contact with disgruntled political elements. The major 
rationale for these spying activities appeared to be that 
Observers were crossing the Line of Control between Srinagar 
and Rawalpindi too often233. The story does not seem to have 
been taken up, apart from an almost carbon copy appearing the 
following February in B_7 i tZ234 ,a sensationalist newspaper at 
any time, and also the voice of the Communist Party, which had 
always tended to be opposed to the presence of UNMOGIP. 
- The Hational Herald article also stated: "Notwithstanding 
the commitment of India'and Pakistan to resolve the outstanding 
issues between the two countries through bilateral 
negotiations, New Delhi has found it difficult to devise ways 
I- 
and means for the permanent closure of the offices of the UN 
Military Observers in Kashmir. Since the conversion of the 
old ceasefire line-into a, line of actuaLcontrol in 1972, the 
Government of India has'not been in favourýof continuing the 
presence of UN observers on the soil of Kashmir. At the same 
time New-Delhi is apparently hesitant to precipitate matters in 
the light of Islamabad's approval of the continuance of the-UN 
military observers in Pakistan, and Dr. Kurt Waldheim's 
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none-too-old observation that a fresh discussion was-needed if 
India wanted'the offices of the UN observers in Kashmir to be 
wound Up"235* 
India-seems to take the-view that-if a fuss is made about 
asking UNMOGIP to leave, the whole Kashmir issue would be 
brought too much into-the public, eye, without'the main-aim 
necessarily being achieved. ' Furthermore a spokesman-from the 
Ministry of External Affairs said in March 1982, that in spite 
of-its, shortcomings the, United, Nations was still a beacon''of 
light in the world, and many of, its-agencies were-doing good 
work**-. It may, be, therefore,, -that-India is reluctant to 
cause - or at-least, to be seen to be--causing - trouble to an 
organisation which essentially it supports; in order to score 
little more than a politicalý, pointý-kagainstýPakistan4 However, 
K. Subrahmanyam, Director of the Indian Institute of Defence 
Analyses suggested that the-opportunity, of requesting UNMOGIP 
to leave was a card-that India found useful-to keep in its hand 
for possible future use'31***. 
Pakistan Policy 
Pakistan takes comfort from'the fact which India, even if 
reluctantly, seems to accept, that India cannot unilaterally 
ask-the Mission to leave. The Pakistan Foreign Minister, Mr. 
Agha Shahi, ' referring to a statement-by the Indian Foreign 
*Presumably referring to the statement on page 526. 
**He also said that UNMOGIP was harmless and the Observers 
were having a nice time, so India saw no reason to spoil 
their holiday231. 
***The writer put the suggestion to several Indians that 
perhaps India was secretly content to have UNMOGIP in 
position so that the Mission could report on any further 
transgressions by Pakistan in the area, but none-would 
admit to this. 
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Minister that UN Resolutions on Kashmir had become-obsolete, 
said in March 1978 that just because they had not been enforced 
did not mean they were obsolete, and Pakistan's stand on the 
two UNCIP resolutions remained unchanged238. , 
Although there has been no discussion of Kashmir in the 
Security Council or General Assembly since 1972, Pakistan 
delegates have sometimes'Mentioned it in-passing at the UN, to 
the annoyance of the Indian Government. - In October 1978 India 
took particular exception to Kashmir being included in a-UN 
list of regions where people have not exercised-the right of 
self-determination, claiming that Kashmir was-an integral part 
of India. Pakistan rejected the-claim231. In October ý1979 
there was a similar exchange on Kashmir before the General 
Assembly committee on self-determination, when Pakistan said 
there should be a plebiscitez". India said the Kashmiris had 
expressed their will in five general electionS241. 
India takes the line that under the Simla Agreement 
Pakistan has agreed not to raise the issue at any international 
forum. Official Pakistan spokesmen do not accept this claim. 
On a visit to India in July 1980 the Pakistan Foreign Minister 
Mr. Agha Shahi tried to assuage India's feelings by drawing a 
distinction between mentioning the Kashmir issue at 
international forums, and attempting to internationalise the 
issue. He said that irrespective of the repeated references 
to Kashmir at international forums Pakistan shared India's view 
that the Dispute should be resolved bilaterally through' 
peaceful negotiations in terms of the Simla Agreement242. 
Indo-Pakistan Relations 
In early 1982 the vast majority of both Indian and 
Pakistan forces were said to be in Kashmir, and along their 
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mutual border, despite Pakistan's fears about the situation on 
243 its boundary with Afghanistan, and India's of China . In 
November 1982 the state of Indo-Pakistan'relations took a major 
step in the right direction when the two leaders met for the 
first time since the Simla Agreement, ten years previouslyi 
although Mrs. Gandhi was a somewhat reluctant participant in 
I the meeting, which she had been finding on6 excuseýafter 
anoth6r to put off. Academics' and Journalists had been 
pressurising for a rapprochement with Pakistan for'some time, 
and wereýconvinced that their continued pressure would force 
her back into negotiation 
244 
.'' Neverthel , 6ss, 'all fhe' 
indications were that any such rapprochement would be a very 
slow process. 
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CHAPTER SIXTEEN - UNMOGIP AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE 
The'concept of peacekeeping developed from the realisation 
that-the UN's members had insufficient political will or mutual 
trust to-take the enforcement measures provided for in Chapter 
Seven, ofý'the'Organisation's Charter. Thus the UN found itself 
in a position where it might be able to apply sufficient 
diplomatic pressure to end hostilities, but was unable or 
unwilling to impose a solution to the underlying problem. 
Peacekeeping was a compromise, its primary aim being to prevent 
or contain violence in order to stabilize the environment of a 
dispiite's-o that a peaceful settlement could be sought by 
diplomatic methods. It was also an attempt to provide a 
remedy for the anxiety that small local wars could escalate to 
the point of Great Power conflict unless they were insulated 
from external interference. 
Chapter Six of the UN Charter makes provision for the 
pacific settlement of disputes by obligating parties to a 
dispute likely to endanger the maintenance of international 
peace and security to seek a solution by such methods as 
negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or 
judicial settlement, and when peacekeeping emerged it was 
envisaged that it would remain an auxiliary to, but distinct 
from, any of these methods. Peacekeeping provides a 
continuing, non-forceful military presence, usually in the form 
of border monitoring and/or ceasefire supervision, to assist 
the parties to a dispute in their avowed intent to avoid 
hostilities whilst they seek a satisfactory solution. To be 
both acceptable and feasible peacekeeping relies on the 
impartiality of the participants in its missions, the consent 
and cooperation of both contributing and host nations, and the 
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tacit consent, at least, of the five Permanent Members of the 
Security, Council. 
In the-light of experience, an argument put forward 
against the concept has been that the security provided by 
peacekeeping allows the parties to avoid coming to any long 
term settlement ofýtheir disputes, which thus become frozen'. 
This-accusation has'been made in connection with the Kashmir 
Dispute, between India and Pakistan* and therefore needs to be 
addressed when an assessment of UNMOGIF's impact, on theýDispute 
is-made. '. I 
UN MEDIATION IN KASHMIR - 
Many possible diplomatic methods of settling the Kashmir 
Dispute were considered, and several were attempted. The 
parties themselves had bilateral negotiations before bringing 
the matter before the United Nations in 1948, and made several 
similar attempts in the ensuing years. The United Nations 
Commission for India and Pakistan was the first UN mission to 
be despatched to the_Subcontinent, in July 1948, with the dual 
purpose of investigation and conciliation. The Commission 
succeeded in launching a parallel peacekeeping mission 
(UNMOGIP) to supervise the ceasefire, which it also had some 
influence in bringing about, but it failed in its attempts to 
have the parties reach a settlement. It suggested that a 
single mediator might have more success. During the 1950s a 
number of UN mediators General MacNaughton, Sir Owen Dixon, 
Dr. Graham (who made several attempts) and Ambassador Jarring 
each in turn failed in their efforts to find a solution. 
*Indeed the Canadian, Observers, were, withdrawn from UNMOGIP in 1978 for this reason2. 
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Both the Commission and Ambassador Jarring suggested the 
submission-of aspects of the Dispute to arbitration, but India 
would not agree, and neither party chose to refer the matter to 
the, International Court of Justice for a binding judicial 
settlement, although some observers of the situation believed 
such a reference would have assisted the search for a 
solution3. Josef Korbel, a member of the UN Commission, 
complained that the Security Council Resolution of 21st April, 
1948 was' a recommendation which bound India'and, Pakistan 
morally but-not'juridically: it did not take sides either by 
condemning Pakistan as aggressor, or-questioning the legality of 
Kashmir's'accession, when-a, ruling on'this, matter by the 
International Court of Justice might, have made'the Dispute 
easier to, handle'. He believed-thatý'the Security Council was 
so-, busy-considering, the immediate'political aspects of, the 
Dispute, from the point of view of its--own-individual member 
states that it failed, to recognise, the-full, gravity of the 
situation4. 
11 -The Kashmir Dispute has effectively been frozen, since the 
early, 1950s. The UN Security, Council, which has primary 
responsibility under the Charter for the-maintenance of 
international peace'l virtually gave, -, up its efforts towards a. 
settlement'after the'Jarring Mission iný1957. '--It did not' 
debate Dr. Graham's last report, submittedýin-, 1958,. - Not even 
theýwars of 1965 or 1971 persuaded it to recommence its 
attempts at mediation or conciliation. India's hostility to 
further involvement by'the Organization, and the attendant;, 
Soviet veto which successfully supported her stance, made any 
such move seem futile. However, if the UN, cannot be said to 
have succeeded in assisting the parties to resolve their 
Dispute, it can lay, claim to at, least a, limited success in, 
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stopping hostilities on two of the three occasions when they 
broke out and, through the presence of its Military Observer 
Groupi in-restraining further outbreaks for considerable 
periods of time. 
UN PEACEKEEPING, IN'KASHMIR 
-I 
Impartiality 
, -UNMOGIP was able-to help the parties-maintain their 
desired ceasefire, mainlyýthrough inhibiting the, -escalation of 
minor incidents. It did this by acting as an-impartial 
referee and-a, channel of, communication-between the disputants. 
The Mission ensured confidence in its, impartiality by the 
even-handed-wayýin which its Observers approached their 
investigations and the-, CMO-awarded his findings, -and by 
observing the strictest confidentiality in-relation, to,, any 
classifie4 information they'received-, -as-part of-their work.. 
This confidentiality was particularly important since, the 
information, made known to the Observers under the-terms-of the 
Karachi Agreement, including such, matters as-the-Order of, 
Battle of both Armies, was of a highly-sensitive nature. -., 
Although theýChief Military Observer, wrote regular reports to 
the Secretary-General,,, these reports-were, neitherýpublished nor 
even made availableto Members of-the, Security Council, who 
were legally responsible for the Mission's activities. Only 
in extreme circumstances, was a general summary made to the 
Gouncilýon the basis of these reports. , UNMOGIF-was therefore 
able to maIntain z, low pvofile, and, the atmosphere of 
mutual trust was greatly assisted-by the lack, of publicity 
which, with only rare exceptions; -the Mission thus enjoyed. - 
, However, whilst UNMOGIP's success'can be attributed to its 
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impartiality, one of the, parties - India - was sometimes 
disposed to find partiality in its actions. This was probably 
a, -consequence of India's belief that the Security Council, in 
its desire to-be neutral between the two parties, took 
impartiality to the point of refusing to recognise an 
aggressor. ý , Thus India was disenchanted with the UN from an 
early, date, ý-which may have laid the foundations for the 
eventual stalemate over the Dispute., As a result of the 
injustice she perceived in the UN's approach, she, -was never 
wholeheartedly7supportive of any of the, missions sent to assist 
in-the search for a settlement.,, In-this way the impartiality 
of the Security Council was-not without cost. - 
It should also, be noted that there, are%limits to the, 
conceptýof, impartiality. -- However, elevated its best , 
intentions,, it may be an over-statement to'say'that a' 
peacekeeping mission can be seen by the parties as totally 
impartial. , The mission may well-pursue its responsibilities 
in-an"even-handed manner, -but its overall effect may prove less 
than even-handed. There is an inherent bias towards the- 
status quo in UN peacekeeping, especially insofar a*S"internal 
politics are concerned since5 ,- in'a world of nation'states, the 
United Nations reflects the view that-the-integrity of the 
nation state-is paramount. If two of these states"areýin 
conflict each can put its case forward. , Where internal 
conflict is,, concerned, there is no"foruM for the rebels' voices 
to be heard. Furthermore the UN is-the sum of its Member 
Governments, who vote according to their own interests. it 
would therefore be unlikely to support any, movement for 
secession-within'a member state, as thisýwould'set an -- 
uncomfortable precedent for the future of many of its members. 
By intervening to keep the peace, the UN may not be serving the 
540 
rebels" interests, and may therefore be accused of favouring 
the status quo rather than impartially allowing for the 
possibility, of desirable change. 
The Kashmir Dispute is not a clear-cut example of these 
issues, but it has been touched by them. In 1948 when the UN 
worked towards a cessation of, hostilities and a plebiscite, it 
was indeed attempting to assist the people within, the state to 
make their-ownýchoice., In-1965, -after-the envisaged . 
plebiscite, had-long-failed to take place, the-people of Azad 
Kashmir took matters into their, -ownrhands, 'fully-aided in the 
final'instance by Pakistan. UNMOGIP was-in no position to 
stop Azad-Kashmiri'infiltrationý'. into'Indian-held Kashmir,, but 
by identifying the Azad Kashmiri, infiltrators in, its, reports to 
the Secretary-General, UNMOGIP, potentially, impeded the ,t- 
revolution they were seeking. It was on the basis of these 
reports that-theý, SecurityCouncil was-finally,,, called-into 
session, and pressure putýon the, ýparties for a ceasefire. 
Aen-the UN then-attempted to stop,, the, hostilities without 
going into-the, background of the-Dispute, -orýinsisting that 
India fulfil its obligation to hold a plebiscite, Pakistan felt 
that the Organisation was favouring the status quo*, which 
UNMOGIP had already helped to maintain for the previous 16 
years; ý Indeed, the Security Council, specifically-demanded 
that the, parties should withdraw to the positions, held before 
the infiltration began, on 5th August, 19651,. 
,-- On-the other hand, -'the bias towards the status quo worked 
to-Pakistan's advantage - in intention, although it did not 
affect-, the-outcome, of the war --when the"people of Bangladesh 
declared their independence from Pakistan in 1971, and war 
*See pages 428'and 450. 
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between India and Pakistan ensued: the UN was not even 
prepared to give the Bangladeshis a hearing as it regarded the 
integrity of Pakistan as the more important consideration7. 
Consent 
India and Pakistan initially agreed somewhat reluctantly 
to receive UNCIP on the Subcontinent. Subsequently they 
formally consented to the presence of UNMOGIP when they 
accepted the Commission's resolutions of August 1948 and 
January 1949, 'which included mention of the stationing of 
Observers along the Ceasefire Line. This consent was 
reinforced when India and Pakistan signed the Karachi Agreement 
in July 1949, which stated that the United Nations Commission 
for India and Pakistan would station Observers where it deemed 
necessary*. 
-- After the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 India claimedýthat the 
Simla Accord, signed the following July, superseded the Karachi 
Agreement. However, after a few feeble'attempts to have the 
Mission withdrawn, she appears to have offered her tacit 
consent to UNMOGIP's remaining in position**. 
Cooperation 
-., For the most part UNMOGIP received good cooperation from 
both parties until 1972 when India withdrew operational 
cooperation. Even then organisational support continued to be 
given as before. The Mission's'contact was almost exclusively 
withýthe military authorities, who were nearly always 
cooperative, both when it came to investigating incidents and 
*See Appendix I, Part 1, D; and Appendix IV, Paragraph I. 
**See pages 515-7,526 and 561. 
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in-'accepting suggestions as to how these might best be avoided 
in--the, future. Each Army also regularly furnished the Mission 
with its, Order of Battle, and allowed Observers to check on it. 
The backlash of political events or ill-feeling was, however, 
oc casionally directed through the military, or otherwise felt, 
especially-on-the Indian side. The most notable instance of 
this was in 1954 when India demanded the withdrawal of all US 
Observers, from the Mission*. 
- Insofar-as--the important-concept of freedom of movement 
was, concerned, -Observers were precluded by India from visiting 
the Ladakh area of Kashmir, immediately,, Preceding"the war with 
China in 1962, -and the CMO, was--obliged to accept that after 
this war the forces deployedalong, the front with China were 
not toýbe included in the Order of Battle checked by the 
Mission**, although technically not to include them was a 
breach of the, Karachi Agreement. Observers also experienced 
problems with both parties in the period leading up to, during, 
and immediately after the war-An, 1965, and-again during and 
after the war of 1971***. Such restrictions in times of war 
were understandable, and were asmuch related to a desire to 
guarantee the Observers'ý,, safety, -or because the roads were 
closed for security reasons, as to inhibit Observers from 
carrying out their tasks. Prior to the war in 1965 there was, 
however,, sometimes reason to believe it was because Pakistan, 
in particular, had something-to hide., However, until India 
withdrew cooperation in 1972, UNMOGIP personnel probably 
experienced fewer problems with freedom of movement than most 
*See pages 277-285. 
**See pages 180-181. 
***See pages 352-353,403-405,434-437,491,503-505, 
509-510,519-521 and 525. 
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peacekeeping operations*. After 1972 there, were considerable 
restrictions on the Indian sidep, although Observers were still 
able to travel to and from their field stations. 
Stabilization 
The Indo-Pakistan Dispute-over Kashmir is typical of the 
kind of conflict that has lent itself to United'Nations 
peacekeeping activity in that the operation emerged outýof the 
turbulent events which followed the withdrawal'of the colonial 
power. - It was also a situation which called for stabilization 
in--that-it contained the necessary elements for, Great Power 
intrigue and possibly confrontation: China bordered on 
Kashmir; the Soviet-Union was, onlyý50 miles awayt Britain had 
residual interests in the area (beingespeciallyl'involvedýat 
the start of the Dispute'as the Armies of both sides'wereýthen 
led-by British officers); and,, finally, the increasing global 
role'of the United States, - coupled with its fiercely I 
anti-Communist stance, 'was soon also to give'that-Power-an 
interest in the area. - 
When-the Dispute was first placed on the agendaý-of the'ý 
Security Council in early-1948, the Great-Powers were anxious 
not to, take sides-for fear of losing influence withýone, party 
or-the other, but the prospect of a-Great Power armed, 
confrontation was not then the consideration it-was soon to 
become. With-the passage of time and the shifting 
*Re5triction of freedom of movement has been imposed by 
, both sides in UNTSO and UNFICYP; the various observer 
missions established in the Balkans and Korea were almost 
entirely, restricted to Greece and South Korea, - 
respectively; UNOGIL was never permitted to enter the 
Moslem-dominated areas of Lebanon along the Syrian border, 
which was the region most likely to be affected by 
gun-running activities; and ONUC experienced difficulties 
of this kind in relation to Katanga. 
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relationships between the Great Powers and India and Pakistan, 
this consideration, augmented UNMOGIP's original peacekeeping 
role because ofthe fear that a war between the parties would 
involve the United States and/or China on the Pakistan, side, 
an&the-Soviet Union on. the Indian side. 1nýthe event, when 
UNMOGIP was unable to prevent hostilities in 1965, -the fear 
proved unjustified in'that. the'Great Powers, worked together to 
help terminate the-war. t In 1971-the Powers were no longer 
able to cooperate, either to maintain or to restore the peace, 
but India-choseýto bring'the-war to'an-early close. This may 
haveýbeen'partly due to-her worry about the possibility of 
external involvement. 
Violence had already broken-outýwhen the Kashmir, Dispute 
wa s first brought before the, UN, -and, to the-extentthat the-, UN 
played'a part in"bringing about Ceasefires-, in 1949'-and-1965,,. 
UNMOGIP'was not involved, ý -- However,, in the intervening years 
the Mission was able to, assist the-Indian,, and'Pakistan Armies 
to-maintain the peace that they and their Governments-desired 
along the-Ceasefire Line. ý- 
At the beginning of'this, period the very, presence of-the 
Mission, was an avowal of-the--two sides'., -desire'to maintain,, calm 
and a moral deterrent against the, temptation to do,, otherwise,., 
which was a-major factor in reducing-tension. At the same - 
time the willing cooperation of, the-two Armiesyencouraged-a-- 
lessening, of-tension on, the-ground as wellýas signifying its, 
reduction in the-political-arena. This-initial goodwill 
evaporated, to some extent when-it became, clear,, that aýpolitical 
solution was; not immediately-forthcoming. - Nevertheless, the 
Ceasefire Line was never as volatile-as. -political relations 
between the parties, perhaps because of the presence of the 
Mission, and also because military personnel tend to be less 
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volatile than-politicians. The military bureaucracy and the 
logistics of making sudden changes could not-. keep pace with the 
hot and cold air blowing in the corridors, of-powerý- A prime 
example of this occurred when India's anger at Pakistan's arms 
pact-with the United States in 1954 was turned against the 
Mission, depriving it of-American Observers (hitherto the 
largest nation group within-UNMOGIP). - Nevertheless, 1954 was 
one of the, quietest years-experienced along-the Ceasefire Line 
itself*. ý ý1. 
- The Mission's function of checking on the Order of Battle 
of both parties served as a reassurance to each side that the 
other was not preparing for war, and".,. at'a: more mundane level 
Observers were'often able to assureýone party that the other 
side was merely undertaking repairs rather than strengthening 
its-defences., , Atýtimes of increased tension at the-political 
level, when each side was poised to mobilise in the belief 
that the other was already mobilising, the CMO could, on 
occasion, assure both sides that this was-not so, thus at least 
reducing tension within the,, Mission-, area. -' 
The knowledge, that Observers would investigate and report 
on-any-incident, and apportion blame where it lay,, served as an 
important and-mostly successful deterrentý, to violations'of'the-, 
Ceasefire by the military; , On numerous occasions the CMO, and 
his Observerswere able to smooth over'difficulties resulting 
from incidents-which were accidental, or-provocative at a low 
level. The award of a'Violationýat appropriate times against 
either offending party by the: -CMO acted as. -a, safety valve and 
tended to give the other side-enough, satisfaction for it not to 
pursue feelings of vengeance. Furthermore the Mission was 
*See pages 277-8. 
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able-to make suggestions to the Armies about how certain 
incidents might be avoided. These were invariably 
well-received, ý. and often acted upon. However, the main cause 
of`incidents, aroseýfrom the activity-of civilians on the 
Pakistan side of, --the Line, and the Pakistan Army professed to 
have no authority, in, this area, -and therefore no ability to 
help'in'controlling such matters., But,, even, so, -the CMO and 
his'Observersýwere able on numerous occasions to restrain or 
prevent a rise in tension caused by innocent civilians in-the 
normal course, of their daily lives. -- -2 
Throughout'the 1950s, with UNMOGIP, and the Armies of both 
sides'settling into the situation,,, the Line, remained, relatively 
calm, and UNMOGIP was usually--able to, defuse any tension 
arising from incidents. crises-did 
occur, -either because of external political, circumstances, or 
a's the result of the escalation-, of-an incident-. ' Generally at 
such times Observers acted as, a channel-of, communication to , 
make possible an understanding between the military authorities 
of the two sides. Sometimes they arranged and, presided-over 
flag-meetings. They acted as referees over, -disputed terms of 
the Karachi Agreement,, particularly where the-, location. of the 
Ceasefire Line was, concerned. They helped, to ease-much of the 
tension caused by civilian problems-along theýLine, byloffering 
their Good Offices in such matters as the return of-kidnapped 
or imprisoned personnel and-of stray animals. ' Some on-going 
incidents necessitated the very best, endeavours-of-the CMO and 
Observers over a period of time before they, were, contained, and 
included negotiation on both sides with the local commanders 
or, indeed, more senior commanders, in, order to-arrange local 
ceasefires. On occasion, way above the call of duty and in 
direct contravention of, their instructions, Observers put -- 
547 
themselves-at great personal risk, in their efforts at crisis 
defusion. 
, When the general situation began, to, deteriorate in the 
1960s, events-seemed to acquire a, momentum of their own, almost 
regardless of the state of political relations between the 
parties,, -, This-again was perhaps partly-because the machinery 
of the Armies could not change direction-as quickly as the 
minds of politicians. In addition, younger recruits entering 
the respective Armies since the days when they had--been one did 
not have the same feelingýof comradeship towards, the other side 
as had originally been present. - The essential reason for the 
breakdown, however, can be laid rather-at the feet of the-Azad 
Kashmiris than of either India or Pakistan. rýThese civilians 
became, increasingly militant as it became more and more 
apparent that the Dispute was not to b&ýspeedily resolved, -and- 
they were generally dismissive, of the moral suasion offered by 
the presence of UNMOGIP. They were concerned about their own- 
personal objectives rather than world opinion, and if the 
police of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, or even the-might, of 
the Indian Army in Kashmir, could not deter, -them, they were 
unlikely to be inhibited in their actions by a small number of 
Observers. Furthermore civilian activity did not officially 
come within the Mission's-brief, and such'a small number of' 
Observers as four or five dozen could not in any event hope to 
keep a detailed watch on the 500-mile length of, the Ceasefire 
Line. Neverthless, UNMOGIP-was able to confirm, that-there was 
a considerable amount of armed civilian or para-military 
activity across the Line prior-to thelwar of 1965, and,, in 
different circumstances, this might, have had some prophylactic 
value8. 
Over the years General Nimmoý'had made constant, reference 
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to the increasing number of incidents caused by civilians - 
mainly from the Pakistan side, and often quite innocently - 
crossing the Ceasefire Line. ý His regular suggestion that the 
two Governments should give some attention to the problem bore 
no-fruit. Ultimately he had declared that where there was 
incontrovertible evidence that armed civilians had effectively 
breached the Ceasefire guidelines, -they would be treated as 
military personnel, but proof was rarely forthcoming and the 
situation continued to deteriorate. Meanwhile General Nimmols 
warnings seemed to receive little attention. in New York. 
It is likely that the Secretary-General mentioned the 
matter informally to the Permanent Representatives of both 
India and Pakistan more often during the years of-increasing 
tension than is apparent from'the record. But certainlythe 
Security Council was, not officially informed, of the seriousness 
of the situation, with a view to its attempting'some action-in' 
accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter, until-a 
matter of days before war broke out in September 1965. This 
was more than three weeks after a massive1nfiltration of the 
State, of Jammu and Kashmir had started, which-, had received 
widespread publicity in-the, worldýs Pressý 
, Until this point, however, UNMOGIP had madeýa valuable 
contribution to the maintenance of stability in-, Kashmir, and, 
probably, beyond. On account of its manifest impartiality and 
with the the consent and cooperation of the parties, it had 
fulfilled its basic prophylactic9 task of 'helping -to maintain 
local-calm and to defuse such incidents as occurred., Without 
its presence Kashmir would have been-more likely-to have been 
the fairly frequent scene of the-sort of violence, which the 
parties would, on their own, have-found-very hard to, -contain., 
In this way UNMOGIP helped', India and-Pakistan to-Amplement 
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their common desire to keep the peace. However, in time the 
local pressures built up to the point at which the major 
contestants were unable or unwilling to keep them in check. 
And UNMOGIP was certainly not in a position to do this on its 
own. The result, in 1965, was a full scale conflict 
underlining the fundamental point that for peacekpeeing to be 
successful it relies on the cooperation of all those who are in 
a physical position to break the peace. 
ATTITUDES OF THE PARTIES 
Attitudes'to, UNMOGIPý 
Neither India nor Pakistan were happy with the Security 
Council Resolution in April 1948 by which the UN Commission was 
mainly constituted, although both agreed to allow the 
Commission onto their soil. India subsequently did not accept 
any of the Security Council Resolutions which requested various 
mediators to attempt to find a solution. Accordingly, 
although she always agreed to offer the UN representatives what 
she regarded as India's customary hospitality, she did not 
commit herself to cooperating with them over the purpose of 
their visits. UNMOGIP was the exception in that, by accepting 
the UNCIP Resolutions and ratifying the subsequent Karachi 
Agreement, India as well as Pakistan agreed to the presence of 
an Observer Group in Kashmir. India's attitude to UNMOGIP was 
nevertheless always more ambivalent than Pakistan's, and this 
was refleýted in her actions. On the one hand she wished to 
I 
give the UN every support, viewing it as a beacon of light in 
its international economic and social policies, and an 
important forum for India's efforts to bridge the gap between 
Ea5t and West. On the other hand she felt badly let down as 
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an individual state who had placed an injury before the 
Organization and had it, if anything, exacerbated rather than 
assuaged. 
The Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, 
effective on the-Indian'side of the Ceasefire Line, was even 
less well-disposed than India towards the UN. Its hostile 
attitude was particularly apparent in, the early years of the 
Observer-Group's operation, before India's administrative 
control over the. State-was consolidated. As., has been seen 
from the history ofAhe Delvoie and Cadwalader incidents, and 
the attitudes shown towards the Mission at-the-time, of General 
de Ridder's-arrival as Acting CMO'in 1953*, the Jammu-and 
Kashmir Government'was not above, exploiting comparatively minor 
incidents or external events to-embarrass the-, Mission. Thus 
the Delvoie incident was, blown up out-of all proportion to 
discredit the UN when"UNCIP was about to, submit, its report, and 
the Cadwalader-, incident'was an endeavour, to do the same when 
Dr. Graham, the UN Representative, -was due to arrive - but 
protests quietened'down'when, Graham's first report was found to 
be acceptable., ý-The'difficulties in 1953'probably stemmed from 
a, fear that UNMOGIP might publicise, the, problems-being 
encountered in Srinagar at the time of Sheik Abdullah's arrest, 
and the belief that if the Mission was discredited, little 
account would be taken of its reports. 
For the most part the Indian'Government was'more subtle 
than the Kashmir State, Government1when it, deemed it'politically 
expedient to, undermine UNMOGIP, as General-Nimmo in particular 
discovered after Krishna-, Menon became Defence Minister, in 
1957**. ' , Howevers the, Indian Government'was also prepared-to 
*See pages 246-270. 
**See pages 295-303. 
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overlook incidents that might have caused offence when the 
current state of Indo-Pakistan relations or other outside 
events made this seem the wisest course. And actions which 
hurt UNMOGIP were not always aimed at it. Thus, India's 
request in 1954 for the withdrawal-of US Observers*, though 
profound in its effect, seemed to be incidentally rather than 
deliberately aimed against UNMOGIP, in that the United States 
and Pakistan were the main causes of India's wrath: UNMOGIP 
was just a convenient target. 
Pakistan, laying greater emphasis on regional ties, 
probably cared less about the United Nations as an Organisation 
than India did. But UNMOGIP was of more political value to 
Pakistan than to India, since the Group's, presence underlined 
Pakistan's insistence that the Kashmir Dispute remained 
unresolved. Thus the Pakistan Government was not inclined to 
cause embarrassment to UNMOGIP for political-purposes, though 
it equally made little attempt to do the one thing that mightý 
have facilitated UNMOGIP's operations - that is to restrain the 
civilians who were the main cause. of incidents along the 
Ceasefire Line. This was in part because the freedom of 
civilians to cross the Line emphasised Pakistan's opposition to 
partition of the State, and in part because such incidents were 
a major factor in keeping the Dispute in the public eyd. - 
Whilst it can be demonstrated that the political - 
atmosphere had its effect on the Mission at the diplomatic 
level, a direct parallel is less obvious from a purely 
operational point of view. The Mission almost invariably 
enjoyed the goodwill of the military. Apart from one short 
*See pages 277-285. 
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period on the Indian side*, which indeed seemed to be 
politically inspired, and a few incidents on the Pakistan side 
immediately preceding the 1965 war, which were probably due to 
pragmatic reasons**, UNMOGIP's relations with the Armies were 
generally good***. This was despite the inevitable strains 
caused by the increasing tension and continually rising number 
of incidents in the early 1960s. However, the cooperation and 
goodwill shown by the senior authorities of both Armies in the 
efforts to maintainthe peace could not in the end 
counterbalance the volatility of the political relations 
between the parties, and the Azad Kashmiris' determination to 
attempt a resolution to their own satisfaction. 
UNMOGIP's relations with the local people were limited, 
but there was never any general ill-feeling shown towards the 
Observers. Such rare ill-feeling as was occasionally shown, 
in the form of demonstrations or adverse Press reports, tended 
to be directed against the Observers as representatives of the 
UN, which was blamed for not having achieved a settlement of 
the Dispute****, rather than against the Mission itself for the 
way in which it performed its duties. 
Indo-Pakistan Relations and, the Azad Kashmiris 
It is generally conceded that, in the ways which have been 
indicated, UNMOGIP helped to maintain the peace in Kashmir 
between 1949 and 1965. However, it may correspondingly 
,7 
*See pages 223-227,299, and 336-346 
**See pages 352-353 and 403-405. 
***Social relations, at-least, at the, senior level, did not 
seriously suffer even after India withdrew cooperation in 
1972. 
****See pages 377-381. 
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be argued that if it was the presence of the Mission which 
helped to reduce tension between the Armies to the point of 
reducing the risk of war, and thus the urgency of the quest for 
a political solution, this was also a1actor which caused the 
Azad Kashmiris to take the matter into their own hands, 
ultimately forcing the Pakistan authorities to support them. 
. It seems unlikely, however, that it was the operation's 
effectiveness which greatly contributed to the frozen 
diplomatic situation. -That was rooted, in wider 
considerations. What UNMOGIP--was able, to do between 1949 and 
1965 was to ensure-that, the peace was not broken as the result 
of-minor incidents or accidents. The larger political 
situation was beyond its reach, and its mandate., 
Kashmir was only one of a number of problems, between India 
and Pakistan. The environment in which a solution to the 
Dispute had to be sought was, in the general`realm of- 
Indo-Pakistan relations,, on which the-day-to-day situation in 
Kashmir, and along the Ceasefire Line, normally had very little 
effect. " Without the aid of-UNMOGIP the, Ceasefire would have 
been more volatile and incidents might, have'escalated more 
quickly to the point of serious hostilities, 'thus worsening 
relations for a period. But in fact even s'erious incidents, 
such, as the one-at Nekowal in 1955*, were quickly smoothed over 
when it suited the parties to-attempt an improvement in, 
relations- although subsequently, - when theýattempt'had failed, 
this incident was used. for propaganda purposes. Similarly, 
much more-minorýincidentsýcould be blown up, for propaganda 
purposes when relations were bad, but were unlikely to have 
caused the deterioration in the first place. : The'leaders of 
I 
*See pages 212-216. 
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the two countries were well-acquainted, having previously been 
colleagues in the fight for Independence, and were quite adept 
at walking a joint tightrope in their relations. Equally, 
both the Indian and Pakistan Armies were well-disciplined and 
highly trained, and its members were also former colleagues who 
had little desire to fight each other. But for the presence 
of, the Kashmiris it seems unlikely that matters would have 
escalated unduly. 
',. _ýIndo-Pakistan, relations did not steadily deteriorate from 
the-point at which-the two sides accepted-the UNCIP Resolutions 
in December 1948, and called a Ceasefire, to the point in 1965 
when. -they were-again-at war. Rather their political relations 
ebbed and-flowed during most of this time., -- However, with 
India-essentially satisfied with-the status quo it was 
inevitable that a head of steam was building-up on the Pakistan 
side, ýwhich was'perhaps bound to erupt one day, and was perhaps 
less easy to contain after the military takeover by General 
Ayub Khan in 1958. 
UNMOGIP's importance lay in its ability to detect this 
head, of steam.. -As the situation deteriorated at an ever 
increasing rate after 1961, - GeneralýNimmols reports reflected 
his-own increasing,, anxiety, until he reached the point of 
requestingýan'extension of his-role: from the'purely military to 
enable him also--to take some political initiatives. - But 
although he was promoted to theýrank, of Under-Secretary there 
is-no indication that his request was met., Instead Ralph 
Bunche visited the Mission, and in his report made some useful 
recommendations to the Secretary-General. It does not seem 
that these recommendations were acted upon, apart from 
representations being made to the two, parties' Delegations in 
New York, but it may be that discussions were in progress when 
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war broke out in 1965. It does seem that the 
Secretary-General might have brought more pressure to bear at 
an earlier stage with a view to avoiding the outbreak of war, 
since he was receiving regular reports of the deteriorating 
conditions from General Nimmo., Mr. C. S. Jha, who has been 
both Foreign Secretary and India's Permanent Representative at 
the, UN, has credited General Nimmo with sending a series of 
very searching and'objective reports which were distributed to 
members of the Security Council*. He said that India was 
astonished that even after these the Security Council and the 
Secretary-General did not take, action'O. -Mr. Jha was 
referring in particular to the reports General Nimmo made of 
the situation in August 1965, immediately prior to the outbreak 
of war. Details-from earlier, reports-were rarely, if ever, 
made available-to-the Security-Council, but,, this makes the 
Secretary-General's lack of action evenýless excusable. , 
Intransigence of the Parties 
However, responsibility for-a settlement of,, the. Kashmir 
Disputeýýwas ultimately that-of the parties, and not that of the 
UN, UNMOGIP, or the Kashmiris. But the Dispute quickly 
reached the point where it, seemed to suit-both sides, so long 
as, their relations. remained generally poor, to have it as a 
tangible propaganda'asset to use against their opponent. Thus 
both parties were content to keep the Kashmir Dispute simmering 
away, and-there seems little hope of a solution in 
*It is not known if the Secretary-General's paper 
privately circulated to individual members of the Security 
Council on 31st August, 1965 (see page 423) contained in 
full General Nimmb's series of reports'on the incidents 
which occurred during the course of that month. Certainly 
his published report", of 3rd September, 1965, based on this paper but "suitably modified", did not. 
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the foreseeable future, whatever the UN does or does not do. 
This emphasises the limitations of the UN's role so far as the 
maintenance of peace is concerned. Despite the numerous long 
debates in the Security Council, and the various efforts by the 
United Nations during the early years of the Kashmir Dispute, 
and again during the wars of 1965 and 1971, the role of the 
Organisation was throughout only marginal. India's sense of 
grievance against the UN for tending, as she saw it, to side 
with Pakistan from the beginning did not predispose her to 
cooperate wholeheartedly with the Organisation, either as a 
conciliator or as a peacekeeping agency, and Pakistan soon 
became disillusioned by the UN's inability to ensure the 
implementation of its own resolutions. Thus the inadequacy of 
Security Council attempts to defuse the situation may have 
driven the parties to take up positions from which they found 
it difficult to retreat. What is apparent is that if the 
parties are intransigent, a solution will not be engineered by 
even the most enormous efforts of UN conciliators. In the 
face of this situation and in the light of its own physical and 
political weakness, there was nothing of significance which the 
UN could do. 
It seems clear that on the Indian side there was 
considerable regret from the very beginning at ever having 
involved the UN in the Kashmir Dispute. It was believed, for 
example, in-the UN Secretariat at the time of the Delvoie 
Incident at the end of 1949, and recalled when India requested 
the removal of the US Observers in 1954*, that "eventually, at 
one stage or another, the Government of India would try to find 
an excuse to request the withdrawal of UNMOGIP"32. 
*See pages 246-252 and 277-285. 
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In fact Indian policy quickly moved towards the positions 
of wishing to settle the Kashmir issue bilaterally and on the 
basis of the status quo, and bilateral talks did - equally 
unsuccessfully - from time to time take place. When Pakistan 
accepted American military aid in 1954, India indicated that 
the situation between the parties had so changed that a 
plebiscite was unlikely to take place, and suggested the 
partition of Kashmir*. The offer of partition was withdrawn 
when Pakistan did not accept, but India's position remained 
substantially the same, and was further reinforced by her 
victory over Pakistan in 1971. Indeed it has been suggested" 
that India and Pakistan effectively partitioned Kashmir in 1972 
at Simla. What this Agreement actually said was that "in 
Jammu and Kashmir, the Line of Control resulting from the 
cease-fire of 17 December 1971, shall be respected by both 
sides without prejudice to the recognized position of either 
side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, 
irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations; 
both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat of the 
use of force in violation of this line 
Clearly, this was not an explicit agreement on partition. 
Perhaps this was because India forbore to press too hard for 
one, recognising that, in the hour of defeat and the traumatic 
loss of the East, the Pakistan Government did not feel strong 
enough to cope with the reaction at home if it formally agreed 
to the partition of the State. But manifestly India held the 
upper military hand. She might well have thought of trying to 
take over all of Kashmir. However, this would have been 
militarily difficult; such an attempt might have provoked 
external involvement; and India may even have had little 
*See page 286 and 288. 
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desire to control western Kashmir, given its lack of resources 
and the anti-Indian sentiments of its people. The fact of the 
matter was that India was basically content with what she had 
in Kashmir, " and had shown herself able to maintain her position 
there. In all the circumstances she may have felt that the 
Simla Accord was not just a satisfactory agreement in itself 
but, ' deý'fa'ct'o, was . also a final solution to the Kashmir problem 
iný the shape of partition. 
Be that as it may, after the 1971 war India certainly came 
to the position that the Kashmir Dispute should be removed from 
the international arema. Accordingly, there was no advantage 
for her in the continued ex-istence of UtiýOGIP. Pakistan, on 
the other hand, despite ignoring the presence of UNMOGIP in 
1965, and-thus proving that the Mission was in no position to 
maintain the peace when one of the parties was determined on 
war, insisted that UNMOGIP remain in position regardless of 
w hether it was even partially abl o fulfil its task. For 
its mere presence was testimony to the fact, as Pakistan saw 
it, that Kashmir was still an international issue. Thus, 
UNMOGIP became of political rather than operational value to 
Pakistan, and a political rather than an operational irritant 
to India. This seem Is. to, underline the basic point that for 
peacekeeping to achieve its stabilizing purpose, the 
cooperation of the partie's is essential. Without that 
cooperation a peacekeeping operation inevitably begins to serve 
'II. I1 .1. IIý. other purposes (or even, possibly, none), which raises the 
question of whether it should be continued. 
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THE QUESTION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNMOGIP 
Erosion of the Karachi Agreement 
The war between India and Pakistan in 1971 was not fought 
over Kashmir, but over the issue of the independence of East 
Pakistan - now Bangladesh - from Pakistan. However, Kashmir 
supplied one of the battle fronts, and at, the-end of the war 
the,., troops, -did not return to their former positions in the 
State,; as they had done-after the 1965 war, but held on to 
their gains., -'During the, full-scale hostilities from 3rd-17th 
December, 1971 General Tassara, UNMOGIP's Chief Military 
Observer,, restricted his men to the immediate areas of their 
field stations; - Both personal observations and-contact with 
the local commands, operating, from their tactical locations in 
the-fieldi,,; were, therefore'somewhat limited. , 
I- At-the request of the two, Army-Commands these restrictions 
were-continued after the ceasefire came into effect*. The , 
Observers were therefore in-no-position,, either, -to supervise the 
old Karachi Agreement Ceasefire-Line, or-to report to the 
Secretary-General on the observance, ýof-the ceasefire along the 
new line of control, or indeed to verify, the location of that 
line. The changes'-were not-great**, - but-Pakistan had some 
gains in the West in the Chamb area', and India in'the North- 
around Kargil. ý- Under the Simla'Accord of, July 1972, President 
Bhutto of Pakistan and Mrs. Gandhi of India, formally agreed 
that the two'countries"should solve'-their problems-on a 
bilateralýbasis. ' As a result India maintained that the United 
Nations should have nothing further to do with the Kashmir 
*See pages 503-507. 
**So minor - at most 100 yards in a few places - that it is not possible-to represent them properly, on Map 515. 
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issue. Mrs. Gandhi said immediately that the Observers now 
had "no role to play" and that India would soon be asking for 
their-'withdrawal'6. 
India'took the view that UNMOGIP's functions derived from 
the 1949ýKarachi Agreement which had been superseded by the 
1972'agreement, not least because the old Ceasefire Line, the 
basis-of the Karachi Agreement, had changed and become a new 
Line, of Control. -, ýPakistan argued that the 1949 Agreement was 
stillývalidifthe Line being the-old one only slightly altered 
and, that-, therefore'UNMOGIP should continue, to operate as 
before. ' Nevertheless the Line in, -question. was referred to as 
the'"Line of Control". -in the Simla Agreemdnt,, and has been so 
ever'since; which gives weight, to India's argument that the 
Ceasefire Line'no longer-exists-. --. India's withdrawal of 
cooperation, from UNMOGIP has meant that not only has India not 
complained of any, breaches of the-Ceasefire by, Pakistan-since 
theýwar of 1971', but also that any, complaints by Pakistan have 
not been investigated on-the Indian side of the Line,, and the 
Order, of, -Battle has not-been checked on the Indian side. . 
India did not go-so, far, as to remove established facilities, 
nor,, -ýafter some slight. hesitation - to deny visas to Observers 
in an attempt to force the Group's withdrawal-. But she has 
quite successfully, eroded the Karachi Agreement to-the point 
where it can hardly be said-to, be sustainable. - ý 
- , Much,, as India may desire-the. Withdrawal of UNMOGIP, she 
hasýnot thought it worth making a formal request to this 
effect,, given-the Secretary-General's insistehce, that the 
Mission cannot-be wound up without'reference to the Security 
Council. - She finds herself in arather circular predicament: 
she insists that UNMOGIP has no part to play as she desires 
only bilateral discussions on the-subject of Kashmir; but in 
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order to rid herself of UNMOGIP she would have to submit the 
matter to the Security Council, and thus take it out of the 
bilateral arena. 
- Pakistan still values the Mission's presence, but more for 
political reasons - to keep the Kashmir issue alive - than as 
an active Observer Group., This is a questionable reason for 
maintaining the operation. Furthermore, Pakistan makes little 
overt use, of the Group even in this symbolic manner*, and does 
not seem prepared to make a formal complaint to the Security 
Council about the Mission's virtual inactivity. She may fear 
that if she forces the issue by resorting to the Security 
' India might win the argument, and the Group would be Council, 
withdrawn - which would further weaken Pakistan's stand on 
Kashmir. This, however, does not explain the UN Secretariat's 
silence on the issue. It appears therefore, possibly as a 
resultýof informal discussions, that India offered her tacit 
consent to UNMOGIP's remaining on the Indian as well as the 
Pakistan side of the Line of Control, in return forthe tacit 
consent of both Pakistan and the Secretary-General not to make 
an issue of the fact that India had withdrawn operational 
cooperation from the Mission. 
Thus India claims that UNMOGIP has no function to perform 
in Kashmir, but seems to consider the' operation, a-benign tumour 
which it might be less painful to ignore thanýto remove. 
Pakistan wants UNMOGIP to stay, but purely, as, a symbol of the 
fact that Kashmir is still an area, of Dispute. The 
Secretary-General maintains the Group cannot be withdrawn 
without reference to the Security Council. No one - including 
the individual Members, who cannot fail to be aware of it - 
*Ritual mention of the Kashmir Dispute, but not UNMOGIP, is made on occasion. See page 533. 
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has seen fit to bring before the Security Council the fact that 
while the Military Observers remain in position, they are 
unable to fulfilAheir mandate. Indeed, no report at all has 
been submitted, to the Council since 1972. However, even if 
one totally accepts the executive authority of the 
Secretary-General, one cannot deny the ultimate reponsibility 
of the Security Council. The fact that the Council is not 
officially-'aware of India's Policy of non-cooperation, either 
because it -has-not been given any'report on UNMOGIP's 
operation since that date, or because it has chosen not to 
request one, must therefore put the whole-value of the Mission 
since 1972 into question. No doubt it was considered 
politically expedient to leave the matterýin the capable hands 
of the Secretary-General, and to maximise the flexibility of 
action which he enjoyed in a role that was essentially whatever 
he made of it. But in view of the failure of the UN-to 
achieve a settlement in the past, ' and the unlikelihood of its 
being able to achieve better results in-the foreseeable future, 
one may question whether there is-still, any value in 
maintaining UNMOGIP in position. 
The Continuing Value of the Operation 
It is possible that the United Nations Secretariat 
considers it worth keeping such a small operation in place not 
so much in the hope of preventing a further war as to have UN 
representation on the spot should one occur. Many Indians, 
even whilst promoting better relations with-Pakistan, still 
believe that Pakistan might well launch another attack, whilst 
claiming that India would never do so. Pakistan equally fears 
an attack from India. The fact that UNMOGIP's presence has, 
on two occasions when hostilities have erupted, given the UN 
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greater leverage to intervene than might otherwise have been 
the case may be sufficient reason to keep the mission in 
position. But the second intervention was not very 
successful, and although in theory the UN can intervene in any 
event1n the case of a breach of the peace, India is likely to 
be opposed to further intervention to the extent - especially 
with the aid of the Soviet veto - of making it impractical. 
This was effectively proved in the war of 1971 when India 
refused to allow Observers to-be stationed on her borders with 
East Pakistan. I 
On a more positive note, since it has been demonstrated 
that UNMOGIP has been able to reduce tension and prevent 
incidents occurring, and to minimise the damage (particularly 
in terms of life and possibly-in terms of-politics) when 
incidents have occurred, it is reasonable to assume that it 
still does so - though to a much lesser extent because of 
India's lack of cooperation. CMO General Waldenstrom believed 
in 1982 that the UN considered UNMOGIP to be an important 
mission and was glad to have it in Kashmir. He maintained he 
still had the ear of the Indian Army, which would make an 
effort to lessen tensions if he reported they were rising 
unhealthily17. 
The cost of UNMOGIP to the UN in the ten years from 1954 
to 1963 was under half a million dollars a year, having been 
slightly over that in its early yearsle*. Four million, two 
hundred thousand dollars were allocated for the two-year period 
1978-79, and five million, eight hundred thousand dollars for 
1980-81". The total cost of UNMOGIP for the calendar year 
1981 was estimated to have been approximately six million 
I I 
*For an approximate breakdown of costs see Appendix V. 
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dollars, of which about half was accounted for in the UN 
budget, and the other half by the contributing and host 
countrie S20. The UN's annual budget was then in the region of 
seven hundred billion dollars. UNMOGIP's cost is therefore 
too small for financial considerations to be likely to hold 
much sway*. It might well be thought that it is worth 
maintaining such an inexpensive operation if it were to 
eliminate'even a small amount of tension, and thus save the 
occasional life. And it is also just conceivable that a major 
conflict - leading to the involvement of the Great Powers - 
might be avoided by the presence of the Mission. A strong 
case for the removal of UNMOGIP can indeed be made. But it is 
difficult to escape the nagging feeling that if there is even 
the remotest chance that its being there will contribute in any 
small way to the maintenance of peace, it would be unwise for 
UNMOGIP to be withdrawn. 
*In fact Australia withdrew her Observers from UNMOGIP in 
, 
1985 on grounds of cost (to Australia), but Italy and Uruguay thought it worthwhile to provide additional Observers to replace those withdrawn". 
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APPENDIX I 
ýResolution of the Security Council - 21 April, 1948 
The Security Council, 
Having considered the complaint of the Government of India 
concerning the dispute over the State of Jammu and Kashmir, 
having heard the representative of India in support of that 
complaint, and the reply and countercomplaints of the 
representatives of Pakistan, 
Being, strongly of opinion that the early restoration of peace 
and order in Jammu and Kashmir is essential and that India and 
Pakistan should do their-utmost to bring about a cessation of 
all-fighting, 
Noting with satisfaction that both India and Pakistan desire 
that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to 
India or Pakistan should be decided through the democratic 
method of a free and impartial, plebiscite, 
Considering that the continuation of the dispute is likely to 
endanger international peace and security; 
Reaffirms the Council's Resolution of January 17th, 
Resolves. that the, membership of the Commission established by 
the Resolution-of the Council of January 20th, 1948 shall be 
increased to five and shall include in addition to the 
membership mentioned in that resolution,, representatives of... 
and ... and that, if the membership of the Commission has not been completed within ten days from the adoption of this 
Resolution, the President of the Council may designate such 
other Member or Members of the United Nations as are required 
to complete the membership of five, 
Instructs the Commis5ion, to proceed at once to the Indian, 
subcontinent and there place its good offices and mediation at 
the disposal of the Governments of India and Pakistan with a 
view to facilitating the taking of the necessary measures, ýboth 
with respect to the restoration of peace and order and to the 
holding of a plebiscite by the two Governments, acting in 
co-operation with one another and with the Commission and 
further instructs the Commission to keep the Council informed 
of the action taken under the Resolution'and to this end, 
Recommends to the-Governments of India and Pakistan the. 
following measures as those which in the opinion of the Council 
are appropriate to bring about a cessation of the fighting and 
to create proper conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite 
to decide whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir is to accede 
to India or Pakistan. 
A. Restoration of Peace and Order 
1. The Government of Pakistan should undertake to use its best 
endeavours: 
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(a) To secure the withdrawal from-the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally 
resident therein who'have entered the State for the purpose of fighting and to prevent any intrusion into the State of such 
elements and any furnishing of material to those fighting in 
the State. 
(b) To make known to all concerned that the measures indicated 
in this and the-following paragraphsýprovide full freedom to 
all subjects-of the State, regardless of creed, caste, or 
party, to express their views and to vote on the question of 
the accession of the State, and that therefore they should 
co-operate in the maintenance of peace and order. 
2. The Government of India should: 
0 
(a) Whenýit is established, to the satisfaction of the 
Commission set up in accordance with the Council's Resolution 
of 20 January that the tribesmen are withdrawn and that 
arrangements-for the cessation of the fighting have become 
effective, put into operation in consultation with the 
Commission'a plan for withdrawing their own forces from Jammu 
and Kashmir and reducing them progressively to the minimum 
strength required for the support of the civil power in the 
maintenance of Law and Order, 
(b)' Make known that-the withdrawal is taking place in stages 
and announce the completion of each stage, 
(c) When the Indian forces shall have been reduced to the 
minimum strength mentioned in (a) above, arrange in 
consultation with the Commission for the, stationing of the 
remaining forces, to be carried out in accordance with the 
following principles: 
(i) That the presence of troops should not afford any -- intimidation or appearance, of intimidation to the inhabitants 
of the State, 
(ii) That as small a number as possible should be retained in 
forward areas, 
(iii) That any reserve of troops which may be included in'the 
total strenghth should be located within their present Base 
area. 
3. The Government of India should agree that until such time 
as the plebiscite administration referred to below finds it 
necessary to exercise the power of direction and supervision 
over the State forces and police provided for in Paragraph 8 
they will be held in areas to be agreed upon with the 
Plebiscite Administrator. 
4. After the plan referred to in paragraph 2 (a) above has been put into operation, personnel recruited locally in each district should so far as possible be utilised for the , re-establishment and maintenance of law and order with due 
regard to protection of minorities, subject to such additional 
requirements as may be specififed by the Plebiscite 
Administration referred to in paragraph 7. 
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5. If these-local forces should be-found to be inadequate, the 
Commission, subject-toýthe agreement of both the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan, should arrange for the 
use of such forces of either Dominion as it deems effective for 
the purpose of, pacification. - 
Plebiscite 
6. The Government of India should-undertake to ensure that the 
Government of-the State invite the major political group to 
designate responsible representatives to share equitably and 
fully in the conduct of the administration at the Ministerial 
level, while the plebiscite is being prepared and carried out. 
7. The, Government of India should undertake that there will be 
established in Jammu and Kashmir a Plebiscite Administration to 
holdýa Plebiscite as-soon as possible on the question of the 
accession of the State to India or-Pakistan. 
8. The Government-, of India should undertake that there will be 
delegated by the State to the Plebiscite Administration such 
powers as the latter considers necessary for holding a fair and impartial plebiscite including, for that purpose only, the direction and supervision of the State forces of police. 
9. The Government of India should at the request of the 
Plebiscite Administration make available from the Indian forces 
such assistance as the Plebiscite Administation may require for 
the performanceýof its functions. 
10. (a) The Government of India should agree that a nominee 
of the Secretary-General of the United Nations will be 
appointed to be the Plebiscite Administrator. 
(b) The Plebiscite Administrator, acting as an officer of the 
State of Jammu and Kashmir, should have authority to nominate 
his Assistant and, other subordinates and to draft regulations 
governing the Plebiscite. Such nominees should be formally 
appointed and such draft regulations should be, formally 
promulgated by the State of Jammu and Kashmir. 
(c) The Government of India should undertake that the 
Government of Jammu and Kashmir will appoint fully qualified 
persons nominated by the Plebiscite Administrator to act as 
special magistrates within the State Judicial system to hear 
ca5es'which in the opinion of the Plebiscite Administrator have 
a serious bearing on the preparation for and conduct of a free 
and impartial Plebiscite. 
(d) The terms of service of the Administrator should form the 
subject of-separate negotiation between the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations and the Government of India. The 
Administrator should fix the terms of service for his 
Assistants'and subordinates. Iý 
(e) The Administrator should have the right to communicate direct with the Government of the State and with the Commission 
of the Security Council and, through the'Commission with the Security Council, with the Governments of India and Pakistan 
and with their Representatives with the Commission. It would be his duty to bring to the notice of any or all of the 
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foregoing (as he in his discretion may decide) any 
circumstances arising which may tend, in his opinion, to 
interfere with the freedom of the Plebiscite. 
11. The Government of, India should undertake to prevent and to 
give full support to the Administrator and his staff in 
preventing any threat, coercion or intimidation, bribery or 
other undue influence on the voters in the plebiscite, and the 
Government of India should publicly announce and should cause 
the Government of the State to announce this undertaking as an international obligation binding on all public authorities and 
officials in, Jammu and Kashmir. 
12. -The Government of India-should themselves and through the 
government of the State declare and make known that all 
subjects of the State of-Jammu andýKashmir, regardless of 
creed, caste or party, 'will-be safe and free in expressing 
their views and in voting on the question of the accession of 
the State and that there will be freedom of the Press, speech 
and assembly and freedom of travel in the State, including 
freedom-of lawful entry and'exit. - 
13. The Government of India should use and should ensure that 
the Government of the State also use their best endeavours to 
effect the withdrawal from the State of all Indian nationals 
other than those who are normally resident therein or who on or 
since'15 August 1947 have entered it for a lawful purpose. 
14. The Government of India should ensure that the Government 
of the State release all political prisoners and take all 
possible steps so that: 
(a) all, citizens of the State who have left it on account of disturbances are invited, and are free, to return to their 
homes and to exercise their rights asýsuch citizens; 
(b) 'there is no victimization; 
(c) minorities in all parts of the State are accorded adequate 
protection. 
15. The Commission of the Security Council should at the end 
of the plebiscite certify to the Council whether the plebiscite has or has not been really free'and impartial. 
General Provisions 
16. The Governments of India and Pakistan should each be invited to nominate a Representative to be attached to the 
Commission-for such'assistance as it may require in the 
performance of its task. 
17. The Commission should establish in Jammu and Kashmir such 
observers as it may require of any of the proceedings in 
pursuance of the measures indicated in the, foregoing 
paragraphs. 
18. The Security Council'Commission should carry out the tasks 
assigned to it herein. 
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APPENDIXýII 
Resolution of the UN Commission for India and Pakistan, 
13 August 1948,1 
The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, 
Having given careful consideration to the points of view 
expressed by the Representatives of India and Pakistan 
regarding the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and 
Being of the opinion that the prompt cessation ofý, hostilities 
and the correction of conditions the continuance of which is 
likely to endanger, international peace and security are 
essential to, implementation of its endeavours to assist the 
Governments of India and Pakistan in effecting a final 
settlement of the situation, ý1 1'' 1 
Resolves to submit simultaneously to the Governments of India 
and Pakistan the following proposal: 
Part, I,, 
Ceasefire, Order 
A. The Governments of India and Pakistan agree that their 
respective High Commands-will issue separately and- -- 
simultaneously a ceasefire order to apply to all forces under 
their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir as of the 
earliest practicable date or, dates to be mutually agreed upon 
within four days after these proposals have beenýaccepted by 
both Governments. 
B. The High Commands of the Indian-and Pakistan forces agree 
to refrain from taking any, measures that might augment the 
military potential of the forces under their control in the 
State of Jammu and Kashmir. 
I 
(For the purpose, of these proposals ": force5 under their 
control" shall be considered to include all forces, organised 
and unorganised, fighting, or participating in hostilities on 
their respective-sides, ) 
C. The, Commanders-in-Chief of the forces of-India and Pakistan 
shall promptly confer regarding any necessary local changes in 
present dispositions which may facilitate the ceasefire. 
D. In its discretion and as the Commission may find- 
practicable, the Commission will appoint military observers 
who, under the authority of the Commission and with the 
cooperation of both Commands, will supervise the observance of 
-the ceasefire order. 
E. The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan, 
agree to appeal to their respective peoples to assist in 
creating and maintaining an atmosphere favourable to the 
promotion of further negotiations. 
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Part II 
Truce Agreement 
Simultaneously with the acceptance of the proposal for the 
immediate cessation of hostilities as outlined in Part I, both 
Governments accept the following principles as a basis for the 
formulation of a truce agreement, the details of which shall be 
worked out in discussion between their Representatives and the 
Commission. 
A. 1. As the-presence of troops of Pakistan in, the territory of 
the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in 
the situation since it was represented by the Government of 
Pakistan, before the Security Council, the Government of 
Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State. 
2. The Government of Pakistan will use its bestýendeavour to 
secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of 
tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein 
who have entered the State for the purpo5e of fighting. 
3., - Pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the 
Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities 
under the surveillance of the Commission. 
B. 1. " When the Commission'shall have notified th Government of 
India-that the tribesmen and Pakistani nationals referred, to in 
Part II, Aj2 hereof have''withdrawn, thereby terminating the 
situation which was represented by the Government of India to 
the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of 
Indian forces in the; -State-of Jammu and Kashmir, and furtheri 
that the Pakistan forces are, being withdrawn from the State of 
Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to 
withdraw the bulk of its forces from that State in stages to be 
agreed upon with the Commission. 
2. Pending the acceptance of the conditions for a final 
settlement of the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, 
the Indian Government will maintain within the lines existing 
at the moment of the ceasefire the minimum strength of its 
forces which in agreement with the Commission are considered 
necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law 
and order. 'The Commission will have observers stationed where 
it deems necessary. 
3. The Government of India will undertake to ensure that the 
Government ofýthe State of Jammu and Kashmir will take all 
measures within its power to make it publicly known that peace, 
law and order will be safeguarded and that all human and 
political rights will be guarAnteed. 
C. 1. Upon signature, the full text of the Truce Agreement or a 
communique containing the principles thereof as agreed upon between the two Governments and*the Commission, will be made 
public. 
Part III 
The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan reaffirm their wish that the future status of the State of Jammu and 
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Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the 
people and to that, end, upon acceptance of the Truce Agreement, 
both Governments agree to, enter into consultations with 
Commission to determine fair and equitable conditions whereby 
such free expression will be assured. 
APPENDIX III 
Resolution of the UN-Commission for India and Pakistan, 
5 January 1949 
The United, Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, having 
received from the Governments of India and Pakistan,. in 
communications dated 23 December and 25 December 1948, 
respectively, their acceptance of the following principles 
which are supplementary to the Commission's Resolution of 13 
August 1948: 
1. The question of the. accession of the State ofýJammu and 
Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the 
democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite; 
2., A'plebiscite will be held when it shall-be found by the, 
COMMi55ion-that the ceasefire, and truce arrangements set forth 
in Parts I and II of the Commission's Resolution of 13 August 
1948 have been carried out and arrangements for the plebiscite 
have, been completed; 
3. (a) The Secretary-General of the United Nations will, in 
agreement with the Commission nominate a Plebiscite 
Administrator who shall be a personality of high international 
standing and commanding general confidence. He will be 
formally appointed to the office by the Government of Jammu and 
Kashmir; -I 
(b) The, Plebiscite Administrator shall derive, from theýState 
of Jammu, and Kashmir the powers he considers necessary for 
organising and conducting the plebiscite and for ensuring the 
freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite; 
(c) The Plebiscite Administrator shall have the-authority to 
appoint such staff or Assistants and Observers as he may 
require; 
4. (a) Afterýimplementation of Parts I and II of the 
Commission's Resolution of 13 August 1948, and when the 
Commission is satisfied that peaceful conditions have been 
restored in the State, the Commission and the Plebiscite 
Administrator will determine, in consultation with the Government ofýIndia, the final disposal of Indian and State 
armed forces, such disposal to, be with due regard to the 
security of the State and the freedom of the Plebiscite; 
(b) As regards the'territory referred to in A, 2 of Part II of the Resolution of 13 August, final disposal of the armed forces 
'in that territory will be determined by the'Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator in consultation with the local 
authorities; 
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5. All civil and military authorities within the State and the 
principal political elements of the State will be required to 
cooperate with the Plebiscite Administrator in the preparation 
for the holding of the plebiscite; 
6. (a) All citizens of the State who have left it on account 
of the disturbances will be invited and be free to return and 
to exercise all their, rights asýsuch citizens. For the 
purpose of facilitating repatriation there shall be appointed 
two Commissions, one composed of nominees of India and the 
other of nominees of Pakistan. The Commission shall operate 
under the direction of the Plebiscite Administrator. The 
Governments of India and Pakistan and all authorities within 
the State of Jammu and Kashmir will collaborate with the 
Plebiscite Administrator in putting this provision into effect; 
(b) All persons (other than citizens of, the State) who on or 
since 15 August 1947 have entered it for other than lawful 
purposes, shall be required to leave the State; 
7. All authorities within the State of Jammu and Kashmir will 
undertake to ensure, in collaboration with-the Plebiscite 
Administrator, 'that: 
(a) there is no threat, coercion or intimidation, bribery or 
other undue influence on the voters in the plebiscite; 
(b) No restrictions are placed-on legitimate political 
activity throughout the State. All subjects of the State, 
regardless of Creed, caste or party, shall be safe and free in 
expressing their views and in voting on the question of the 
accession of the'State-to India or-Pakistan,. There shall be 
freedom of press, speech and assembly , freedom of travel in the State, including freedom of lawful entry and exit; 
(c) All political prisoners are released; 
(d) Minorities in all parts of the State are accorded adequate 
protection; and 
There is no victimization. 
B. The Plebiscite Administrator may refer to the United 
Nations Commission for India and Pakistan problems on which he 
may require assistance, and the Commission may in its 
discretion call upon-the Plebiscite Administrator to carry out 
on its behalf any of the responsibilities with which it has 
been, entrusted; 
9. At the conclusion of the plebiscite, the Plebiscite 
Administrator shall report the result thereof to the Commission 
and to the Government, of Jammu and Kashmir. The Commission 
shall then certify to the Security Council whether the 
plebiscite has or has not been free and impartial; 
10. Upon the signature of the Truce Agreement, the details of the foregoing proposals will be elaborated in the consultations 
envisaged in Part III of the Commission's Resolution of 13 August 1948. The Plebiscite Administrator will be fully 
associated in these consultations; 
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Commends the Governments-of India and Pakistan for their prompt 
action ordering a ceasefire-to take effect-from one minute 
before midnight of I January 1949-pursuant to the agreement 
arrived at as provided for by the Commission's Resolution of 13 
August 1948; and 
Resolves to, return in the immediate future to the Sub-continent 
to discharge-the responsibilities imposed upon it by the 
Resolution of 13 August 1948 and by the foregoing principles. 
APPENDIX IV 
Agreement between military representatives of India and 
Pakistan regarding the establishment of a ceasefire line in the 
State of Jammu and Kashmir 
INTRODUCTION 
A. The military-representatives of India, and Pakistan met 
together in Karachi from 18 July to 27 July 1949 under--the 
auspices of the Truce Sub-committee of the United Nations 
Commission for India and Pakistan. 
B. The members of the Indian delegation were: 
Lieutenant-General S. M. -, Srinagesh, Major-General K. S., 
Thimmaya, Brigadier S. H. F. J. Manekshaw. As observers: Mr. H. M. Patel, Mr. V. Sahay. 
C. The members of the-Pakistan, delegation were: Major-General 
W., J., Cawthorn, Major-General Nazir Ahmad, Brigadier M. Sher 
Khan. As observers: Mr., M. Ayub, Mr. A. A. Khan. 
D. The members of the Truce Sub-committee of the United Nations 
Commission, for India and, Pakistan were: Mr. Hernando, Samper 
(Colombia), Chairman;, Mr. L. S. Williams (United States); 
Lieutenant-General Maurice Delvoie, Military Adviser; Mr. 
Miguel A. Marini Legal Adviser.. 
AGREEMENT 
A. Considering: 
1. That the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, 
in its letter dated 2, July 1949, invited the Governments of India and Pakistan to send fully authorized military 
representatives to meet jointly in Karachi under the auspices 
of the Commission's Truce Sub-committee to establish a 
ceasefire line in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, mutually 
agreed upon by the Governments of India and Pakistan; 
2. That the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan in its letter stated that "The meetings will be for military 
purposes; political issues will not be considered, " and that "They will be conducted without prejudice to negotiations 
concerning a truce agreement"; 
That in the same letterýthe United Nations Commission for 
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Indiaýand Pakistan further'stated that: "'The ceasefire1ine is 
a complement of the suspension of hoi-stilities, which falls 
within the provisions of part I of the resolution of 13 August 
1948, and can be considered separately from the questions 
relating to part II of the same resolution"; 
4. That the Governments of India and Pakistan, in their letters 
dated 7 July 1949 to the Chairman of-the Commission, - accepted 
the Commission's invitation to the military conference in 
Karachi, 
B. The delegations-of India and Pakistan, duly authorized, have 
reached the following agreement: , 
1. Under, the provision of-part I of the resolution of 13 August 
1948, and as a complement of the suspension of hostilities in 
the State of Jammu and Kashmir on 1 January 1949, -a ceasefire 
line is established., 
2. The ceasefire line runs from Manawar in the south, no: ýth to 
Keran and from Keran east to the glacier area, as follows: 
(a) The line from Manawar to the south bank of the Jhelum River 
at Urusa (inclusive to India) is the line now defined by the 
factual positions-about which there is agreement between'both 
parties. Where there has hitherto not been agreement, the 
line shall be-as follows: 
(i) In Patrana area; Kohel (inclusive to Pakistan) north along 
the-Khuwala Kas Nullah up to Point 2276 (inclusive to-India), 
thence to Kirni (inclusive to India). 
(ii), Khambha, Pir Satwan, Point 3150 and Point 3606 are 
inclusive to India, thence-the line runs to the factual 
position at Bagla Gala, thence to the factual Position at Point 
3300. 
(iii) In-the area south of Uri the positions of Pir Kanthi and 
Ledi Gali are inclusive to Pakistan. 
(b) From the north bank of the Jhelum River the line runs from 
a point opposite the village of Urusa (NL 972109), thence, north following the Ballaseth Da Nar Nullah (inclusiveto Pakistan), 
up to NL-973140, thence northeast to Chhota Qazing (Point 10657 
inclusive to India), thence to NM 010180, thence to NMM7210, 
thence to Point 11825 (NM 02534, inclusive to Pakistan), thence 
to Tutmari Gali (to be shared by both sides, posts to be 
established 500 yards, on either side of the Gali), thence to 
the northwest through the first "R" of Burji Nar to north of Gadori, thence straight west to just north of Point 9870, 
thence along the black line north of Bijidhar to north of Batarasi, thence to just south of Sudpura, thence due north to the Kathaqazinag Nullah, thence along the Nullah to its 
junction with the Grangar Nullah, thence along the latter Nullah to Kajnwala Pathra (inclusive to India), thence across the Danna ridge (folowing the factual Positions) to Richmar 
Gali (inclusive to India), thence north to Thanda Katha Nullah, 
thence north to the Kishenganga River up to a point situated between Jargi and Tarban, thence (all inclusive to Pakistan) to Bankoran, thence northeastto Khori, thence to the hill feature 8930 (in square 9057), thence northeast straight to Guthur, 
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thence to Bhutpathra, thence to NL 980707, thence following the 
Bugina Nullah to the Junction with the Kishenganga'River at 
Point 4739. Thereafter the line follows the Kishenganga River 
to Keran and onwards to Point 4996 (NL 975818). 
(c) From Point 4996 the, line follows (all inclusive to 
Pakistan), the Jamgar Nullah-eastward to Point 12124, to 
Katware, to Point, 6678, then to, the northeast to Sarian (Point 
11279), to Point 11142, thence to Dhakki, thence to Point 
11415, thence to Point 1301, thence to Point 7507, thence to 
Point 10685, thence to Point 8388, thence southeast to Point 
11812. Thence the line runs (all inclusive to India) to Point 
13220, thence across the River to the east to Point 13449 
(Durmat), thence to Point 14586 (Anzbari), thence to Point 
13554, thence to Milestone 45 on the Burzil Nullah, thence to 
the east to Ziankal (Point 12909), thence to the southeast to 
Point 11114, thence to Point 12216, thence to Point 12867, 
thence to the east to Point 11264, thence to Karo (Point 
14985), thence to Point 14014, ''thence to Point 12089, thence 
following the track to Point 12879. From there the line, runs 
to Point 13647 (Karobal Gali, to be-. shared by both sides). - 
The ceasefire line runs thence through Retagah Chhish (Point 
15316), thence through Point 15889, thence through Point 16458, 
thence to Marpo La (to be--shared by both sides), thence through 
Point 17561, thence-through Point 17352, thence through Point 
18400, thence through Point 16760, thence to (inclusive to 
India), Dalunang. 
(d) From Dalunang eastwards the cea5efire line will follow the 
general line Point 15495, Ishmam, Manusi Gangam, Gunderman, 
Point 13620, Junkar (Point 17628), Marmak, Natsara, Shangruti 
(Point 17531), Chorbat La'(Point 16700), Chalunka (on the Shyok 
River), Khor, thence north to the glaciersý This portion of 
the ceasefire line shall be demarcated in detail on the basis 
of the factual position as of 27 July 1949ýby the local 
commanders, assisted by-United Nations Military Observers. 
C. The ceasefire line described above shall be drawn on a 
one-inch map (where available) and then be verified mutually on 
the ground by local commanders on each side with the assistance 
of the United Nations Military Observers, so as to eliminate 
any no-man's land. In the event that the local commanders are 
unable to reach agreement, the matter shall be referred to the 
Commission's Military Adviser, whose decision shall be final. 
After this verification, the Military Adviser will issue to 
each High Command a map on which will be marked the definitive 
ceasefire line. 
D. No troops shall be stationed or operate in the area of the 
Burzil Nullah from the south of Minimarg to the ceasefire line. 
This area is bounded on the west by the ridge leading 
northeast from Dudgaikal to Point 13071, to Point 9447, to 
Point 13466, to Point 13463, and on the east by the ridge 
running from Point 12470, to Point 11608, to Point 13005, to 
Point 13976, to Point 13450. Pakistan may, however, post 
troops on the western of the above ridges to cover the 
approaches to Kamri Bal Pass. 
E. In any dispositions that may be adopted in consequence of the present agreement troops will remain at least 500 yards from the ceasefire line except where the Kishanganga River 
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constitutes the line. Points which have been shown as 
inclusive to one party may be occupied by that party, but the 
troops of the other party shall, remain at a distance of 500 
yards. 
F. Both sides shall be free to adjust their defensive Positions 
behind the ceasefire line as determined in paragraphs A through 
E, inclusive, subject to no wire or mines being used when new 
bunkers and defences are constructed. There shall be no 
increase of forces or strengthening of defences in areas where 
no major-adjustments are involved by the determination of the 
ceasefire line. 
G. The action permitted by paragraph F above shall not,. -be 
accompanied or accomplished by the introduction of additional 
military-potential by either side into the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir. 
H. Except as modified-by paragraphs A to G inclusive, above, 
the military agreements between the two High Commands relating 
to the ceasefire of 1 January 1949 shall continue to remain 
operative. 
I. The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan will 
station Observers where it deems necessary. 
J. The delegations shall refer this agreement to their- 
respective Governments for ratifiation. The documents of 
ratification shall be deposited with the United Nations 
Commission for India and Pakistan not later than 31 July 1949. 
K. A period of thirty days from the date of the ratification 
shall be allowed to each side to vacate the areas at present 
occupied by them beyond the ceasefire line as now determined. 
Before the expiration of this thirty-day period there shall be 
no forward movement into areas to be taken over by either 5ide 
pursuant to this agreement, except by mutual agreement between 
local commanders. 
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, -APPENDIX V 
UNMOGIP Budget Estimates for 1957 
1955 1956 1957 
Temporary Assistance* 
Travel and Subsistence 
of Military Observers 
Travel and Subsi5tence 
of Staff 
Communications Services 
Rental and Maintenance of 
Premises and Equipment . 
Stationery and Office 
Supplie5 
Local Transportation 
Operation and Maintenance 
of Tran5pOrtation 
Equipment 
Rental of Aircraft and 
Related Expenses 
Freight, Cartage and 
Express 
Insurance 
Miscellaneous Supplies 
and Services 
Transportation Equipment 
Miscellaneous Equipment 
Expenditure Appropriations Estimates 
$ 20,605 $ 21,900 $ 23,200 
$139,415 $140,500 $141,300 
$ 85,960 $ 88,700 $ 89,600 
,$1,703 $ 1,800 $ 1,800 
$ 11,135 $ 12,000 $ 16,650 
$ 1,412 $ 1,800 $ 11800 
$ 2,220 $ 2,400 $ 2,400 
$ 27,937 $ 23,400 $ 22,600 
$ 98,812 $101,300 $101,300 
$ 7,608 $ 10-1800 s 9,000 
7,720 $ 6,800 $ 7,550 
$ 9,466 $ 13,200 s 11,500 
$-$8,200 $ 6,750 
$ 2,485 $ 4,000 $ 8,200 
-------- -------- -------- 
-------- -------- 
$416,478 $436,800 $443,650 
*The category "Temporary Assistance" includes the salary of the Chief Military Observer, Special Post Allowances for the Finance Officer-and Assistant Administration Officer, and salaries of. seven of the thirty locally recruited personnel not included under other categories. 
Source: United Nations Archives, File DAG-1/2.1.4-1 - Mission Policy I 
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